

**WARSAW EAST  
EUROPEAN REVIEW**

**VOLUME III/2013**



Warsaw East European Conference

**WARSAW EAST  
EUROPEAN REVIEW**

**VOLUME III/2013**

---

**INTERNATIONAL BOARD:**

Egidijus Aleksandravičius, Vytautas Magnus University  
Stefano Bianchini, University of Bologna  
Miroslav Hroch, Charles University  
Yaroslav Hrytsak, Ukrainian Catholic University  
Andreas Kappeler, University of Vienna  
Zbigniew Kruszewski, University of Texas, El Paso  
Jan Kubik, Rutgers University  
Panayot Karagyozov, Sofia University  
Alexey Miller, Russian Academy of Sciences  
Richard Pipes, Harvard University  
Mykola Riabchuk, Kyiv-Mohyla Academy  
Alexander Rondeli, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies  
John Micgiel, Columbia University  
Barbara Törnquist-Plewa, Lund University  
Theodore Weeks, Southern Illinois University

**EDITORIAL COMMITTEE:**

Jan Malicki, University of Warsaw  
(Director of the WEEC – Warsaw East European Conference, chair of the Committee)  
Leszek Zasztowt (chair of the WEEC Board), University of Warsaw  
Andrzej Żbikowski (secretary of the WEEC Board, University of Warsaw)

**EDITOR-IN-CHIEF**

Jerzy Kozakiewicz, University of Warsaw

**ASSISTANT EDITOR**

Konrad Zasztowt, University of Warsaw

ISBN: 978-83-61325-32-1

ISSN: 2299-2421

Copyright © by Studium Europy Wschodniej UW 2013

**COVER AND TYPOGRAPHIC DESIGN**

J.M & J.J.M.

**LAYOUT**

Jan Malik, "MALGRAF"

**PRINTING**

Zakład Graficzny UW, nr zam. 780/2013

|                |   |
|----------------|---|
| FOREWORD ..... | 9 |
|----------------|---|

## I. POLAND

|  |    |
|--|----|
| <b>Galia Chimiak</b> , <i>The Evolution of the Vision of Civil Society in Poland</i> .....   | 13 |
| <b>Beata Halicka</b> , <i>The Shifting of Borders in 1945 in Memory of Poles, Germans and Ukrainians</i> .....                           | 29 |
| <b>Richard J. Hunter, Leo V. Ryan</b> , <i>Economic Transformation and Privatization</i> .....   | 37 |
| <b>Magda Stroińska</b> , <i>Civil Society, Government and the Opposition Movements in Poland: The Post-Communist Role Reversal</i> ..... | 53 |
| <b>Alexander Tsimbal</b> , <i>The Policy of Polish Authorities Concerning the Orthodox Church in Poland 1921–1939</i> .....              | 65 |

## II. EUROPE

|   |     |
|---|-----|
| <b>Klara Bruvere</b> , <i>Shifting Representations: The Effect of European Union Film Policies on the Latvian Cinemascope</i> ..... | 77  |
| <b>Casimir Dadak</b> , <i>The Greek Crisis, A Lesson for Poland</i> .....   | 89  |
| <b>Inga Gaizauskaitė</b> , <i>Support for Democracy: Tendencies in Lithuania 1990–2012</i> .....                                    | 101 |
| <b>Ieva Gajauskaitė</b> , <i>Lithuanian – Ukrainian Strategic Partnership in the Context of EU Neighborhood Policy</i> .....        | 115 |
| <b>Cynthia M. Horne</b> , <i>Transitional Justice and Social Trust in Post-Communist Countries</i> .....                            | 129 |
| <b>Natalia L. Iakovenko</b> , <i>Eastern Partnership: View from Ukraine</i> .....   | 153 |
| <b>Diana Janušauskienė</b> , <i>Democratic Transformation in Lithuania: Still Post-Soviet?</i> ....                                 | 161 |
| <b>Krzysztof Kokoszczyński</b> , <i>Has International Conditionality Worked in Central and Eastern Europe</i> .....                 | 169 |

### III. SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| <b>Magdalena Dembińska</b> , <i>Fluctuating Images of Enemies and Friends: Abkhazia, With Turkish Cyprus' Lens</i> .....                           | 177 |
| <b>Natalia Konarzewska</b> , <i>Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus (Instrumentalist Approach)</i> .....                         | 205 |
| <b>Azim Malikov</b> , <i>Collective Memory, History, Identity in the Bukharan Oasis in Post-Soviet Period</i> .....                                | 213 |
| <b>Svajonë Mykënë</b> , <i>Trends in Gender (In)equality in Azerbaijan</i> .....   | 229 |
| <b>Alexander Rondeli</b> , <i>Georgia and Russia: What's on Their Minds?</i> .....   | 247 |
| <b>Yalchin Mammadov</b> , <i>Post-Communist Nation-State Building in the South Caucasus and the Challenges of the Consolidation of Demos</i> ..... | 257 |

### IV. RUSSIA

|  |     |
|--|-----|
| <b>Yury Kabanov</b> , <i>Information Security in Europe: Perspectives of EU-Russia Common Policy</i> ..... | 271 |
| <b>Krzysztof Szumski</b> , <i>Post-Communist Giants - China and Russia: Partners and Rivals</i> .....      | 281 |
| CONTRIBUTORS .....   | 287 |

# FOREWORD



## Foreword

This Warsaw East European Review (vol. III/2013) provides a general overview of the major topics pertaining to the sphere of the Eastern studies as well as fields of interest as they were presented on last year's Nineths Annual Session of Warsaw East European Conference (2012, July 15-18) organized by the Center for East European Studies of the Warsaw University.

General subject of the conference was entitled „Old and New: Past, Present and Future of the Post-Communist World”.

Quite similarly to some previous annual sessions of the WEEC the issues of cooperation as well as working and operational contacts between the post-communist countries and EU structures and institutions were most willingly taken as the themes of presentations and reports. In this review the section devoted to that is represented by five texts, out of which we particularly commend to your attention „Information Security in Europe: Perspectives of the EU-Russia Common Policy”.

Also, difficult problems of the system changes transforming the post-soviet societies and economies have been very popular and permanently studied. In the review we have as many as seven presentations from this section, including the text by Cynthia M. Horne especially worthy to be read.

Another section is devoted to the not-so-distant history represented by two texts here, and particularly the excellent work by Alexander Tsimbal.

Caucasian section was especially frequented that year, so it has been represented by group of texts, out of which the one on “Trends in Gender (In)equality in Azerbaijan” seems to be particularly informative.

In general terms, the Ninth Annual Session of Warsaw East European Conference had over 400 participants including about 150 speakers in thirty seven discussion panels and seven round tables. Thus, the task of this review is rather to point out the main directions of Eastern studies, policies and discussions as well as to encourage to participate in coming sessions of the WEEC.

*Jerzy Kozakiewicz*  
WARSAW EAST EUROPEAN REVIEW, Editor-in-Chief  
University of Warsaw

I  
**POLAND**



# The Evolution of the Vision of Civil Society in Poland\*

GALIA CHIMIĄK

*Institute of Philosophy and Sociology Polish Academy of Sciences  
Collegium Civitas, Warsaw, Poland*

## Where It All Began

In order to analyze the evolution of the vision of civil society, one should first ask about the group(s) seeking to develop civil society during communist times. This question is especially pertinent to Poland, where unlike any of the other former communist countries in Europe, the communist regime had to cope with a number of local actors which sought to undermine its legitimacy. It has been recognized that there are two main collective actors that should be taken into account when considering civil society in Poland. These are the unprecedented in its scope and unparalleled elsewhere in Europe social movement and trade union Solidarity (*Solidarność*), which emerged in the early 1980s, and the Polish opposition leaders. The latter developed indigenous to Poland yet influential abroad civil society ideology. Among other international commentators, Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind observed that Adam Michnik “resurrected the language of civil society” to express his opposition to the authoritarian rule and his vision of an alternative democratic society<sup>1</sup>.

As civil society embodies pluralism, an attempt to consider only one aspect of Polish society’s self-organization would be partial and unjustified. In order to fully understand how the vision of civil society has evolved since communist times, it is necessary to consider both the development of the postulates raised by *Solidarność* and the legacy of the opposition leaders in Poland. In addition to these two main factors which were instrumental in toppling the communist system, two more collective actors on the civic scene merit attention. Firstly, the Catholic Church and the last pope John Paul II’s support for self-organization of Polish society during communist times should be recognized. As Adam Michnik put it, the Catholic Church shared the moral principles postulated by

---

\* An earlier draft of this paper was developed under the international research project “Has our dream come true? Comparative research of Central and Eastern European Civil Societies” financed by Trust CEE (grant nr CBI\_2009\_11) implemented in Poland by the Institute of Public Affairs and published in *Civil Szemle* in 2012

<sup>1</sup> Jude Howell and Jeremy Lind, *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society Before and After the War on Terror* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009), 31–32

the dissidents but also spread a “protective umbrella” over the democratic opposition<sup>2</sup>. Namely, the Catholic Church cultivated civic culture by providing a haven for grassroots activities in the spheres of culture, education and self-help<sup>3</sup>.

Secondly, one of the then unconventional examples of civic sensitivity and civic disobedience should also be recognized. The civic spirit which bloomed in Poland in the 1980s also had its artistic embodiment. *Akademia Ruchu* is the earliest and most prolific artistic collective which since the 1970s carried out on a regular basis urban-space actions oriented towards questioning the official, static vision of reality while awakening the participants’ and observers’ civic sensitivity. Most popular, however, remains the so-called *Orange Alternative*. This counter-cultural movement developed in Wrocław and was active throughout the 1980s. The *Orange Alternative* utilized aesthetic means to ridicule the one-party state and acted as a safety valve to citizens’ discontent especially in the late 1980s, as it allowed them to criticize with impunity, albeit in an abstract way, the totalitarian regime.

Thus, civil society in Poland in the early 1980s exhibited an untypical constellation of traits. It united workers and members of the *intelligentsia*, the Catholic Church and artists, to pursue one common goal: undermine the totalitarian system, demand not only bread, but also liberty and human rights.

### Theoretical Interpretations

This text would not recount the copious literature dealing with the history and development of civil society in Poland. The unparalleled development of civic activism in communist Poland has accordingly spurred both academics’ and intellectuals’ discourse in Poland and abroad. By coining the now popular concept of the “Third Wave of democracy”, Samuel Huntington – among others – popularized the democratic uprisings in countries from the then Third World and Eastern Europe by highlighting the role of civil actors in triggering social and political change<sup>4</sup>. While subscribing to the views expressed by observers who understood Polish intellectuals’ and workers’ protests in terms of the development of indigenous civil society, in this paper the most important arguments of this discourse will only be touched upon. Instead of recounting the milestones of the evolution of civic activism, this paper will focus on the *Polish* vision of civil society in order to establish whether and how it has developed since the early 1980s, which date can be taken as the birth of genuine civil society. This paper will also consider

<sup>2</sup> Paweł Ścigaj, “O podmiotowości społeczeństwa – idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w pracach Adama Michnika” in *Czas Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego. Między teorią a praktyką*, ed. Barbara Krauz-Mozer and Piotr Borowiec (Kraków: UJ 2006)

<sup>3</sup> Piotr Wandycz, *Cena wolności. Historia Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej od średniowiecza do współczesności*, (Kraków: Znak 1995), 396–7

<sup>4</sup> Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (USA: University of Oklahoma Press 1991)

the changes which the so-called advocacy function has undergone since the rebirth of civil society in Poland, as the scope of groups civil society addresses and with which it expresses solidarity have proliferated.

Before reconstructing the vision of civil society, it is important to point out what both workers and intellectuals did *not* – or could not – dream about thirty years ago. Back then neither workers nor intellectuals in Poland could have foreseen the toppling of the communist regime. Both existing documentary evidence and memoirs of participants in the analyzed here events indicate that the changes they imagined or the demands they put forward to the one-party-state were to take place in the framework of the existing political system. Indeed, as a number of commentators have correctly noted, members of the democratic opposition did commit self-censorship<sup>5</sup>. Nonetheless, the vision of society dissidents dreamt about was one that was meant to come true in communist Poland<sup>6</sup>.

It is also necessary to distinguish between what the participants in the events in the early 1980s really thought back then and what commentators *ascribed* to them. Thus, in Poland the events of March 1968 have been initially interpreted by the opposition leaders themselves as unsuccessful revolution, in the 1980s – as constituting the origins of civil society, and in the 1990s – as the milestone of the Third *Rzeczpospolita*<sup>7</sup>. Western leftist intellectuals and academics hailed the emergence of *Solidarność* in Poland in the 1980s as the materialization of *their* dream of civil society, i.e. one where the working class, and not the middle class, is the driving force of change. Critics of this view question the interpretation of these events as manifestation of civil society. Indeed, most commentators did view *Solidarność* as revolution<sup>8</sup>. A few authors, however, expressed their dissenting opinion regarding this interpretation. Kurczewski for example insightfully traces Solidarity's roots to the old Polish movement of "law enforcement"<sup>9</sup>. The divergence of observers' views notwithstanding, the unquestionable fact is that Polish dissidents proved to be not just visionaries, but dared to challenge totalitarianism on an unprecedented scale.

## The Historical Context

Although one can agree with Pełczyński's argument that the application of the concept of „civil society” before the emergence of *Solidarność* is a „piece of mystification”<sup>10</sup>, it is nevertheless true that this mass movement did not appear out of a vacuum. The

<sup>5</sup> Dariusz Gawin *Blask i gorycz wolności*. (Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej 2006), 50.

<sup>6</sup> see Kuroń and Michnik in Jan Józef Lipski *Komitet Obrony Robotników*. KOR. Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo CDN: 1983): 380–1.

<sup>7</sup> Gawin. *Blask i gorycz wolności*, 81.

<sup>8</sup> Jacek Kurczewski „PS. Socjologia Solidarności”, *Konflikty i „Solidarność” 1980/1981*, Jacek Kurczewski and Joanna Kurczewska (Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Lecha Wałęsy, 2010), 137–8.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 139.

<sup>10</sup> Zbigniew Pełczyński, “Solidarity and “The Rebirth of Civil Society” in Poland, 1976–81”, *Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives*, ed. John Keane (London: Verso 1988), 368.

roots of awakening civic self-consciousness can be traced back to the events in 1956 when workers in Poznań initiated social protest and demanded „freedom and bread”<sup>11</sup>. Although this demonstration did not achieve its aim, it had a positive side effect. It coincided with the disorientation in the communist party caused by the death of the then president Bolesław Bierut. The party took a tactical decision and thwarted both worker’s further protests and intervention by the Soviet Union. As a result this same year marked the end of the Stalinist regime and Władysław Gomułka became the new leader<sup>12</sup>.

After 1956 revisionism set the new rules of the game in Poland. Gomułka remained at his post till 1970, when workers’ protests in Gdansk, Gdynia and Szczecin lead to his dismissal. Edward Gierek became the new first secretary. The years of his rule are known for the relative affluence Polish society enjoyed in the 1970s. However, when victuals’ prices grew in 1976, workers again went on strike. Like in 1970, this strike was uncompromisingly crushed. In 1976 the Workers’ Defense Committee (*KOR – Komitet Obrony Robotników*) was established to help prosecuted workers. It was at this time that the Movement for the Defense of Human and Citizens’ Rights (*ROPCIO – Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela*) was also founded. Later on KOR acted as an organ of self-defense and also as a link between intellectuals with workers.

## The Dissidents’ Story

The described-above dynamic changes taking place in the public sphere in communist Poland were reflected in the writings of the then Polish democratic opposition. The intellectual leaders of the democratic opposition openly admitted that their ideas were formulated on the spot, i.e. immediately reflecting the current events<sup>13</sup>. The improvisational nature of their writings notwithstanding, Polish dissidents not infrequently abandoned or criticized their previous ideas and systematically strove after offering new models of action to cope with the topical problems of society. This refers especially to the most famous dissidents and theoreticians of the „Polish way” Adam Michnik and Jacek Kuroń. They believed in the possibility of a quasi-independent society, a society that would function in spite of the totalitarian state.

The “Letter to the Party Members” written by Jacek Kuroń and Karol Modzelewski in 1965 can be considered as a milestone of Polish dissidents’ writings. In the letter Kuroń and Modzelewski challenged the foundations of real socialism and parliamentary bourgeois democracy alike. To remedy the shortcomings of both systems, the authors of the “Letter” championed the introduction of “workers’ democracy” based on a system of

<sup>11</sup> Michał Buchowski, “The shifting meaning of civil and civic society in Poland”, in *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models*, eds. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn (London: Routledge, 1996), 86.

<sup>12</sup> Wandycz, *Cena wolności*, 382–3.

<sup>13</sup> Agnes Arndt, “Premises and Paradoxes in the Development of the Civil Society Concept in Poland”, *Discussion Paper* (2008), 3.

workers' councils<sup>14</sup>. Back then Adam Michnik and the other young left-wing followers of Kuroń and Modzelewski embraced the belief in the imminent success of a revolution. However, the course of the students' protests in March 1968 verified dissidents' ability to galvanize mass support for their revolt and questioned Kuroń and Modzelewski's assumption regarding the political maturity of the then working class.

The years that followed the events of March 1968 allowed Polish dissidents to reconsider their evaluation of the political situation in the country. Thus, in an article published in 1971 in Paris Leszek Kołakowski suggested that Polish society could lead a "life in dignity" and regain its subjectivity via self-organization<sup>15</sup>. Kołakowski agreed with Kuroń's diagnosis regarding both the degradation of the communist system and the lack of messianic potential of the working class. The left vs. right division seemed to have exhausted both its explanatory and reactive potential to solve the most pressing problems of Polish society after the events of March 1968.

The search for alternative models to change social reality and other than the working class partners to achieve this aim led both left-wing intellectuals and representatives of the Roman Catholic Church to consider an alliance in their quest for the common good. Thus, the lay left and the liberal Catholics realized they cherish common values and postulated the need to build upon the ethical and moral grounds they shared. Indeed, one should not overlook the possibility that the pact between the left-wing dissidents and the liberal Catholics remained in the area of rhetoric<sup>16</sup> or shall we say a dream. Nonetheless, the fact is representatives from both sides did strive after cooperation to undermine the totalitarian system by building civil society in Poland. At the same time, it has been argued that the idea of civil society, which has been developing in Poland since 1980, was in principle "entrenched in morality"<sup>17</sup>. The moral basis of Polish civil society is to be traced back to Christianity and contemporary Catholic social science. Thus, for example, the moral-Christian interpretation of the right to freely participate in public life highlights the primacy of community over the individualistic interpretation of equality<sup>18</sup>. As a result, the teaching of John Paul II and the Catholic Church's support to *Solidarność* created a common platform for the otherwise varying visions of democratization of public life espoused by different groups in Polish society<sup>19</sup>.

In the late 1970s one of the unique to Poland ideas that can be discussed within the discourse of civil society was formulated. It is the "new evolutionism" concept coined by Michnik<sup>20</sup>. New evolutionism implied self-liberation of the society, but it

<sup>14</sup> Dariusz Gawin "Civil Society Discourse in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s", *Discussion Paper* (2008): 33.

<sup>15</sup> Kołakowski 1971/1984 in Gawin "Civil Society Discourse": 35.

<sup>16</sup> Ścigaj, "O podmiotowości społeczeństwa", 70.

<sup>17</sup> Ireneusz Krzemiński, *Świat zakorzeniony* (Warszawa: Wola, 1988), 88.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 93.

<sup>20</sup> Adam Michnik, *Ugoda. Praca organiczna. Myśl zaprzeczna* (Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza, 1983).

also meant “self-limiting revolution”<sup>21</sup> in the words of Kuroń. The “new evolutionism” approach postulated that societal self-organization should take place *within* the limits of the oppressive political system. Michnik postulated that the democratic opposition should commit itself to „unremitting participation in public life”<sup>22</sup>. However, Michnik’s strategy to undermine the totalitarian system did not rest on an elite vision of societal self-organization. It presumed the gradual yet continuous cultivation of civic culture, non-conformism and dignity among the working class<sup>23</sup>. Michnik hailed the tactics of organizations like *KOR*, the Scientific Courses Societies (*Towarzystwa Kursów Naukowych*) or publishers of underground literature to undertake “public, though illegal” activities<sup>24</sup>. Michnik believed “illegal publicity” to be the strategy that can in the long run legitimize society’s self-organization as well as undermine authorities’ reticence towards independent civic initiatives.

Jacek Kuroń further developed the idea of unremitting participation in public life by focusing on what we would call today “social capital”. Kuroń was namely concerned with the erosion of social ties and therefore postulated the need to reconstruct these by self-organization of the society<sup>25</sup>. Jacek Kuroń’s vision of civil society can be characterized as being both utopian and radical. His belief in the innate goodness of the human being does sound like a dream. However, it constitutes the basis of Kuroń’s vision of societal self-organization where – in the name of higher values and principles – individuals are spontaneously and voluntarily engaged in developing their own potentials while working for the sake of the common good<sup>26</sup>. Kuroń’s radicalism is exemplified by the fact that unlike some other oppositionists<sup>27</sup>, he was uncompromising towards the then existing institutions and advised against participation in these as a way to heal the shortcomings of the totalitarian system. Instead, Kuroń championed the idea of self-government organized outside the state. Interestingly, he did not consider tapping available resources by postulating participation in already existing traditional grass-roots organizations<sup>28</sup>. Instead, Kuroń advocated for building civil society from scratch where moral values – but also knowledge – would be both cultivated and disseminated. The ethical model of civil society proposed by Kuroń was meant to make up for the lack of systemic reforms, in the eventuality of which Kuroń did not believe anyway.

Unlike the then one-party state, which purported to aim at higher values, yet compromised itself by utilizing immoral means, the civil society envisaged by Kuroń was

<sup>21</sup> Jadwiga Staniszkis, *Poland’s Self-Limiting Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).

<sup>22</sup> Michnik, *Ugoda*, 148.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>24</sup> Ścigaj, “O podmiotowości społeczeństwa”, 73–74.

<sup>25</sup> Kuroń 1973/1984 in Gawin “Civil Society Discourse”: 36.

<sup>26</sup> Krystyna Rogaczewska, “Koncepcja społeczeństwa obywatelskiego według Jacka Kuronia”, *Czas Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego. Między teorią a praktyką*, ed. Barbara Krauz-Mozer and Piotr Borowiec, (Kraków: UJ, 2006), 83.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 86.

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 80.

to set an example by its insistence on employing moral means to reach higher ends<sup>29</sup>. Kuroń called for the establishment of a social movement consisting of multiple grass-roots initiatives where – under the disinterested and competent guidance of the polish *intelligentsia* – social ties would be cultivated thus paving the way for the birth of a “community of the most general purpose”<sup>30</sup>.

Kuroń created a vision where civil society in Poland would successfully mobilize its own resources to create a world functioning apart from and even in spite of the totalitarian state. His idea of the Self-Governing Republic (*Samorządna Rzeczpospolita*) is also to be found in the program *Solidarność* presented on its first national congress in September-October 1981.

### *Solidarity's Dream*

In the early 1980s both the ideas of uprising or revolution have been rejected by members of the opposition and the concept of civil society naturally emerged as the only viable option for a society willing to „live in truth and dignity”<sup>31</sup>. Although living in what was thought back then to be “the merriest barrack in the communist camp”, Poles could only enjoy their right to associational life in quasi-NGOs controlled by the state. However, none of these traditional, self-help, hobbyist or sport associations could offer the opportunity to spontaneously and freely organize around issues other than those approved and controlled by the totalitarian regime. This concerns especially institutionalized grass-roots initiatives advocating for civic rights. Therefore, as Kuroń foresaw it, a genuine self-organization of society embodying the advocacy function could only evolve alongside or against the totalitarian system.

The newly formed trade union had to continue the policy of the self-limiting revolution. Even when Lech Wałęsa, the leader of *Solidarność*, was in the position to file requests with the authorities, he insisted, “We do not question socialism... We surely will not go back to capitalism, neither will we emulate some Western model, because here it is Poland and we want to have Polish solutions. ... we will not further any political demands, let alone put such into practice”<sup>32</sup>. The need to practice self-censorship notwithstanding, the above-mentioned programmatic-ideological conception of the Self-Governing Republic unequivocally exhibited the “national urge to normalcy”<sup>33</sup>. Or, as Zbigniew Bujak nicely put it, Poles have been striving after feeling at home in their own country<sup>34</sup>.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.*, 84.

<sup>30</sup> Kuroń 1973/1984 in Gawin “Civil Society Discourse”: 37.

<sup>31</sup> Adam Michnik *Kościół, lewica, dialog*. (Warszawa: Agora 1998).

<sup>32</sup> Wałęsa 1980 in Jerzy Holzer, “*Solidarność*” 1980–1981. *Geneza i historia*. (Paris: Instytut Literacki 1984), 131.

<sup>33</sup> Piotr Gliński, „The Self-Governing Republic in the Third Republic”, *Polish Sociological Review*, 1 (2006): 59.

<sup>34</sup> Bujak in Maciej Łopiński, Marcin Moskit and Mariusz Wilk, *Konspira. Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarności*. (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Przedświt 1984), 76.

The Self-Governing Republic project postulated to develop democratic institutions while guaranteeing the moral foundations of the suggested reforms<sup>35</sup>.

In spite of the concern of workers for their economic and social rights to be found in the *21 Demands* by the Interfactory Strike Committee issued on 17 August 1980, the *Solidarność* movement had more than „pragmatic” aims. It also stood for a „moral crusade”<sup>36</sup> or a ‘social crusade for the re-birth of the nation’<sup>37</sup>. It had its idiosyncratic features, which made it difficult to completely fit this movement into any of the analytical frameworks of civil society developed before. It is the ethical underpinnings of the line of action undertaken by *Solidarność* that can help understand the nature of this self-limiting revolution. The Polish philosopher and priest Józef Tischner in his book *The Ethos of Solidarity* argued that *Solidarność* aimed at a dialogue with the authorities and purposefully refrained from violence. For the members of *Solidarność* freedom was the essence of being<sup>38</sup>. *Solidarność* exhibited communal traits by insisting on values such as human dignity, solidarity and national independence and the importance of personal contacts. The renowned Polish sociologist Stefan Nowak, among others, has argued that *Solidarność* had become an „ethos group”<sup>39</sup>.

The „independent civil society” survived during the martial law introduced in Poland on December 13, 1981. Indeed, *Solidarność* had to go underground. During these hard times underground literature, discussions and lectures played the role of school for the democratic opposition. However, the delegalization of *Solidarność* also highlighted the differences between workers and the *intelligentsia*. Indeed, these two groups’ common goal, which was to undermine the totalitarian system, remained the same. However, after *Solidarity*’s delegalization, the means utilized by representatives of the various „branches” of grass-roots activism bifurcated. A study among rank-and-file „col-porteurs” of underground literature in the 1980s critically assesses the lack of common ground, continuity and even „enthusiasm” among representatives of the *intelligentsia* regarding workers’ *Solidarność* after 1981<sup>40</sup>. After the communist system was toppled in 1989, the differences between various social groups in Polish society became even more pronounced, which development characterizes the other countries from the former communist bloc, too. Nonetheless, it is the fate of groups considered underprivileged, like workers or farmers, which mostly attracts the attention of politicians and observers alike. The *intelligentsia* in Poland was as usually left to its own devices while it was tacitly accepted that it should continue its messianic mission towards the nation.

<sup>35</sup> Gliński, „The Self-Governing Republic in the Third Republic”, 59.

<sup>36</sup> Pełczyński, „Solidarity and “The Rebirth of Civil Society”, 372.

<sup>37</sup> Ash in Wandycz, *Cena wolności*, 399.

<sup>38</sup> Józef Tischner, *Etyka Solidarności oraz Homo Sovieticus* (Kraków: Znak 1992), 399, 27.

<sup>39</sup> Stefan Nowak, “The Premises, Hypotheses and Problems of Research Concerning Peace and Internal Order in Poland” *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1990), 125.

<sup>40</sup> Adam Mielczarek, „Czy polski trzeci sektor jest spadkobiercą podziemia lat osiemdziesiątych”, *Trzeci Sektor* 11 (2007).

## The Legacy of the Democratic Opposition

The dissidents' vision of the desired mode of societal self-organization has been in flux since its inception. Unlike Polish and international observers' equivocal assessment of *Solidarity's* civic nature, there is unanimity regarding fact that since the 1950s the Polish democratic opposition has been not only dreaming, but also systematically working towards activating society's potential to undermine the totalitarian system. The questioning of the dissidents' real motives to build civil society happens on an ideological basis. The dissidents themselves have consistently demonstrated willingness to bring about palpable change that would benefit the whole society and upgrade its capacity to take its fate in its own hands. This is not to say that the members of the democratic opposition did agree with each other on every issue or that they did not commit blunders. The democratic opposition in Poland was neither a monolith nor an in-crowd. Quite on the contrary, the representatives of the Polish *intelligentsia* active in the democratic opposition did demonstrate a high level of soul-searching, brain-racking and self-criticism while working towards identifying constructive solutions to the topical problems of the society they sought to enlighten and help „live in truth and dignity”.

Many members of the democratic opposition continued their political involvement after 1989, albeit from various political stances. Others were instrumental in the founding of the fledgling non-governmental sector in the 1990s. Yet others employed their entrepreneurial skills in establishing the business sector in Poland. In a word, they put into practice Kuroń's vision of independent initiatives in various areas of life, ranging “from economy to culture”<sup>41</sup>. Although Balcerowicz's widely acclaimed “shock therapy” did not leave intact any of the social groups in Polish society, one could say that generally members of the *intelligentsia*, including those who were active in the democratic opposition, managed to take advantage of the transformation. No doubt, it was the social and cultural capital of the *intelligentsia* that facilitated this process. However, the same cannot be said about the ten million members of *Solidarność*. When discussing the evolution of the dream of civil society in Poland, it is necessary to also have a closer look at the changes that took place in the *Solidarność* ethos after 1989.

## Contingencies

As any mass social movement that eventually entered institutionalized politics, *Solidarność* moved from the area of mythical heroism to the domain of the Establishment. The wide-spread conviction that what *Solidarność* stood for and what it became are two different things has its logical explanation. Wesołowski argues that *Solidarność* of the 1980s was characterized by its strong communal features, which roots were in

<sup>41</sup> Rogaczewska, “Koncepcja społeczeństwa obywatelskiego według Jacka Kuronia”, 85.

nationalism and Christianity. When the chief aim of this movement was achieved and new political, social and economic interests came to the fore, this ethos had become “inappropriate” and “counter-productive”. As a result, what was supposed to happen was a gradual shift from the socialized idea of civil society towards the more limited classical notion, which lays emphasis on the rule of law, political citizenship and the freedom of economic enterprise. There has accordingly been a move away from the communal to individual group rights<sup>42</sup>. Hence, the advocacy function of civil society as represented by *Solidarność* has evolved from focusing on issues related to the common good to particular groups’ interests. Furthermore, the state became the legitimate partner and object of civil society’s advocacy activities.

As far as the legacy of *Solidarność* itself is concerned, nowadays many find discordance between the noble program the trade union strove to achieve and the reality of the present. The difference between an aspiration, which can also be called a dream, and reality is that only this latter can be experienced. However, as Aleksander Smolar insightfully notes, it is actually not the case that Poles have been „unfaithful” to *Solidarity*’s program. Besides the unquestioned role *Solidarność* played in overturning the communist system, it also facilitated the „transformation of millions of people of labor into citizens”<sup>43</sup>. Furthermore, even before *Solidarność* got delegalized, it stood for a textbook example of social, political and cultural innovation on both regional and European level<sup>44</sup>. Nonetheless, there seems to be evidence that it was the political circumstances in the 1980s that made the Self-Governing Republic assume the characteristics of civil society<sup>45</sup>. This “beautiful illusion”<sup>46</sup> did not even survive the communist times which gave birth to it. What more, it is possible that it is the *downside* of the then civil society that has survived the test of time. Namely, the overriding status of negotiation practices over official state policy and the rule of law testifies to the persistency of the litigious modes of participation in public life inherited from the previous system<sup>47</sup>.

Could it be, then, that the dream of civil society had evolved into a nightmare? There is evidence pressure groups in Poland still exert influence on decision-making processes by employing the old, tried methods of protests and occupation strikes, thus circumventing institutionalized politics. However, the tendency to influence policy making by going on strike is also used in older democracies. Furthermore, historically Poles have not refrained from demonstrating their free spirit long time before the 1956 strikes. In

<sup>42</sup> Włodzimierz Wesolowski, “The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland after Solidarity”, *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison*, ed. John A. Hall (Cambridge, Polity Press 1995), 114.

<sup>43</sup> Aleksander Smolar, “Rocznice, Pamięć i Przyszłość”, *Znak* 11 (2001), 37.

<sup>44</sup> Joanna Kurczewska, „Socjologia i socjologowie wobec Solidarności”, *Konflikt i „Solidarność” 1980/1981*, Jacek Kurczewski and Joanna Kurczewska (Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Lecha Wałęsy: 2010), 158

<sup>45</sup> Edmund Mokrzycki, „Demokracja „negocjacyjna”, *Utracona dynamika? O niedojrzałości Polskiej demokracji*, eds. Edmund Mokrzycki, Andrzej Rychard and Andrzej Zybertowicz (Warszawa: IFIS PAN 2002), 137.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, 141.

other words, both *Solidarity's* mode of action and current strike events draw on Poles' tradition of fights for independence.

As demonstrated above, at present solidarity and civil society – both as concepts and praxes – have been subject to change, and yet exhibit continuity traits with self-organized initiatives before 1989. However, when considering the dynamics of the relationship between solidarity and civil society, a certain specialization seems to have taken place during the last two decades. Indeed, one can only agree that although solidarity has been important throughout the XIX and XX centuries in different countries of the worlds, the “iconisation” of solidarity took place in Poland in the 1980s<sup>48</sup>. Kössler and Melber also argue that since that time the term of civil society has evolved and co-opted the terrain previously occupied by solidarity, while the slogan of solidarity has been politicized. The more popular currently use of the notion of civil society notwithstanding, there is evidence solidarity is again becoming in vogue worldwide. Namely, solidarity has acquired *global* characteristics, which can be observed by the involvement in development cooperation by an increasing number of (especially non-state) actors. Hence, in Poland the above-mentioned specialization of solidarity refers to the broadening of the range of participants and beneficiaries of solidarity-motivated activities, whereas civil society has become the Third sector, i.e. equal to yet different from the state and the business sectors.

In the case of Poland, which is a former recipient of official aid, advocacy and solidarity have evolved to include people living in developing countries. Having benefited from foreign aid themselves, Polish civil society organizations are increasingly getting involved in providing assistance in developing countries. *The Multiyear program for development cooperation 2012–2015* accepted by the Council of Minister in Poland on 20.03.2012 foresees support for civil society organizations in the priority countries. The partnership with Polish civil society organizations and the earmarking of funds for civil society in developing countries are indicative of the previous efficient use of foreign aid by Polish NGOs. Thus, for example, although in the first decade of the transition the amount of foreign foundation assistance earmarked for higher education and economic reforms in Poland exceeded the support for civil society, Polish NGOs together with local governments were the entities which were most successful in putting to good use foreign aid<sup>49</sup>. At present Polish civil society organizations not only implement projects in developing countries, but also engage in global education in the country, thus sensitizing citizens to the problems of people living in the global South and raising the awareness of the global interconnectedness of the world we live in.

Hence, the modern understanding of solidarity underlying development cooperation activities actually echoes the original meaning of the term which in medieval and early modern Europe stood for a “community of liability where all members were

<sup>48</sup> Reinhardt Kössler and Henning Melber, “International civil society and the challenge for global solidarity” *Development Dialogue*, (2007): 29.

<sup>49</sup> Kevin Quigley, *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe*, (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1997).

obliged to stand up for the debts and duties incurred by, or imposed upon, the collective or individual members”<sup>50</sup>. The Polish *Multiyear program for development cooperation 2012–2015* corroborates the argument about the renaissance of solidarity as a fundamental value explaining Polish involvement in development cooperation. The underlying principles of this multiyear programme are solidarity, democracy and development. However, it is solidarity that is “both a means and an end of Polish involvement in development cooperation”<sup>51</sup>.

## Concluding Remarks

At a nominal level, the Polish dream of civil society understood as having „freedom and bread” granted has come true. However, as the insightful yet counter-intuitive saying by Mother Theresa of Calcutta goes, more tears are shed over answered prayers than unanswered ones. Thus, as the totalitarian adversary of the champions of the then civil society in Poland was – unexpectedly – ousted, former dissidents and *Solidarność* members alike realized that grass-roots self-organization is not so much a dream that may eventually come true, but a process that requires unremitting participation in public life as well as open-mindedness and readiness to cope with new challenges. Undoubtedly, one of these challenges is that the relationship between civil society and the state had to be rethought and reworked, as in democracies the state is supposed to not merely sponsor, but also partner with civil society initiatives and involve these in decision-making processes.

When analyzing the extent to which the postulates referring to civil society and embodied in the *Self-Government Republic* project have been implemented in Poland, it is most feasible to focus on the institutional aspects of the transformation. The feeling of belonging to the same community of ideas characterizing the sixteen months before *Solidarność* was delegalized was discontinued throughout the 1980s and could not be revived in 1989. In the meantime, both the historical context and the main actors have undergone change<sup>52</sup>. Nonetheless, when studying the aspects of the *Self-Governing Republic* project which refer to civil society, only two of them – the self-government reform and the emergence of institutionalized civic initiatives – appear to embody the ideas of self-organization as postulated by *Solidarność* in the 1980s<sup>53</sup>. Gliński is right to attribute the development of the NGO sector largely to the combined effect of the indigenous, grass-roots initiatives emerging around representatives of the *intelligentsia* and the support of foreign aid. Indeed, institutionalized civil society in Poland is still rather of an enclave type. However, its bottom-up growth emulates the *Solidarity*'s vision of self-organization. Thus, although *Solidarity*'s ideas of workers' self-governance and the

<sup>50</sup> Kössler and Melber, “International civil society and the challenge for global solidarity”, 36.

<sup>51</sup> *Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2012–2015*, 3.

<sup>52</sup> Gliński, „The Self-Governing Republic in the Third Republic”.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 61–6.

postulated moral-axiological foundations of the new order largely turned out to be *utopist* and did not materialize after 1989, the other elements predicating the emergence of genuine civil society have been established<sup>54</sup>.

The mushrooming of institutionalized civic initiatives after 1989 did not go unnoticed by researchers. Along with the well-documented maturation and professionalization which the non-governmental sector has been undergoing for the last twenty years, there also happened an internal specialization. Empirical research provided evidence for the existence of two visions and two models of civil society in contemporary Poland. Namely, NGOs in Poland can be described as belonging to either the „center” or the „periphery”<sup>55</sup>. The former of these types refers to big, efficient in acquiring funds from various sources, often active nation-wide, usually city-located NGOs. The latter type refers to smaller, local, often traditional, less formalized, and largely dependent on local resources NGOs. This binary typology of non-governmental organizations in Poland highlights the differences within the Third sector. However, this finding should not be regarded as identifying a weakness of organized civil society in contemporary Poland. Quite on the contrary, by fulfilling their different functions in the public sphere, „central” and „peripheral” NGOs actually complement each other. Modern institutionalized civic initiatives in Poland are successfully fulfilling the watchdog function, as demonstrated by „central” NGOs. At the same time, „peripheral” or local, grass-roots NGOs act as a partner to self-governments and guarantee that the constituency is involved in both decision-making and policy-implementing processes. Therefore, both types of NGOs strive to fulfill the advocacy function of civil society, albeit in a different way and on a different administrative level.

The Polish dream and practice of civil society are therefore still evolving to adapt to changing circumstances and cope with new issues. Having gained freedom and increasing affluence, Polish society has been faced with the need to attend to previously unconsidered aspects of solidarity and human rights. Most importantly, these are global solidarity or minorities’ rights. The contemporary challenges civil society has to deal with accordingly require novel approaches. Hence the need for civil society organizations advocating for solidarity and human rights has not subsided with the democratization of the public sphere. However, the dissidents’ noble aspiration to “unremitting participation” in public life has evolved from undermining the then oppressive system and acquired more pragmatic, constructive characteristics as well as emphatic attitude and the responsibility to *give back* to eastern neighbors and developing countries. The democratic opposition has fulfilled its historical function thus paving the way for the next generation of Polish social activists to freely reinterpret and implement solidarity while striving for the common good and the realization of their individual interests.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>55</sup> Magdalena Dudkiewicz, „Dwie wizje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w świadomości ludzi trzeciego sektora”, *Samorganizacja społeczeństwa Polskiego: III sektor i wspólnoty lokalne w jednoczącej się Europie*, eds. Piotr Gliński, Barbara Lewenstein, and Andrzej Siciński (Warszawa: IFIS PAN 2004), 163.

**Literature:**

- Arndt, Agnes "Premises and Paradoxes in the Development of the Civil Society Concept in Poland" in *Discussion Paper nr. SP IV 2008–402*, 1–29. Berlin: WZB 2008
- Buchowski, Michał "The shifting meaning of civil and civic society in Poland", in *Civil Society: Challenging Western Models*, eds. Chris Hann and Elizabeth Dunn, London: Routledge 1996
- Dudkiewicz, Magdalena „Dwie wizje społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w świadomości ludzi trzeciego sektora”, in *Samoorganizacja społeczeństwa Polskiego: III sektor i wspólnoty lokalne w jednoczącej się Europie*, edited by Piotr Gliński, Barbara Lewenstein, and Andrzej Siciński, 162–173, Warszawa: IFIS PAN 2004
- Gawin, Dariusz *Blask i gorycz wolności*, Kraków: Ośrodek Myśli Politycznej 2006
- Gawin, Dariusz "Civil Society Discourse in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s" in *Discussion Paper nr. SP IV 2008–402*, 31–42. Berlin: WZB 2008
- Gliński, Piotr „The Self-Governing Republic in the Third Republic” *Polish Sociological Review*, 1 (2006): 55–74
- Holzer, Jerzy *„Solidarność” 1980–1981. Geneza i historia*. Paris: Instytut Literacki 1984
- Howell, Jude and Jeremy Lind *Counter-Terrorism, Aid and Civil Society Before and After the War on Terror*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2009
- Huntington, Samuel P. *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*. USA: University of Oklahoma Press 1991
- Kössler, Reinhardt and Henning Melber "International civil society and the challenge for global solidarity" *Development Dialogue*, November 2007: 29–39
- Krzemiński, Ireneusz *Świat zakorzeniony*, Warszawa: Wola 1988
- Kurczewska, Joanna „Socjologia i socjologowie wobec Solidarności” in Jacek Kurczewski and Joanna Kurczewska, *Konflikt i „Solidarność” 1980/1981*, 143–158, Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Lecha Wałęsy: 2010
- Kurczewski, Jacek „PS. Socjologia Solidarności” in Jacek Kurczewski and Joanna Kurczewska *Konflikt i „Solidarność” 1980/1981*, 127–141, Warszawa: Fundacja Instytut Lecha Wałęsy: 2010
- Lipski, Jan Józef *Komitet Obrony Robotników. KOR. Komitet Samoobrony Społecznej*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo CDN: 1983
- Łopiński, Maciej, Marcin Moskit and Mariusz Wilk *Konspira. Rzecz o podziemnej Solidarności*. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Przedświt 1984
- Michnik, Adam *Ugoda. Praca organiczna. Myśl zaprzeczna*. Warszawa: Niezależna Oficyna Wydawnicza 1983
- Michnik, Adam *Kościół, lewica, dialog*. Warszawa: Agora 1998
- Mielczarek, Adam „Czy polski trzeci sektor jest spadkobiercą podziemia lat osiemdziesiątych” *Trzeci Sektor* 11 (2007), 7–17
- Mokrzycki, Edmund „Demokracja „negocjacyjna” in *Utracona dynamika? O niedojrzałości Polskiej demokracji*, edited by Edmund Mokrzycki, Andrzej Rychard and An-

- drzej Zybertowicz, 129–146, Warszawa: IFIS PAN 2002
- Nowak, Stefan. “The Premises, Hypotheses and Problems of Research Concerning Peace and Internal Order in Poland” *Dialectics and Humanism*, 2 (1990)
- Pełczynski, Zbigniew “Solidarity and “The Rebirth of Civil Society” in Poland, 1976–81” in *Civil Society and the State. New European Perspectives* edited by John Keane, 361–80, London: Verso 1988
- Quigley, Kevin *For Democracy's Sake: Foundations and Democracy Assistance in Central Europe*, Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press 1997
- Rogaczewska, Krystyna “Koncepcja społeczeństwa obywatelskiego według Jacka Kuroń” in *Czas Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego. Między teorią a praktyką*, edited by Barbara Krauz-Mozer and Piotr Borowiec, 79–88, Kraków: UJ 2006
- Smolar, Aleksander “Rocznice, Pamięć i Przyszłość” in *Znak* 11 (2001)
- Staniszki, Jadwiga *Poland's Self-Limiting Revolution*, Princeton: Princeton University Press 1984
- Ścigaj, Paweł “O podmiotowości społeczeństwa – idea społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w pracach Adama Michnika” in *Czas Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego. Między teorią a praktyką*, edited by Barbara Krauz-Mozer and Piotr Borowiec, 57–78, Kraków: UJ 2006
- Tischner, Józef *Etyka Solidarności oraz Homo Sovieticus*, Kraków: Znak 1992
- Wandycz, Piotr *Cena wolności. Historia Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej od średniowiecza do współczesności*, Kraków: Znak 1995
- Wesołowski, Włodzimierz “The Nature of Social Ties and the Future of Postcommunist Society: Poland after Solidarity” in *Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison* edited by John A. Hall. Cambridge, Polity Press 1995
- Wieloletni program współpracy rozwojowej na lata 2012–2015* (Multiyear programme for development cooperation 2012–2015). Accessed 29.03.2012. <https://www.polskapomoc.gov.pl/files/inne%20dokumenty%20PDF/Pomoc%20zagraniczna%202011/PWieloletni.pdf>





# The Shifting of Borders in 1945 in Memory of Poles, Germans and Ukrainians

BEATA HALICKA

*Viadrina European University, Frankfurt (Oder), Germany*

This article takes the shifting of borders in 1945 as an example to demonstrate the way in which memories of the Second World War and the post-war years are cultivated by Polish, German and Ukrainian expellees, and furthermore, how the experience of force migration was encoded by the three nations. On both sides of the Oder-Neisse line and in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, the memories of these events were manipulated politically and this manipulation has influenced the collective memory of the respective groups. This paper is based on the results of an Oral History project with Poles, Germans and Ukrainians ([www.pyrzany-kozaki.eu](http://www.pyrzany-kozaki.eu)) carried out under my supervision in 2011, as well as on the analysis of memoirs written by Polish new settlers in the 1950s and the reports by German refugees and expellees. These sources were the main focus of my research on the topic of “Poland’s Wild West” – forced migration and cultural appropriation of the Oder region 1945–1948<sup>1</sup>, financed by the German Polish Research Trust<sup>1</sup>.

The shifting of the borders brought about forced transfer of people. The regions recognised today as Western and Northern Poland, which became part of Poland in 1945, were the site of an almost complete population exchange. This had the consequence of ending one society and creating in its place a new and different one. In line with the policy of the victorious powers concerning ethnic conflicts after the Second World War, the Polish government made an effort to create a nationally homogenous state. In order to achieve this, a population exchange in Eastern Poland with the Soviet Republics of the Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania was agreed upon in 1944, under pressure from Moscow. The circumstances surrounding the execution of this so-called exchange, however, resembled what one would more properly describe as flight, expulsion or ethnic cleansing. Similarly, about 3,2 Million Germans living in the Oder region were since Autumn 1945 forced to leave their home, which had now become the territory of the Polish

---

<sup>1</sup> A partial result of this project is my habilitation treatise on the topic “Poland’s Wild West” – forced migration and cultural appropriation of the Oder region, 1945–48<sup>1</sup>. It was submitted to the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt (Oder) and published in book form in 2013: Beata Halicka, *Polens Wilder Westen. Erzwangene Migration und die kulturelle Aneignung des Oderraumes 1945–48* (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2013).

state. In 1942 while the war was still going on, radical Ukrainian nationalists started the expulsion of Poles from the Volhynia region and Eastern Galicia.

Up to **350 000** Poles fled from the eastern territories of Poland to the west over the San River. In September 1944 the Polish Committee for National Liberation signed treaties with the Ukrainian, Lithuanian and Belarussian Soviet Socialist Republics regarding the “evacuation” of the Polish population from these territories. Between 1944 and 1948 over **1,1 million** Poles were transferred from the East to the West. In this population exchange in Eastern Poland more than **480 000** Ukrainians were transferred from Poland into Soviet Union. More than **140 000** Ukrainians and Polish-Ukrainian marriages, who still inhabited southeastern Poland in the spring of 1947 were deported to the west and north of Poland. These historical facts are certainly well known. The counting of victims is a difficult problem and historians in each country represent different position. The number of victims that I used here came from the book: *Resettlement, flight and expulsion 1939–1959. Atlas of Polish territory*<sup>2</sup>.

### Memories of the War and Post-War Years by Poles and Germans

The word ‘memory’ is formulated in the plural intentionally in order to convey that remembering the year 1945 often takes on different characters for Poles and Germans, and is usually treated separately. For Poles, the whole of the war represented a traumatic experience. The year 1945 signified its end and a new beginning, frequently in a different, foreign world. Germans, on the other hand, most frequently remember the last months of the war and the experiences after capitulation.

In Germany the history of the settlement of the territories adjoined to Poland in 1945 is little known. Even though the events of forced migration of the Germans often occurred in parallel to the new settlement of Poles, they are usually described separately: it is either the German or the Polish story<sup>3</sup>. My research approach was based on the idea to explore memories not from a national point of view, but instead, to focus on a region, the Oder region, and to investigate the memories of the local residents. The central theme of my research project was thus both the memory of forced migration and the appropriation of the region, as well as the consequences of the population exchange for the new residents and the region. The investigation was conducted from a perspective from the point of view of the individual, the ordinary citizen, whose personal destinies were explored by means of written memories.

<sup>2</sup> Witold Sienkiewicz and Grzegorz Hryciuk, *Wysiedlenia wypędzenia i ucieczki 1939 – 1959. Atlas ziem Polski ; Polacy, Żydzi, Niemcy, Ukraińcy* (Warszawa: Demart, 2008).

<sup>3</sup> Hugo Service equally argues in his article that the expulsion of Germans and the settlement of Poles should be considered as part of one process. Compare Hugo Service, ‘Sifting Poles from Germans? Ethnic cleansing and ethnic screening in Upper Silesia, 1945–1949’, *Slavonic and East European Review*, 88, 4, October 2010, 652–680.

## Sources

German Federal Government decided in the late 1940s to produce a comprehensive documentation of the process and the meaning of the forced migration of Germans from territories of east of the Oder and Neisse. The German Government was hoping that the presentation of factual material in future court cases under international law, particularly in the expected peace negotiations, would improve the German bargaining power. The documentation was thus supposed to be politically useful. The result of the major research project conducted from 1951 until 1963 was the publication 'Documentation of the expulsion of Germans from Eastern and Central Europe'<sup>4</sup>. This volume includes an infinite number of contemporary witnesses and is until today an important source and a kind of model for creation of common memory of forced migration in Germany.

The political situation of Poland, which remained de facto under Soviet occupation after 1945, made it impossible to have an open public debate to come to terms with the shifting of Poland's borders. Journalistic and literary works, and with that, remembrance literature, came under censorship, with the effect that most authors either practiced self-censorship, wrote for the proverbial drawer or later looked for possibilities to publish their works abroad. Thus, very few accounts of memories were published in the early post-war years. Only with the political thaw of 1956, many started to believe that they were able to write freely about their experiences. At that time various institutions (research institutes, but also cultural centres and newspapers) had advertised competitions for the best memoirs in the region of Western and Northern Poland. Among the most comprehensive and interesting ones, are collection of so-called memories to order, which were the result of several competitions initiated by the Western Institute (Instytut Zachodni) in Poznań during the years 1957, 1966 and 1970. The competition was looking for contributions concerned with stories from before and during the war, with reasons for resettlement in the newly gained territories, with the process of resettlement and the first years in the new homeland. While the memories from the 1960s and 1970s are dominated by propagandistic rhetoric, the texts written in the late 1950s, just after the so-called Polish October 1956 and thus under the influence of the political thaw, are marked by a more liberal treatment of individual experiences and bear critical remarks as well as attempts to uncover reasons for committed mistakes<sup>5</sup>.

The consultation of German and Polish testimonies was, however, not intended to demonstrate the asymmetry of the memories of the two national groups. Although in

<sup>4</sup> *Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa / hrsg. vom Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte*. Bearb. von Theodor Schieder. (Bonn, multiple volumes from the years 1954–1963).

<sup>5</sup> Since it was one of the first of such initiatives, only 229 texts were submitted. During the following competitions on this topic in 1966 and 1970, 167 and 747 accounts of memories were collected respectively. Following the disappointment about the promised and not fulfilled improvements of the situation, however, these were again dominated by the laudatory note imposed by propaganda.

one case memories were dominated by the notion of 'leaving', while in the other case 'arriving' was prevalent, and therefore the perspectives from which experiences are reconstructed must be different. Although both groups found themselves in the same reality, they tried to come to terms with it in the face of completely different baggage. For they had diametrically opposed emotional attitudes to the places in which fate brought them together. Within a short space of time, however, everyday survival forced them to deal with very similar problems<sup>6</sup>. For this reason, problems of everyday life took an important part in this research. Germans as well as Poles had to reconstruct their livelihoods anew in the Oder region during the difficult post-war years. Not infrequently they had to struggle for mere survival and face confrontations not only with political but also with natural elements, in order to eventually look after the satisfaction of spiritual needs. The comparison of different cultures of remembrance is supposed to allow us to take a look at the mosaic of reality. During the quest for sources most suited for this project, particular care was taken to make sure the source material was created in a short space of time possible after the original events. This condition was to promise a quality arising only from immediacy, and which seemed likely to capture the way of thinking, the fears, delights and sympathies of the people who lived in the time and space in question. For this reason, I chose the oldest of the German and Polish biographical documents, in especially the diaries, memoirs and testimonies originating in the late 1940s and the 1950s.

### Memories of the War and Post-War Years by Poles and Ukrainians

It is very interesting for me to find out, what is the difference between testimonies originating in the late 1940s and the 1950s and stories, which recount experiences 50 or 60 years later. To prove this, I started last year an Oral History project, called 'Germans, Poles and Ukrainians on the path of remembrance of forced migration'. We conducted interviews with inhabitants of two villages: Kozaky, district Zolochiv in region Lviv, what is today an Ukrainian village and until 1945 was settled by Polish majority. The second village was Pyrzany, until 1945 called in German Pyrehne, situated not far from the river Odra, district Kostrzyn, region Lubuskie. Polish citizens of Kozaky has been expelled from their home and had to move to Western Poland. Almost all inhabitants settled in Summer 1945 in Pyrzany. The German inhabitants of Pyrzany fled in Winter 1945 from the Red Army, the second part of German population of Pyrzany has been expelled from their home by new Polish administration. The German houses have been settled by Polish expellees from Kozaky. To the village Kozaky came in late summer 1945 Ukrainian expelled by Poles from the region of Przemyśl and from East of Ukraine. The goals of this project were to know the history of this two villages, to visit those places

<sup>6</sup> Hans-Jürgen Karp and Robert Traba, *Nachkriegsalltag in Ostpreußen. Erinnerungen von Deutschen, Polen und Ukrainern* (Münster 2004), 3.

and to speak with victims of force migration during the Second World War and in first years after the end of the war. The results of this projects are 34 long-life interview, a exhibition, a book publication and a homepage in Polish and German. The results have been analyzed under following aspects: way of migration and passing of borders, relationship between different regions and ethnic groups, the role of religion in the life of these villages, the meaning of homeland then and today. The shifting of boarders was an important experience for our witnesses, who changed their whole life. The results of these projects shows very exactly the different way of telling the own story by Germans, Poles and Ukrainian. Our witnesses from those 3 national groups are victims of forced migration and their experiences have a lot of similarities, but the way of telling the story is different. This difference is a result of historian politics in each of these three countries and the way of remembrance at the Second World War and its consequences. Because of this, the story of victims written short after the experiences and those told or written 50 or 60 years later differ from each other. Our German witnesses underlined very often extremely brutal character of the war although the war operations lasted in East of Germany only for a few months. Helga Marsch, who fled from the Red Army in January 1945 said: *For a child it was a horrible shock*<sup>7</sup>. *The memories of Germans are primarily focused on the circumstances of the flight and expulsion, as well as on the time under Soviet and Polish administration.* The German group of our witnesses described a lot of details about behavior of the enemy, at first of Russian and Polish soldiers. In spite of long time passed from those days they indicated the big injustice, they had experienced. Many years long Germans expellees didn't acknowledge, than also other nationalities have been victims of forced migrations. At least since about ten years many of them recognize this and show their understanding, that most Polish inhabitants of their old homes in Eastern of the river Odra have been also expelled from their homeland.

In the stories told by Polish witnesses the word expulsion has been mentioned very seldom. Poles called it resettlement and also indicated it as a big injustice. In their memory the Second World War was a terrible time of 6 long years, they described the experiences of Soviet and German occupation, deportation, force labor and collectivization, holocaust and Polish-Ukrainian civil war. The end of those tragedy was the forced migration and a new start in Western of Poland. Asked, why did they have to leave their homeland, they seldom attributed the blame to somebody, but say, the guilt for it takes the war. *We had to go away to an unknown land*<sup>8</sup> - said Irena Domagała and she believes, the war was so terrible, than one had no choice than become reconciled to the own fate.

Our Ukrainian witnesses found only seldom reason to complain about their fate, even then their experiences of war and forced migration were often very tragic and similar to the Polish one. They also don't attribute the blame to somebody, but say, the guilt

<sup>7</sup> Helga Marsch. Biographical interview, conducted by Charlotte v. Stromberg, 28.05.2011, Trebnitz.

<sup>8</sup> Irena Domagała. Biographical interview, conducted by Małgorzata Polczewska, 09.07.2011, Gorzów Wielkopolski.

for it takes the war. The main important statement of many of our Ukrainian witnesses was: *I have worked my whole life very hard and have had never time for celebrations*<sup>9</sup>. So the meaning of Maria Kozak, who could stay in her homeland, but a part of her family was moved to the West of Poland and she has never seen them again. She believes to have a big luck, don't to be expelled, even then she had to exist in a communistic system for many tens of years.

I have presented in this article only some general conclusions of our interviews, a detailed analysis of this stories has to take into account the specific conditions in the life of individuals. My goal was to show, what the difference between testimonies originating in the late 1940s and the 1950s and stories, which recount experiences 50 or 60 years later is. According to the results of my researches I can say, those stories, which are told with a temporal distance of 50 or 60 years, are usually changed by later experiences, such as the perception of history transported by the media or school books, and are therefore constructed anew.

## Summarize

The agreement on the new border after 1945, the crossing of borders on departure and the arrival was a significant moment in the lives of the old and new inhabitants. This experience is preserved differently by Germans, Poles and Ukrainian respectively, it is handed down differently in families. However, it is exceptionally important that every nation has the opportunity to exchange its experiences and talk about the fact that it is sharing the experience of shifting borders and being moved from East to West or from West to East. Polish elites of the 1990s have recognized the injustice committed against the German civilian population by means of the expulsion, and they have publicly expressed their regret<sup>10</sup>. It would be desirable to have this attitude shared by the whole of Polish society. The German side, on the other hand, is slowly becoming aware of the fact that most Poles were not the initiators of the expulsion of Germans, but that they were themselves victims of the war started by the Germans. A similar way of reconciliation go Poles and Ukrainian since at least 20 years. In 1990, the Polish parliament recognized the injustice committed against the Ukrainian minority in south-east of Poland in the

<sup>9</sup> Maria Kozak. Biographical interview, conducted by Taras Medyński, 07.08.2011, Łuka.

<sup>10</sup> The process of reconciliation did in fact start with a letter of the Polish bishops from the year 1965 and with the German chancellor Willy Brandt's 'Kniefall' (genueflection) in front of the memorial for the heroes of the Warsaw Ghetto rebellion in 1970. The mutual perception of 'average citizens', however, changed very slowly. See: Robert Traba and Robert Zurek: „Vertreibung“ oder „Zwangsumsiedlungen“. Die deutsch-polnische Auseinandersetzung um Termini, das Gedächtnis und den Zweck der Erinnerungspolitik. In: *Historischer Umbruch und Herausforderungen für die Zukunft. Der deutsch-polnische Vertrag über gute Nachbarschaft und freundschaftliche Zusammenarbeit vom 17. Juni 1991. in Rückblick nach zwei Jahrzehnten.* (Warszawa 2001) 409–451.

so called *Akcja Wisła*. The traumatic experiences of over 480 000 Ukrainians, who were expelled from Poland into Soviet Union between 1944–46 are very little known in Poland today. Poles know about Polish victims of ethnic cleansing in both regions of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, but only seldom have they been able to recognize, that in the Polish-Ukrainian civil war Poles were not only victims, but also often perpetrators. It is very important to speak about it, in mass media, at school and universities, in public space. The Polish-German reconciliation takes place already since many years and brings results not only on the level of politician or historians, but also in wide parts of both societies. The process of cultural appropriation of the Oder region by Poles has been going on for more than half a century and is still not quite completed. The former German residents of this region still mourn the loss of their home. The process of cultural appropriation of the region of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia, which belong to Ukraine since 1945 is also still not quite completed. Poles and Ukrainians still have a lot of problems on how to speak about the common history. There is a need for mutual respect and sympathetic memories which can unite both parties despite the differences.





# Economic Transformation and Privatization

RICHARD J. HUNTER, JR.

*Seton Hall University, New Jersey, United States*

LEO V. RYAN, C.S.V.

*DePaul University, Chicago, United States*

## Background and Introduction

In its simplest form, privatization is de-statism – that is, removing the state as the owner of property and assets. From the outset of the transformation process in Poland, significant systemic limitations to the privatization process existed<sup>1</sup>. A developed market infrastructure was absent. Businesses that were being prepared for privatization lacked the ability to conduct market research, and advisory and consulting services were in short supply. Procedures and benchmarks for property valuation were almost non-existent. The financial infrastructure was immature and data on the profitability of firms being prepared for privatization was problematic. In addition, both the quality and level of competency of civil servants (the *nomenklatura*) and private managers remained low-largely due to the negative legacy of Poland’s communist past.

Roman Frydman and Andrzej Rapaczynski, two major researchers in the field, delineated four major requirements of the privatization process that would guide future privatization activities:

- Privatization must be accomplished quickly;
- Privatization must be socially acceptable and elicit wide-spread societal support;
- Privatization must assure effective “private” control over the management of the newly privatized enterprises;
- and
- Privatization must assure access to significant foreign capital and expertise<sup>2</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of early patterns and processes of privatization, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & John Northrop, “Management, Legal and Accounting Perspectives: Privatization in Poland,” *The Polish Review*, Vol. 38,(1993): 407–420 .

<sup>2</sup> Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, *Privatization in Eastern Europe: Is the State Withering Away*, (Central European University Press, 1994), 14–15.

In order to assure the success of the privatization process, economists – most notably in the “Balcerowicz Team”<sup>3</sup> and others – theorized about the overall objectives of the policies they would seek to implement. Thus, the privatization process was generally considered as one of the main components of the transformation process in Poland. Its success or failure would be based on meeting the following core *systemic objectives*:

- To move the economy from a centrally planned system to a fully developed market system, which would encourage the development of a competitive and dynamic private sector;
- To improve the economic performance of enterprises through more efficient use of the factors of production;
- To reduce the size of the public sector (termed *demonopolization*) and lessen and eventually eliminate the burden on the public budget caused by the payment of state subsidies to unprofitable and failing SOEs;
- To generate funds from the sale of state-owned-enterprises or their shares (termed *commercialization*) for use in the transformation process;
- To ensure a wide diffusion of ownership of privatized assets; and
- To provide an effective system of corporate governance of newly privatized enterprises.

## A multi-Track Policy

### The MPP

Several strategies were employed simultaneously in order to meet these systemic objectives. To these ends, the Mass Privatization Program (MPP) was initiated in December of 1994. It was the “brainchild” of Finance Minister Janusz Lewandowski<sup>4</sup>. The MPP ultimately resulted in the transformation of 512 state-owned-enterprises, which represented *10 percent of Poland’s national assets at that time*. How were the funds created? In December of 1994, the Ministry of the Treasury established 15 funds as joint-stock, limited liability companies, wholly owned by the Treasury. During the next two-year

<sup>3</sup> The “Balcerowicz Team” consisted, among others, of Marek Dabrowski, later deputy in the Ministry of Finance; Stefan Kawalec, first chief adviser, responsible for financial institutions; Janusz Sawicki, responsible for foreign debt negotiations; Andrzej Podsiadlo, who oversaw state enterprises; and Grzegorz Wojtowicz, first deputy chairman of the Polish National Bank, and its chairman in 1991. All were graduates of the Faculty of Foreign Trade of the Central School of Planning and Statistics in Warsaw, Poland’s premier school for state planning and for producing “policy experts.” Wojciech Misiag and Ryszard Pazura were also deputies in the Ministry of Finance. In addition, the team included numerous *foreign advisers* – Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton, Wladyslaw Brzeski, Stanislaw Gomulka, Jacek Rostowski, and Stanislaw Welisz – and *Polish ones* – Karol Lutkowski, Andrzej Bratkowski, Antoni Kantecki, Adam Lipowski, Andrzej Parkola, and Andrzej Ochocki. Many of the foreign advisers were of Polish origin – so called *Polonia academics*.

<sup>4</sup> The mass privatization program was known in Poland by the acronym PPP, standing for *Program Pow-szechniej Prywatyzacji*.

period, the Ministry transferred 60 percent of the shares of the selected state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to the National Investment Funds (NIFs), retaining 25 percent in the Treasury and reserving 15 percent for employees of the individual enterprises. The main objective of the MPP was to provide market access, capital, and technology to the privatized enterprises – as well as eventually increasing individual shareholder value<sup>5</sup> Every eligible Pole was able to receive a Universal Share Certificate for 20 zlotys or approximately \$7.00, which could then be sold to another person or organization or exchanged for shares in any of the created National Investment Funds. *Around 27 million adult Poles took part in the program.* The NIFs were managed by a carefully constructed combination of Polish and foreign consulting companies, commercial banks, and consortia through tenders of NIF shares. The certificates were distributed from November 1995 through November 1996 and were collected by an astounding 96 percent of eligible Poles. The funds themselves began trading on the WSE on July 15, 1997. A capital market thus literally rose from the ashes of the command-and-rationing system through the creation of the National Investment Funds.

### Privatization Procedures

Other more limited privatization strategies were also established. Two major privatization methods were effected in Poland: *Indirect privatization* (often referred to as *commercialization*), accomplished through a publicly announced offer, a public tender, negotiations commenced following a public invitation, and acceptance of the offer by the subject announcing the privatization call;<sup>6</sup> and *direct privatization* (mainly used in cases of small and medium sized companies), accomplished through sale of an enterprise, contribution of an enterprise into an existing company (traditional merger and acquisition activity), and “giving over an enterprise for use against payment” – a traditional lease arrangement. These arrangements may include enterprises in which a majority of employees are state employees<sup>7</sup>.

These strategies will be explained in greater detail in the following discussion.

<sup>5</sup> For a discussion of the early phase of the mass privatization program, see R. Puntillo & D. Ibsen, “Poland’s Mass Privatization Program,” *The European Journal of Finance*, Vol. 2, (March 1996: 41–55); Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V, Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Artur Nowak, “The Zig-Zag Road to Polish Privatization,” in *International Business in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Khosrow Fatemi & Susan E.W. Nichols eds., 1995: 1079–1107). See also Iraj Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund: Mass Privatisation with a Difference?” *Comparative Economic Studies*, Vol. 42, No. 1, pp. 87–134; Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., “Privatization and Transformation in Poland,” *The Polish Review*, Vol. 49, (2004): 43. For a summary discussion of the Polish experience with privatization, see Richard J. Hunter, Jr. & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., “A Field Report on the Background and Processes of Privatization in Poland,” *Global Economy Journal*, Vol. 8, Issue 1, Article 5 (Spring 2008).

<sup>6</sup> See Article 88, par. 4, Art. 154 of the Act of August 21, 1997 – *The Law on Public Conveyance of Securities*, Journal Item 447.

<sup>7</sup> See “*An Act of August 30, 1996 on commercialization and privatization*,” No. 171, Item 1397, as amended.

## Indirect Privatization<sup>8</sup>

Indirect privatization is the sale of State Treasury's) government) shares in a company. The first step in the process is termed "commercialization." The process may be commenced in a variety of ways: at the initiative of the director of the state-owned-enterprise (SOE) and its employee board, or its founding entity, or at the initiative of the Minister of the Treasury. The entity may be transformed into a *joint stock* or limited liability company. In changing the legal and organizational form of the entity, the new company established through commercialization will now function according to the provisions of the Commercial Company Code, the Act of August 30th, 1996 on Commercialization and Privatization and individual company regulations/articles of incorporation.

In a company that has been established through the process of commercialization, the State Treasury takes over 100% of the shares (stakes) of the corporation. In order to assure transparency and secure the public character in the sale of the State Treasury's shares, the offer of the shares, the invitation to tender, or the invitation to enter into negotiations are required to be published in at least one national journal and in the Public Information Bulletin (*Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej*). The consent of the Council of Ministers is necessary for the sale of shares/stakes of the State Treasury by any manner other than the prescribed public procedure. A breach of the statutory requirements regarding the sale of shares in a company owned by the State Treasury will render the action invalid.

The legal authority for the process of commercialization may be found in the Privatization Act, the Commercial Company Code,<sup>9</sup> and the regulation of the Council of Ministers of December 20, 2004, providing for detailed procedure for selling State Treasury shares,<sup>10</sup> as well as the regulation of the Council of Ministers of December 14, 2004 on financing the sale of shares and the form and conditions of payment for shares acquired from the State Treasury<sup>11</sup>. These enactments provide detailed regulations

<sup>8</sup> Information on indirect and direct privatization is adapted from the website of the Ministry of the Treasury, "Privatization Procedures," at <http://www.msp.gov.pl> (last accessed December 13, 2012). We are indebted to the Ministry for providing detailed information on the methods and procedures currently in use in the privatization process.

<sup>9</sup> See, e.g., Anna Flick and Gerhard Lang, "New Polish Commercial Company Code," *International Business Lawyer*, Vol. 28, No. 11 (2000), available at <http://www.archive.ibanet.org>. There are three main forms of conducting business in Poland:

- *Spółka akcyjna (SA)* – Join-Stock Company;
- *Spółka z ograniczoną odpowiedzialnością (z o.o.)* – Limited Liability Company; and
- *Spółka komandytowa*- Limited Partnership.

In general, citizens of foreign countries who hold the right of permanent residence in Poland may make use of the same rights as Polish citizens in terms of undertaking and conducting a business activity in Poland. Foreign persons may undertake and conduct business activity in Poland according to the principle of *reciprocity*, provided that international agreements ratified by Poland do not stipulate otherwise.

<sup>10</sup> Journal of Laws, No. 286, item 2871.

<sup>11</sup> Journal of Laws, No 269, item 2666.

regarding the procedures for selling shares in State Treasury companies and the forms of payment for such shares.

Before the shares of a company established through commercialization are offered to the general public for sale, the legal status of company property, as well as a company's general financial condition and prospects for future development, will be analyzed in detail. In addition, a company's value will be assessed and the performance of duties relating to environmental protection requirements will be evaluated. Especially relevant is the regulation of the Council of Ministers of June 3rd, 1997 on the scope of analysis of a company or state enterprise, the procedure of its commissioning, preparation, submission, and financing, and the conditions, which, when fulfilled, might allow the entity to forego the analysis<sup>12</sup>. This provision provides information on the scope of analysis as well as other relevant issues.

#### ***a. A publicly announced offer***

The offer of sale of the State Treasury's shares will include the following: information identifying the seller; the legal basis for the sale; the firm, registered office and company address; the nature of its business activity; the number and kind of shares offered; the beginning and ending of the offering term; the place where written declarations accepting the offer shall be submitted; and the value of the any deposit required of a prospective buyer.

When the first declaration accepting the offer arrives, a *sales agreement* is concluded. In the event that the price for shares is not paid on time, the agreement ceases to be binding and the deposit paid is forfeited.

#### ***b. Public tender***

A public tender involves publicly inviting potential purchasers to submit offers for the purchase of State Treasury's shares. An announcement on a public tender will specify with specificity the number and kind of shares, their nominal value, a minimum sales price of one share, the maximum term for which a tender's participant is bound to the offer, and the form, venue and procedure of providing a deposit. During the time specified in the invitation, potential purchasers, having fulfilled the initial tender requirements, will receive written information about the company. After the lapse of the term provided for submitting the offers, the Minister of Treasury will open all the offers submitted by potential purchasers, assess their compliance with the announcement, and then will choose the most advantageous offer. The Minister may also decide to reject a tender offer. If accepted, the Minister of the Treasury signs a "shares purchase agreement" with the successful offeror.

<sup>12</sup> Journal of Laws, No 69, item 408.

### *c. Negotiations commenced following a public invitation*

An invitation to enter into negotiations will specify in particular information relating to the seller; the legal basis for the sale; data regarding the company; the number and kind of shares; their nominal value; and the place, procedure, form, and time allowed for responding to the invitation. The seller is entitled to reserve the right to withdraw from negotiations without giving a reason or to change the procedure and schedule of negotiations.

Negotiations with a potential purchaser will primarily concern the number of shares, sales price, payment conditions, investment obligations, and any required “social package” of benefits for company employees. Negotiation procedures provide for the possibility of granting “negotiating exclusivity” to one party. However, during any negotiations, employees of the Ministry of the Treasury, as well as professional privatization advisers, are obligated not to inform “third persons” about other potential purchasers and the course of negotiations. Only information agreed upon with the purchaser will be publicly announced following the conclusion of the sales agreement.

## **Direct Privatisation**

The main goal of direct privatization is to provide tools for effecting “fast ownership changes” in state enterprises, generally characterized as small or medium size businesses. Direct privatization is accomplished through the sale, or merger of a company or enterprise into another company, or “giving an enterprise for use against payment” – i.e., a traditional “use” or lease agreement. This type of privatization is *direct* in the sense that it is implemented without a state enterprise assuming a legal and organizational form of a sole shareholder company of State Treasury.

Both physical (individual) and legal persons may participate in the direct privatization of state enterprises. A distinguishing feature of direct privatization is the fact that is “carried out by state enterprises’ founding organs on behalf of and with the consent of [the] State Treasury.”<sup>13</sup> The process of preparing and implementing direct privatization is generally *decentralized*; however, the so-called “founding organs” play a decisive role in the form of the sixteen Polish *voivods* or governors. The Minister of the Treasury, within the statutorily defined scope, controls and supervises direct privatization by consenting to launch the implementation of individual privatization projects. At the beginning of 2002, the Minister of the Treasury authorized the directors of the Ministry’s Regional Offices to have the authority to grant on his behalf the consent for the direct privatization of state enterprises supervised by *voivods*. This decentralization may be viewed in direct contrast to the period of communism in Poland where the *nomenklatura* – a quintessentially “top down” organizational structure – controlled all aspects of Polish

<sup>13</sup> *Id.*

economic life. As we have reported on many occasions, “By the late 1980s, the system had virtually elapsed into a “lunatic collage of incompetence, privilege, pandering and outright corruption,” based on a “principle of underqualification and a ‘perverted practice’ of negative selection.”<sup>14</sup> The role of the *voivod* is in sharp contrast.

The *voivods* are responsible for initiating the direct privatization process, preparing a state enterprise for privatization, soliciting and selecting investors, and defining the terms of transaction. Once the *voivods* have obtained the consent of the Minister of the Treasury for the privatization of a given state enterprise, the *voivod* will finalize the privatization process and sign appropriate agreements with the investor on behalf of the State Treasury.

Direct privatization is carried out with a recognition of the obligations towards employees (for example, retaining workplaces, assuring adequate social welfare and benefit packages for employees), and the “social aspects” of investments, including taking into account environmental protection considerations in the investment.

#### ***a. Sale of an enterprise***

This form of direct privatization may be used for all enterprises and especially for an enterprise that might require the infusion of investment capital. Payment for the enterprise may be in a lump sum or may be effected in installments. However, pursuant to requirements of the Acts on Commercialization and Privatization, the first installment is required to amount to at least 20% of the agreed price of an enterprise. The remaining portion of the agreed upon price may be paid in installments, with interest over a five year period.

#### ***b. Contribution of an enterprise into a company***

A second form of direct privatization is the contribution (effective merger) of the enterprise into an existing company. This form relies on the State Treasury making

<sup>14</sup> See Lawrence Weschler, *Solidarity: Poland in the Season of Its Passion*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), 46. The role of the *nomenklatura* is still hotly debated in Polish society. A pattern was common in transition economies throughout the region. Not surprisingly, members of the *nomenklatura* almost immediately became active in private businesses and banks – especially as the prospects for advancing their bureaucratic careers in the “new system” appeared more limited. The particular type of privatization carried out by the *nomenklatura* in the early period has sometimes derisively been referred to as “spontaneous privatization,” but was in reality theft of public assets and property. For a discussion of the phenomenon of “spontaneous privatization,” see Richard J. Hunter & Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V., *From Autarchy to Market*, (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997), 112–113. Directors and managers exercised their new authority to split up state companies or to spin off or divest units into limited liability companies or other new joint ventures. Skilled workers were often transferred to the new enterprises to the detriment of their former enterprises. Members of the *nomenklatura* have also greatly benefited politically and economically from popular discontent that is practically unavoidable during economic reforms started under very difficult economic conditions and circumstances. Members of the *nomenklatura* have been major “winners” in the transformation process. The issue of winners vs. losers in post-communist Poland is discussed at length in Richard J. Hunter, Jr., Leo V. Ryan, C.S.V. & Andrew Hrechak, “Out of Communism to What? The Polish Economy and Solidarity in Perspective,” *The Polish Review*, Vol. 39, (1994): 328–329, 334–335.

a contribution “in kind” in the form of the enterprise and in return taking over an appropriate number of shares in the newly established enterprise. This form of privatization is designed to assure the access of credible and financially sound *strategic partners* (both Polish or foreign). In addition, employees, creditors, or other individuals may enter into similar agreements.

### *c. Giving an enterprise for use against payment*

With regard to the leasing option, provisions generally favor Polish domestic corporations composed of physical persons that might also include employees of a state enterprise. The leasing option may be concluded for the maximum period of *fifteen years* and will involve both rental (installment) and additional fees<sup>15</sup> negotiated on purely commercial terms. The lease option is designed mainly for enterprises in “good economic-and-financial standing.” Corporations seeking to benefit from the lease option are required to meet a number of conditions concerning the accumulation and availability of appropriate “registered” capital, enterprise structure, and the development of a realistic action plan that will indicate that the corporation will be able to function effectively and will be able to fulfill its financial and contractual obligations, including those obligations towards the State Treasury. In order to protect workers’ rights in the leasing option, and to assure an appropriate “investment and managerial mix,” the law introduced a condition stipulating so that at least 20% of registered capital of a corporation owned or controlled by employees should be taken over by physical persons who are not employed in the privatized company, i.e., external investors.

## **Developments and Prospects Under The PiS**

The *Warsaw Voice* reported that “Privatization proceeded at snail’s pace in the two years the Law and Justice (PiS) party was in power.”<sup>16</sup> Gross revenue derived from privatization efforts in 2006 was zł.622 million and zł.1.95 billion in 2007<sup>17</sup>. These amounts were lower than projected revenues, resulting in higher taxes in the Polish economy due to the increasing cost of servicing Poland’s public debt. What were some of the challenges and opportunities that faced the government and Polish society in the area of privatization during this period? Then-Minister of the Treasury Aleksander Grad offered some interesting insights that would be helpful in refiguring privatization plans for the period 2009–2011 that would involve *670 companies in 40 sectors – most especially power, chemical, and finance*:

<sup>15</sup> Regulation of the Council of Ministers of December 15, 2004, Journal of Laws, No 269, item 2667.

<sup>16</sup> See “Privatization Must be Transparent” (An interview with then Treasury Minister Aleksander Grad), *The Warsaw Voice-Business*, February 10–17, 2008, 40.

<sup>17</sup> For a listing of privatization projects in 2006 and 2007, see Ministry of the Treasury, “Privatization in 2007,” at [http://www.msp.gov.pl/index\\_eng.php?dzial=49&id=333](http://www.msp.gov.pl/index_eng.php?dzial=49&id=333).

- Privatization was no longer only the area of interest for managing and supervisory boards – employees and trade unions were now heavily involved in privatization efforts;
- The value of real investments by investors who took part in the privatization process was “many times more than investors were obliged to invest,” raising the question of “insider deals” and special economic relationships and arrangements in the privatization process;
- Civic Platform (PO), the main opposition party to PiS was committed to making the privatization process more open and *transparent* by “declassifying” certain contracts, creating specialized “privatization files” for each privatization process accessible to the general public, providing information concerning when the process is to begin, the parties who are involved, and the time when decisions were required to be made;
- The government was committed to the separation of supervisory boards from politics to assure accountability of the process;
- Privatization revenues were expected to grow to zł.2.3 billion in 2008; and
- The government was committed to take a “long range” view of privatization, designing a four- year privatization program that was designed to instill long-term investor confidence in the process.

The list of companies to be fully privatized in 2008–2009 contained over 300 enterprises, many of which had actually been privatized in the past but in which the Treasury still held a minority stake. These included companies involved in agriculture, and in the furniture, tourist, leather, publishing, and printing sectors. However, the list of companies did *not* include so-called “strategic companies” in the fuel and energy sector such as PKN Orlen,<sup>18</sup> Lotos,<sup>19</sup> KGHM,<sup>20</sup> and PGNiG,<sup>21</sup> in which the state was still a major stakeholder.

<sup>18</sup> The following is taken from the website of the company:

“PKN ORLEN fuel stations form the largest retail network in Poland and one of the largest in Central Europe. *ORLEN* offers fuels and non-fuel products of the highest quality, new card programs for institutional and individual clients, competitive prices, quick and friendly service.

Sales in Poland currently run at 1,922 fuel stations operating under two main brands: *ORLEN* and *Petrochemia Plock*. Within the Polish network, 1,393 outlets are ORLEN owned, whereas 428 are dealer operated and 101 are franchised.”

The company also has retail stations in Lithuania, Germany, and the Czech Republic. See <http://www.orken.pl> (the website of PKN Orlen),

<sup>19</sup> From the website of Lotos: “Grupa LOTOS S.A. (Rafineria Gdańska SA till 2 June 2003) is one of the largest Polish companies, and the largest company in Pomeranian Region. Activities include processing of petroleum, distribution and sale of a wide range of petroleum products, such as lead-free fuels, diesel oils, heating oils, aviation fuel, lubricating oils, asphalts, and gases.” See <http://www.lotos.pl/en/>.

<sup>20</sup> KGHM is involved in copper mining and production. See <http://www.kghm.pl>.

<sup>21</sup> PGNiG is a Polish company involved in gas exploration and production. See <http://www.pgnig.pl>.

Under the plan enunciated by PiS, the government would continue to control several important areas of the economy. This list included companies involved in Poland's energy infrastructure (supplying oil refineries), and companies and institutions that fulfill important "public roles," such as public television and radio. Minister Grad included *Lasy Państwowe*<sup>22</sup> in this category.

All of these plans changed dramatically with the election of the Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska or PO) to majority status in November of 2007.

## The 2008–2011 Privatization Plan<sup>23</sup>

The **Privatization Plan for 2008–2011**, prepared by the Ministry of Treasury and approved by the Council of Ministers in April 2008 provides for the privatization of 802 companies. The program has been underway for the last 18 months. The program is based on the government's decision to increase the pace of privatization considerably. The Ministry of Treasury developed a program, involving the selection of 58 key companies to be privatized in the years 2009–2010; 19 companies by the end of 2009; and the remaining 39 companies in 2010.

The information found in this section encompasses the period 2009–2010. It includes plans that had previously been developed by the Ministry of Privatization. As found on the website of the Ministry of Privatization, the key privatization project offer includes:

### 1. Energy Sector

Enea S.A. has been listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange since 17 November 2008. The Ministry of Treasury owns 76.48% of the shares and intends to sell 67.05% of this amount in 2009 through negotiations. On 27 July 2009, the Ministry of Treasury announced an invitation to negotiations and on 17 August 2009 it decided to invite a potential investor to the next stage of privatization of Enea. PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna S.A. is a parent company of the largest Polish capital group in the energy sector and one of the largest groups in Central and Eastern Europe. The Treasury owns 100% of the shares, and intends to sell up to 10% of this amount on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2010 as a stake of shares to be sold in several lots. The first phase of privatization involves the listing of PGE shares on the Warsaw Stock Exchange in 2009. Consisting of 94 companies, Tauron Polska Energia S.A. is Poland's second-largest provider of electric power. The Treasury owns 100% of the shares and intends to sell a part of its stake to the level enabling to retain the state control over the company, in the IPO on the WSE

<sup>22</sup> See [http://www.lp.gov.pl/media/biblioteka/in\\_english](http://www.lp.gov.pl/media/biblioteka/in_english).

<sup>23</sup> The information that follows is taken directly from the website of the Ministry of Privatization. It is found in edited form. The Appendix to the paper contains information on one company from each of the mentioned sectors.

or through negotiations with sector investors on the basis of public invitation. Energa S.A. controls a capital group of 44 companies. The Treasury owns 100% of the shares and intends to sell 85% in 2010 through negotiations with industry investors. Zespół Elektrowni Pątnów Adamów Konin S.A. is Poland's second-largest provider of electric power obtained from brown coal. The privatization process will involve the sale through negotiations of the entire stake of 50% shares owned by the Treasury in 2010.

Other energy companies intended to be sold in 2009 include: Wojewódzkie Przedsiębiorstwo Energetyki Ciepłej S.A., Elektrociepłownia Zabrze S.A., Nadwiślańska Spółka Energetyczna S.A. and Zespół Elektrociepłowni Bytom S.A., in which the Treasury will sell through negotiations 85% out of 100% of shares, as well as Zespół Elektrociepłowni Wrocławskich Kogeneracja S.A. (3.68%, sale on the regulated market). Thirteen more companies from this sector are intended to be privatized by 2011.

## **2. Chemical and Plastics Sector and Chemical Resources Mines**

Intended to be privatized in 2009 are the companies forming the so-called First Chemical Group of the Great Chemical Synthesis: Ciech S.A., Zakłady Azotowe Kędzierzyn S.A. and Zakłady Azotowe Tarnów. The Treasury owns 36.68% of the shares in Ciech and (together with Nafta Polska S.A.) 86.28% and 52.56% of the shares in ZA Kędzierzyn and ZA Tarnów respectively. Respectively 36.68%, 86.28% and 52.15% of the shares of these companies are intended for sale. Privatization of the companies forming the group shall take place in 2009 through negotiations conducted by Nafta Polska S.A. pursuant to the agreement with the Treasury. On 26 June 2009, Nafta Polska published the invitation to negotiations. The deadline for submitting written responses was 15 September 2009.

Intended for sale through negotiations in 2010 are two further Great Chemical Synthesis companies, i.e. Zakłady Azotowe Puławy S.A. (50.12% out of 50.70% of shares owned by the Treasury) and Zakłady Chemiczne Police S.A. (59.23% out of 59.41%). Intended is also the sale through negotiations of 85% out of 100% of shares owned by the Treasury in Azoty-Adipol S.A. and Kopalnie i Zakłady Chemiczne Siarki Siarkopol w Grzybowie S.A. 12 companies from these sectors will be sold in 2009–2011.

## **3. Financial Institutions**

Giełda Papierów Wartościowych w Warszawie S.A. (Warsaw Stock Exchange), in which the Treasury holds 98.82% of shares, was scheduled for privatization in 2009. Currently, the process of verification of initial offers placed by 4 investors is underway. In 2010, the sale of 3.68% in the bank BPH S.A. and 2.49% in Bank Handlowy w Warszawie S.A. is planned (most probably on the regulated market). The list of privatization projects for the years 2009–2010 also includes PKO BP S.A., in which the Treasury holds 51.49% of the shares. As part of its expansion plan, the bank will issue new shares to increase the share capital. By 2011, the Ministry of Treasury also plans to privatize another 6 financial institutions.

#### **4. Coal Mines, Mining Related Industry and Coke Industry**

Lubelski Węgiel Bogdanka S.A. – one of the Poland's largest coal mines, debuted on 25 June 2009 on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Following an initial public offering the Treasury retained a majority stake. Upon registration of increase of the company's share capital, the Treasury's share will be 65.50%. Also earmarked for privatization in 2010 are Kopalnia Węgla Brunatnego Konin S.A. and Kopalnia Węgla Brunatnego Adamów S.A., in which the Treasury intends to sell through negotiations 85% of its 100% stake. By 2011, the Treasury plans to privatize another 8 companies from these sectors.

#### **5. Pharmaceutical Sector**

In 2010, the sale through a public tender of 41.65% out of 49.00% stake held in Cefarm-Rzeszów S.A. is planned as well as privatization of Tarchomińskie Zakłady Farmaceutyczne Polfa S.A. (16.71%) and Warszawskie Zakłady Farmaceutyczne Polfa S.A. (5.14%), as well as 5 more companies from the pharmaceutical sector.

#### **6. Petroleum Industry**

In 2010, the Treasury plans to sell a part of its stake in Grupa Lotos S.A. (63.97% together with Nafta Polska) with retaining a majority stake by the Treasury, and through negotiations 85% of its 100% stake held in OBR Przemysłu Rafineryjnego S.A. By 2011, another 3 companies from the Polish oil industry will be privatized.

#### **7. Iron, Steel and Non-Ferrous Metallurgy and Rock Materials**

Earmarked for sale in 2009 on the regulated market is 4.52% of the Treasury's share in Grupa Kęty S.A. In 2010, the sale up to 10% of the Treasury's stake held in the company KGHM Polska Miedź S.A. is planned while retaining ownership control over the company, and 85% out of 100% held in Centrozłom Wrocław S.A. (negotiations) and Zakłady Górniczo-Hutnicze Bolesław S.A. (sale on regulated market). By 2011, the privatization of another 19 companies from these sectors is planned.

#### **8. Defense industry**

In 2010, the sale of the entire stake held by the Treasury in Huta Stalowa Wola S.A. (56,82%, through negotiations) is planned and 85% out of 100% held in Zakłady Tworzyw Sztucznych Gamrat S.A. (negotiations, initial offers shall be filed by 15 September 2009).

In the years 2009 and 2010 the Treasury plans to privatize its entire stake held in Wytwórnia Sprzętu Komunikacyjnego PZL-Kalisz S.A. (53.94%, through negotiations). By 2011, the privatization of another 28 companies from the defense sector is planned.

#### **9. Construction, building industry and ceramics**

In 2009, the Treasury will sell 2.12% of its shares held in Cersanit S.A. and 3.50% in Elektrobudowa S.A. By 2011, the Treasury will sell its shares in about 50 more companies in these sectors.

### **10. Trade enterprises and enterprise development agencies**

In 2009, the sale of 33.21% shares in Kopex S.A. is planned on the regulated market. In 2010, the State Treasury will sell through a response to a call preceded by negotiations its whole 55.07% stake in Ruch S.A., the largest Polish press distributor and one of the largest distributors of FMCG articles, and through the public offer 85% of its 100% stake in Towarzystwo Obrotu Nieruchomościami Agro S.A. and Intraco S.A. The Ministry of Treasury also plans to sell its whole stake in Nadwiślańska Spółka Mieszkaniowa Sp. z o.o. (96.47%, through negotiations). By 2011, it is planned to sell another 15 trade enterprises and 12 enterprise development agencies.

### **11. Wood, paper and furniture industries**

Mondi Packaging Paper Świecie S.A. (5%, sale on the regulated market) and Fabryka "Sklejka-Pisz" S.A. (85% out of 100%, through negotiations) are earmarked for privatization in 2009. By 2011, it is planned to privatize another 12 companies from these sectors.

### **12. Tourism**

In 2009, the privatization of Gliwicka Agencja Turystyczna S.A. (100%, through an auction) and Wojewódzkie Przedsiębiorstwo Usług Turystycznych Sp. z o.o. (85% out of 100%, through negotiations) is due to be carried out. The 4-year privatization plan also envisages privatizing another 11 tourism companies.

### **13. Metal and machine industries**

In 2010, the State Treasury intends to sell on the basis of negotiations its 85% out of 100% shares in Remag S.A. For Zakłady Górniczo-Metalowe Zębice S.A. various privatization methods are considered. By 2011, it is planned to privatize about 60 more companies from these sectors.

### **14. Food, sugar, meat, distillery and farming-related industries**

In 2010, the State Treasury plans to sell its stake in Warszawski Rolno-Spożywczy Rynek Hurtowy S.A. (59.32%), for which, along with Fabryka Osłonek Białkowych "Fabios" S.A., various privatization methods are considered. By 2011, it is planned to privatize about 50 more companies from these sectors.

### **15. Transport and transport means industries**

The Ministry of Treasury list of privatization projects includes Polskie Linie Lotnicze LOT S.A., in which the State Treasury holds 67.97% of shares. The 4-year privatization plan also envisages privatizing 115 companies from the transport sector, including about 80 public road transport enterprises (the so-called Przedsiębiorstwa Komunikacji Samochodowej).

## 16. Other sectors

In 2009, the State Treasury will sell its shares in Telekomunikacja Polska S.A. (1.04% out of 4.15% of shares owned, on the regulated market). In 2010, the remaining 3.11% of the shares will be sold. By 2011, the State Treasury shares in another 3 telecommunication companies will be sold. In 2010, the State Treasury intends to sell through negotiations 85% of the shares in Polska Żegluga Bałtycka S.A. (and by 2011 another 10 companies from this sector), Zakłady Graficzne “Dom Słowa Polskiego” S.A. (and by 2011 another 18 companies from the publishing and printing sector), Zespół Uzdrowisk Kłodzkich S.A. (and by 2010 another 11 health resorts) and Lubuskie Zakłady Aparatów Elektrycznych Lumel S.A. (and by 2011 the remaining 16 companies from the electrical and electronic sectors) as well as Dipservice w Warszawie S.A. It is also planned to privatize Mennica Polska S.A. through the sale of the whole 31.64% State Treasury stake on the regulated market. The Privatization Plan for 2008–2011 also envisages the privatization of 7 companies from the shipbuilding industry, 16 from the farming and breeding sector, 23 from the clothing industry, 26 of service entities, 29 companies from the NIF programme, as well as other residual stakes, not mentioned above.

## Privatization “Realities” in 2012

In December of 2011, Polish Treasury Minister Mikołaj Budzanowski announced that 300 companies will be included in the government’s privatization program for the 2012–2013 period, including ZE PAK (Pątnów – Adamów – Konin Power Plant Group) and Polski Holding Nieruchomości (Polish Real Estate Holding Group).

The following represents a survey of Polish companies being prepared for privatization:

- 19.12.2011:* Invitation to a public tender to purchase shares of Fabryka Maszyn Introligatorskich INTROMA sp. z o.o. with its registered office in Łódź. The final date for submitting Offers for purchase of the Company share is 20 January 2012 at 2:00 pm (Warsaw time).
- 19.12.2011:* Invitation to a public tender to purchase shares of Wytwórnia Filtrów “PZL-Sędziszów” S.A. with its registered office in Sędziszów Małopolski. The final date for submitting Offers for purchase of the Company’s shares is 19.01.2012 at 2.00 pm (Warsaw time).
- 14.12.2011:* Invitation to a public tender to purchase shares of Przedsiębiorstwo Komunikacji Samochodowej w Myszkowie spółka z o. o. with its registered office in Myszków. The final date for submitting Offers for purchase of the Company share is 18 January 2012 at 2:00 pm (Warsaw time).
- 13.12.2011:* Invitation to participate in the auction concerning the purchase of the shares of Fabryka Przyrządów i Uchwytów. Auction applications should be submitted by 10 January 2012. The auction will be held on 13 January 2012 at 10:00 am.
- 12.12.2011:* Invitation to negotiations regarding the purchase of shares of Fabryka

Maszyn “BUMAR. The deadline for submitting written responses is 23 January 2012, 2:00 pm.

- 12.12.2011: Invitation to a public tender to purchase shares of Przedsiębiorstwo Komunikacji Samochodowej w Siedlcach S.A. with its registered office in Siedlce. The final date for submitting Offers for purchase of the Company’s shares is 16 January 2012 at 2.00 pm Warsaw time.
- 12.12.2011: Invitation to a public tender to purchase shares of Elektrocarbon spółka z o. o. with its registered office in Tarnowskie Góry. The final date for submitting Offers for purchase of the Company share is 12 January 2012 at 2:00 pm (Warsaw time).
- 05.12.2011: Invitation to negotiations regarding the purchase of shares of Przemysłowy Instytut Maszyn Budowlanych Sp. z o.o. with its registered office in Kobyłka. The deadline for submitting written responses is 3 January 2012, 2:00 pm.
- 05.12.2011: Change in the terms of the auction for the purchase of shares of Przedsiębiorstwo Budownictwa Elektroenergetycznego “ELBUD” Gdańsk S.A. with its registered office in Sopot.

## 7. A Privatization Update: 2012<sup>24</sup>

The Ministry of the Treasury announced in its 2012–2013 Privatization Plan that the Polish government will continue selling down stakes in the listed, large-capitalized companies it controls, such as PKO Bank Polski SA (PKO.WA) and insurer PZU SA (PZU.WA), but will maintain operational control over them.

The current plan, which covers 300 companies, aims to raise 10 billion zlotys (\$3.2 billion) in 2012, compared with privatization income of PLN13.1 billion in 2011, and PLN22 billion in 2010.

It should be recognized that in 2012 – after more than 20 years of economic change and transformation – Poland still owns about PLN100 billion worth of companies across various sectors.

The 2012–2013 program continues a policy of selling stakes in large companies and selling controlling stakes in small companies – a policy that has been in place since 2008. The current plan includes proposals to sell stakes in coking coal miner Jastrzebska Spolka Weglowa SA (JSW.WA) and other, unlisted coal miners, as well as power utilities and hundreds of smaller companies.

In addition to the sale of 279 companies controlled by the Treasury Ministry, the plan includes the sale of 15 companies overseen by the Defense Ministry, four companies overseen by the Economy Ministry and two overseen by the Transport Ministry.

As of 2012, the Ministry of the Treasury listed 49 companies the government deems

<sup>24</sup> See Dow Jones Newswire, “Poland Continues Privatization Drive with Plan Through 2013,” <http://www.foxbusiness.com/news/2012/03/27/poland-continues-privatization-drive-with-plan-through-2013/#ixzz1-sZvbVM2O>, March 27, 2012.

“strategic,” including PZU, PKO BP, refiners PKN Orlen SA (PKN.WA) and Grupa Lotos SA (LTS.WA), gas company PGNiG SA (PGN.WA), copper miner KGHM Polska Miedz SA (KGH.WA), power companies PGE Polska Grupa Energetyczna SA (PGE.WA) and Tauron Polska Energia SA (TPE.WA), but also a music publisher, radio and television stations, and tourist favorite the Wieliczka salt mine.

It should be noted that power utilities Energa SA and Enea SA (ENA.WA) were absent from the strategic list, suggesting the ministry plans to sell off its entire holdings in these two companies.

### **Some Concluding Comments**

As can be demonstrated, privatization has been a core component of the Polish process of transformation begun in 1989. Privatization has been the engine providing capital to underpin many of the important systemic changes accomplished in the Polish economy. Perhaps more importantly, privatization has been the key to de-statism in Poland and to creating a fully operational private economy. Through de-statism, Poland has been able to join the family of Western nations that have embarked on a calculus that private ownership of the factors of production – most especially of the major industries in Polish society – is the key measure of assessing success.



# Civil Society, Government and the Opposition Movements in Poland: The Post-Communist Role Reversal

MAGDA STROIŃSKA

*McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada*

*'Without civil society, democracy remains an empty shell; without civil society, the market becomes a jungle.'*

Michael Ignatieff<sup>1</sup>

## Introduction

Before 1989, big industry in Poland's centrally planned economy was more or less synonymous with the communist structure of power and its antidemocratic principles. Inefficient factories were destroying the environment and low wages were contributing to the pauperization of the work force. Support for the communist government was low because it was seen as an imposter, loyal to a foreign power instead of to the people. Poland's civil society, on the other hand, represented by intellectual and moral elites, independent (underground) trade unions and the Catholic Church, grew out of the opposition to this oppression and was treated as both a panacea and a solution to all the social and political problems (cf. Załęski 2006). Now, almost 25 years later, little is left of communism's heavy industry – it simply did not pass the test of market economy. On the other hand, those who were involved in the establishment of the civil society in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s are still around. After 1989 they became engaged either in the new government structures or the post-communist businesses and corporations. As such, they were the ones making the business decisions, shaping the country's new market economy and fashioning a democratically organized political structure that truly represents Polish interests. However, these same civil society activists left a vacuum that was filled by social movements of a new breed: they form a populist, often nationalistic (anti-globalist or even xenophobic) and increasingly militant alternative to the pro European Union politicians and the big businesses with ties to Western economies.

---

<sup>1</sup> Michael Ignatieff was the leader of the Liberal Party of Canada and leader of the Official Opposition (2008–2011); quoted in Dahal' Dev Raj, 2011.

While the political situation in Poland has changed and still keeps changing, the language used to describe it lags behind and is even being abused in such a way that old distinctions are tainting the new divisions. This paper looks at political role reversal between government and the opposition in post communist Poland, at the role of language in creating the new social reality, and at the future of the idea of civil society.

## Opposition Movement in Poland

Everyone has an idiosyncratic perspective on historical and social developments and sees them from their own particular point of view. The author of this paper belongs to the generation that graduated from the university around summer of 1980, the time when the Solidarity movement in Poland was born. Many of us also experienced the imposition of the martial law in December 1981. Some of us left Poland, some stayed and lived through the eight years of a prolonged agony of the communist system. These years, whether experienced directly in Poland, or indirectly and from afar, have shaped our perception of the Polish transition from communism to democracy and from a centrally planned to market economy. This does not mean that my generation constitutes a homogeneous group and that we all think alike. Far from that! But we all share the same frame of reference in terms of the historical development, even if we happen to have different assessment of it. This paper is a reflection of my perspective on this transition and the role of the civil society in it.

In the context of the Polish history after WWII, the term *civil society* first came into use predominantly through English language publications and radio broadcasts. Poles themselves used to speak about *democratic opposition* to the communist government, *self-government*, and *dissidents*. The opposition organizations came into being as a result of the perceived need to protect human rights and as a result of mass protests by workers. For example the Movement for the Defense of Human and Civic Rights (Ruch Obrony Praw Człowieka i Obywatela or ROPCiO) was formed in 1975 and the Workers' Defense Committee (Komitet Obrony Robotników or KOR) was formed in 1976 to help prisoners and their families after the workers' protests in Radom in June of that year were brutally dispersed by police.

It is interesting to note that the first two major protests in communist Poland, the demonstrations in Poznań in June 1956 and the country wide student protests in March 1968 did not result in an across-the board mobilization of wider social groups: 1956 was seen as a workers' protest and 1968 is generally considered to be a student uprising. This perception, however, may be partly shaped by foreign broadcasting services such as Radio Free Europe and Voice of America that focused on students' riots in major cities and ignored a significant number of workers who were also arrested in the aftermath of the same events in other parts of the country. Andrzej Frischke (1994) reports that the largest category of those arrested and detained in March/April 1968 were in fact workers.

Poles listened to foreign radio stations broadcasting in the Polish language despite the fact that they were often jammed by the state. What Poles heard shaped their views of what was going on in the world and in their own country. Before the end of the 1970s many Poles believed that there was no other source of information that provided the complete truth. Obviously, it could not have been truly “complete” because foreign media had limited access to information in the smaller cities and, in some cases, had their own agenda. They were financed by foreign governments and so would have been focused on their domestic stakeholders and not necessarily on furthering the cause of the people of Poland.

It was only after the workers’ riots in December 1970, sparked by unexpected price hikes and brutally crushed by the government forces, that Poles from different professional groups and different social strata understood that they shared a vision for a more humane political system and social order. Both ROPCiO and KOR were an inspiration for getting involved and mustering the courage to defend the basic values of human dignity and solidarity. The formation of the Solidarity trade union movement following the workers’ strikes in 1980 would not have been possible without the work done by the independent opposition movements of the 1970s.

What was the main motivation and goal of the opposition movement in communist Poland? It was morality and justice. The very existence of the opposition movement was evidence that there were like-minded people prepared to risk their personal safety in defense of moral values. These values were part of what it meant then to be Polish. Morality was taught by the Church, especially on important national anniversaries and holidays. The population was almost all Catholic and the church retained a fair degree of independence during communist rule; even communist party members attended church or had relatives who did. These same values were also passed on from past epochs as the country’s history is important to Poles and the cycles of foreign oppression and persecution are well known. Literature and art perpetuated the ideals of fighting for freedom, and slogans such as “God, Honour and Fatherland” resonated in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century as much as they did during the two World Wars, the uprisings and partitions.

During the communist rule, Poles were united and opposed to the communist government to an unprecedented degree. Especially after 1970, the chances that a random person approached in the street would have a similar political outlook were high; the chances that they would inform the authorities about the anti-communist tendencies of their fellow Pole were low. There were obviously exceptions, but it may have been this feeling of relative safety and trust that helped to establish the foundations of the civil society in Poland. One particular event that in the view of many Poles played an important role in strengthening the feeling of collective power among ordinary people was the 1979 visit to Poland by the Polish born Pope John Paul II. The size of the crowds that welcomed the Pope and the fact that even policemen could be seen genuflecting and kneeling during the papal masses had an empowering effect.

## Civil Society

The idea of *civil society* (Polish *społeczeństwo obywatelskie*) is not a new one. In his study on neoliberalism and the civil society, Paweł S. Zającki (2012) traces it back to the philosophy of Alexis de Tocqueville and G.W.F. Hegel. Hegel (1820) understood it as a “market society” and described it as “a system of needs” of the consumers (251). Almond and Verba (1989) argue that political culture plays a very significant role in democracy as it fosters more political awareness among the citizens. This, in turn, translates into better informed voting choices, higher level of participation in politics, and more interest in holding government more accountable. Citizens’ participation in the life of the community, whether political or not, is crucial for holding the society together (cf. Putnam et al. 1994).

But what was the Polish understanding of the term *civil society*? In the view of the author’s generation, the essence of civil society was that citizens could have the transformational power. People who felt that it was up to them to create a better future for themselves and their children started to demand political freedom and respect for human dignity despite the overwhelming advantage of the government forces. And together they did transform Poland from an economically backward and undemocratic state to a modern democracy with a robust economy that was better able to weather the crisis of 2008 than many other EU states. What, perhaps, differentiated the civil society movement in Poland and some other East European countries (e.g., Rumania or the former Czechoslovakia), as well as from earlier revolutions was its ability to give to its opponents the same respect it asked for itself. While people wanted to see former communist officials punished, it was a punishment within a legal system they demanded, not a lynching. A more restrained language translated into more civilized actions.

The political and economic transformation after 1989 engaged largely the same people who were active in the 1970s and 1980s. With the power in the hands of the former opposition, there was initially no need to contest new authorities and, somehow, the need for a grass root activism that is the feeding ground for civil society disappeared. Young people embraced the new opportunities to travel and study abroad, and for many Poles consumerism proved more attractive than social activism. While it would seem that democracy is a better environment for civil society to thrive in, this was not the case in Poland.

## The Industry

The political transformation led to a transformed economy. Many of the heavy industry flagships of the communist regime – Nowa Huta Steel Works, Katowice Steel Works, Gdańsk Shipyard, some of the coalmines in Silesia – all but disappeared from the Polish landscape. They were inefficient and expensive to run, and they did not comply

with EU environmental standards. The principles of market economy eliminated those businesses that did not make the cut. Many factories and workplaces inherited by the post-communist government underwent significant restructuring, often ending up on the verge of bankruptcy before being bought out by foreign investors (e.g., Katowice Steel Works which had been part of Mittal Steel Poland S.A, the biggest steel company in the world, since 2003).

As a result, many regions experienced heavy job losses that, in turn, caused poverty and dissatisfaction with the new system. No one, not even Western economists, was prepared for the almost overnight collapse of the communist system, and so no one could have prepared the people of Eastern Europe for what lay ahead. Most Eastern Europeans had a false expectation that the transition to Western style democracy would bring immediate prosperity to their region. The image of full store shelves did not prompt people to consider how they would have enough money to afford the goods. In many cases, old jobs were no longer available and new jobs required new qualifications that for some were too often unattainable.

The new reality alienated many and created a big group of citizens who were dissatisfied, disgruntled, and hostile to a government that introduced harsh economic reforms. As it turned out, the reforms, carried out by the first Minister of Finance (after the June 1989 free elections and until 1991 and then again from 1997 until 2000), Leszek Balcerowicz (cf. Balcerowicz 2001) became the foundation of the new economy and helped strengthen Polish currency. Nevertheless, they also made Balcerowicz one of the most hated of politicians. As is often the case, a patient whose health has been compromised by years of abuse and neglect and who has been told of the need for a strict new regimen, often curses the cure rather than the cause of their disease. Thus people were often quick to turn against the post-communist government who tried to reform the economy, even to the point of becoming nostalgic about “the good old times” when there was full employment even though jobs were meaningless and the pay was minimal. The old communist system was perceived as a *welfare* state that *took care* of those less able – or willing – to work. It certainly did create that impression, as people did not have to compete for jobs by achieving higher and higher qualifications or by their willingness to work longer and harder. A free market economy does not support full (and fictional) employment and the resulting competition for fewer jobs turned many Poles – usually those for whom the adaptation was particularly difficult – against the new system.

This created new forms of opposition to the now democratic government in Poland, an opposition whose goals revolve not around the protection of human rights and freedoms but – in the best case – the protection of the economic privileges of times gone by.

Thus, the new industries in Poland may be more economically viable, better paying, and less damaging to the environment but they no longer supports a *socially* engaged working class. The new trade unions are no longer a breeding ground for Poland’s civil society. Instead, they are now *politically* engaged. It started with the defeat of communism in 1989 when Solidarność, as if by default, became a political party. This was not

the role it grew up to play and it was not prepared for it. Independent trade unions first tried to form their own political parties, as was the case in the 1991 and 1993 elections, but without much electoral success. Now they use their power to support political parties with similar platforms, such as opposing the increase in retirement age or keeping all kinds of financial and social privileges that some sectors of the economy used to enjoy. Stefan Bratkowski (2013) criticizes Polish trade unions of today for not learning anything new and sticking to their old, now outdated strategies and goals instead of becoming business partners and shareholders in their companies. He concludes: “unfortunately, they are in fact not trade unions but quasi political parties, with party ties and party activities. The well-paid trade union leaders participate in political struggles and do not engage in any trade union work” (ibid.).

There are trade union members on the fringe who make a lot of noise and march with banners and national flags, shouting slogans inherited from another era yet they no longer seem relevant to the situation. The changes they are calling for have been made. It is interesting that those trade unions, even those carrying the name of Solidarity, have programs that are far from the ideals of Solidarity as they fight for the preservation of narrow privileges dating back to communist times that benefit only the individual union not the broader Polish community.

### ***The Nouveau Riche***

The privatization of the communist industry after 1989 created an array of opportunities to buy out whole businesses and even sectors of the economy if one had the right amount of money at the right time. In communist times, the people with money were usually those high up in the communist hierarchy. Thus, the first Polish capitalists after 1989 were often those who had been successful under the communist regime as they had the means and the connections to get the best deals available. There were also the entrepreneurs who just saw an opportunity and knew how to find the money and sponsors to enter the post-communist markets. In most cases, those who at the turning point of 1989 were able to see and grasp these opportunities became financially successful and are now forming the financial elite of Poland. One must not paint them all with the same brush, but unlike the holders of “the old money” in more stable economies, people described as the “nuworysze” (from the French *nouveau riche* – ‘new money’) are interested in showing off their material possessions rather than in showing their interest in community. They do not typically engage in charities, non-government organizations (NGOs) or sponsor grass roots initiatives that would contribute to the development of the civil society in post-communist Eastern Europe. In his weblog *Niebo w płomieniach* (entry from 02/07/2012), Jarosław Markowski from the Polish weekly *Polityka*, states that ‘nuworysze’ are worse than ‘boors’ (in Polish *chamy*), because they have much more influence and no loyalty to any group or cause other than themselves.

## Poland Today: Is There a Civil Society?

The Polish system of government today can be described as a parliamentary democracy. Poland has been a member of the European Union since 2004. As part of the membership agreement, the country's political and social structures have to conform to EU norms and they are regularly scrutinized to make sure they uphold European standards.

These new norms in most cases have contributed to improvements in Poland. A democratic society, with guarantees of individual freedoms (e.g., freedom of speech, association, etc.) exemplifies a civil society because it gives its citizens those protections that the opposition movements of the 1970s and 1980s were fighting for. In that authoritarian context, civil society consisted of the individual citizens and groups who opposed the authorities in a struggle against oppression and in defense of human rights. In 2013, this is a battle that no longer needs to be fought.

The fact that political opposition exists in the context of a democracy does not mean that democratic principles are compromised and need to be protected. In most democracies there is a long-standing tradition of political competition between different political options, and it is this possibility of competition that is one of the safeguards of democracy. In post-communist countries, however, the concept of opposition is still associated with the concept of government as an entity imposed by an enemy state. Before 1989, it was the opposition alone that represented individual freedom and democracy. Today, that is a central tenet of all parties, and the opposition should be seen as a different embodiment of democracy and not as an automatic *negation* of government. The ruling power is no longer representative of unjust and inhumane policies because the government is a democratic body elected by a majority of the Polish people. The fact that the opposition describes itself as an antithesis of the government makes it, by definition, anti-democratic as the European Union would not tolerate an undemocratic rule in one of its member states.

Thus, the current opposition groups, mostly the right-wing Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawiedliwość, PiS), the politicized trade unions, and some church organizations (e.g., those centred around the networks of *Radio Maryja* and *TV Trwam*) are not really offering an alternative in the old sense to a government that is undemocratic and hostile to the traditional values of Poland. However, they keep using language that deliberately triggers associations familiar to many older Poles. For those who remember communist period, the opposition and the Catholic Church were perceived as the only champions of national values, freedom and the integrity of Poland. In today's Poland, the accusations that the government is against the teachings of the Catholic Church, is meant to make the Catholic population think that their faith is in grave danger, as it used to be in communist times, when atheism was the official state doctrine. One of the popular patriotic church songs plays an interesting role in this manipulation. Originally composed at the beginning of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, that is during the time of partitions, it

ended with the chorus “Lord, save our king.” The king of the then Kingdom of Poland was imposed by the Russians and while the Poles quickly picked up the song, they also changed the chorus to: “Lord, give us back our free fatherland”. This version used to be sung until Poland regained independence in 1918. Then, the words had been changed, quite spontaneously to “Lord, bless our free fatherland.” During WWII, Poles automatically returned to the pre-1918 version of the chorus. After 1945, the communist government tried in vain to make people return to the version with “blessing” – it happened, again quite spontaneously but only after the free elections of 1989. The current opposition movement exploits the song’s patriotic significance and associations by using it during all kinds of anti-government demonstrations with words “Lord, give us back our free fatherland.” Leszczyński (2010) comments about this in Polish daily *Gazeta Wyborcza*: “The message is clear even though it has not been expressed directly: the government is not Polish but foreign. It is a pity that PiS does not have a better idea about what kind of opposition they want to be. The fatherland is free. Now it only needs a sensible opposition, not one that has lost its mind.”

This linguistic manipulation seems to be effective but it is a misrepresentation of the reality: Poland is a free and democratic country and is ruled by a political party that won fairly in a democratic election. Not everyone may support the governing party, but painting it as anti-Polish and treacherous is simply a crass example of propaganda.

### **A New Role for Civil Society in Modern Poland**

Is there a place in modern, post-communist Poland for civil society, or did the need for it disappear when democracy was established? As Edmund Burke observed in the 18<sup>th</sup> century, all that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good men to do nothing. Everyone should stay alert and vigilant to make sure their country does not slide towards authoritarianism (a fear that is naturally strong among people who have experienced it). Nevertheless, there is no need, in the opinion of the author, for the engaged citizen in Poland to express their activism by negating the government even if, in the past, it was a definition of patriotism. On the contrary, there are many opportunities for citizens to get involved in positive initiatives through charitable work in the country or abroad. A democratic state should support and complement civil society by simply doing what it is supposed to be doing and by providing its citizens with guarantees of basic human and civil rights.

In the past, the goal of Poland’s civil society was to make the country a better place for its citizens. This can still be its aim today. However, rather than simplistically targeting the government (which is also working towards the same goal), concerned citizens can get involved politically and/or socially through non-government organizations at all levels of society. A democracy both allows and encourages people to gather in support of a cause (thanks to the freedom of association and gathering) and to donate in support

of that cause (providing it does not break any laws by inciting hate or harm). This type of civic engagement, though often not political, can create a positive environment, encourage inclusion and embrace diversity. It also builds community and helps people stay active and connected to others, something that is very important, e.g., for seniors. The goal of civic engagement is to help those who need help, to see the other as a reflection of ourselves and therefore work to remove the barrier between the notions of *us* and *them*. A civil society fosters solidarity with *others*. Civil society operates as *we*. It is based on the basic principle that we can best help ourselves by helping others. Then, those *others* become part of *us*. This is, unfortunately, not at all what can be seen in post-communist Poland today.

In fact, the opposite seems to be the case: the level of intolerance towards people who think, behave or simply look differently is on the rise. According to a recent study by Swedish researchers Berggren & Nilsson (2013), between 10 and 15% of Poles would not want to have neighbours of a different race, as compared to fewer than 5% in countries such as Australia, Canada, the UK and the USA. The authors claim that “tolerance has the potential to affect both economic growth and wellbeing. It is therefore important to discern its determinants” (177). Having surveyed responses from 69 countries, they found that “economic freedom is positively related to tolerance towards homosexuals, especially in the longer run, while tolerance towards people of a different race and a willingness to teach kids tolerance are not strongly affected by how free markets are” but rather by a stable monetary policy and the quality of the legal system (*ibid.*). Historically, the frequency of hate crimes increases when people’s welfare is threatened by economic crises. People – both politicians and the average person – tend to look for scapegoats who can be blamed for their problems. Sometimes problems are manufactured so that the group selected as the scapegoat can be punished in order to release the tension or justify austerity measures. Soviet policies against the so-called *kulaks*, i.e. wealthier peasants, can serve as an example here.

## Intolerance and Linguistic Violence

In Poland today, the main target of criticism is the government. But with the increasingly violent public discourse, the level of linguistic hostility towards other groups is also on the increase. In her interview with Agnieszka Kublik, Dr. Katarzyna Kłosińska, a linguist who studies political discourse acknowledges that Polish language of politics has not created a single positive expression to describe political transformation after 1989. On the contrary: “aggression became a virtue” (Kłosińska 2013). There are examples of hate speech and organized hate propaganda against sexual, religious and ethnic minorities, against various political factions and, in general, against anyone who is perceived as “different.” For a country whose citizens still like to pride themselves on their tradition of tolerance, it is a very sad development. One reason for the rising level of intolerance

in many countries is the economic crisis that makes people compete for a share of an ever smaller employment base. But another possible reason is, in my view, the incendiary language that shapes public discourse and that seems to be beyond anyone's control because of the easy access to the Internet (over 60% Internet penetration according to World Internet Project: Poland, 2011) and other forms of social media.

The segments of society that have set themselves in opposition to the government are those who feel alienated by the changing times. Some people feel that the liberal values of the European Union contradict the traditional but increasingly backward and materialistic teachings of the Catholic Church. Some people feel threatened by the emergence of ethnic minorities and the acceptance of alternative sexual preferences and life styles. Some feel threatened by the unaccustomed work ethic demanded by a market economy and the shrinking or disappearing safety net of the welfare state. Those who feel dissatisfied with the current direction have become very vocal, literally. They organize frequent protest marches and demonstrations, especially on the anniversaries of important historical events. Interestingly, however, they also opposed the proclamation of June 4<sup>th</sup> as a national holiday (celebrating the anniversary of the 1989 election – the first free election in post war Poland), possibly because this would go against their rallying cry that Poland is not a free country (cf. Kościński, 2013). This group claims ownership of national and religious symbols (e.g. Polish flag, Polish eagle, the cross) and its members misuse or abuse them when their campaigns are accompanied by hate propaganda and intolerance towards ethnic or other minorities. They condemn the *other* in every form, be it other ethnicities now seeking refuge in Poland, like the Chechens, persons of alternative sexual orientation, or babies conceived *in vitro*. Minorities may not represent us but how we treat them identifies us as people. It is disturbing to see the Catholic Church involved in hate propaganda against other human beings, especially the most vulnerable ones who cannot even defend themselves. For example, Prof. Longchamps de Brier, a Catholic priest in Warsaw, claims that children conceived *in vitro* have genetic flaws that are easily recognizable by experts; his theories have been published in the weekly *Uważam Rze* (11–17 February, 2013; cf. commentary by Kołodziejczyk 2013). The current teachings of the Catholic Church in Poland can easily be interpreted as a condemnation of the person, not the deed.

## Conclusions

The new movements that present themselves as the *opposition* in Poland are not focused on the defense of democratic values but rather on the defense of their own narrowly defined political and financial interests. The Catholic Church, identified in the past as the mainstay of moral values, has become a political player, siding with the right wing parties because they either proclaim their allegiance to those same values or offer the Church promises of financial protection, e.g. with respect to the recent issues of

Church owned real estate. This has made the Church lose touch with those for whom it should remain a spiritual leader rather than a political player. The democratically elected Polish government is working to bring Poland closer to Europe ideologically, slowly changing the political and social landscape. It takes a lot of ill will to negate its accomplishments and call its initiatives “anti-Polish” as the opposition does. Big corporations, on the other hand, even if for reasons such as market profits, seem to be more interested in promoting democratic or liberal principles (such as gender equality, employment of minorities, and religious tolerance) than some nationalist or xenophobic groups within the current opposition.

This paper looked at this role reversal in the context of Polish political and social movements and the language they use. It seems that the current opposition is deliberately exploiting traditional associations of freedom and justice to win support for its own interests; however it has twisted and perverted them to its own ends. Paying attention to how language is used is crucial to understanding how opinion is manipulated – particularly when a vocal minority seeks to hold sway over the whole. In the 1970s and 1980s it was the communist minority that sought to hold power – now it is a disaffected old guard who seek to stop the Polish people from embracing what the civil society fought for.

## Bibliography

- Almond, G., & Verba, S. 1989. *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes And Democracy In Five Nations*. Sage.
- Balcerowicz, Leszek. 2001. *Post-Communist Transition: Some Lessons*. The Institute of Economic Affairs. London.
- Berggren, Niclas & Therese Nilsson: 2013. “Does Economic Freedom Foster Tolerance?” *Kyklos: International Review for Social Sciences*, Volume 66, Issue 2, pp. 177–207.
- Blundell, John. 2003. “Beyond ideology: toward the demise of the state and the coming era of consumer politics.” *In Waging the War of ideas*. The Institute of Economic Affairs. London, pp. 129–133.
- Bratkowski, Stefan. 2013. “Po co komu związki zawodowe.” Studio Opinii: Niezależny Portal Dziennikarski. Posted on March 27, 2013. <http://studioopinii.pl/stefan-bratkowski-po-co-komu-zwiazki-zawodowe/>
- Dahal, Dev Raj. 2011. “An Inquiry into the Forms and Functions of Civil Society in Nepal”. *Democracy Nepal* website. Accessed on May 31, 2013 at: [http://www.nepal-democracy.org/civic\\_education/A%20critical%20Inquiry%20on%20Civil%20Society.pdf](http://www.nepal-democracy.org/civic_education/A%20critical%20Inquiry%20on%20Civil%20Society.pdf).
- “Defining civil society,” accessed on May 10, 2013 at the website of the World Bank at <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/CSO/0,,contentMDK:20101499~menuPK:244752~pagePK:220503~piPK:220476~theSitePK:228717,00.html>

- Friszke, Andrzej. 1994. "The March 1968 Protest Movement in Light of Ministry of Interior Reports to the Party Leadership."
- Friszke, Andrzej. 2011. *Czas KOR-u. Jacek Kuroń a geneza Solidarności*. Wydawnictwo Znak. Kraków. Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN.
- Hall, J. 1995. *Civil Society: Theory, history, comparison*. Polity.
- Hegel, G.W.F. 1820/1991. *Elements of the Philosophy of Right*. Cambridge Texts in the History of Political Thought. CUP. Cambridge.
- Kłosińska, Katarzyna. 2013. „Język po 89” – agresja stała się wartością.” An interview conducted by Agnieszka Kublik. *Gazeta Wyborcza*. Posted on 04.06.2013; accessed on June 4, 2013 at: [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,14031860,Jezyk\\_po\\_89\\_agresja\\_stala\\_sie\\_wartoscia.html#ixzz2VDEl9Sc9](http://wyborcza.pl/1,75478,14031860,Jezyk_po_89_agresja_stala_sie_wartoscia.html#ixzz2VDEl9Sc9).
- Kołodziejczyk, Marcin. 2013. „Oślepiające światło prawdy” (“The blinding light of truth”). *Polityka* (13.03–19.03. 2013). 28–30.
- Kośmiński, Paweł. 2013. “Bp Wiesław Mering sprzeciwia się ustanowieniu kolejnego święta – rocznicy pierwszych wolnych wyborów w Polsce.” *Gazeta Wyborcza* online. Accessed on May 11, 2013 at [http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,13893084,Bp\\_Wieslaw\\_Mering\\_sprzeciwia\\_sie\\_ustanowieniu\\_kolejnego.html#TRNajCzytSST#ixzz2T4RZYHthttp://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,13893084,Bp\\_Wieslaw\\_Mering\\_sprzeciwia\\_sie\\_ustanowieniu\\_kolejnego.html#TRNajCzytSST#ixzz2T4QzPchR](http://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,13893084,Bp_Wieslaw_Mering_sprzeciwia_sie_ustanowieniu_kolejnego.html#TRNajCzytSST#ixzz2T4RZYHthttp://wyborcza.pl/1,75248,13893084,Bp_Wieslaw_Mering_sprzeciwia_sie_ustanowieniu_kolejnego.html#TRNajCzytSST#ixzz2T4QzPchR)
- Leszczyński, Adam. 2010. “Rozum prezesowi racz wrócić, Panie!” *Gazeta Wyborcza*. October 10, 2010. Accessed on May 28, 2013 at [http://wyborcza.pl/1,107889,8491978,Rozum\\_prezesowi\\_racz\\_wrocic\\_\\_Panie\\_.html#ixzz2UjH9hnm](http://wyborcza.pl/1,107889,8491978,Rozum_prezesowi_racz_wrocic__Panie_.html#ixzz2UjH9hnm).
- Makowski, Jarosław. 2012. “‘Polski cham’ vs. ‘polski nuworysz.’” Blog *Niebo w Płomieniach*, entry from July 2, 2012; Accessed on May 9, 2013 at <http://makowski.blog.polityka.pl/2012/07/02/„polski-cham”-vs-„polski-nuworysz”/>
- Putnam, Robert D., Robert Leonardi, Raffaella Y. Nanetti. 1994. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton University Press.
- “Społeczeństwo obywatelskie,” accessed on line on May 10 at the website of the *Biuletyn Informacyjny* of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy. <http://www.mpips.gov.pl/spoleczenstwo-obywatelskie/>
- United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights, accessed on May 28, 2013 at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>.
- World Internet Project. Poland. 2011. Warsaw, Agora S.A. & TP Group
- Załęski, Paweł Stefan. 2006. *Global Non-governmental Administrative System: Geosociology of the Third Sector*, [in:] Gawin, Dariusz & Głinski, Piotr [ed.]: “Civil Society in the Making,” IFiS Publishers, Warszawa.
- Załęski, Paweł Stefan. 2012. *Neoliberalizm i społeczeństwo obywatelskie*. Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika. Toruń.

# The policy of polish authorities concerning the orthodox church in Poland 1921–1939

ALEXANDER TSIMBAL

*Minsk State Linguistic University, Belarus*

Poland was a multinational and multiconfessional republic during the interwar period. In 1921–1939 the issue of the Orthodox Church was extremely significant. It was connected with the relationship between the state and the Roman-Catholic Church. The issue had an international aspect and affected the policy towards the national minorities, as the majority of believers consisted of the Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians. According to the constitutions of 1921 and 1935, Riga's peace treaty of 1921 and small Versailles Treatise, which was signed at the peace conference in Paris, Poland was obliged to protect the privileges of national minorities living on its territory. The guarantee of the treaty articles observance was the League of Nations<sup>1</sup>.

The foundation of the Polish religious policy was the idea hold by the leading parties according to which the state had to rely on the national unity based on religion. The preference was given to the nation-state model, where a religion played the leading role. The Polish state interests for extension and consolidation around the Roman Catholic Church resulted from this. The authorities aimed at close integration of this public faith and patriotism. The point of view on Catholicism as a chief value, the fundamental element of national union, results from the experience, which was acquired by the Poles during the rule of the Russian tsarism. At that time precisely Catholicism was the factor of the national belonging. This understanding of the religion was actively propagandized by the Roman-Catholic Church among people. According to this concept of the statehood the national minorities were supposed to go through cultural, national and religious assimilation. In connection to that the research of the Polish authorities' policy about the Orthodox Church is very interesting.

From the very beginning of the independence the Polish State strived for the proclamation of the Orthodox Church autocephaly. The authorities tried to avoid the previous mistakes, when the church was dependant on the particular centers abroad, which gave the grounds and possibilities for the neighbors to interfere with the state affairs of

---

<sup>1</sup> J. Żaryn, *Od niepodległości do teraźniejszości 1918 – 1998* (Warszawa: Polska Agencja Informacyjna S.A. – Wydaw. „Interpress”, 1998), 38.

Rzeczpospolita<sup>2</sup>. The problem of autocephaly was settled with the pressure over the episcopacy and diplomatic communication with Moscow Patriarch. In 1921 patriarch Tikhon appointed archbishop George (Jaroszewski) (who was the supporter of an autocephaly) exarch of Poland. With his approval in January, 1922 “The temporary rules of relation of government to the Orthodox Church in Poland”<sup>3</sup> were ratified by the authorities. When the power came to the Church commission in Moscow in May, 1922, and patriarch Tikhon was arrested, the Polish authorities decided to hasten the settlement of the problem. Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment A. Ponikowski spoke at the Council of bishops in June, 1922, expressing the wish of the authorities, according to which for the reasons of the Church authority change in Moscow, bishops should proclaim the autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland. By the votes of metropolitan George, archbishop Dionisy and bishop Alexander against bishops Elephery and Vladimir votes the following resolution was sent: “The Council of Orthodox hierarchs, due to the Church discord and collapse in Russia, has nothing against the Orthodox Church autocephaly in Poland and it is ready to work on the basis of autocephaly, confident in a successful cooperation with Polish authorities on the grounds of constitution, but provided that the Polish authorities acquire the benediction over autocephaly by Constantinople’s and others Patriarchies, as well as by the heads of autocephalous Churches – Greek, Bulgarian and Romanian and Moscow’s Patriarch if he returns to the authority and the Patriarchy in Russia isn’t liquidated”<sup>4</sup>. Hierarchs who resisted autocephaly soon were deported. The police of the government and pressure over the episcopacy caused the protest of the Belarusian and Ukrainian political groups, who blamed the authorities for breaking the rights and discrimination of national minorities. On February 8, 1923 the atmosphere of discontent of the Orthodox people triggered the murder of metropolitan George, whose policy was considered to be threatening to the Church. Archbishop Dionisy was elected to this position with the benediction by Constantinople’s patriarch in March, 1923<sup>5</sup>. On November 11, 1924 Patriarchal Synod in Constantinople signed the edict on the Church autocephaly benediction in Poland and on November, 13 patriarch Gregory VII signed a special “Tomos” on recognition autocephaly of the Orthodox Church in Poland. The Ceremonial proclamation of the autocephaly took place in Warsaw on September 17, 1925<sup>6</sup>.

“The temporary rules” regulated the issue of the Church legal position and internal system in the following way: the synodal-consistorial system was retained and the secular

<sup>2</sup> M. Papierzyńska-Turek, “Historyczne uwarunkowania ogłoszenia autokefalii Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce w 1925 r.” in *Autokefalie kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce*, ed. Antoni Mironowicz, 160 (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2006).

<sup>3</sup> “Tymczasowe przepisy o stosunku rządu do Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce,” *Monitor Polski*, 38 (1922).

<sup>4</sup> State archive of Grodno Region, Belarus (Dziaržauny Arhiu Grodzenskaj Voblastci), f. 92, vop. 1, spr. 19, 19.

<sup>5</sup> Papierzyńska – Turek, *Historyczne uwarunkowania*, 158–159.

<sup>6</sup> K. Krasowski, *Związki wyznaniowe w II Rzeczypospolitej. Studium historycznoprawne* (Warszawa – Poznań: PWN, 1988), 126.

element wasn't introduced to the Church management. The jural Church representative became the Council of hierarchs under the leadership of exarch with the metropolitan jurisdiction. The authority gave an opportunity to have an essential influence on the internal Church matters, especially in personnel issue. The usage of the language was controlled by Church establishments, where Polish was preferable<sup>7</sup>.

However, the way of "The temporary rules" proclamation aroused doubts about their legality. They were promulgated by the minister's order, while the constitution provided the promulgation of the law, which was confirmed by the parliament. Thus, the question of the legislative definition of the Orthodox Church status was left open<sup>8</sup>.

W. Grabski's cabinet made an attempt to solve this problem. At the same time according to the conclusion of the concordat the negotiations with Vatican were held. The premier, being concerned about complications, engaged in the preparations of the status action and the structure of the Orthodox Church only after signing the agreement. In April, 1926, there was an agreement between metropolitan Dionisy and minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment S. Grabski, but the coup d'état which took place in May made it an outdated issue. The Church authorities considered the change of the political situation to be profitable for them and put forward the propositions, which didn't reflect the previously agreed legislation<sup>9</sup>. Thus, the negotiations with the authority started again.

The issue of the Church property was closely connected with the problem of the Orthodox Church legal position. The Catholic Church strived for revindication of the belongings taken from it and the Uniate Church during the tsarist time. A part of these belongings was transferred to the Orthodox Church, remaining the government property. According to the decree of December 16, 1918 all the property of the Orthodox Church, which was within the Rzeczpospolita territory, was transferred to the Polish state.

Hereby, the Church didn't possess the right for the lands and buildings property, which it used in fact. At the same time the Church became one of the parties in an ownerships argument together with the state and the Catholic Church. The action of the revindication started by the Catholic Church immediately after finishing the military operations only worsened the situation. At the beginning of 1924 there was a conflict between Catholic and Orthodox people in Khelmshchyzna and Podlachia. Then the premier Grabski ordered to stop all the revindication processes until the legislative reconciliation of the issue of the Orthodox property in Poland<sup>10</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> A. Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921 – 1939* (Wrocław; Warszawa; Kraków; Gdańsk: Zakł. Narod. im. Ossolińskich. Wyd-wo Pol. Akad. Nauk, 1979), 51.

<sup>8</sup> A. Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny w Polsce* (Białystok : Zakład Poligraficzny OFFSET-PRINT, 2006), 523 – 524; Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 52.

<sup>9</sup> A. Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX wieku* (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2005), 110 – 111.

<sup>10</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 52–53.

A typical feature of the internal Orthodox Church life was the question of its national character. The overwhelming majority of believers were the Belarusians and Ukrainians, but the superior clergy was represented by Russians who were the least numerous of the national minorities and determined the Church policy. The Belarusian and Ukrainian opposition to the episcopate Russification tendency was concentrated on the two points. The introduction of the believers' national language in the Church and the change of the internal system were demanded. The first demand concerned the language of sermons, motet and religion theory education, the second one provided the introduction of the cathedral system and election of clergy. The Polish authorities observed the processes inside the Orthodox Church, and officially took a neutral stand. But in reality they supported the episcopate's position, which protected the Synodal – consistorial system, as it was beneficial for the state in terms of the possibility to interfere with the internal Church matters. The experience of the first part of the 1920s gave an optimistic forecast for the cooperation of the government and the Russian hierarchy, while the Church Ukrainisation and Belarusisation programmes presupposed a search for a new model of the relationships. It would also mean the strengthening of the Belarusian and Ukrainian national minorities' position, which the authorities couldn't afford<sup>11</sup>.

The elections in 1928 opened a new stage of the relationships of the May cataclysm leader and the society, the government attitude towards the non-Polish people also changed. The situation of the unsolved problems triggered the growth of a more radical mood of the national minorities and nationalistic mood among the Polish population. The new authorities inherited three main problems: the problem of the Orthodox Church system, its privileges of an ownership and the national character.

On June 5-6, 1927, in spite of the prohibition of the Church authorities, the Ukrainian Orthodox congress was held in Lutsk. The regulations, which were accepted there, contained the demands of the introduction of a cathedral system with the participation of believers in the church management, and also the steps towards the Church Ukrainisation. The demands for conciliarism were put forward by the Belarusian representatives, who supported the introduction of the Belarusian language in the Church. They also denied the Orthodox Church autocephaly in Poland<sup>12</sup>.

The internal conflicts in the Church made the whole situation even more difficult for the authorities. Willing to hold a neutral position of an intermediary, the authorities couldn't openly stand against the demands of the Ukrainians or Belarusians.

According to the opinion of the government the basis of the further discussion with the Orthodox Church could only be the project that was earlier agreed on by Grabski and metropolitan Dionisy. The main disagreement between the minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment and synod was about the introduction of the Gregorian calendar. But the new demands that were put forward by the episcopate

<sup>11</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 54.

<sup>12</sup> Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny w Polsce*, 610.

after the May coup d'état according to the government opinion went beyond the limits of the concordat position with Vatican. The authorities came to the conclusion that a metropolitan didn't want to finish the negotiations being afraid of the reaction of the political groups in the Church. Metropolitan Dionisy informed that he would like the government to issue the law<sup>13</sup>.

There were two possible plans of actions for this situation worked out by the government. The supporters of fast decisions in the ethnic issue suggested solving the problem of the Church legal status by the unilateral action of the government. Such position was represented by Minister of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment A. Sujkowski. The opponents of such decision pointed out, that it would be an infringement of the constitution, according to which the attitude of the state and Church should be settled by the agreement with its legal representatives. There was a proposition to delay the legislative settlement of the given problem. Such a tactics should persuade the Church authorities to compromise. In November 1928 metropolitan Dionisy agreed, that the Ministry of RD and PE would engage in the development of project on the internal Church organization and the bill on the legal Church status and only these projects should become the basis for the further negotiations<sup>14</sup>.

The work on the projects in the Ministry of RD and PE was continued until the beginning of 1930. However, the episcopate tried to take the initiative. So the idea of the convocation of the Polish Orthodox Council without the government consent appeared in 1929. Though its program did not mention the issue of the internal Church life reform the problems of the mutual relations with the Roman – Catholic Church, the protection against propagation of neo – Union, and the question of the opening of new parishes were discussed<sup>15</sup>.

The opportunity of the normalization of the Orthodoxy status appeared at the beginning of 1930. Some certain arrangements were achieved by H. Józewski, the supporter of the Church Ukrainisation and democratisation of its internal organization, who in December, 1929 became Minister of the Internal Affairs. His negotiations in April 1930 with the Orthodox episcopacy resulted in the positions rapprochement, which in its turn brought the creation of the special commission, aimed at developing of a precouncil meeting program, as well as the main Council positions and the program of its work<sup>16</sup>. The commission included the representatives of the authority and clergy. On representatives of the authorities were director of Political Department of the Internal Affairs Ministry F. Potocki, the chief of East Department of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs T. Holovko and the chief of the Nationalities Department of the Internal Affairs Ministry H. Suchenek – Suchecki<sup>17</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 150

<sup>14</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 151.

<sup>15</sup> Ibidem; Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny w Polsce*, 545.

<sup>16</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 151

<sup>17</sup> J.S. Langrod, *O autokefalji prawosławnej w Polsce* (Warszawa:Druk «Biblioteka Polska» w Bydgoszczy, 1931), 133.

The activity of the commission resulted in the presidential appeal on May 30, 1930 calling metropolitan Dionisy to convocation of the first Orthodox Church Council in the revived Poland. However, the long negotiations and spadework began again. This process took two directions: the precouncil meeting developed the positions concerning the internal Church organization, and the so-called conciliatory commission, including the government and clergy representatives, with metropolitan Dionisy as a chairman, that dealt with the issues, demanding the coordination with the authorities. This work proceeded for about eight years. During the period before 1938 the authorities supported the legislatively unsettled Church position and continued the policy of the using of the Russian element against the national movements in the Church.

The rumours about the possible settlement of the Orthodox Church position began to disturb the Catholic circles. In February 1927 bishops addressed the government with the memorandum, according to which if the agreement with the Church was reached without the Catholic Church, it couldn't be recognized. In 1929 the Polish bishops began a new revindication stage of the Orthodox Church possessions. 755 claims on the returning of the former Catholic and Uniate property were sent to courts against the Orthodox Church<sup>18</sup>. This action caused deep indignation of the Orthodox population. The doubts also came from the judicious Catholic circles. In this situation the government dared to show the aspiration to protect the Church from the Catholic Church encroachments. That fact accelerated the work on the settlement of the legal Church status. On November 20 the Supreme Court dismissed the claim on former possession to the Catholic Church.

In 1934 the Committee on the ethnic questions was founded. This committee comprised the prime-minister, Ministers of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defense, Religious Denominations and Minister of Agriculture. The purpose of its work was the development of the national policy concept and the coordination of the separate departments, as well as boosting of the public initiative on the issue. The first session of the Committee was carried out on December 20, 1935 and was devoted to the policy of the authorities, concerning the Orthodox Church. There was a decision, that the Church should become the means of the Polish cultural influence in the eastern lands instead of provoking the national separatist movements. There was a plan to leave an old Slavic language with the simultaneous introduction of the Polish language in a liturgy thus using neither the Belarusian nor Ukrainian language in fact.

The whole office work should be carried out in Polish. Willing to connect the Orthodox clergy with the Polish culture, the Committee decided, that the clergy training should be held in Warsaw, while the seminaries in Wilno and Kremenets should be closed down. The committee recognized that the process of the Orthodoxy Polonisation should start from the army<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>18</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 153.

<sup>19</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 208 – 209.

Such decisions reflected a new approach to the Orthodoxy problem, which was turned to practice. Obstacles of the Church Ukrainisation and Belarusisation, the support for the so-called “Orthodox Poles’ movements, pressure on the episcopate in a direction of the gradual Orthodox Church Polonisation were the results of this new approach in action.

At the end of 1934 the Central administration of the Orthodox clergy of the Polish army acted with the initiative of the prayer book edition in the Polish language, which was blessed by metropolitan Dionisy. At the same time the authorities were inspired by the creation of the social – religious “Orthodox Poles’ movement. The creation of its organizational structure in Bialystok became possible due to the assignment the head of the Grodno diocese of Bishop Alexy Martsenko in April 15, 1934. Under his order in September 1935 the office-work of the consistory was translated into the Polish language. He also gave the instruction about partial carrying out of divine services and teaching of religion fundamentals in Polish<sup>20</sup>.

On December 9, 1934 the “Orthodox Poles” meeting took place in Bialystok. Chairman Alexander Savitsky read the resolution with the requirement of the sermons to be carried out in the Polish language. In April, 1935 the association “The House of Orthodox Poles named after J. Piłsudski”<sup>21</sup> was registered in Bialystok. In 1936 bishop Sava Sovietov was appointed in Grodno diocese. For some months he had been finishing the work on foundation of the organization “The House of Orthodox Poles named after Stephan Batory” in Grodno, which solemn opening took place in February 1937<sup>22</sup>. Shortly after the similar organizations appeared in Slonim, Volkovysk and Novogrudok.

In 1938 two military priests in the rank of colonels (Timophey – George Shretter and Matvey – Constantine Semashko) who considered themselves Poles were ordained bishops. These bishops began a hard work of changing the cultural image of the Orthodox Church in Poland and Western Belarus<sup>23</sup>.

The law project on the state relation to the Orthodox Church in Poland was submitted on December 3, 1936 and the agreement with the episcopate was reached only on April 8, 1937. The final edition appeared only in January 1938, when the work on the law about the lands, which earlier belonged to the Uniate Church, was finished. At this time the parliament passed the bill introduced by the government, which vested the president’s with the power of the decree edition on the state attitude to the Orthodox Church. Thus there was a decision to avoid a parliamentary way, as the authorities were afraid, that the government project would cause criticism in the parliament, especially among the deputies from the national minorities.

<sup>20</sup> State archive of Grodno Region, Belarus (Dziarshauny Arhiu Grodzenskaj Voblastsi), f. 226, vop. 1, spr. 65, p.65.

<sup>21</sup> В.Н. Черепица, *Очерки истории Православной Церкви на Гродненщине (с древнейших времен до наших дней)* (Гродно: Гродн. гос. ун-т, 2005), 25.

<sup>22</sup> M. Kalina, „Polonizacja Cerkwi prawosławnej w województwie białostockim (1918–1939),” *Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 2(4) (1995):100.

<sup>23</sup> Я. Мірановіч, *Найноўшая гісторыя Беларусі* (Санкт-Пецярбург : Неўскі прасцяг, 2003),104.

On November 7, 1938 the Synod familiarized with the project of the president decree and recognized that it entirely corresponded to the Church organization and reflected its interests. Simultaneously the project of the Orthodox Church internal statute was submitted to the government, and “The Decree of the President of Rzeczpospolita of November 18, 1938 on the relation of the State to the Polish Autocephaly Orthodox Church” was published on November 19<sup>24</sup>.

On December 10, 1938 the Council of Ministers’ order authorized “The Internal Statute of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church”<sup>25</sup>. On June 23, 1939 the law on the Church legal possessions, which stated the property right for the lands on November 19, 1938 was authorized<sup>26</sup>.

The settlement of the Orthodoxy legal status did not stop national – political conflicts among the believers. The growth of the tension was also promoted by the authorities continuing the policy of the Church Polonisation. Making comments on the presidential decree minister of RD and PE W. Swentoslawski said that we should pay attention to the fact, that the process of the Churches de-Russification should be connected with the struggle against “Belarusian and Ukrainian nationalist propaganda”. The “strengthening of the Polish element” in the eastern lands, where the leading role belonged to the army, was carried out in the second half of the 1930th. The basis for it was the statement of military minister Kasprzycki on July 2, 1936, where he emphasized, that the Polish state should aspire to the cultural assimilation of the believers of the various denominations; concerning Slavic minority, the process of the Polonisation in the religious and Church life must be closely guided. This tendency soon turned into the so-called revindication program, which aimed at the returning of the people, whose ancestors belonged to the Polish nation or culture. In the sphere of religion it was connected to the returning of fathers’ belief with transition into the Roman – Catholic Church<sup>27</sup>.

The policy of the Polish authorities concerning the Orthodox Church, during the interwar period, was directed on changing of the cultural form of the Church and the transformation of the Orthodox Church into the tool of national, cultural and religious assimilation of Slavic minorities. The legal status of Orthodoxy in Poland was settled only in 1938. During the whole existence of the Polish state, the authorities actively interfered with the internal affairs of the Church; the clergy was exposed to the pressure and reprisals.

<sup>24</sup> M. Papierzyńska-Turek, *Mędzy tradycją a rzeczywistością. Państwo wobec prawosławia 1918 – 1939* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wyd-wo Nauk., 1989), 184.

<sup>25</sup> S. Kuryłowicz, *Z dziejów prawosławia w II Rzeczypospolitej polskiej. Niektóre problemy na tle polityki wyznaniowej państwa 1918 – 1939* (Warszawa: Państwowe Wyd-wo Nauk., 1986), 77.

<sup>26</sup> Mironowicz, *Kościół prawosławny w Polsce*, 553.

<sup>27</sup> Chojnowski, *Koncepcje polityki*, 227.

## Bibliography

- Chojnowski, A. *Koncepcje polityki narodowościowej rządów polskich w latach 1921–1939*. Wrocław; Warszawa; Kraków; Gdańsk: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich. Wydawnictwo Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1979.
- Kalina, M. „Polonizacja Cerkwi prawosławnej w województwie białostockim (1918–1939).” *Białoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne*, no. 2(4) (1995): 74–105.
- Kiryłowicz, S. *Z dziejów prawosławia w II Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej. Niektóre problemy na tle polityki wyznaniowej państwa 1918–1939*. Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1986.
- Krasowski, K. *Związki wyznaniowe w II Rzeczypospolitej. Studium historycznoprawne*. Warszawa – Poznań: PWN, 1988.
- Langrod, J.S. *O autokefalji prawosławnej w Polsce*. Warszawa: Druk «Biblioteka Polska» w Bydgoszczy, 1931.
- Mironowicz, A. *Kościół prawosławny na ziemiach polskich w XIX i XX wieku*. Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2005.
- Mironowicz, A. *Kościół prawosławny w Polsce*. Białystok: Zakład Poligraficzny OFFSET-PRINT, 2006.
- Papierzyńska–Turek M., “Historyczne uwarunkowania ogłoszenia autokefalii Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce w 1925 r.” in *Autokefalie kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce*, ed. Antoni Mironowicz, Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2006, 151–164.
- Papierzyńska–Turek, M. *Mędzy tradycją a rzeczywistością. Państwo wobec prawosławia 1918–1939*, Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1989.
- State archive of Grodno Region, Belarus (Dziaržauny Arhiu Grodzenskiej Voblastsi), f. 92, vop. 1, spr. 19, p. 19.
- State archive of Grodno Region, Belarus (Dziaržauny Arhiu Grodzenskiej Voblastsi), f. 226, vop. 1, spr. 65, p.65.
- “Тymczasowe przepisy o stosunku rządu do Kościoła prawosławnego w Polsce,” *Monitor Polski*, no. 38 (1922), pkt 17.
- Żaryn, J. *Od niepodległości do teraźniejszości 1918–1998*. Warszawa: Polska Agencja Informacyjna S.A. – Wydaw. “Interpress”, 1998.
- Мірановіч, Я. *Найноўшая гісторыя Беларусі*. Санкт-Пецярбург: Неўскі прасцяг, 2003
- Черепица, В.Н. *Очерки истории Православной Церкви на Гродненщине (с древнейших времен до наших дней)*. Гродно: Гродн. гос. ун-т, 2005.



II  
**EUROPE**



# Shifting Representations: The Effect of European Union Film Policies on the Latvian Cinemascape

KLARA BRUVERE

*University of New South Wales, Kensington, Australia*

The transition from Soviet satellite state to democratic European republic demands a complete restructure of all aspects of national life on a public and personal level. This not only involves the technical aspects of how the country will be run, what type of government will dominate, but also the re-evaluation of the nation's sense of self. This article explores one aspect of Latvia's restructure after the fall of the Soviet Union, specifically, the relationship between cinema and the state. The Latvian cinema industry once enjoyed lucrative patronization from the Soviet state and was used as a powerful ideological tool. Once the Union crumbled the film industry was forgotten, the need for cinema was no longer considered to be of importance. However, once Latvia joined the European Union (EU) this relationship began to change. This article argues that the recent implementation of EU policies combined with a crisis of identity in Latvia has led the Government to reconsider the importance of Latvian cinema to the nation-building project. It also explores how this renewed interest has the potential to change not only cinema policies but also how the Latvian nation is represented through the film medium.

## European Union Cinema Policies

To understand how EU policies have impacted on film legislation in Latvia, it is important to first understand the EU's attitude towards cinema and the regulations it imposes on its member states. The EU places high importance on cultural understanding and integration within the Union. Katharine Sarikakis attributes this focus on intercultural understanding to the development of economic interdependence within the European community, designed to ensure inter-European peace. The first attempts of European economic integration were accompanied by the establishment of institutions that would trumpet the importance of cultural integration, to develop social cohesion in the continent<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, a parallel agenda evolved of not only economic integration but also

---

<sup>1</sup> Katharine Sarikakis, "Introduction: The Place of Media and Cultural Policy in the EU," in *Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union*, ed. Katharine Sarikakis (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2007), 14.

cultural integration. Cinema's ability to reach a broad audience and disseminate cultural discourses led the EU to focus on its development and protection within the European community. Consequently, European cinema industries within the Union are closely monitored and legislated by the EU through the implementation of cinema policies.

Sarikakis argues that culture and media are of greater importance to the EU and the continuation of its cohesive functioning than other frequently emphasized fields such as technology, politics, and economics. First, she states that media and culture have become increasingly important to the economies of European member states. Second, they have become the stage through which an European identity, or the idea of one, conflates and is contested. Furthermore, she highlights that media and cultural policies should be understood not only as expressions of political ideological positions but also as expressions of conflicting economic interests within the Union<sup>2</sup>. Media and cultural policies are therefore, not only, important for social cohesion but also for the continuation of economic interdependence. Sarikakis' argument clearly highlights the major concerns apparent for the EU, regarding media and cultural policies. Cinema falls within this area of concern and the medium's ability to not only provide extra revenue for a nation but also encourage supranational unification, or national segregation, ensures that the field remains closely monitored by the EU.

The primary way that the EU attempts to monitor the financial and cultural aspects of film production in Europe, is through the regulation of state aid for film industries within each individual member state. State aid for cinema is a popular policy amongst the European member states. Caroline Pauwels, Sophie De Vinck and Ben Van Rompuy maintain that the traditional motivations for state aid in Europe are national identity, public interest, cultural diversity and financial gain<sup>3</sup>. UNESCO's 'A Survey on National Cinematography' highlights another pertinent reason for state aid. The excess of imported images from Hollywood creates a need within sovereign states to counter balance foreign images to attempt to preserve "the social texture and the sovereignty and cultural identity of a country"<sup>4</sup>. However, inverted cultural exclusionism and increase of capital through a film industry are contradictory to the liberalism heralded within the EU, and this puts state aid under pressure on both a European and global level.

In 2001 the EU prepared a document entitled 'Communication From the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Certain Legal Aspects Relating to Cinematographic and Other Audiovisual Works', otherwise known as the 'Cinema Communication'. This document highlights that the EU acknowledges film as a powerful medium through

<sup>2</sup> Sarikakis, "Introduction: The Place of Media and Cultural Policy in the EU," 14.

<sup>3</sup> Catherine Pauwels, Sophie De Vinck, Ben Van Rompuy, "Can State Aid in the Film Sector stand the Proof of EU and WTO Liberalisation Efforts?," *Media and Cultural Policy in the European Union*, ed. Katharine Sarikakis (Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2007), 23.

<sup>4</sup> UNESCO Culture Sector, Division of Creativity, Cultural Industries and Copyright, *A Survey on National Cinematography*, Paris, 2000, 18.

which both European and national identities are shaped. The EU considers cinema as an important element for the good functioning of democracy because of its widespread influence on society. The cinematic medium promotes cultures amongst the EU, and increases mutual understanding among the member states<sup>5</sup>. The ‘Cinema Communication’ has both socio-political and economic motivations. Socio-politically its purpose is to “safeguard public interest objectives such as pluralism, cultural and linguistic diversity and the protection of minors.”<sup>6</sup> The economic motivations entail the maintenance of balance between the member state cinema industries to guarantee that smaller nation states can compete within the European market. This creates a competitive market where smaller countries can compete with cinema giants such as Germany and France.

The ‘Cinema Communication’ has been met with criticism, as with most EU policies that attempt to apply one model to a great variety of differential sovereign states. On the surface, the ‘Cinema Communication’ is a regulatory law, with the dual aims of protecting cultural heritage and producing market results. However, Anna Herold suggests that the implementation of the ‘Cinema Communication’ is predominantly motivated by economic factors, mainly competition laws that aim to establish a balanced market in all aspects of the EU. She criticises the ‘Cinema Communication’ for the tension that it creates between the ‘protectionist’ measures in regards to culture, and what she calls the principles of liberal trade<sup>7</sup>. The two criteria are arguably incompatible, which has led both the European Parliament (EP) and European cinema professionals to contest the ‘Cinema Communication’ and the restrictions it places on state aid. They believe that restrictions on state aid to the audio-visual sector should become more flexible<sup>8</sup>.

Authors such as Schaeffer, Kreile and Gerlach argue that European Law should not govern state funding for cultural practices<sup>9</sup>, however, for some countries such as Latvia enforced government funding can be considered positive rather than negative. Interestingly, financial aid from governments to any part of their economy is strictly prohibited under Article 87(1) of the Maastricht treaty. However, Herold highlights that subparagraph D of Article 87(3) of the same treaty states that government aid within the EU aimed at promoting culture and preserving heritage is allowed while it does not affect trading conditions<sup>10</sup>. This suggests that the European Commission (EC) has every right to monitor the budgets of member states in relation to cinema funding. While the above

<sup>5</sup> Commission of the European Communities, “Communication From The Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Certain Legal Aspects Relating to Cinematographic and Other Audiovisual Works,” Brussels, 26.09.2001, <http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52004DC0171:EN:NOT>, 3.

<sup>6</sup> “Communication From The Commission”, 3.

<sup>7</sup> Anna Herold, “European Policies and Competition Law: Hostility or Symbiosis?,” in *The European Union and the Culture Industries: Regulation and the Public Interest*, ed. D. Ward (Hampshire, Burlington: Ashgate, 2008), 33.

<sup>8</sup> Herold, “European Policies,” 36–37.

<sup>9</sup> Herold, “European Policies,” 35.

<sup>10</sup> Herold, “European Policies,” 35–36.

authors dislike the amount of control the EC yields in regards to the financing of culture, the 'Cinema Communication' effectively forced the Latvian Government to take an interest in their film industry. Without the 'Cinema Communication' Latvian film professionals would still be campaigning for the security that they've now secured. After years of what can only be described as indifference toward Latvian cinema, the Latvian Government has finally committed itself to the protection of the film industry, which is evidenced through the passing of the Film Law. However, before moving on to examine what changes have occurred due to the 'Cinema Communication' in Latvia, it is crucial to highlight the Latvian Government's previous disinterest toward Latvian film.

### Post-Soviet Latvian Film Policies

After regaining independence in 1991, the Latvian Government saw no need for a Latvian film industry. The Government considered Latvian film as a monument to Latvia's cultural heritage rather than a driving force in its cultural present and future. Consequently, the Government encouraged privatisation of the film industry to alleviate itself from the burden of supporting a small nation cinema with limited potential for financial return and, as it saw it, little cultural value. Such disinterest from a post-colonial state is an unusual phenomenon. As Mette Hjort and Duncan Petrie argue post-colonial or revolutionary states usually strongly support film, with the intention of using cinema as a political tool to build a new independent nation and forge a new national identity<sup>11</sup>. Furthermore, it is unusual within the context of the EU, as authors such as Sarikakis, Pauwels, De Vinck and Van Rompuy argue that most member states in the EU are heavily involved with their nation's cinema industry.

The Latvian film industry faced many challenges in the early 1990s, challenges experienced by most of the ex-Soviet cinema industries. The Latvian Government wasn't the only one that struggled to find a place for cinema in the development of their new nation. Susan Larsen points out that the idea of cinema as a symbol of national prestige or as a useful tool in shaping society's thoughts lost its power after the collapse of the Soviet Union<sup>12</sup>. Pērkone suggests that this was because in some countries such as Latvia, film was considered a foreign and Soviet art, not something that was natural to the national way of life<sup>13</sup>. This led successive governments to either decrease or completely cease government funding for films, and to sell their studios to private companies. This lack of interest in the film industry from the government led to empty and disused

<sup>11</sup> Mette Hjort, Duncan Petrie, "Introduction," in *The Cinema of Small Nations*, eds. Mette Hjort, Duncan Petrie (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2007), 16.

<sup>12</sup> Susan Larsen, "In search of an audience: The new Russian cinema of reconciliation," in *Consuming Russia: Popular Culture, Sex, and Society since Gorbachev*, ed. Adele Marie Barker (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 192.

<sup>13</sup> Inga Pērkone, "Kino Receptija," in *Kino Latvijā 1920–1940*, ed. Inga Pērkone (Rīga: Zinātne, 2008), 15.

studios. Because the industries had depended on the government for so long they did not know how to function without it. This led to a virtual disappearance of domestic films from the market and high unemployment within the sector<sup>14</sup>.

Furthermore, cinema did not only lose the support of the government but also of the audience. As Anna Lawton underlines the overall social and moral confusion that occurred after the Soviet Union collapsed also affected filmmakers. Their quality of work suffered due to an inability to find themes that were relevant to an audience of the time<sup>15</sup>. The challenges that the ex-Soviet State cinema industries faced during this period, only further encouraged governments to distance themselves from the troubled sector.

The state of the Latvian cinema industry after the collapse of the Soviet Union was, therefore, dire. The industry received only token support from the Latvian State before joining the EU. Physical and moral bankruptcy within the nation after the fall of the Soviet Union led to the development of a continuous cycle of ignorance perpetuated by the Government, filmmakers and audience. The dissolution of the Soviet film system forced filmmakers to cease work or continue to make films of poorer quality due to the disappearance of the support mechanisms they were used to. Furthermore, the moral confusion at the time led filmmakers to explore themes that alienated the audience. The Government in turn viewed low audience numbers as a sign that film was not a powerful tool for widespread dissemination and further distanced itself from the industry that it wished to privatize. However, in 2004 Latvian cinema found a beacon of hope in the EU. Latvia's ascension to the EU ensured Latvian cinema a secure future, if not an overly productive one, thanks to the implementation of EU film laws. The 'Cinema Communication' was arguably the main exterior motivator behind the implementation of film legislation in Latvia; conversely, the recent crisis of national identity in Latvia is arguably the main interior motivator behind the Government's renewed in Latvian cinema.

### **A Crisis of National Identity**

According to Mārcis Auziņš, rector of the University of Latvia, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) caused the population of Latvia to question the Latvian national identity. He asserts that this was because of the social and economic instability leading up to and after the crisis, and the new issues this created for Latvia and its inhabitants<sup>16</sup>. The new global and local challenges for Latvia included: economic and cultural trends that encouraged globalisation, the importance of "nations" started to lessen, Latvia's initiation into the EU, and a crisis of faith between State leaders and the population.

<sup>14</sup> Antra Cilinska, "Making Films in Latvia: Producers' Challenges," *KinoKultura*, Special Issue No. 13, 2012, 1.

<sup>15</sup> Anna Lawton, "Introduction," in *Before the Fall: Soviet Cinema in the Gorbachev Years* (Washington: New Academia Publishing, 2004), 4.

<sup>16</sup> Mārcis Auziņš, "Opening Address," Advanced Social and Political Research Institute of the University of Latvia, Berlin Auditorium, Faculty of Social Sciences, Riga, 20<sup>th</sup> June 2012.

In 2010, the same year that the Film Law was introduced the Government developed a research programme entitled “National Identity”. The program is driven by the belief that when a nation faces these above challenges, when a period of considerable change is experienced, then it is very important that the inhabitants of a nation have a mutual feeling of solidarity<sup>17</sup>. This solidarity is achieved through the *public reinforcement* of an ethnic and/or national identity. Thus, the Latvian Government needs a way to disseminate the results of the research to a mass audience.

The academics involved in the state research program “National Identity” discover and present critical information about Latvia and the Latvian national identity, but failure to disseminate this information to the greater public makes this information redundant. Lowell W. Barrington stresses that unified nationalism expires without the support of the masses<sup>18</sup>. He further argues that nationalist elites must transmit their ideas to the masses and make certain that the masses are inspired and willing to act on these ideas. Hence, Barrington highlights the importance of forms of mass communication, such as cinema, which possess the ability to reach a broad spectrum of the population. It is not unreasonable to argue, then, that the final push to implement film legislation was connected to the creation of the “National Identity” research program and the realisation that to progress in their goal of unifying the nation politicians need to employ the power of film to disseminate this research. This would avoid a regression to the early 1990s when the struggle to create new national narratives was hindered by a lack of dissemination of national signifiers.

## Latvian Film Law

The above sections examined two possible motivations for the introduction of the Film Law. It is now important to examine this document to understand how the Latvian State’s renewed interest in cinema will possibly change the Latvian cinemascape. The purpose of the Film Law is to “ensure the development of the film industry in Latvia, supporting the creation and distribution of Latvian films, as well as the preservation, protection, accessibility and popularisation thereof.”<sup>19</sup> The law also defines what the Latvian State considers to be a film, co-produced film, film industry project, the film industry, and film creation amongst many other terms relevant to the law and the industry. The other eleven sections describe policies that will be implemented to protect and

<sup>17</sup> Nacionāla identitāte, “Kas ir nacionāla identitāte,” <http://www.nacionala-identitate.lv/section/print/3> Accessed 15<sup>th</sup> June 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Lowell W. Barrington, ‘Introduction: Nationalism and Independence’, in *After Independence: Making and Protecting the Nation in Postcolonial and Postcommunist States*, ed. Lowell W. Barrington (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 22.

<sup>19</sup> The Parliament of the Republic of Latvia, “Film Law,” [www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/.../Film\\_law.doc](http://www.vvc.gov.lv/export/sites/default/docs/LRTA/.../Film_law.doc), pg. 1.

preserve Latvian films, film classification, public financing, the function of the National Film Centre (NFC) and the Latvian Film Council, as well as the State's policy on co-financing for the production of foreign films in Latvia.

The most interesting section, however, for the examination of representational changes is section eight. Section eight specifies what criteria a film must satisfy to receive government funding. Six conditions are listed and a film must conform to at least three of the stated conditions, which are primarily concerned with issues of nationality:

1. the action of the film mainly takes place in Latvia or another European Union Member State, or in a Member State of the European Economic Area, or in Switzerland;
2. at least one of the main characters is connected to the culture of Latvia or a territory where Latvian is spoken;
3. the film producer or scriptwriter is a citizen of Latvia or a non-citizen of Latvia, or a person who has received a permanent residence permit in Latvia, or if the scriptwriter is a person who speaks Latvian;
4. the main theme of the film is issues of culture, society, politics or history, relating to the Latvian community and is important thereto;
5. at least one of the original final versions of the film is in Latvian; and
6. the film script is based on an original literary work of Latvia<sup>20</sup>.

On face-value, it seems that with this Law the Government aims to monopolise the film industry and encourage the development of one homogenous national narrative. Government funding is the primary source of financial support for Latvian filmmakers. The impact of the Film Law's requirements may lead filmmakers, in order to secure financial support, to develop film proposals that depict the national narrative favoured by the Government. This would inevitably lead to the homogenisation of Latvia's national narratives.

However, these concerns are not shared by the NFC, indeed Uldis Dimiņševskis, Deputy Head of Film Production at the NFC, stated that the 'Cinema Communication' would not allow such homogenisation to occur. The multiplicitous cinemascape of the past few years may indeed establish this as a plausible argument. This is evidenced through the multiple national narratives apparent in the Latvian cinemascape. The visibility of such different national narratives suggests that film professionals are indeed encouraged to produce a heterogeneous vision of Latvia and its inhabitants. This suggests that the above criteria are broad enough to allow for variations.

## Representational Changes

The Film Law entered legislation in 2010, however, the NFC has assigned funding to films under the above criteria since 2008 when under the pressure of the EU Latvia produced article Nr. 975, which set out how the NFC would assign state aid to film projects.

<sup>20</sup> "Film Law," 3

Looking at the films that have been produced since this time, there are a large range of 'Latvian' stories; some which are extremely nationalistic and engage with an heavily ethnic Latvian nationalism, some that do not engage in a Latvian identity that is ethnic but rather civic and some that do not address the Latvian identity at all. For example, *Rūdolfā Mantojums/Rudolf's Inheritance* (Jānis Streičs, 2010) is saturated with *ethnic* Latvian cultural signs. This nationalistic film depicts Rudolf's, a Latvian farmer, struggle to rise above the confines of social hierarchy and become an equal with the German Barons that occupy Latvia's land. The film is set during the late 1800s during the first national awakening, when the first seeds of freedom were planted in the Latvian national consciousness. Throughout the film *ethnic* Latvian traditions and values are presented to the audience, which produces an air of nostalgia for a Latvia of a bygone era. The film also blatantly presents the idea that to be a Latvian is to be a member of the Latvian *ethnie*. This encourages a discourse of the 'other' and fuels already present factions in Latvian society between Latvians and other minority groups within the geopolitical territory. Interestingly, it is these types of ultra-nationalistic films, which are most popular with Latvian audiences.

In contrast to this film is *Monotonija/Monotony* (Juris Poskuš, 2008). This film is a fiction film, which depicts the life of a modern country girl Ilze as if it was a documentary. We follow her in her quest for a more exciting life in the capital Riga after growing weary of her monotonous and oppressive life in the countryside, however when she gets to the city life does not change much for the better. In contrast to *Rudolf's Inheritance* this film does not engage with issues of ethnic identity, rather it looks at civic issues such as a lack of infrastructure in the countryside and the isolation of those who move to the city but do not have any social support to help them establish a successful and rewarding existence. It could be argued that the film highlights what civic issues need to be resolved, and in a way could be considered a unifying film as everybody in Latvia, could relate to these social issues no matter what their ethnicity or religious denomination.

Then there is the film *Amaya* (Mārtiņš Mārtinsons, 2010), which again presents a different national narrative. *Amaya* receives its name from the main character in the film. Amaya is a Japanese woman married to a Chinese man, living in Hong Kong. The film is predominantly about the trials and tribulations of her life, which include meeting a lost and lonely eastern European traveller, called Paul. Their stories then intertwine and make up the narrative of the film. *Amaya* does not address any issues of national identity, but rather looks at the idea of global citizenship. The director manages to avoid identity politics by never revealing to the audience where the Europeans are from, even with the Asian characters their national heritage does not impact on the development of the characters or the storyline.

These three films are examples of the great range of national discourses present in the contemporary Latvian cinemascap. A comparative analysis of the three strengthens the argument that under the 'Cinema Communication', a Latvian homogenous and ethnically exclusive cinema cannot develop due to the policies and laws in place. Indeed the NFC each year looks at the projects that have been put forward for consid-

eration and tries to ensure that if there are five films that are of an ultra-ethnic Latvian persuasion that only the best gets chosen, ensuring that other alternative national ideas can be presented as well.

### **Cinema as a Tool of Cultural Nationalism**

Since the introduction of the Film Law profound changes in the types of national narratives on Latvian screens have not occurred, diversity is still apparent in the cinemascap. The criteria of the Film Law seem broad enough to allow for a multiplicity of Latvian narratives on Latvian screens. However, there are other ways the Government can circumvent both their own Film Law and EU regulations to ensure that only national narratives they approve dominate the market. The Government provides extra funding to films outside of the regulated government subsidised cinema program, monitored by the EU. Government funding outside of the regulated aid is given to films by Government organisations such as Latvia's Mobile Telephone Company and Latvia's State Forests. The Government owns these organisations and therefore their money is also Government money. These organisations give extra funding to certain film projects, which provide films with more opportunities to be distributed in Latvia. According to EU law the NFC is only allowed to fund up to 50% of a film's overall budget. However, other Government organisations provide funding on top of that, as their budgets do not have to be controlled by the 'Cinema Communication'.

The danger here lies with the fact that these government organisations can pick and choose which films they will sponsor. These organisations support public projects that fall in line with a particular image of the Latvian nation that they wish to portray, which is often one based in ethnic foundations rather than civic responsibilities. This could lead to an imbalance of 'Latvian' stories on Latvian screens. Films that receive more funding can attract a greater viewership and thus become further disseminated. Although, the NFC has a mandate to promote diversity and ensure that all voices are heard, the Government does have the power to further influence how versions of national identity are presented onscreen. In fact, within the last year, the Citizenship Education Subcommittee (CES), driven by the conservative politician Raivis Dzintars, have begun to plan and debate the creation of a new funding program, which would provide financial resources to films commissioned by the State. Many filmmakers have reacted negatively to this, arguing that it will destroy the diversity currently present in Latvian cinema.

The role of the CES entails analysing situations, researching the experience of other countries and developing proposals and legislative initiatives dealing with issues of education that relate to the civic and patriotic responsibilities of Latvia's citizens<sup>21</sup>. Under

<sup>21</sup> Saimes Preses Dienests, „Saeimā izveidota sporta apakškomisija un Valstiskās audzināšanas apakškomisija,” *Latvijas Republikas Saeima*, November 2, 2011, <http://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas->

the Film Law and 'Cinema Communication', the Government has no power to decide on the content of a film, in other words currently there are no films produced in response to orders from the Government. However, in early 2012 the film *Kolka Cool*<sup>22</sup>/*Kolka Cool* (Juris Poškus, 2012) was released. It depicted in a seemingly realistic manner the depressing reality of a group of young adults in a small Latvian country village. Dzintars and the CES protested against this film as they argued that the negative representation of Latvian country life, such as excessive drinking and unlawful activities, would have undesirable effects on the audience and work against the creation of a positive morale in Latvia<sup>23</sup>.

The CES maintains that film in Latvia needs to be uncensored ensuring that filmmakers have creative freedom, but that cinema also needs to educate. The members of the CES argue that part of state funding for films should be set aside for cinema filmed to meet the requirements of the Government. Their aim is to guarantee that Latvian audience members watch only nationally important and unifying themes and ensure that society develops in a manner acceptable to the Government. Their main concerns are the further development of the cinema industry, the depiction of national values, the development of national belonging and the strengthening of national pride and national identity. The negative representation of life in the Latvian countryside as presented in *Kolka Cool* arguably opposes these CES goals.

The CES wants to implement more defined selection criteria than currently found in section eight of the Film Law. They aim to base these criteria on market research, which they hope will show them what cinematic 'formula' is the most popular in Latvia. The NFC has provided the CES with such results, admitting that out of the four 'success stories' of Latvian cinema, three have been nationally orientated. These include the above-mentioned *Rudolf's Inheritance* as well as two other films produced by the same producer *Baigā Vasara/The Dangerous Summer* (Aigars Grauba, 2000) and *Rīga Sargi/The Defenders of Rīga* (Aigars Grauba, 2007). The CES, therefore, argues that as these nationally orientated films are the most popular, that these should be the types of films the State should directly fund. Furthermore, they fall in line with the goals of the CES as they depict historic events of national importance that motivate the audience to national unification.

Additionally, films distributed and exhibited before 2012 are to be reassessed in regards to the new criteria, which the CES wants to establish. Those films deemed unsuitable for the Latvian public would be shelved and their further distribution and exhibition restricted<sup>24</sup>. This would return official censorship to Latvian cinema. However,

---

zinas/18969-saeima-izveidota-sporta-apakskomisija-un-valstiskas-audzinasanas-apakskomisija Accessed on 10 September 2012.

<sup>22</sup> *Kolka Cool*. Kolka is a town in Latvia.

<sup>23</sup> I. Egle, A. Eriņa, "Kolkā kā dzīvē. Vai to rādīt kino?," *Diena*, January 12, 2012, 10.

<sup>24</sup> Saeimas Preses Dienests, "Valstiskās audzināšanas apakškomisija aicina pārskatīt kritērijus valsts finansiāli atbalstītu filmu izvēlei," *Latvijas Republikas Saeima*, January 24, 2012, <http://www.saeima.lv/lv/aktualitates/saeimas-zinas/19281-valstiskas-audzinasanas-apakskomisija-aicina-parskatit-kriterijus-valsts-finansiali-atbalstitu-filmu> Accessed on 10<sup>th</sup> September 2012.

if the CES successfully implements this plan, then their actions would contradict the 'Cinema Communication' and its aim of maintaining diversity. It might also cause concerns in regards to financial gain, although, this is doubtful, as the planned funding would only be enough to produce one low-budget feature film a year.

The CES is finding it difficult to gain the support from the film industry and from other members of the Government. The main concern of both politicians and film professionals is that the implementation of this program will reduce the diversity of cinema products available to Latvian audiences. As director of the NFC, Ilze Gailīte-Holmberga argues, although "national films" such as *The Defenders of Riga* are the most popular this is not a reason to forget about more alternative cinema. State funding, she maintains, needs to support diversity and creativity as well as monetarily. Gailīte-Holmberga further emphasizes this point arguing that the Latvian nation does not need to look to the past but to the future, Latvian cinema needs to depict people and themes that can inspire positive change for the future.

However, not all filmmakers view the CES proposed funding program as a negative thing. Andrejs Ēķis, CEO of the film production and distribution company *Platforma Films*, argues that it does not matter what criteria this new program will put forward, even if it is highly nationalistic. He believes that it is a good opportunity to receive more investment into the Latvian film industry and would help put more Latvian films into the cinema market. Ēķis, however, produces films that are aligned with the goals of the CES. Therefore it is arguable that the prospect of personal gain through this new funding program drives his defence of its necessity, rather than the future development of the Latvian film industry in general.

## Conclusion

The new state aid program, currently under development by Raivis Dzintars and the CES, is only in its early planning stages. There is no guarantee that such a program will eventually go ahead. However, if it does then it will arguably change the range and nature of representations of the Latvian self in the Latvian cinemascape. It is curious that the Government has suddenly become interested in cinema as a nation-building tool, twenty-one years after regaining independence. This sudden interest is arguably due to two main influences. The exterior pressure from the EU, concerned about the financial and cultural ramifications of an unmonitored member state cinema industry, and Latvia's interior crisis of national identity. The combination of the two has arguably led the Latvian State to realise the importance and usefulness of cinema on national and European level. This is an interesting area of research for both Latvian and European cinema studies. Once the policies have been further developed and implemented, it will be pertinent to research the impact this has had not only on inter-cultural European relations but also on the development of the national self in the Latvian nation.



## The Greek Crisis, A Lesson for Poland

CASIMIR DADAK

*Hollins University, Roanoke, United States*

Greece is experiencing an unprecedented decline in the level of economic activity and standard of living. Over the period of 2008–12 the nation's real GDP lost a total of over 20 percent and the most recent projections show that the recession will continue for another year and that the nation will lose yet another 4.2 percent<sup>1</sup>. This is an economic catastrophe that has no parallel in the Western world during peacetime. Greece is not the only nation in the euro area that is experiencing severe economic problems. As of May 2013 four other euro area countries, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus, required financial aid from other members of the region and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The current crisis started in the United States, but it has affected the euro area to a much greater extent. In fact, America managed to overcome this calamity already in late 2009 while the euro area still suffers from its aftershocks.

The diverging post-crisis paths in the United States and the euro area point to fatal weaknesses of the European economic order. The roots of the economic malaise were sown in 1992 when the Continent chose to adopt a single currency. Economists as diverse as James Tobin and Milton Friedman predicted that the euro may cause severe economic difficulties<sup>2</sup>. Those pessimistic predictions originate in the fact that the euro area is not an optimum currency area<sup>3</sup>. Unfortunately, the document that served as the justification for the implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) dismissed optimum currency theory as “limited and outdated” and proclaimed that the analysis of EMU feasibility should not be confined to “this rather narrow approach”<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Eurostat, European Commission, accessed May 20, 2013, [http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search\\_database](http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database). Accessed on May 20, 2013.

<sup>2</sup> James Tobin, “Monetary Policy: Recent Theory and Practice,” in *Current Issues in Monetary Economics* ed. Helmut Wagner (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1998), 13–21; Milton Friedman in *The Wall Street Journal* “Whither the EMU?” June 20, 1997, A18.

<sup>3</sup> For an extensive overview of the concept see Casimir Dadak, “Political Economy of the Euro Area Crisis,” *Panoeconomicus*, vol. 58, issue 5 (2011), 593–604, and in Polish Kazimierz Dadak, “Grecki kryzys – czy przyszłość Europejskiej Unii Walutowej jest zagrożona,” *Arcana*, no. 97 (2011), 27–37 and “Euro po dziesięciu latach,” *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny*, no. 23 (2008), 5–18.

<sup>4</sup> Commission of the European Communities, “One Market, One Money: An Evaluation of the Potential Benefits and Costs of Forming an Economic and Monetary Union,” *European Economy 44* (Brussels: Commission of the European Communities, 1990), 45.

Numerous experts argue that the decision to create the euro was political rather than economic in nature<sup>5</sup>. The present crisis provides strong evidence that the critics were right; the economic disadvantages of the single currency outweigh the benefits.

### Mainstream View of the Crisis

Yet, the mainstream position held by euro enthusiasts is that the principal reasons for the economic collapse in Europe are generous spending on welfare programs and, resulting from this, excessive budget deficits and national debt levels. As a result, the key element of all programs implemented to aid failing euro area nations was extreme austerity. The donors, the biggest economies in the euro area and the IMF demand that the receiving nations drastically cut spending and increase taxes to meet stringent deficit and debt levels. But actual economic data point to a much more complex situation.

Indeed Tables 1 and 2 show that prior to the eruption of the present crisis Greece had been persistently violating the deficit and debt levels prescribed in the 1997 Stability and Growth Pact. But this is where the case against budget deficits and debt levels exceeding, respectively, 3 and 60 percent of the GDP, ends. During the years 2001-07, that is after the introduction of the common currency at the retail level and before the start of the present economic disturbance, Germany violated the budget deficit rule five times, euro area as a whole once, and Spain none<sup>6</sup>. Yet, it is Spain and not Germany that requested financial aid from the rest of the euro area. Similarly, Ireland, another nation that was forced to appeal for financial assistance, enjoyed stellar public finances prior to the start of the crisis. With the exception of 2002 when the country recorded a tiny budget shortfall (0.4 percent of GDP), Ireland had budget surpluses that were at times massive throughout the period<sup>7</sup>. For instance, in 2006 the nation had a surplus equal to 2.9 percent of GDP. Cyprus, the recipient of the most recent bailout, suffered from significant budget deficits in the years 2002-04, but by 2007 it turned the situation around and recorded a huge surplus (3.5 percent of GDP). As a result, at the end of 2007 the level of national debt in Ireland, Spain, and Cyprus, equaled, respectively, 24.8, 36.3, and 58.8 percent of GDP.

Table 2 also dispels the myth that excessive government expenditure was the culprit. Spain's government was spending much less, as a percentage of GDP, than the euro area's average and Germany throughout the pre-crisis period. The same is true of Greece until 2006. In fact, before 2007 the Greek government was spending a smaller share of GDP than an average nation in the euro area or Germany. The problem in Greece was

<sup>5</sup> For instance: Václav Klaus, "The Future of the Euro: An Outsider's View", *Cato Journal*, vol. 24, no. 1-2, 2004, 171-7 and Dadak, "Political Economy".

<sup>6</sup> Spain, a country in many respects similar to Poland serves as a counterfactual in this paper.

<sup>7</sup> *Eurostat*, European Commission.

not excessive spending, but insufficient taxation. The nation's government was collecting a smaller share of GDP than those accumulated in frugal Spain. In sum, the argument that excessive government expenditure, budget deficits, and debt levels are the root causes of the present crisis in the euro area has at best weak foundations.

**Table 1**  
Government budget position and national debt (% of GDP)

| Indicator       | Area | 2001  | 2002  | 2003 | 2004 | 2005  | 2006  | 2007  | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  |
|-----------------|------|-------|-------|------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Budget position | EA   | -1.5  | -2.6  | -3.2 | -2.9 | -2.5  | -1.5  | -0.9  | -2.4  | -6.9  | -6.5  | -4.5  |
|                 | D    | -3.1  | -3.8  | -4.2 | -3.8 | -3.3  | -1.7  | 0.2   | -0.1  | -3.2  | -4.3  | -1.0  |
|                 | E    | -0.5  | -0.2  | -0.4 | -0.1 | 1.3   | 2.4   | 1.9   | -4.5  | -11.2 | -9.3  | -8.5  |
|                 | GR   | -4.4  | -4.8  | -5.7 | -7.4 | -5.6  | -6.0  | -6.8  | -9.9  | -15.6 | -10.5 | -9.2  |
| National debt   | EA   | 61.0  | 60.4  | 61.9 | 62.3 | 62.9  | 61.6  | 59.0  | 62.5  | 74.8  | 80.0  | 82.5  |
|                 | D    | 59.1  | 60.7  | 64.4 | 66.3 | 68.6  | 68.1  | 65.2  | 66.7  | 74.4  | 83.0  | 81.2  |
|                 | E    | 55.6  | 52.6  | 48.8 | 46.3 | 43.2  | 39.7  | 36.3  | 40.2  | 53.9  | 61.2  | 68.5  |
|                 | GR   | 103.7 | 101.7 | 97.4 | 98.6 | 100.0 | 106.1 | 107.4 | 113.0 | 129.4 | 145.0 | 165.3 |

EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece.

Data: Eurostat.

**Table 2**  
Government expenditure and revenue (% of GDP)

| Indicator              | Area | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
|------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Government expenditure | EA   | 47.2 | 47.5 | 48.0 | 47.5 | 47.4 | 46.7 | 46.0 | 47.1 | 51.2 | 51.0 | 49.4 |
|                        | D    | 47.6 | 47.9 | 48.5 | 47.1 | 46.9 | 45.3 | 43.5 | 44.0 | 48.1 | 47.9 | 45.6 |
|                        | E    | 38.7 | 38.9 | 38.4 | 38.9 | 38.4 | 38.4 | 39.2 | 41.5 | 46.3 | 45.6 | 43.6 |
|                        | GR   | 45.3 | 45.1 | 44.7 | 45.5 | 44.6 | 45.2 | 47.6 | 50.6 | 53.8 | 50.2 | 50.1 |
| Government revenue     | EA   | 45.2 | 44.8 | 44.8 | 44.5 | 44.8 | 45.3 | 45.3 | 45.0 | 44.8 | 44.7 | 45.3 |
|                        | D    | 44.5 | 44.1 | 44.3 | 43.3 | 43.6 | 43.7 | 43.7 | 44.0 | 44.9 | 43.6 | 44.7 |
|                        | E    | 38.1 | 38.7 | 38.0 | 38.8 | 39.7 | 40.7 | 41.1 | 37.0 | 35.1 | 36.3 | 35.1 |
|                        | GR   | 40.9 | 40.3 | 39.0 | 38.1 | 39.0 | 39.2 | 40.8 | 40.7 | 38.2 | 39.7 | 40.9 |

EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece.

Data: Eurostat.

## The Introduction of the Euro and Diverging Macroeconomic Paths

**Table 3**  
Annual GDP growth (%) and inflation (CPI, %)

| Indicator  | Area | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Ave. |
|------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| GDP growth | EA   | 2.0  | 0.9  | 0.7  | 2.2  | 1.7  | 3.2  | 3.0  | 0.4  | -4.4 | 2.0  | 1.4  | 1.2  |
|            | D    | 1.5  | 0.0  | -0.4 | 1.2  | 0.7  | 3.7  | 3.3  | 1.1  | -5.1 | 4.2  | 3.0  | 1.2  |
|            | E    | 3.7  | 2.7  | 3.1  | 3.3  | 3.6  | 4.1  | 3.5  | 0.9  | -3.7 | -0.3 | 0.4  | 1.9  |
|            | GR   | 4.2  | 3.4  | 5.9  | 4.4  | 2.3  | 5.5  | 3.5  | -0.2 | -3.1 | -4.9 | -7.1 | 1.2  |
| Inflation  | EA   | 2.2  | 2.4  | 2.3  | 2.1  | 2.2  | 2.2  | 2.2  | 2.1  | 3.3  | 0.3  | 1.6  | 2.1  |
|            | D    | 1.4  | 1.9  | 1.4  | 1.0  | 1.8  | 1.9  | 1.8  | 2.3  | 2.8  | 0.2  | 1.2  | 1.7  |
|            | E    | 3.5  | 2.8  | 3.6  | 3.1  | 3.1  | 3.4  | 3.6  | 2.8  | 4.1  | -0.2 | 2.0  | 2.8  |
|            | GR   | 2.9  | 3.7  | 3.9  | 3.4  | 3.0  | 3.5  | 3.3  | 3.0  | 4.2  | 1.3  | 4.7  | 3.4  |

EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece.

Data: Eurostat.

**Table 4**  
National gross saving and gross capital formation (% of GDP)

| Indicator    | Area | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Ave. |
|--------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Gross saving | EA   | 20.1 | 19.7 | 19.5 | 20.2 | 19.9 | 20.7 | 21.5 | 20.6 | 17.9 | 18.2 | 19.0 | 19.8 |
|              | D    | 20.2 | 20.1 | 19.7 | 22.3 | 22.4 | 24.6 | 26.8 | 25.6 | 22.3 | 23.1 | 23.7 | 22.8 |
|              | E    | 22.0 | 22.9 | 23.4 | 22.4 | 22.1 | 21.9 | 21.0 | 19.5 | 19.3 | 18.8 | 18.2 | 21.0 |
|              | GR   | 11.8 | 9.6  | 12.2 | 12.0 | 10.6 | 11.2 | 8.8  | 5.8  | 4.0  | 3.9  | 3.2  | 8.5  |
| Investment   | EA   | 20.6 | 19.7 | 19.7 | 20.0 | 20.3 | 21.2 | 22.1 | 21.7 | 18.4 | 18.8 | 19.2 | 20.2 |
|              | D    | 20.3 | 18.1 | 17.9 | 17.6 | 17.3 | 18.1 | 19.3 | 19.4 | 16.5 | 17.3 | 18.2 | 18.2 |
|              | E    | 26.4 | 26.6 | 27.4 | 28.3 | 29.5 | 30.9 | 31.0 | 29.1 | 24.4 | 23.3 | 22.1 | 27.2 |
|              | GR   | 23.2 | 22.3 | 24.5 | 22.5 | 21.4 | 24.2 | 25.7 | 23.7 | 18.3 | 16.2 | 14.5 | 21.5 |

EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece.

Data: Eurostat.

Tables 3 and 4 shed some light on actual origins of the euro area troubles. In the period 2001-07 both Greece and Spain experienced an above euro area rate of investment (gross capital formation) and GDP growth. In fact, Spain was frequently mentioned as a success story of the European monetary union. To a significant extent this was a result of rapid interest rate decline and foreign capital inflows that financed the investment

spurt<sup>8</sup>. This was especially true in Greece where the difference between the level of saving and investment was exceptionally high. In both nations the saving rate had been declining while at the same time the investment rate had been increasing. In sum, an ever growing proportion of gross capital formation was financed with capital inflows<sup>9</sup>. When the crisis exploded, capital flows reversed and both the private and public sectors found it exceedingly difficult to raise money<sup>10</sup>. Hence the need to ask for financial aid from other euro area nations. Data in Table 3 also indicate that over the same period Germany, a slow-growth nation, enjoyed an excess of saving over investment; hence, it was not exposed to the adverse effects of capital flows during the crisis.

Table 3 also provides evidence on substantial inflationary differentials among euro area member-states over the years 2001-07<sup>11</sup>. Greece and Spain experienced a much higher growth rates and, consequently felt an above average inflationary pressure. None of them could have taken a preventive measure, for instance by adopting a restrictive monetary policy, because they gave up their own currency and control over the interest rate. The rate is now set in Frankfurt by the European Central Bank (ECB) and, as long as Germany, the biggest economy in the region, was experiencing sluggish growth the bank maintained monetary policy that from the point of view of high-growth nations was too lax. As observed above, Spain conducted a very restrictive fiscal stance, but even this policy was insufficient to counterbalance the impact of ECB's relatively loose monetary policy and foreign capital inflows.

The nefarious impact of international capital flows within the euro area is also present in international trade data. Table 5 illustrates the magnitude of current account deficits in Greece and Spain. Especially Greece was running huge trade deficits prior to the start of the crisis and a trade deficit by definition is balanced by a surplus on the capital account. The introduction of the euro resulted in significant integration of financial markets in the region and fostered enormous capital flows among member-states. These flows allowed both Spain and Greece to maintain robust rate of investment and, resulting from this, above average rate of economic growth. But these positive developments also led to unpleasant consequences, both nations experienced above average inflation rates and, with the exchange rate effectively fixed within the euro area, they lost international competitiveness. As an overwhelming majority of their exports was going to other members of the euro area, Greece and Spain suffered trade deficits. Once the crisis struck, both nations

<sup>8</sup> Rafał Kierzenkowski, "Preparing for euro adoption in Poland", *OECD Economic Department Working Paper No. 790* (Paris: OECD, 2010), especially pages 30–1.

<sup>9</sup> At the end of 2009 banks that report to the Bank of International Settlements had total assets of \$240.8 and \$1,104.4 billion in, respectively, Greece and Spain (*Bank of International Settlements*, "BIS Quarterly Review, Statistical Annex", March 2011, [http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r\\_qa1103.pdf](http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qa1103.pdf) ). In each case, those investments were equivalent to approximately three quarters of GDP.

<sup>10</sup> *Bank of International Settlements*, "BIS Quarterly Review, Highlights of the BIS International Statistics", September 2012, 14–16, [http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r\\_qt1209b.pdf](http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1209b.pdf).

<sup>11</sup> The sharp increases in inflation observed in 2009 in Spain and Greece were a result of huge tax hikes.

found themselves in an unenviable position. In the absence of devaluation they have to regain competitiveness through deflation. Typically, a price and wage compression is accomplished through recession and high unemployment, and Greece and Spain, as well as Ireland, Portugal, and Italy are no exceptions from this rule.

**Table 5**  
Net exports of goods (% of GDP) and exports extra-EU-27 (% of total)

| Indicator            | Area | 2001  | 2002  | 2003  | 2004  | 2005  | 2006  | 2007  | 2008  | 2009  | 2010  | 2011  |
|----------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
| Net exports of goods | EA   | 0.4   | 0.9   | 0.7   | 0.4   | -0.1  | -0.6  | -0.7  | -1.1  | -0.3  | -0.4  | -0.6  |
|                      | D    | 4.7   | 6.3   | 6.0   | 6.9   | 7.0   | 6.9   | 8.2   | 7.3   | 5.7   | 6.4   | 6.0   |
|                      | E    | -5.6  | -5.0  | -5.1  | -6.3  | -7.5  | -8.4  | -8.6  | -7.8  | -4.0  | -4.5  | -3.7  |
|                      | GR   | -18.4 | -19.2 | -18.5 | -18.1 | -16.3 | -17.1 | -20.0 | -20.8 | -16.0 | -13.8 | -13.3 |
| Exports extra-EU-27  | EA   | 32.1  | 32.0  | 31.2  | 31.5  | 32.2  | 31.7  | 31.8  | 32.5  | 33.3  | 34.7  | 35.3  |
|                      | D    | 36.4  | 36.6  | 35.1  | 35.4  | 35.7  | 36.4  | 35.3  | 36.7  | 37.6  | 39.9  | 40.7  |
|                      | E    | 25.6  | 25.2  | 24.7  | 25.7  | 27.6  | 28.8  | 29.2  | 30.4  | 30.2  | 31.3  | 33.1  |
|                      | GR   | 35.9  | 39.2  | 35.1  | 35.8  | 38.2  | 36.1  | 35.0  | 34.8  | 36.6  | 37.4  | 49.4  |

EA = Euro area (16), D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece.

Data: Eurostat.

## Fiscal Federalism, American and European Experiences

Theory of optimum currency areas also provides important hints to other factors that contribute to the current situation in the euro area. It stipulates that states choosing a common currency have to have well correlated business cycles, highly flexible labor markets, and a common fiscal authority. A common fiscal authority, frequently referred to as fiscal federalism, may be necessary to overcome the adverse effects of asymmetric economic shocks, especially on the demand-side. Kenen made this crystal clear stating that members of a monetary union must be “armed with a wide array of budgetary policies to deal with the stubborn ‘pockets of unemployment’ that are certain to arise from export fluctuations combined with an imperfect mobility of labor”<sup>12</sup>. In other words, states that assume a common currency and give up their own monetary policy need to become a transfer union.

The euro area has no central government and no institution that is in charge of collecting taxes and making transfers among member-states. The idea of the euro area becoming

<sup>12</sup> Peter B. Kenen, “The Theory of Optimum Currency Areas: An Eclectic View,” in *Monetary Problems of the International Economy*, eds. Robert A. Mundell and Alexander K. Swoboda (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 41–60.

a transfer union is anathema to some nations, especially Germany<sup>13</sup>. Chancellor Angela Merkel dismissed even a modest proposal to issue common euro area bonds<sup>14</sup>. The entire EU is ill equipped to serve such a function, too. The EU receives funds from member-states that are equal to about 1.25 percent of the region's GDP. But the monies are distributed according to a rigid seven-year framework. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of the funds are devoted to two items, common agricultural policy and cohesion funds. The Union, by law, is barred from running budget deficits and, overall, the region has little, if any, flexibility to address problems stemming from adverse demand-side shocks.

On the other hand, the United States has a strong central government that collects a majority of all taxes, on average an equivalent of 19 percent of GDP. The federal government transfers a significant part of its revenues to states, for instance in 2006 the U.S. Treasury collected \$2,407 billion and of the above total it passed onto states over \$434 billion<sup>15</sup>. The federal transfers made almost a quarter of all state revenue in that year. Also, the federal government has no limits on running annual budget deficits and the country took full advantage of this possibility during the current crisis. In 2009 and 2010 the budget deficit of the central government equaled about 10 percent of GDP. The federal government used its borrowing capacity to drastically increase aid to states and, consequently, by 2010 the share of federal transfers in total state revenue rose to over 35 percent<sup>16</sup>.

### The policy of austerity

The experience of American fiscal federalism is not imitated in Europe at all. Just the opposite, the euro area member-states decided to implement an exactly the opposite policy, the policy of extreme austerity. The policy is deeply rooted in neoliberal views of the economy, including that any government involvement in economic matters, especially discretionary fiscal policy, is harmful<sup>17</sup>.

This thinking permeates economic policy not just in the euro area, but in an overwhelming majority of EU members. For instance, in 2012 the EU countries, with the

<sup>13</sup> *The Economist*, "We Don't Want No Transfer Union," December 4–10, 2011, 63–4; Wolfgang Schäuble, "Why Austerity is only Cure for the Eurozone," *Financial Times*, September 5, 2011, <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/97b826e2-d7ab-11e0-a06b-00144feabdc0.html#axzz257cnwVNV>

<sup>14</sup> Thorsten Severin and Catherine Bremer, "Merkel buries euro bonds as summit tension rises," *Reuters*, June 26, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/26/us-eurozone-idUSBRE85O0CS20120626>.

<sup>15</sup> Office of Management and Budget, *Historical Tables*, Table 12.1. (2012), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Historicals>.

<sup>16</sup> Cheryl H. Lee, Robert Jesse Willhide, and Nancy I. Higgins, "State Government Finances Summary: 2010", *U.S. Census Bureau, Governments Division Briefs*, December 2011, <http://www2.census.gov/govs/state/10statesummaryreport.pdf>.

<sup>17</sup> For instance, John B. Taylor, "The lack of empirical rationale for a revival of discretionary fiscal policy," *American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings*, vol. 99, no. 2 (2009): 550-5.

exception of the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, adopted the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, commonly known as the Fiscal Pact<sup>18</sup>. The Pact sets new, more stringent budget deficit and national debt levels. Structural annual budget deficit cannot exceed 0.5 percent of GDP<sup>19</sup>. Additionally, nations that accumulated public debt in excess of 60 percent of GDP are required to bring it down to the above benchmark at a rate of one twentieth per annum.

Austerity has been the rallying cry throughout the euro area crisis. The temporary European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) extended loans to Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and Cyprus in exchange for strict conditions<sup>20</sup>. Those conditions strive to limit budget deficits at all costs. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the permanent instrument that replaces the EFSF in the middle of 2013 has identical goals. The ESM Treaty stipulates that a euro area member-state can obtain aid that is “**subject to strict conditionality**” [emphasis added] that may “range from a macro-economic adjustment programme to continuous respect of pre-established eligibility conditions”<sup>21</sup>.

This approach is in conflict with both academic research and opinions propagated by major international organizations. For instance, the IMF estimated that, under current conditions fiscal multiplier in the euro area is much higher than it had been thought before. Instead of being only 0.5, it actually is as high as 1.7<sup>22</sup>. Therefore, a sudden fiscal consolidation does more harm than good. This position is consistent with an OECD recommendation stressing that such policies should be implemented at “**a steady, gradual pace** consistent with a medium-term plan to restore fiscal stability”.

Many academics agree with the above position. Paul Krugman has been the most vocal critic of the use of neoliberal prescriptions in combating the crisis<sup>23</sup>. But many others agree with Krugman. For instance Ball, Leigh, and Loungani show that a one percent reduction in government expenditure has a significant negative impact on economic growth, employment and equitable distribution of income and; hence, budget deficit reduction should coincide with robust economic growth<sup>24</sup>. DeLong and Summers advocate that, given the exceptionally low interest rates and unusually low demand for credit from the private sector, governments should substantially increase borrowing and spending and that this fiscal stimulus will pay for itself as economic growth and

<sup>18</sup> *Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union*, 2012, [http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26\\_en12.pdf](http://european-council.europa.eu/media/639235/st00tscg26_en12.pdf).

<sup>19</sup> *Treaty on Stability*, Title III, article 1, paragraph b.

<sup>20</sup> Council of the European Union, *Extraordinary Council Meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Press Release 9596/10*, 2010, [http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/114324.pdf).

<sup>21</sup> *Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism*, T/ESM 2012/en, article 12, paragraph 1, [http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esm\\_treaty\\_en.pdf](http://www.esm.europa.eu/pdf/esm_treaty_en.pdf). Article 20, par 1 of the Treaty specifies that pricing of such loans should cover costs and “include an appropriate margin”.

<sup>22</sup> International Monetary Fund, “World Economic Outlook”, (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 2012), 41–43.

<sup>23</sup> Paul Krugman, *End This Depression Now!* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012).

<sup>24</sup> Laurence Ball, Daniel Leigh, and Prakash Loungani, “Painful Medicine”, *Finance & Development*, September 2011, 20-3.

rising employment should lead to a dramatic increase in government revenue and no long-term increase in national debt<sup>25</sup>.

Table 5 also points to the fact that austerity in the euro area has an adverse indirect impact on struggling nations in the region. As EU member-states strive to limit government spending and, therefore, experience at best a sluggish rate of economic growth Greece and Spain have to find export markets elsewhere. Over the last couple of years Greece managed to drastically redirect its exports, in 2011 almost half of its exports went outside the EU, a remarkable increase from only 35 percent in 2008.

### **International Competitiveness**

One of the main reasons thanks to which Germany managed to escape the present crisis is the nation's international competitiveness. Data in Table 5 clearly show that Germany, unlike Greece and Spain, has had significant trade surpluses not only prior to the outbreak of the crisis but also throughout this catastrophe. Table 5 also demonstrates that Germany exports to regions outside the EU substantially more than the euro area average. This is possible because Germany has many firms that operate on a global scale and enjoy strong brand-name recognition, not only in the traditional heavy industry sectors, for instance car manufacturers, but also in other fields. SAP is a leading international provider of industrial software, Adidas is a global player in sporting goods, and Deutsche Bank and Allianz are among the largest providers of financial services. Table 6 sheds more light on the sources of Germany's international competitiveness. The country spends considerably more on research and development activities (R&D) than the euro area average and the difference in this category between Germany and Spain and Greece is truly shocking. As a result, a relatively large percentage of German exports is in the high-tech sector, an area that is less sensitive to business cycle fluctuations.

Overall, as opposed to Spain and, especially Greece, Germany has not suffered from the deleterious effects that the adoption of a common currency conferred on the euro area. It has the largest economy and, therefore, the policies of ECB are more in line with its needs than those of smaller member-states. It is a highly developed economy with very well developed infrastructure and, therefore, Germany does not need to invest heavily in this area. It enjoys a deep-rooted culture of thrift and, hence, it is a net saver. Germany also has a very strong export sector that is less dependent on economic fortunes in the euro area and is able to benefit from expansion in other regions of the world, giant emerging markets in Asia in particular. The nation spends a relatively large proportion of GDP on R&D and, hence, it is able to maintain a high degree of international competitiveness.

<sup>25</sup> Bradford DeLong and Lawrence H. Summers, "Fiscal policy in a depressed economy", March 20, 2012, [http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2012\\_spring\\_bpea\\_papers/2012\\_spring\\_BPEA\\_delongsummers.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/Files/Programs/ES/BPEA/2012_spring_bpea_papers/2012_spring_BPEA_delongsummers.pdf).

**Table 6**  
Innovation, high-tech exports (% of total) and spending on R&D (% of GDP)

| Indicator         | Area | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 |
|-------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| High-tech exports | EA   | 19.2 | 17.6 | 17.0 | 17.0 | 17.1 | 16.7 | 13.7 | 13.2 | 14.8 | 14.9 |
|                   | D    | 18.3 | 17.5 | 16.9 | 17.8 | 17.4 | 17.1 | 14.0 | 13.3 | 15.3 | 15.3 |
|                   | E    | 7.8  | 7.2  | 7.5  | 7.3  | 7.3  | 6.4  | 5.1  | 5.3  | 6.2  | 6.4  |
|                   | GR   | 10.3 | 12.0 | 12.6 | 11.8 | 10.6 | 11.0 | 7.4  | 9.3  | 10.9 | 10.2 |
| Spending on R&D   | EA   | 1.86 | 1.88 | 1.87 | 1.85 | 1.84 | 1.87 | 1.88 | 1.96 | 2.06 | 2.06 |
|                   | D    | 2.47 | 2.5  | 2.54 | 2.5  | 2.51 | 2.54 | 2.53 | 2.69 | 2.82 | 2.82 |
|                   | E    | 0.92 | 0.99 | 1.05 | 1.06 | 1.12 | 1.2  | 1.27 | 1.35 | 1.39 | 1.39 |
|                   | GR   | 0.58 | N.a. | 0.57 | 0.55 | 0.6  | 0.59 | 0.6  | N.a. | N.a. | N.a. |

EA = Euro area, D = Germany, E = Spain, GR = Greece, N.a. = not available.

Data: World Bank. Eurostat.

## What Are the Lessons for Poland?

The present crisis offers invaluable lessons for Poland. The euro deprived the members of the European Monetary Union of control over monetary policy and the exchange rate. Recent developments in the EU also point to a drive to limit the use of fiscal policy in fighting harmful effects of adverse economic shocks. Consequently, nations that do not possess highly competitive economies may be exposed to unprecedented economic disasters that result in extraordinary declines in the standard of living and unparalleled levels of unemployment. Tables 7 and 8 provide important clues to the potential impact on Poland, if it chooses to adopt the common currency and implement new economic policies that are being endorsed in the euro area, for instance the Fiscal Pact.

Data in the tables point to Poland's serious economic weaknesses. The nation has been recording serious budget deficits. Over the period of 2001–11 Poland has had much higher budget shortfalls than the euro area average. As a result, the country has been substantially increasing its national debt burden. It is important to note that the rise in indebtedness was not a result of a spurt in investment spending. Although, Poland is lagging behind other East-central European nations, let alone the most advanced Western European countries in infrastructure development, this was not the main reason behind government borrowing<sup>26</sup>. Consequently, the government failed to accumulate assets that it could sell off to retire the debt or that could boost the rate of economic growth and, thus, government revenues. The rate at which Poland augments its productive capacity is slow, close to that of well developed, mature economies of the euro area rather than

<sup>26</sup> Kazimierz Dadak, "Twenty Years of Economic Transformation: The Price of Economic Orthodoxy," *Warsaw East European Review*, vol. 2 (2012), 131–45.

to, for instance, the Asian Tigers<sup>27</sup>. Moreover, like in the case of Greece and Spain, gross capital formation is financed with foreign capital to a considerable extent. Over the years 2001–11 savings in Poland have been insufficient to fund investment expenditure.

**Table 7**  
Poland, macroeconomic performance

| Indicator                  | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 | Ave. |
|----------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Budget position (% of GDP) | -5.3 | -5.0 | -6.2 | -5.4 | -4.1 | -3.6 | -1.9 | -3.7 | -7.4 | -7.9 | -5.1 | N.a. |
| National debt (% of GDP)   | 37.6 | 42.2 | 47.1 | 45.7 | 47.1 | 47.7 | 45.0 | 47.1 | 50.9 | 54.8 | 56.3 | N.a. |
| Gross saving (% of GDP)    | 18.4 | 16.5 | 17.0 | 15.9 | 18.1 | 18.0 | 19.4 | 19.1 | 17.3 | 17.2 | 17.4 | 17.7 |
| Investment (% of GDP)      | 20.8 | 18.6 | 18.7 | 20.1 | 19.3 | 21.1 | 24.4 | 23.9 | 20.3 | 21.0 | 21.7 | 20.9 |
| GDP growth (%)             | 1.2  | 1.4  | 3.9  | 5.3  | 3.6  | 6.2  | 6.8  | 5.1  | 1.6  | 3.9  | 4.5  | 4.0  |
| Inflation (CPI, %)         | 10.1 | 5.3  | 1.9  | 0.7  | 3.6  | 2.2  | 1.3  | 2.6  | 4.2  | 4.0  | 2.7  | 2.9  |

N.a. = not applicable.

Data: Eurostat.

**Table 8**  
Poland, international competitiveness

| Indicator                        | 2001 | 2002 | 2003 | 2004 | 2005 | 2006 | 2007 | 2008 | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
|----------------------------------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| Net exports of goods (% of GDP)  | -4.0 | -3.7 | -2.6 | -2.2 | -0.9 | -2.0 | -4.0 | -4.9 | -1.0 | -1.8 | -2.1 |
| Exports extra EU-27 (% of total) | 18.8 | 18.8 | 18.1 | 19.7 | 21.4 | 21.0 | 21.1 | 22.2 | 20.4 | 20.9 | 22.2 |
| High-tech exports (% of total)   | 3.2  | 2.9  | 3.1  | 3.3  | 3.8  | 3.7  | 3.0  | 4.3  | 6.1  | 6.7  | N.a. |
| R&D spending (% of GDP)          | 0.62 | 0.56 | 0.54 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.56 | 0.57 | 0.6  | 0.68 | 0.74 | N.a. |

N.a. = not available.

Data: Eurostat.

Regrettably, similarities between Poland, Spain, and Greece do not end here. Poland has had substantial trade deficits over the period 2001-11. This shows that the economy is not internationally competitive and that the Polish currency is overvalued. Moreover,

<sup>27</sup> Dadak, "Twenty Years".

the nation's exports are primarily destined to other EU nations. As Greece, Poland possesses no firms that operate globally and are recognized for value and quality. The proportion of exports that are considered high-tech is quite small, too. This should come as no surprise because Poland spends very little on R&D.

The experience of the past five years offers direct proof that having its own currency saved Poland from the fate of Greece, Spain, Portugal, and Ireland. Between the summer of 2008 and the spring of 2009 the value of its currency, the zloty, drastically declined. This devaluation allowed the country to boost exports, close the trade deficit and avoid recession<sup>28</sup>. The National Bank of Poland analysis finds that "the flexible exchange rate" has been the main stabilizing force in Poland after 2007 and that adopting the euro "would have removed that protection"<sup>29</sup>. This finding is in line with earlier research that demonstrates that the process of real and nominal convergence between Poland and the euro area is largely incomplete and that an early adoption of the common currency could create substantial difficulties and risks<sup>30</sup>. Kierzenkowski especially warns against the danger of the boom-bust cycle that occurred in Spain and Ireland and is also likely to emerge in Poland should the country join the euro area not fully prepared.

## Conclusions

The present crisis validates reservations that many experts voiced before and after the implementation of the EMU. The euro exposes the region to adverse asymmetric shocks and, therefore, requires remedies, for instance, fiscal federalism, that the euro area members are loath to implement. Instead, the region follows a policy of extreme austerity that is clearly counterproductive. In such an environment only countries that have internationally competitive economies can withstand economic crises relatively well. Unfortunately, Poland is not in this category. The nation suffers from considerable trade deficits and exports few high-tech products. The likelihood of a speedy catch up is exceedingly low. Poland's investment rate is low and a significant part of gross capital formation is financed with foreign capital. This makes the country a net debtor and will burden it with sizeable capital transfers in the future. The persistent budget deficits and a growing national debt burden do not inspire a great deal of optimism about the future. Additionally, Poland spends disproportionately small amounts on R&D and, therefore, is not likely to break out of the present predicament soon. The key factor that has allowed Poland to avoid recession is the ability to maintain a flexible exchange rate. Should Poland adopt the euro, this most important defense would be gone forever.

<sup>28</sup> Kazimierz Dadak, "Krach mniemany", *Wprost*, November 9, 2008, 62–63.

<sup>29</sup> Michał Brzoza-Brzezina, Krzysztof Makarski and Grzegorz Wesołowski, "Would it have paid to be in the eurozone?", *Narodowy Bank Polski, Working Paper, no. 128* (Warszawa: NBP, 2012), 21.

<sup>30</sup> Kierzenkowski, "Preparing for".

# Support for Democracy: Tendencies in Lithuania 1990–2012

INGA GAIŽAUSKAITĖ

*Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania*

Lithuania is one of the countries in Central Eastern European (CEE) region that more than two decades ago experienced transformation from communist regime to democratic political system. The restitution of the independent state in 1990<sup>1</sup> meant substantial changes in Lithuanian society. Establishment of democracy and market economy implied fast and large-scale institutional reform: creation of new, and reorganisation of already existing social, political and economic institutions.

At the very beginning of transformation people of Lithuania expressed high expectations and strong support for the on-going process that led to the establishment of self-governing democratic state<sup>2</sup>. However, the euphoria of being independent has rather soon been replaced with the difficulties of the new reality. The scope and pace of reforms, the lack of experience, material and human resources as well as external pressures<sup>3</sup> led to complex social, political and economic conditions. Public support and unity were replaced with less positive sentiments and disillusion. The attainment of formal democracy was only the breaking point. Sustainment of democracy and development of efficient democracy is a lasting if not a permanent process.

Reviewing from present perspective, the development of twenty years has led to a settled condition. In very general terms it can be concluded that Lithuania has a rooted framework of formal democratic institutions, quite well developed market economy and is a full-fledged member of European community of old and new democracies<sup>4</sup>. However, besides structural transformation and institutional development it is no less relevant to review the formation of citizen's attitudes towards democracy. Supportive and pro-democratic citizenry is an integral part of legitimacy, consolidation and sustainability of democracy in a particular country.

This paper focuses on the dynamics of public support for democracy in post-communist Lithuania during the year 1990–2012. Conceptualising support for democra-

<sup>1</sup> The official act on restitution of the independent state of Lithuania was adopted on March 11, 1990.

<sup>2</sup> For example, involvement in Sąjūdis movement starting in 1988 or the “Baltic Way” human chain held on August 23, 1989.

<sup>3</sup> For example, the economic blockade on April 1990 imposed by the USSR.

<sup>4</sup> Accession to European Union on May 1, 2004.

cy as multidimensional notion, the paper will cover a variety of empirical indicators: preferences of political system, assessment of the way democracy works, confidence in political institutions, assessment of performance of government and other. Data from a set of representative international surveys will be used: World Values Survey (WVS)<sup>5</sup>, European Values Study (EVS)<sup>6</sup>, Eurobarometer (EB) surveys<sup>7</sup> (Standard Eurobarometer, Candidate Countries Eurobarometer (CEEB)), New Baltic Barometer (NBB)<sup>8</sup>, Life in Transition Survey (LiTS)<sup>9</sup>, and Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Project (PEW)<sup>10</sup>. Analysis of data reveals that Lithuanians support the idea of democracy as the best form of government; however, the scepticism about the way democracy functions in their country is widespread.

### Conceptual Dimensions of Political Support

Consolidation and long-term stability of democracy is closely related to mass political culture in a particular society. As Ronald Inglehart<sup>11</sup> puts it, political culture provides enduring mass support that stabilises democracy: “Democracy can be imposed from above or from outside, but whether or not it survives through good times and bad depends on whether its institutions have built up deep-rooted cultural attachments among the citizens”. It is commonly labelled that CEE countries took path of democratisation. However, it is observed that ‘democratisation’ went into a variety of directions and levels because countries in the region had different historical, cultural or social backgrounds. Also, citizenry in individual countries had different expectations towards and appreciation of democratic system as well as diverse social and cultural experiences leading to diverse formation of political culture and civil society. Therefore, developing public political attitudes and values affect viability and dynamics of democratic consolidation in the region<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> World Values Survey Online Data Analysis, <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAanalyzeIndex.jsp>.

<sup>6</sup> European Values Study Online Data Analysis, <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5>.

<sup>7</sup> Eurobarometer Surveys, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm).

<sup>8</sup> New Baltic Barometer, Trends Across Baltic States, [http://www.balticvoices.org/nbb/baltic\\_nbb\\_trends.php](http://www.balticvoices.org/nbb/baltic_nbb_trends.php).

<sup>9</sup> “Life in Transition after the Crisis” (EBRD, 2011), [http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/surveys/LiTS2e\\_web.pdf](http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/surveys/LiTS2e_web.pdf).

<sup>10</sup> “Twenty Years Later: Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union” (Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, 2011), <http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2011/12/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Former-Soviet-Union-Report-FINAL-December-5-2011.pdf>.

<sup>11</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), 164.

<sup>12</sup> Larry Diamond, *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation* (Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

The paper focuses on a set of public attitudes defined as ‘political support’. Political support is a multidimensional concept. David Easton<sup>13</sup> highlighted distinction between diffuse and specific political support. According to Easton<sup>14</sup>, it is a well-known phenomenon when members of political system may be dissatisfied with political authorities or condition of life and yet maintain confidence in the regime or identification with the political community. In this conceptual framework, *specific support*<sup>15</sup> refers to assessment (or satisfaction with) the perceived outputs and beneficial performance of the political authorities. It is a response to daily actions and decisions of governmental bodies and actors. Specific support rests upon the causal relationship between the performance of authorities and beneficial outputs when fulfilling needs of members of political system. To put it simple, if members assume that the authorities are responsible for all the good (or bad) outcomes influencing their situation it will be reflected in the levels specific support towards the authorities. On the contrary, *diffuse support*<sup>16</sup> is not dependent on the perceived results of the performance of authorities. It is an expression of generalised attachment towards political system. Specific support is not relevant or only indirectly relevant for the input of diffuse support. However, where diffuse support is negative, “it represents a reserve of ill-will that may not easily be reduced by outputs or performance”<sup>17</sup>.

Based on Easton’s conception, Pippa Norris et al<sup>18</sup>. provided an extended conceptual framework of political support. Along the continuum between diffuse and specific support there are five dimensions (or objects) of political support<sup>19</sup>: political community, regime principles, regime performance, regime institutions, and political actors. Thus, political support ranges from diffuse support for the *political community* (in terms of basic attachment to the nation and its political formation). Then it goes to support for the core *regime principles*, or the ideal of democracy, as opposed to the next more specific level of support for *regime performance*, that is, assessment of how democratic political system functions in practice. Support for *regime institutions* is the fourth dimension, close to the margin of specific support. It reflects attitudes towards core democratic institutions (parliament, government, political parties, the legal system, and other). And finally, there is specific support for particular *political actors* or leaders.

Though distinction of political support levels is important for a more advanced and detailed analysis of trends in political support in a particular society or societies, it is nevertheless clear that both diffuse and specific support can affect the development,

<sup>13</sup> David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975).

<sup>14</sup> Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” 436.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 437–439.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 444.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 444.

<sup>18</sup> Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>19</sup> Pippa Norris, “Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?,” in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9-12.

sustainability and legitimacy of democracy. The credit of positive diffuse political support for democracy may provide for solid base to withstand temporary flaws in system and institution performance<sup>20</sup>. Likewise, dissatisfaction with perceived performance of democratic government may lead to disbelief in democracy itself and its values thus causing problems for government stability and consolidation of democracy<sup>21</sup>. Thus, analysis of public support for democracy is also time-sensitive. Inglehart<sup>22</sup> provides with a clear argument how public support can affect long-term stability and persistence of democracy: “But once democratic institutions are in place, their long-term survival depends on the presence or absence of supportive orientations among the citizens. The growing importance in mass preferences is inherent in the very nature of democracy. If democratic institutions do not attain enough deep-rooted mass support to weather difficult times, the citizens can simply vote democracy out of existence”.

Therefore, to attain the diagnostic purpose of this paper (to analyse what are the trends of public support for democracy in post-communist Lithuania?) both the levels of diffuse and specific political support will be covered<sup>23</sup> following the conceptual and empirical schema provided by Norris et al<sup>24</sup>. Also, given the availability of survey data, time-line development along the levels of analysis will be provided.

## **Tendencies of Public Support for Democracy: Case of Lithuania**

### ***Support for Political Community***

The closest empirical counterpart<sup>25</sup> for support for political community is national identity and pride. In WVS/EVS<sup>26</sup> survey, question is stated as follows: ‘*How proud are you to be Lithuanian?*’. Data from 1990 to 2008 is used to identify if there are any changes in support for political community in the course of democratic development.

Since 1990, level of national pride decreased (see Table 1). Vast majority of population (87 per cent) were proud to be Lithuanians on the rise of democracy. In 2008, pride in being Lithuanians was expressed by 73 per cent. Moreover, it can be noticed that there is a sharp downward change in the share of those who were ‘very proud’. This is clear evidence that consolidation of the nation’s effort and support was really high

<sup>20</sup> David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” 445–446.

<sup>21</sup> Pippa Norris, “Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens,” 25–27.

<sup>22</sup> Ronald Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 164.

<sup>23</sup> With exception of political actors as it is quite country specific and not handful for comparison.

<sup>24</sup> Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*.

<sup>25</sup> It is disputable how well existing empirical indicators correspond to the theoretical conceptualization of the dimensions of political support. However, this is not the aim of this paper to discuss the problem. For the purposes of this paper the indicators were selected from existing survey data containing case of Lithuania and providing possibility to observe dynamics over time.

<sup>26</sup> World Values Survey Online Data Analysis / European Values Study Online Data Analysis.

during the initial phase of transition towards democracy in Lithuania. However, it appeared much more difficult to keep the attachment to political community in the course of reforms and development of independent state.

### *Support for Regime Principles*

Looking in parallel, the next three levels of support for democracy (support for regime principles, support for regime performance, and support for political institutions) in case of Lithuania reveal a pattern of *decreasing support with each more specific aspect of support*. It looks like there is dissatisfaction with the way democracy *and* its institutions work. However, the values of democracy are not neglected or refused.

Support for regime principles is measured by appreciating the idea of democracy as *'better form than any other form of government'* and preference of democracy as a political system in front of authoritarian forms of governments, that is, *'having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections'* (WVS/EVS)<sup>27</sup>.

Lithuanians prefer democracy as a political system. Significant majority (see Figure 1) agrees that though democracy may have problems it is still better than any other form of government: in 1997 and in 2008 levels of agreement are 90 per cent. Also, having to choose between democratic political system or having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and election, support for democracy prevails (87.6 per cent in 1997 to 83.4 in 2008) and share of those who would choose strong leadership as a political system decreased from 63.7 per cent in 1997 to 52 per cent in 2008 (see Figure 2).

### *Support for Regime Performance*

Though there is high support for democracy as a regime, it is obvious that there is more criticism than satisfaction about the way democracy works and develops in the country. Different surveys over time show that satisfaction with the development of democracy in post-communist Lithuania decreases. Support for regime performance can be reflected in few available measures. One indicator is satisfaction with the way democracy works in a country (*'On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in Lithuania'* (EB)<sup>28</sup>). Another indicator refers to the comparison of present regime (i.e. democracy) and past regime (i.e. communist rule). This indicator directly compares experiences with perceived government performance under different regimes that Lithuania has had. In NBB<sup>29</sup>,

<sup>27</sup> World Values Survey Online Data Analysis / European Values Study Online Data Analysis.

<sup>28</sup> Eurobarometer Surveys.

<sup>29</sup> New Baltic Barometer, Trends Across Baltic States.

this parallel is posed in question ‘*Do you think that we should return to Communist rule?*’. Also, surveys (LiTS<sup>30</sup>, PEW<sup>31</sup>) provide with a measure of *presence* and *working* of different key features of democracy (e.g. *fair judiciary, free and fair elections, law and order, freedom of speech*, etc.).

Having quite high satisfaction with democracy of 36 per cent in 2002 and 39 per cent in 2003, only 17 per cent of Lithuanians in 2010 say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (see Figure 3). Though satisfaction level increased in 2011 (23 per cent) this increase does not look to be stable.

At the same time, a tendency is observed that Lithuanians tend to transpose their resource of support for democracy performance to outside systems. Though Lithuania is a member country of European Union (EU), there is quite a gap between levels of satisfaction with national democracy and satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU. From 2005 to 2010 a stable share of 47–49 per cent of Lithuanians thought that democracy in EU works satisfactory. Share of those satisfied with democracy in EU increased to 52 per cent in 2012. Moreover, the same pattern repeats when assessing presence of separate features of democracy in Lithuania and in EU.

In general, survey data show that people in Lithuania do not believe that working of democratic system in their country is either able to provide with positive policy outcomes or to ensure democratic values to exist in reality. LiTS 2010 survey<sup>32</sup> shows that assessing existence of basic democratic institutions in their country, Lithuanians are especially sceptical about law and order, court system, political opposition, free and fair elections. In any aspect Lithuanians’ perception of realisation of elements of democracy is far below Western European average.

PEW 2009 report<sup>33</sup> repeats this pattern: people perceive listed key democratic features as *very important* (e.g. freedom of speech, fair judiciary, etc.). However, minority of them think that in case of Lithuania these feature *describe country very well* (see Table 2). Huge performance gap (54 per cent) refers to fair judiciary. Also, in citizens’ perceptions realization of free speech, free media and multiparty elections is far from being satisfying.

Pattern of support for principles and support for performance of democracy in Lithuania resembles what Klingemann<sup>34</sup> labels as ‘dissatisfied democrats’: those who clearly approve of democracy as a mode of governance, but they are discontent with the way their own system is currently operating. According to Klingemann<sup>35</sup>, though citizens express considerable dissatisfaction with performance of democratic regimes, “the fact of dissatisfaction does not imply danger to the persistence or furtherance of

<sup>30</sup> “Life in Transition after the Crisis”.

<sup>31</sup> “Twenty Years Later: Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union”.

<sup>32</sup> “Life in Transition after the Crisis”, 87.

<sup>33</sup> “Twenty Years Later: Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union”, 15.

<sup>34</sup> Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis,” in *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, ed. Pippa Norris (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 32.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.*, 32.

democracy". This can be supported with another indicator. Lithuanians (in line with two other Baltic states, namely Latvia and Estonia) have quite low levels of nostalgia for Communist regime (see Table 3). The average level of willingness to return to Communist rule has not exceeded much over 15 per cent in Lithuania. According to Ekman and Linde<sup>36</sup>, in comparison to other countries in transition, the Baltic countries have quite significantly lower nostalgia towards communist rule.

### *Support for Regime Institutions*

The main survey question behind support for regime institutions is public confidence (trust) in them. This paper focuses mainly on *trust* in core democratic political institutions (parliament, government, and political parties).

Survey data show that levels of political trust (or trust in institutions) in Lithuania are among the lowest both compared to EU countries and transition region. The core democratic institutions have not exceeded the benchmark of 1/3 of citizens' support (see Figure 4). Lithuanians have extremely low levels of trust in political parties (up to 10 per cent). Trust in parliament fluctuated at levels between 19 (in 2003–2004) and 7 (in 2009–2010), increasing to 13 per cent in 2012. Trust in government had peaked to 30 per cent during 2003–2004, however, went down to 13–14 per cent in 2010–2011, and increased to 21 per cent in 2012. Thus, despite temporary increases the general trends of trust in political institutions over two decades remain low or moderate.

Also, levels of political trust in Lithuania are below EU27 average and lower than levels of political trust by citizens in closest neighbouring countries. Eurobarometer 75<sup>37</sup> data shows, that in 2011, trust in government in Latvia was 15, in Estonia 56, in Poland 29, and average EU27 32 per cent, whereas in Lithuania 14 per cent. Trust in parliament in Latvia was 11, in Estonia 47, in Poland 26, and average EU27 33 per cent compared to 8 per cent in Lithuania. LiTS survey<sup>38</sup> also confirms that public trust in political institutions in Lithuania tends to decrease (from 2006 to 2010) and is below average of Western Europe democracies.

At the same time, there is another tendency observed. In Lithuania, there is a strong expression of something what Sztompka<sup>39</sup> calls 'externalisation of trust'. While trust in national political institutions is low, trust in supranational institutions is significantly stronger. Lithuanians have high trust in EU (see Figure 7). In contrast to national institutions, trust in EU is above average of EU27 of 41 per cent in 2011 if compared to 52

<sup>36</sup> Joakim Ekman and Jonas Linde, "Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 21 (2005), 360.

<sup>37</sup> "Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 75," (European Commission, May 2011), [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75\\_anx\\_full\\_fr.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_anx_full_fr.pdf).

<sup>38</sup> "Life in Transition after the Crisis," 87.

<sup>39</sup> Piotr Sztompka, *Trust: A Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 162.

per cent in Lithuania<sup>40</sup>. The gap between trust in national institutions and trust in EU is substantial.

Analysis of support for democratic institutions reveals that credit of trust has not been accumulated in post-communist Lithuania. Also, there is general public agreement that national institutions are less reliable than supranational institutions.

## Conclusion

Public support for democracy can be analysed along different dimension ranging from diffuse support in political community to specific support in political actors. It is generally argued that public support plays a crucial role in long-term sustainability and stability of a democratic system. To summarise the finding of the public support in the case of post-communist Lithuania it can be concluded that there is a clear pattern: there exists strong support at diffuse level whereas it decreases along each step of more specific support. Likewise, it can be stated that there is general support for the idea of democracy as preferable political system while the realisation of democracy in the country is not perceived as satisfactory.

Though having diminished since 1990, still majority of Lithuanians are proud with their nationality. Also, there is clear support for the statement that democracy is best political system. Appreciation of authoritarian rule or return to Communist rule is not accepted as possible direction of the development. However, at the same time there is clear scepticism about the way the ideal of democracy is implemented in the country. About 1/5 of Lithuanians are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country, whereas majority think that core features of democracy are not well working or present in their country. When it comes to trust in core political institutions, it is obvious that trust is low or even close to absent. However, Lithuanians tend to externalise their satisfaction with democracy and trust in institutions towards EU.

Though it can be claimed that certain levels of criticism are beneficial for democracy, it is also obvious that specific support is persistently low in Lithuania during two decades of democratic experience. The diffuse support may be considered as safeguard of further democratic development. However, constant dissatisfaction with system outputs is worrying as it can erode democratic values in a long-term perspective.

## Bibliography

Diamond, Larry. *Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation*. Baltimore, London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.

<sup>40</sup> "Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 75".

Easton, David. "A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support". *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (1975): 435–457.

Ekman, Joakim and Jonas Linde. "Communist Nostalgia and the Consolidation of Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe". *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, Vol.21, No.3 (2005): 354–374.

European Values Study Online Data Analysis, <http://zacat.gesis.org/webview/index.jsp?object=http://zacat.gesis.org/obj/fCatalog/Catalog5>.

Eurobarometer Surveys, [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm).

Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997.

Klingemann, Hans-Dieter. "Mapping Political Support in the 1990s: A Global Analysis". In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 31-56. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

"Life in Transition after the Crisis" (EBRD, 2011), [http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/surveys/LiTS2e\\_web.pdf](http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/surveys/LiTS2e_web.pdf).

New Baltic Barometer, Trends Across Baltic States, [http://www.balticvoices.org/nbb/baltic\\_nbb\\_trends.php](http://www.balticvoices.org/nbb/baltic_nbb_trends.php).

Norris, Pippa (ed.). *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

Norris, Pippa. "Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?". In *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, edited by Pippa Norris, 1–28. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

"Public Opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 75", (European Commission, May 2011), [http://ec.europa.eu/public\\_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75\\_anx\\_full\\_fr.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb75/eb75_anx_full_fr.pdf).

Sztompka, Piotr. *Trust: A Sociological Theory*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

"Twenty Years Later: Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union" (Pew Research Center, Global Attitudes Project, 2011), <http://www.pew-global.org/files/2011/12/Pew-Global-Attitudes-Former-Soviet-Union-Report-FINAL-December-5-2011.pdf>.

World Values Survey Online Data Analysis, <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAalyzeIndex.jsp>.

## Appendix

**Table 1.**

National pride in Lithuania, 1990–2008.

| Per cent                | 1990 | 1997 | 1999 | 2008 |
|-------------------------|------|------|------|------|
| <b>Very proud</b>       | 41,2 | 18,5 | 21,7 | 22,6 |
| <b>Quite proud</b>      | 46,3 | 50,5 | 38,9 | 49,7 |
| <b>Not very proud</b>   | 11,1 | 23,9 | 26,3 | 20,6 |
| <b>Not at all proud</b> | 1,4  | 7,1  | 13,2 | 7,1  |

Source: WVS/EVS, Online data analysis.

Survey question: How proud are you to be (Lithuanian). Answer items: very proud; quite proud; not very proud; not at all proud.

**Table 2.**

Gap between value and working of key features of democracy in Lithuania (2009).

| Per cent                            | Very important | Describe country very well |
|-------------------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Fair judiciary</b>               | 59             | 5                          |
| <b>Free media</b>                   | 50             | 14                         |
| <b>Religious freedom</b>            | 47             | 44                         |
| <b>Multiparty elections</b>         | 39             | 14                         |
| <b>Free speech</b>                  | 38             | 15                         |
| <b>Civilian control of military</b> | 20             | 9                          |

Source: PEW survey report, p. 15.

Note: % saying key features of democracy are 'very important' and describe their country 'very well'.

**Table 3.**

Preference to return to Communist rule in the Baltics (1995–2004).


| % strongly agree/<br>somewhat agree | Spring 95 | Autumn 96 | Spring 00 | Autumn 01 | Autumn 04 |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|-----------|
| <b>Estonians</b>                    | 1         | 1         | 4         | 3         | 4         |
| <b>Estonian Russians</b>            | 9         | 14        | 25        | 17        | 11        |
| <b>Latvians</b>                     | 4         | 3         | 1         | 5         | 5         |
| <b>Latvian Russians</b>             | 9         | 9         | 4         | 11        | 19        |
| <b>Lithuanians</b>                  | 7         | 7         | 9         | 12        | 7         |
| <b>Lithuanian Russians</b>          | 10        | 8         | 14        | 21        | 14        |

Source: NBB trends data.

Note: Survey question: Our present system of government is not the only one the country has had. Some people say that we would be better off if the country was governed differently. Do you think that we should return to Communist rule? Answer items: Strongly agree; somewhat agree; somewhat disagree; strongly disagree.

**Figure 1.**

Agreement that democracy is better than any other form of government in Lithuania, 1997–2008.




Source: WVS/EVS, Online data analysis.

Survey question: Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. Answer items: agree strongly; agree; disagree; disagree strongly.

**Figure 2.**

Preference of democratic political system or having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections, Lithuania (1997–2008).

% of those who think that a particular type of system is very good/fairly good for the country




Source: WVS/EVS, Online data analysis.

Survey question: I'm going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about each as a way of governing this country. Having a democratic political system / Having a strong leader who does not have to bother with parliament and elections. Answer items: Very good; fairly good; fairly bad; very bad.

**Figure 3.**

Satisfaction with democracy (national and in EU) in Lithuania, 2002–2012.




Source: EB data.

Survey question: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (OUR COUNTRY); in (EU)?

**Figure 4.**


Trust in political institutions in Lithuania, 2001–2012.



Source: CCEB; EB data.

Survey question: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? Tend to trust/tend not to trust.

**Figure 5.**  
Trust in EU in Lithuania, 2001–2012.



Source: CCEB; EB data.

Survey question: I would like to ask you a question about how much trust you have in certain institutions. For each of the following institutions, please tell me if you tend to trust it or tend not to trust it? Tend to trust/tend not to trust.





# Lithuanian – Ukrainian Strategic Partnership in the Context of EU Neighborhood Policy

IEVA GAJAUSKAITĖ

*Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania*

## Introduction

The EU's pragmatism was the main reason for the formation and implementation of the Neighborhood Policy in 2003. The Neighborhood Policy is based not only on such common values as democracy, human rights, free market, rule of law, but also on mutual economic benefit and common security threats (regional conflicts (Transnistria, Israel – Palestine), illegal cross-border migration, international organized crime, etc.). The changing geopolitical situation in the Eastern and Middle Europe was equally important: the new neighbors have become the area where Russia and EU compete for the expansion of influence zones. Also, the Neighborhood Policy's eastern vector coincides with the transit countries for strategically significant energy resources. Furthermore, the new external policy's cause has become not only the intention to control the stability of the energy supply, but also an opportunity to surround the strategically important Black and Azov seas thereby reducing Russia's influence in the region.

In 2004, Lithuania achieved the strategic security and foreign policy goal – Lithuania became a NATO and EU member. Lithuania had to define a new foreign policy agenda and as a result the concept of the regional leader or expert on Eastern Neighborhood was generated. This concept was formulated according to EU's "Wider Europe" vision and established external European Neighborhood policy. Furthermore, this vision was presented as the long-term goal of the Lithuanian foreign policy and Lithuania proclaimed commitment to further NATO's and EU's expansion to Eastern Europe and South Caucasus. Consequently, Lithuania initiated the formation process of the security partnerships with Eastern Neighborhood countries.

After restoration of the independence Ukraine declared the doctrine of a multi-vector foreign policy – the fluctuation between East (Russia) and West (EU and NATO) became determinant for changeable foreign policy decisions and maneuvering in the order of the biggest benefit. In spite of indetermination, EU membership was proclaimed as Ukraine's formal strategic goal. In 2004, after the Orange Revolution's gravitation to the West, the dedication to democracy, rule of law and human rights was seen as a solid

goal, but after the parliamentary elections of 2006, which led to political crisis, it was obvious that there were no real changes in Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy. However, the European Neighborhood Policy became Ukraine's opportunity for economic, trade benefit and also for closer cooperation with EU members without the animosity of Russia – Neighborhood policy became the cause and external context for the transformation of the bilateral relations between Ukraine and member states.

### **The European Neighborhood Policy as External Factor of Lithuanian – Ukrainian Strategic Partnership**

The formation of the Neighborhood Policy maintained the system of privileges based on the capacity of the neighboring countries to harmonize the judicial and technical regulation with the *acquis communautaire*. The bilateral relations with the EU's neighboring countries have been defined as preferential relations between the EU and its partners which are based on the EU's offer for economic integration, free movement of persons, goods, services, capital benefits, and also the obligation of partners to conduct reforms according to the differentiated framework in the areas of politics, justice, economy, etc.<sup>1</sup>. Therefore, the EU committed to strengthen relations with third countries on purpose to create conditions for reform and sustainable development, which could lead to free trade, access to the EU's internal market, and building of deeper euro-integration on the common values of democracy and rule of law.

Bilateral Action plans have been introduced as the main instrument for the implementation of the Neighborhood Policy: differentiated goals and reforms have been tied to the financial assistance to a concrete partner and the closer cooperation between the neighboring countries and the EU institutions, member countries<sup>2</sup>. The communication and cooperation process have been maintained through the EU and national institutions, bilateral (EU-partner, member-partner, partner-partner) and regional institutions in pursuance of secure and good neighborhood. With reference to Partnership and Cooperation Agreements or Association Agreements preferential bilateral relations in the context of the EU Neighborhood Policy have been proposed to Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova (Eastern vector) and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Israel, Occupied Palestinian Territory, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria (Southern vector) – countries, which have territorial borders with EU and can be considered as European countries (Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova) not only in terms of geography, were evaluated as equal to the countries that have no common civilization context or cultural – historical development aspects and have no capacity nor potential to become an EU

<sup>1</sup> Communication From The Commission To The Council And The European Parliament “Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors,” 2003.

<sup>2</sup> European Commission, “European Neighbourhood Policy,” 2004, [ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy\\_paper\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf).

member in a long-term perspective. This decision was very disappointing to Ukraine and Moldova, which were considered as primal candidates for further euro-integration and had concrete goal to become the EU members. However, the Neighborhood Policy had become the framework for the EU – Ukrainian and EU members – Ukrainian relations.

The first phase of the EU-Ukrainian relations can be considered as an overture (1991–1998). The relations were formally created in 1991, when EU recognized the independence of Ukraine and called for the development of an open, constructive dialogue. In 1994, EU and Ukraine signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The common goals established by the agreement were a constructive political dialogue, promotion of trade and investment, closer economic, financial, social, scientific cooperation, also Ukraine's transition into democracy and a market economy. The relations were institutionalized by the annual summits, the Cooperation Council, the Cooperation Commission, and the Parliamentary Cooperation Committee. In 1995, Ukraine established diplomatic mission in EU and after a year EU recognized Ukraine as a transitional economy, these actions resulted in an intensified cooperation not only in the economy and trade, but also in the political dialogue.

The second phase of the bilateral relations as a formal strategic partnership continued from 1998 until 2004. In 1998, when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement entered into force, the first Cooperation Council meeting was held and after that the Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma announced a decree, in which he defined EU membership as a strategic goal of both Ukrainian internal and external policies. The EU's response was the declaration of the EU-Ukrainian relations as a strategic partnership and formation of the Common Strategy towards Ukraine based on three strategic goals regarding Ukraine: assistance to the emergence of a democracy and market economy in Ukraine, cooperation in the maintenance of regional security and closer cooperation in the areas of economy, politics, justice, culture, social matters, etc.<sup>3</sup>

The third phase of the EU-Ukrainian cooperation can be defined as a neighborhood (2004–2008). In 2004, the European Commission presented the strategy paper “European Neighborhood Policy”, which detailed communique “Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbors”. Also Ukraine became a partner in the context of the Neighborhood Policy. The partnership was defined by the means of a National Action Plan, in which EU committed to Ukraine to give financial and technical support in exchange for reforms satisfying EU's requests. 2008 was the year when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement would expire, so in March of 2007 EU and Ukraine started negotiations on a new cooperation agreement – Association Agreement, in which a substantial area of cooperation should be a free-trade zone.

<sup>3</sup> European Council, “Common Strategy On Ukraine,” 1999, [www.nti.org/e\\_research/official\\_docs/eu/ukraine\\_99.pdf](http://www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/eu/ukraine_99.pdf).

Negotiations on the Association Agreement can be considered as the fourth phase of the EU-Ukrainian bilateral relations, which has not concluded yet. Until former Ukrainian prime minister Yulia Tymoshenko politically motivated trial EU-Ukrainian relations can be called as “first among equals”. In 2009, Ukraine’s Action Plan was replaced by the Association Agenda, which consists of three areas of cooperation: democratic development and good governance, regulatory reform and building of administrative capacity and development of infrastructure<sup>4</sup>.

The negotiations of the Free Trade Agreement became the cornerstone of the future of the Association Agreement in order to establish a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade area, thus providing conditions for Ukraine’s integration into the EU internal market and abolishing the trade barriers, promoting investment. Also, since 2009 Ukraine has become the entity of EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative, which aims for acceleration of the political and economic integration between the EU and the eastern partners: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. In essence this policy includes cooperation in four areas: democracy, good governance and stability, economic integration and integration into the EU’s energy security policy and human relations, which are carried out through the heads of states, foreign ministers meetings and working groups<sup>5</sup>. Nevertheless, the Neighborhood Policy and Eastern partnership do not give membership’s perspective or role in the EU institutions, decision making process.

The EU recognizes the geostrategic importance of Ukraine in respect of its geographical location, the role of a transit country for main goods and energy resources, and ability to influence the situation in Transnistria, but the EU criticizes the situation in the protection and promotion of human rights, rule of law violations and bent for authoritarian Russia. Ukraine defines the EU as the main trade partner and a condition for sustainable development because the EU can guarantee access to free market of 27 countries, but Ukraine’s official position on non-alignment status and continuously fluctuating foreign policy between the EU and Russian vectors, neglects Ukraine as an element of the common European security system and reliable partner. Despite the uncertain vision of the future, Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership, which can be considered as a framework for EU-Ukrainian relations, led to the member states – Poland and Lithuania – deeper interests to intensify bilateral and trilateral relations with Ukraine. Lithuania defined Neighborhood Policy and Eastern Partnership as an opportunity to expand influence and increase importance in the EU agenda setting. Gradually, Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations were recognized as strategic partnership.

<sup>4</sup> European Commission, “EU – Ukraine Association Agenda,” 2009.

<sup>5</sup> Gabriela Drăgan, Iulia Serafimescu, “The Future Of Our Neighbours: EU’s Eastern Partnership Initiative,” *Strategic Impact 2* (2009): 65 – 66.

## Initiation of Lithuanian – Ukrainian Relations

Diplomatic Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations were established in 1991, after the mutual recognition of independence. The legal basis for the bilateral relations was the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in 1994, which came into force in 1995. In 1996, during the Ukrainian President's Leonid Kuchma visit in Vilnius the priorities of the bilateral relations were approved, which emphasized mutual support for each other's Euro-integration and the objective to become NATO members. The countries declared the common goal of building a stable and secure Europe on the basis of good neighborhood, the promotion of friendly cooperation and commitment to human, minority rights. However, despite high-level political visits, joint declarations and several signed agreements the bilateral cooperation until 2004 was neither constructive, neither effective – Lithuania gravitated to the West and supported the Euro-Atlantic relations, while Ukraine orientated to Russia and developed shifting and unpredictable foreign policy.

In 2002, the Council of Presidents was established (first meeting took place in 2006). Also the Inter-Parliamentary Assembly and Inter-Governmental Cooperation Council, the commissions of European integration and cultural cooperation were established, which supposed to deepen the commercial, economic, scientific and technical cooperation. Despite the extensive institutionalization of the bilateral relations, the cooperation did not become regular, because meetings of the bilateral institutions simply did not take place.

Orange Revolution, a nationwide democratic revolution in Ukraine, was a major turning point for the Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations, in which both Lithuania and Poland played roles of external stability and mediation factors. Lithuania formulated objective to promote democratization, European integration and political stability in Ukraine. Lithuania was perceived as an actor, which can become an active and relevant actor in the Ukrainian democratization processes. In 2004, the new EU Neighborhood Policy became the context of this process: the promotion of the stability and democratization in the EU neighborhood became the opportunity for Lithuania to take over the role of the democracy exporter and make base for new foreign policy priorities: as a result the concept of the regional leader or expert on Eastern Neighborhood was generated<sup>6</sup>. This concept was formulated according to EU's "Wider Europe" vision and established external European Neighborhood policy. Furthermore, this vision was presented as the long-term goal of the Lithuanian foreign policy and Lithuania proclaimed commitment to support Ukraine's Euro-integration processes, internal reforms, consolidation of the market economy, membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and to promote the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement signing<sup>7</sup>. This commitment was based on a provision

<sup>6</sup> Lithuanian president Paulauskas, The speech: New Lithuanian Foreign policy, 2004, Vilnius.

<sup>7</sup> Lithuanian Foreign Minister Valionis, The speech: Democracy beyond Baltic sea: Euro-Atlantic contribution, 2005, Riga.

formed in the doctrine of “New Lithuanian foreign policy”, i.e., the vision that Ukraine is an integral part of the Europe and Euro-Atlantic institutions, and that Lithuania should not only support the political, economic, social and other reforms, but also to encourage the EU and NATO support for these reforms. In this process created bilateral institutions played a crucial role: continuous communication and dialogue at the highest guaranteed the possibility of the coordination of the cooperation programs and promotion of the bilateral relations to the level of the strategic partnership.

The Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership was initiated in the context of the dynamics of the EU-Ukrainian bilateral relations. The EU’s recognition of Ukrainian as an important partner in the European neighborhood stimulated the formation of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian formal strategic partnership. When the EU announced the decision to start negotiations with Ukraine on the Association Agreement, Lithuania instigated the formalization and implementation of the strategic partnership and the cooperation showed the signs of a real strategic partnership.

### **Evolution of Lithuanian – Ukrainian Strategic Partnership**

In 2005, the Lithuanian – Ukrainian bilateral relations were recognized as strategic partnership. This transition was influenced not only by the democratic revolution in Ukraine, the Lithuanian membership in the EU and NATO and the renewal of the Lithuanian foreign policy goals, the Neighborhood Policy formed by the EU, but also by an active mutual political dialogue. Personal efforts of Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus (1998–2003, 2004–2009) and pro-Western Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko (2005–2010) led to the formation of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership.

The presidents sought to create effective strategic partnerships and shift Ukraine closer towards NATO and EU membership. Therefore, they personally were involved in the promotion of cooperation and the maintenance of communication between the EU, USA and Ukraine. The meetings helped to reshape and precisely define the goals of the cooperation, considering that Lithuania successfully had become an EU and NATO member, while Ukraine firmly decided to seek the same goal<sup>8</sup>. Consequently, the systemic principle of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership was formed as a concept of the support of continuous process of the EU extension and the Ukraine’s Euro-Atlantic integration.

The implementation of the strategic partnership was based on the Ukraine – EU Action Plan introduced in the context of the Neighborhood Policy: the EU defined the areas of reform in Ukraine and Lithuania committed to cooperate with Ukraine as a strategic partner in this area, provide information, technical assistance, share experi-

<sup>8</sup> Joint Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania on cooperation in the field of European and Euro-Atlantic integration and regional cooperation, 2005, <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/lithuania/en/8753.htm>.

ence and support these reforms. The partners decided to promote not only an active political dialogue, but also the cooperation between non-governmental organizations and academic institutions to develop and deepen the Baltic Sea and Black Sea inter-regional cooperation in the areas of economy, energy, transport, environmental protection and sustainable development, also to maintain the cooperation in solving the issues of the separatist region of the Moldovan Republic of Transnistria and to support democracy and civil society in Belarus<sup>9</sup>.

Lithuania have obligated to share the experience in the sphere of creating overall social dialog, social and labor sphere, in the sphere of improvement of rural infrastructure, in the adjusting of the public procurement legislation to the EU standards, in the implementation of the electronic public procurement system, in the harmonization of the regulation systems of the insurance market with international and other standards, thus creating a broad inter-governmental and inter-agency cooperation solving issues in concrete spheres. Another sphere of bilateral cooperation became the strategically important security/defense area, promoting Ukraine's readiness to seek NATO membership plan<sup>10</sup>.

In 2008, the Ukrainian and Lithuanian strategic partnership was formalized and the phase of the initiation of the strategic partnership was concluded: there strategic relations was based on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law values, also on common historical memory and on the mutual interest in Ukraine's European and Transatlantic integration. Another sphere of bilateral cooperation became the strategically important security/defense area, promoting Ukraine's readiness to seek NATO membership plan<sup>11</sup>.

In 2008, the Ukrainian and Lithuanian strategic partnership was formalized and the phase of the initiation of the strategic partnership was concluded: there strategic relations was based on democracy, respect for human rights and the rule of law values, also on common historical memory and on the mutual interest in Ukraine's European and Transatlantic integration. The key area of the strategic cooperation has been identified as the European integration and the main purpose of this functional cooperation became the EU – Ukraine Association Agreement and speeding up of the EU – Ukrainian negotiations on visa-free regime. The second most important area of cooperation has been identified as the Euro-Atlantic integration and security. The purpose of this cooperation was defined as the preparation for Ukraine's membership in NATO. Energy security became another important area of the functional cooperation. The aim of the area is the security of energy supply and the transparency of the energy sector, also Ukraine's

<sup>9</sup> Joint Statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine Borys Tarasyuk and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania Petras Vaitiekūnas on cooperation in implementing Ukraine – EU Action Plan, 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/lithuania/en/8752.htm>.

<sup>10</sup> Joint Declaration by the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko and the President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, 2006, <http://www.mfa.gov.ua/lithuania/en/7706.htm>.

<sup>11</sup> Joint Declaration by the President of Ukraine Victor Yushchenko and the President of the Republic of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, 2006.

integration into the EU energy market. The main issues in the area are the creation of Caspian – Black Sea – Baltic Sea energy transit space, energy infrastructure projects and Lithuania's involvement in the solution of Ukraine's problems regarding integration into the EU energy market.


In 2011, when Lithuania chaired OSCE, Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic political cooperation became more intense: regular government and parliamentary meetings allowed to maintain an effective political dialogue. In addition, in 2012, in the bilateral cooperation agenda included Lithuania's sharing of experience with Ukraine as the latter is to chair this organization in 2013. Continuous communication was maintained not only at the highest political level; private business elements are more frequently involved in the cooperation at the strategic level: the annual business forums promote bilateral trade rates<sup>12</sup>, albeit the Lithuanian-Ukrainian economic cooperation is hampered by geographical distance, disproportion of the markets, inconsistency of the economic systems, etc. Moreover, The Programme of Cooperation in the Science, Innovation, and Information Technology in 2011 – 2015 was created. Another important achievement is a signed Memorandum between the Government of the Republic of Lithuania and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on the Cooperation in the Field of Energy, which provides the increasing energy security, the diversification of the energy supply, transparency of the energy sector and integration of energy markets (Lithuania's involvement in the Odessa-Brody-Gdansk oil pipeline project).

The cooperation involves not only state and local governments, agencies, bilateral institutions (the Council of Presidents, the Intergovernmental Council and its committees, the Parliamentary Assembly, the Forum of business) or tripartite institutions (the Lithuanian-Polish-Ukrainian Parliamentary Assembly, the Lithuanian, Ukrainian, Belarusian and other interested countries' coordinating council), but also military structures, such public groups as businessmen, artists, students, researchers, etc. The dialogue between civil societies, non-governmental organizations, research and educational institutions is being promoted by using a bilateral humanitarian forum and the amplification of interpersonal cooperation between societies. The cooperation in these areas is facilitated by positive interpretation of the common past. Moreover, both Lithuanian and Ukrainian societies often emphasize the negative aspects of the common history with Poland. Although the discourse of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian bilateral relations both in Lithuanian and Ukrainian media and political rhetoric is limited, Lithuania is presented as a "loyal friend". This image is reinforced by the fact that Vilnius implements the principle of non-interference to the internal affairs of the other states and expresses limited criticism regarding Ukraine's undemocratic development; however it emphasizes "the necessity of the EU's further enlargement to Eastern Neighborhood countries"<sup>13</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> "Kinah, Ukrainy i Litvy spilne bazhannya – rozvyvatysya za suchasnymi evropeiskymi standartami," <http://www.partyofregions.org.ua/ru/news/faces/show/6746>.

<sup>13</sup> "Komunike Spilnoi Rady Ministerstva zakordonnyh sprav Ukrainy ta Ministerstva zakordonnyh sprav Litovskoi Respubliki," Vilnius, 2010.

## The Evolution of Lithuanian – Ukrainian Partnership



### Evaluation of Lithuanian – Ukrainian Strategic Partnership

Despite the positive results in the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership in 2004–2010, the euphoria created by the political rhetoric began to falter after the change of the political leaders in Lithuania and Ukraine in 2010. Dalia Grybauskaitė became President of Lithuania, so called pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich became the President of Ukraine. Although the new presidents repeated predecessors' commitment to develop a strategic partnership, it remained just a formal priority and did not receive more personal attention from the presidents. In addition, in 2010, The new Ukrainian president declined the goal of NATO membership and foreign policy became multi-vectoral, i.e., Ukraine began to maneuver between the partnership with the EU and the partnership with Russia.

After controversial Viktor Yanukovich's actions, not only Vilnius, but also the EU started to implement with Ukraine the strategy of a conditional dialogue. He canceled already obscure democratic achievements: Amendments of the Constitution introduced in 2004 were declared invalid, the President powers were re-strengthened and foreign

policy once again took multi-vectoral nature. In 2010, the new law was announced, outlining the principles of Ukraine's domestic and foreign policy: document identified Ukraine as a non-aligned European country, which develops an open foreign policy with all countries, avoids dependence on particular countries or international organizations (Article 11)<sup>14</sup>, seeks membership in the EU, but at the same time cooperates with Russia and the United States. This foreign policy strategy has been defined as a pragmatic and striving to implement Ukraine's economic interests, i.e., the choice of partners and the development of international cooperation has been linked with the economic benefits<sup>15</sup>, trade agreements and foreign investment (Ukraine's foreign policy became a lobbying instrument of oligarchic system).

In 2013 Viktor Yanukovich came to Lithuania in order to update the guidelines for the bilateral cooperation. The political rhetoric was moderate, but the visit showed the search of supporters of the signing of Ukraine – EU Association Agreement during the Lithuanian presidency of the EU. However, Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations again were determined as strategic partnership and the guidelines for the cooperation included short-term strategic goals. Despite that Lithuania's capacity to influence the signing of Ukraine – EU Association Agreement is strictly limited. Ukrainian euro-integration process remains not only as context of Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership, but also as systemic principle of this partnership, according to this bilateral relations directly depends on Ukrainian internal situation, quality and quantity of reforms and EU – Ukrainian relations' development.

### **Convergence of EU – Ukrainian, Lithuanian – Ukrainian and Russian – Ukrainian Relations**

| <b>EU – Ukrainian relations</b>                                   | <b>Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations</b>                                    | <b>Russo – Ukrainian relations</b>   |
|---|--|--|
| 1991–1998 Overture (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement signed) | 1991–1996 Mutual recognition (Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed) | 1991–1996 Hostility (revision of common borders, disagreements about military base in Sevastopol, strategic arms, that rested in the territory of Ukraine after the collapse of the USSR, the Russian requirement for dual citizenship, energy supplies, Ukrainian refusal to join the CIS Collective Security Treaty) |

<sup>14</sup> "Pro zasady vnutrishnoi i zovnishnoi polityki," *Vidomosti Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy* 2411(2010).

<sup>15</sup> Petro Trygub, Oleksandr Trygub, "Evrointegraciyniy proces v Ukraini v pershyi rik prezidentstva V. Yanukovycha: zdobutki i perspektyvy," *Naukovi praci: naukovo-metodychnyi zhurnal* 154 (2011): 52.

| EU – Ukrainian relations   | Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations  | Russo – Ukrainian relations   |
|--|---|---|
| 1998–2004 Formal strategic partnership (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement came into force. The EU membership announced as a strategic goal of Ukraine’s internal and external policy. EU formulated Common Strategy towards Ukraine) | 1996–2004 Formal support (priorities of bilateral relations formulated, emphasizing mutual support for each other’s objective to become members of EU. The institutionalization of relations)   | 1997–2004 1996 Mutual recognition (Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed, Treaty of Long-term economic cooperation signed, Treaty of gas supplying signed, in 2001 multi-vector doctrine was introduced in the Ukraine’s foreign policy)  |
| 2004–2008 Neighborhood (Ukraine became a partner in the context of Neighborhood policy. In 2005 the Action Plan was presented. In 2008 the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement expired)  | 2005–2008 Formation of strategic partnership (Lithuanian-Ukrainian relations declared as strategic partnership)   | 2005–2006 Crisis (Orange revolution, Gas wars)  |
| 2009–2010 First among equals (The negotiation on Association Agreement started and the Association Agenda was presented. EU introduced the Eastern Partnership initiative)   | 2008–2010 Implementation of strategic partnership (In 2008 <i>Guidelines for Strategic Partnership</i> of Lithuania and Ukraine was formulated and renewed after few years)   | 2006–2010 Uncovered Animosity (After the political crisis in Ukraine pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovich became Prime Minister, Gas Wars)   |
| 2010 – now Conditional dialogue (Yulia Tymoshenko’s trial: Ukraine showed signs of “managed democracy”, therefore Association Agreement’s final accords and signing have become conditional. Increasing isolation of Ukraine)            | 2011 – now Evaluation of strategic partnership and renewal (Concept of strategic partnership is used as part of political rhetoric, however, dialogue between partners is moderate and conditional. Formal renewal of <i>Guidelines for Strategic Partnership</i> of Lithuania and Ukraine) | 2010-dabar Formation of strategic partnership (Russian-Ukrainian relations declared as strategic partnership. Agreement on a military base in Sevastopol, the Law on the language policy, signed a package of long-term cooperation agreements and announced the declaration on the formation of strategic partnership) |

The negative aspects of the Euro crisis, the EU members paid bigger attention to North Africa and Middle East, Ukraine’s non-alignment status, the chronic lack of reforms in Ukraine’s political, economic and social system, the trial of the former Prime Minister Tymoshenko, the uncertainty of the democratic evaluation of the 2012 Ukrainian parliamentary elections, Ukraine’s striving to combine Euro-integration and the development of a strategic partnership with Russia and its vision of the Eurasian Union interrupted the progress of EU-Ukrainian relations and the last round of the negotiations on Association Agreement and its signing.

Selective application of law has been the critical point in the relationship between the EU and Ukraine. The internal policy decisions in Ukraine jeopardized Ukraine’s prospects of Euro-integration and showed the tendency of authoritarian tendencies:

the imprisonment of pro-Western former Ukrainian Prime Minister and the opposition candidate of the 2010 presidential elections Yulia Tymoshenko and her allies have been named as a political elimination. Furthermore, continuous maneuvering by Ukraine between EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan Customs Union does not promote mutual trust. Sentencing Yulia Tymoshenko for 7 years by accusing of abuse of authority in negotiations with Russia on the 2009 gas contract led to the EU's boycott of the European Football Championship 2012 that took place in Ukraine and Poland, as well as the boycott of the Central European Summit, which was held in Yalta. In this way the EU has begun to isolate Ukraine while the latter started engaging in a formally closer cooperation with Russia; in 2010, Ukraine and Russia signed the agreement on the operation of the Russian military base in Sevastopol until 2042 (Kharkov Agreement), and in 2012, formed the Russian – Ukrainian strategic partnership and Ukraine's rapprochement with Russia was crowned by Viktor Yanukovich initiated Law on Language Policy Basis, granting the Russian language an official status in Ukrainian regions. Consequently, the concept of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership became only a part of rare political rhetoric.

The limited achievements of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian relations are based on the fact that both Lithuania and Ukraine implemented a reactionary policy towards each other. Moreover, both of them due to their relative lack of power are oriented to direct cooperation with the EU and its major member states. Lithuania's role as a mediator between Brussels and Kiev can not be fulfilled due to the lack of its influence in the EU. Nevertheless, Ukraine's democratic and socio-economic development, the implementation of the EU *acquis*, membership conditions are not directly dependent on whether the states develop strategic cooperation. Consequently, Lithuania can only play the role of Ukraine's supporter.

## Conclusions

The implementation of the European Neighborhood policy is the process, which can be regarded as an external environment for the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership. The development of the EU – Ukrainian bilateral relations in the context of the Eastern Neighborhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership led to the intensification of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian cooperation. The Neighborhood Policy affects the initiation, implementation and evaluation phases of the strategic cooperation between Lithuania and Ukraine, consequently, the EU – Ukraine bilateral relations, the synergy of the foreign policies of EU and Lithuania in objectives and priorities influence the evolution of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership.

Lithuania's membership in the EU and NATO led to changes in foreign policy, which were reflected as an aspiration to become a regional leader and/or the expert on the Eastern Neighborhood policy, and the development of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian

relations may be perceived as an instrument for the implementation of such a role, in order to establish the national importance in the EU and the ability to affect the shaping of the EU external policies. However, the change in the international environment and focus on the domestic policy led to inertia of implementation of the Lithuanian foreign policy priorities. Disagreements over the lack of reforms, democracy, human rights and rule of law, negative evaluation in EU – Ukrainian relations, despite negotiations on the Association Agreement, also led to the decrement of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership.

The roles of the partners of the Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership were defined in the context of Euro-Atlantic integration: Lithuania became a supporter of Ukraine's membership in NATO / EU. The evolution of the partnership was also influenced by the Ukrainian – Russian bilateral relations, the orientation of Ukraine's domestic development, but even more influenced by the lack of common territorial borders and the power imbalance (territory, population, military and economic power). For these reasons, Lithuania has a limited impact on the democratic, economic and social development of Ukraine. However, Lithuania can contribute to the implementation of the EU's *acquis communautaire* in Ukrainian public policy.

The Lithuanian – Ukrainian partnership is defined by formality than the effective strategic cooperation. Ukraine's multi-vector foreign policy (the Russian factor), the gap between Ukraine's geopolitical gravity (to the east) and the orientation (to the west), the chronic lack of democratic and market economy reforms decrease the capabilities of Euro-integration, therefore Lithuania has limited ability to affect the intensity of the cooperation. The evolution of the partnership is determined by the implementation of pragmatic short-term interests, rather than ability to ensure effective cooperation in strategic areas.

The Lithuanian – Ukrainian strategic partnership can remain as formal and self-actualize only in the political rhetoric; the both countries will promote limited cooperation only when it is necessary and very beneficial (“frozen stability” scenario) or the Lithuanian – Ukrainian partnership will intensify and, despite frictions due to Ukraine's internal policy and the situation in the country, partners will extent and deepen cooperation in all functional areas according to the long-term priorities (“gradual development” scenario).

The process of the cooperation itself depends on the goals and orientation of the ruling elite (groups of interests) and opportunities to develop a more efficient cooperation can be created only by changes in Ukraine's political situation and by EU Association Agreement's entering into force. For Lithuania, Ukraine will remain a priority in the context of the EU Neighborhood Policy. However, the lack of resources in Lithuania, the deficit of influence in the EU, the geographical distance between Vilnius and Kiev, as well as the power imbalance will continuously result the marginalization of the bilateral relations in either foreign policy.



# Transitional Justice and Social Trust in Post-Communist Countries

CYNTHIA M. HORNE

*Western Washington University, Bellingham, United States*

## Introduction

A social trust deficit is a widely acknowledged legacy of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Former Soviet Union (FSU).<sup>1</sup> Social trust refers to the type of trustor/trustee relationships individuals have with colleagues, friends, neighbors, and fellow citizens, either directly or within an institutional setting. More narrowly, interpersonal trust, as a type of social trust, is generally defined as the propensity of individuals to trust others or a kind of “pooled cultural capital.”<sup>2</sup> Interpersonal trust expresses the general trusting propensity of collectives of individuals, loosely bounded by community, nation, state or other intersubjectively understood collective structures. Social trust is used often in place of or to define the concept of social capital<sup>3</sup>. A lack of social trust is frequently cited as an impediment to democratic consolidation and economic development especially in the post-communist sphere<sup>4</sup>. *Whether* and *how* to address this deficit remain central questions for post-communist states.

There are several reasons to think low social trust in CEE and the FSU should be addressed as a policy problem. First, social trust is low in the post-communist space even compared to other similarly situated countries. Inglehart’s analysis of cross-national in-

---

<sup>1</sup> Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008); János Kornai, Bo Rothstein and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds., *Creating Social Trust in Post-Socialist Transition* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan Press, 2004); and Susan Rose-Ackerman, “Trust and honesty in post-socialist societies,” *Kyklos* 54 (2001):2–3.

<sup>2</sup> Piotr Sztompka, “Trust, Distrust, and the Two Paradoxes of Democracy,” *European Journal of Social Theory* 1, 1(1998): 20.


<sup>3</sup> Bo Rothstein and Dietlind Stolle, “The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust,” *Comparative Politics*, 40, July (1998): 441; and Eric Uslaner, “Democracy and social capital,” in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 135.

<sup>4</sup> Russell Hardin, “Trust in government,” in *Trust in Governance*, eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998); János Kornai and Susan Rose-Ackerman, eds. *Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan Press, 2004); and Tom Tyler, “Trust and Democratic Governance,” in *Trust in Governance*.

terpersonal trust levels revealed that “all 21 of the ex-communist societies rank below all 13 of the non-communist protestant societies” in terms of interpersonal trust; noting in particular that “rule by large, hierarchical, unresponsive, centralized bureaucracies seems to corrode interpersonal trust.”<sup>5</sup> The lowest levels of subjective well-being ever recorded were in the post-communist space, namely the peoples of Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, which relates to and exacerbates the problem of generalized low trust levels<sup>6</sup>. Overcoming some of these institutional legacies poses social challenges for the post-communist transitions.

Figure 1 presents comparative interpersonal trust data across European states that were and were not part of the former communist bloc. The figure shows the percentage of people who when asked the *World Values Survey* question, “Most people can be trusted?” (A165) responded that “you couldn’t be too sure.”<sup>7</sup> This is understood to be the mark of generalized distrust in a society. The data are drawn from the 1999 survey wave, grouping former communist countries to the left and non-communist legacy countries to the right. Even a decade after the transition, there is a clear pattern of higher levels of distrust in the former communist countries.

**Figure 1.**  
World Values Survey: Most People Can Be Trusted?  
% total Response – Can’t be too careful (1999 Survey Wave)



Second, and perhaps most critically, citizens in post-communist societies themselves cite the importance of reestablishing social trust. Many have even suggested that a culture of distrust plagues these societies, resulting in low levels of interpersonal trust. “One

<sup>5</sup> Ronald Inglehart, “Trust, well-being and democracy,” in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 92.

<sup>6</sup> Inglehart, 108–109.

<sup>7</sup> Online Data Analysis, *World Values Survey* homepage, <http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAalyzeQuestion.jsp>. Last accessed 05/09/13.

of the hallmarks of communist rule... was the perversion of civic society. In place of a sense of community, these 'societies' were instead marked by a mutual distrust between the state and its people, and between the people themselves."<sup>8</sup> Networks of secret police informers created generalized fear and distrust among citizens. The well documented nature of secret police activities during the communist period, and the post-regime revelations of vast files, in which spying by friends, colleagues, family and spouses were revealed, demonstrated a rational basis for institutional and interpersonal distrust, both during and after the communist period. The perceptions by CEE citizens themselves that their social institutions must be renewed provide solid justification for the design and implementation of social correctives.

Third, social trust is seen as a means of achieving the larger downstream goal of effective, consolidated democracy. Both interpersonal trust and trust in social institutions contribute to or are often considered constitutive elements of social capital. It is the linkages between social trust, social capital, and democracy that preoccupy much of the social trust literature. Almond and Verba's seminal work *The Civic Culture* suggests a direct relationship between cultures of trust and democracy<sup>9</sup>. Cultures of trust have been highlighted by Putnam and Ingelhart as facilitators of democratic stability<sup>10</sup>. Therefore there is concern about the stability and vitality of democracy across the post-communist sphere given the low social trust levels and limited social capital. In other words, promoting social trust is a way of supporting democracy.

One way in which countries in the region have tried to facilitate trust-building is through transitional justice policies. Transitional justice measures adopted in the post-communist region include facilitating access to secret police files, vetting public or semi-public office holders through lustration measures, public disclosures of past collaboration, truth commissions, trials, and property restitution measures, to name a few. In particular, lustration, one of the regionally dominant transitional justice measures opted for by almost all countries in CEE and some in the FSU as part of their post-communist transitions, is a specialized form of employment vetting, primarily "the banning of communist officials and secret political police officers and informers from post-communist politics and positions of influence in society."<sup>11</sup> In some countries the consequences of this involvement could entail removal from office or position, while in other cases only lying about the nature of that collaboration or involvement is grounds for removal<sup>12</sup>. Lustration has been a lightning rod of controversy surrounding both its methods and impact.

<sup>8</sup> Mark Gibney, "Prosecuting Human Rights Violations From a Previous Regime: The East European Experience," *East European Quarterly* 31, 1 (1997): 95.

<sup>9</sup> Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (New York: Sage Publications, 1963).

<sup>10</sup> Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Ingelhart, "Trust."

<sup>11</sup> Lavinia Stan, ed. *Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the communist past* (New York: Routledge Press, 2009), 11.

<sup>12</sup> Natalia Letki, "Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe," *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, 4 (2002): 530.

Despite the many assertions about the relationship between transitional justice and trust, the evidence is much more scant. The relationship is more often assumed than demonstrated, with conflicting claims about the trust repairing or trust wresting effects of transitional justice. This paper attempts to address this lacuna by examining the impact of lustration policies and truth commissions on social trust. Specifically, does transitional justice improve, undermine or have no impact on interpersonal trust in post-communist countries? The findings fall short of the rhetoric on either side. While policymakers have painted a picture of lustration as either a panacea for trust problems or a destroyer of trust, the empirics do not support either side of the debate. Truth commissions also fail to induce the desired social trust changes. In general, we see social trust is less malleable to direct policy change than hoped or feared, although the findings do suggest indirect trust building mechanisms are possible. However, transitional justice is not the hoped for social trust elixir that has been promised.

## Building Social Trust?

### *Transitional Justice, Lustration and Social Trust*

There are competing narratives in the literature regarding the relationship between transitional justice and trust: transitional justice measures could increase trust or undermine trust. From this trust building perspective, different types of transitional justice can create trust by enhancing transparency, demonstrating fairness, and/or holding individuals accountable for past actions. David and Choi categorize three types of transitional justice measures: *reparations*, which empower victims through financial compensation, truth telling and social acknowledgment; *reconciliation*, which rebuilds civic relationships between victims and perpetrators; and *retribution*, which punishes perpetrators of previous abuses in some way such as disallowing their participation in public office<sup>13</sup>. Both reparations and reconciliation focus primarily on enhancing transparency and demonstrating fairness, while retribution focuses on holding individuals accountable. These categories of transitional justice measures present complementary but different approaches to trust building.

The trust building perspective argues that transitional justice measures, such as file access, truth telling, truth commissions and apologies, build trust through the process of increasing transparency and promoting public reconciliation. Truth commissions and apologies demonstrate a commitment by the regime to acknowledging past abuses. The process of revealing the truth about the past allegedly functions as a mechanism to build trust in government and public institutions, and by extension fellow citizens. Truth-telling, both through truth commissions and through file access, is also seen as

<sup>13</sup> Roman David and Susanne Choi, "Getting Even or Getting Equal? Retributive Desires and Transitional Justice," *Political Psychology* 30, 2 (2009): 161.

personally empowering to citizens, because it gives them a voice in the process and formally records and therefore validates their experiences. This empowerment facilitates their ability to take risks and individually assess the trustworthiness of both institutions and other citizens. These types of measures focus on trust building through recognition and reconciliation, as well as through direct material reparation.

In contrast, lustration, as a form of transitional justice, focuses on building trust through the process of accountability. Lustration is “the banning of communist officials and secret political police officers and informers from post-communist politics and positions of influence in society.”<sup>14</sup> The positions of influence have focused on high ranking public institutions, but also include semi-public institutions, and generally understood “positions of public trust” such as the media and religious institutions<sup>15</sup>. Lustration creates trust by forcing accountability for past actions through a combination of bureaucratic change and symbolic change. Lustration symbolically signals a break with the past, and bureaucratically changes the composition of public institutions and the government by removing or preventing from taking office or positions of power those individuals whose previous regime involvement or complicity renders them untrustworthy<sup>16</sup>. Public opinion polls in CEE show that people do think that lustration policies could prove the trustworthiness of political candidates, and we have evidence that lustration improves the trustworthiness of targeted public institutions<sup>17</sup>. As such, lustration functions differently but complementarily with the recognition and reconciliation focus of other transitional justice measures by including a component of accountability through institutional or bureaucratic change.

In sum, one side of the debate argues that transitional justice has a positive impact on building trust. Even if there are problems with the implementation or the context of the transitional justice, generally speaking the process of truth telling, or bureaucratic change, or retribution can enhance trust from this perspective. Specifically, lustration with its targeted institutional change component has a theorized trust building effect on institutions, and by extension interpersonal trust.

### **H1: Transitional justice increases interpersonal trust.**

<sup>14</sup> Stan, 11.

<sup>15</sup> Cynthia M. Horne, “Late Lustration Programs in Romania and Poland: Supporting or Undermining Democratic Transitions?” *Democratization* 16, 2 (2009).

<sup>16</sup> United Nations, *Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Vetting: An Operational Framework*. Office of the UN High Commission on Human Rights, New York, United Nations HR/PUB/06/5, 2006; and Casper Fithen, *The Legacy of Four Vetting Programs: An Empirical Review* (New York, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009), February. [www.ictj.org](http://www.ictj.org); and Vojtech Cepl, “The Transformation of Hearts and Minds in Eastern Europe,” *The Cato Journal* 17, 2 (1997).

<sup>17</sup> Horne, “Late Lustration”; and Cynthia M. Horne. “Assessing the Impact of Lustration on Trust in Public Institutions and National Government in Central and Eastern Europe,” *Comparative Political Studies* 45, 4(2012).

The opposing narrative is that transitional justice has no impact, or worse threatens to undermine trust in transitional societies. Retroactive justice measures might transgress rule of law procedures, thereby damaging government trustworthiness. Additionally, problems with the design or the implementation of the transitional justice program could undermine trust rather than enhance it. Transitional justice measures that are overtly manipulated by political parties for personal advantage or used as acts of revenge politics, as documented in Hungary, Albania, and Poland, could poison citizen trust in political parties, public institutions, and government<sup>18</sup>.

Transitional justice could also negatively impact interpersonal trust. Claus Offe suggested that transitional justice “may provoke hostile attitudes on the part of those affected or potentially affected by such measures, leading to acts of sabotage, revenge, resentment, and conspiracies on their part. They may even create martyrs, which is even more the case with criminal sanctions applied against key actors of the old regime.”<sup>19</sup> There is also a concern that truth revelation programs could foment distrust. Secret police files contain information documenting how betrayals by friends, colleagues, and even relatives. Revelations about the scope of the interpersonal betrayals could undermine trust<sup>20</sup>. “Opponents [of lustration] have feared that the general release of the files would unleash a torrent of mistrust and suspicion thereby undermining the hard work of building a stable democracy.”<sup>21</sup>

This perspective highlights a number of ways that transitional justice could undermine trust. Poorly implemented programs or programs fraught with political manipulation could thwart trust building. The revelations from even well designed and well implemented programs could catalyze renewed fear, retraumatization, and distrust. Priscilla Hayner’s work on truth commissions has highlighted this double-edged sword of truth telling, by which the process of revealing the truth can cause substantial trauma to citizens sometimes resulting in the retraumatization of victims<sup>22</sup>. Hence, the assumption that trust-building will result from well intentioned transitional justice measures is problematic from this perspective.

## H2: Transitional justice decreases interpersonal trust.

<sup>18</sup> Csilla Kiss, “The Misuses of Manipulation: The Failure of Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Hungary,” *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, 6(2006); and Robert Austin and Jonathan Ellison, “Post-Communist Transitional Justice in Albania,” *East European Politics and Societies* 22, 2 (2008).

<sup>19</sup> Claus Offe, “Coming to Terms with Past Injustices: An Introduction to Legal Strategies Available in Post-communist Societies,” *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 33, 1(1992): 198.

<sup>20</sup> Author conversation with János Kornai at Budapest Collegium, Hungary, Fall 2002.

<sup>21</sup> Charles C. Bertschi, “Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria,” *East European Quarterly* XXVIII, 4 (1995):448.

<sup>22</sup> Priscilla Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions* (New York: Routledge Press, 2002), 141.

*Traditional trust building mechanisms*

Although more widely used now than in the past, transitional justice measures are not typical trust building devices. There are more traditional mechanisms that highlight economic, political or social means of directly and indirectly building trust.

First, economic security, material gains, optimism about the future, and levels of education are all associated with interpersonal trust<sup>23</sup>. In particular, Inglehart's research demonstrates that material well being is closely linked with higher levels of interpersonal trust. The magnitude of the effect of material factors is disputed. Although Delhey and Newton find evidence to support a relationship between economic well being and trust, they find that subjective measures of well-being and happiness are better at explaining trust than objective ones like income and education<sup>24</sup>. The converse is that declining material conditions can undermine interpersonal trust. More narrowly, the literature cites a relationship between rising inequality and declining social trust<sup>25</sup>. Mishler and Rose find less evidence to support these assertions in post-communist countries, arguing "fairness considerations are less important than freedom considerations in affecting citizens' perception of trust in institutions."<sup>26</sup> Applying these findings to the post-communist transitions, optimism about the economic future could have an interpersonal trust building effect. Conversely, rising inequality or decreased economic security could adversely impact social trust.

**H3: Perceptions of economic well-being and satisfaction with government promote interpersonal trust.**

**H4: Rising economic inequality undermines social trust.**

**H5: Corruption or unfair treatment by government undermines interpersonal trust.**

Related to this, we apply Inglehart's and Uslaner's findings that life satisfaction, which is partially a function of having material needs met, will impact interpersonal trust. However, this must be approached with caution because the post-communist space retains some unique features. Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer show that subjective perceptions of well-being don't correlate with actual economic figures in the post-communist space early on, as would be expected, although there is hope they could over time<sup>27</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> Kenneth Newton, "Social and Political Trust," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 355; Mark Warren, ed., *Democracy and Trust* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Claus Offe, "How can we trust our fellow citizens," in Mark Warren *Democracy and Trust*; and Inglehart, "Trust."

<sup>24</sup> Jan Delhey and Kenneth Newton, "Who Trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies," *European Societies* 5, 2 (2003): 111.

<sup>25</sup> Eric Uslaner, *Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Life Easy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); and Bo Rothstein and Eric Uslaner, "All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust," *World Politics*, 58 (2005).

<sup>26</sup> William Mishler and Richard Rose, "Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism About Institutions of Civil Society," *Studies in Public Policy*, No. 252 (1995), 24.

<sup>27</sup> Rose, Mishler and Haerpfer, 170.

**H6: As life satisfaction increases, social trust increases.**

Second, a dominant discourse in the social capital literature focuses on the relationship between engagement in voluntary organizations and interpersonal trust, although the empirical findings are mixed. While Putnam makes a strong case for the relationship between voluntary participation in social institutions, trust building, and democracy, Delhey and Newton's review of the origin of social trust across seven countries found no evidence that participation in voluntary organizations was associated with trust<sup>28</sup>. This resonates with other empirical studies that limit or reject a relationship between voluntary organizations and interpersonal trust altogether<sup>29</sup>. Moreover, critiques of the trust building approach assert that certain voluntary organizations, such as those focused on religion, ethnicity, race or gender can actually create "antisocial" capital by excluding others or creating distrust of others, thereby undermining the general trust in society<sup>30</sup>. The theoretical debates and empirical evidence supporting the trust building properties of voluntary social organizations yield mixed results. To support the particular goal of this project, which is to assess the impact of transitional justice on trust, I will narrow the scope of inquiry and simply test whether we observe a relationship between trust in social institutions and interpersonal trust, and whether that relationship is affected by lustration and transitional justice measures.

**H7: More trust in social institutions increases interpersonal trust.**

Third, institutional competence, fairness, and trustworthiness are also presented as social trust builders. Rothstein and Stolle demonstrated a direct relationship between trust in institutions of "order," meaning institutions like the courts, police, judiciary, and civil service that are tasked with impartial implementation of the law, and generalized trust. However, this relationship doesn't hold with other more politicized public institutions, such as political parties or parliament, which are assumed to be partisan<sup>31</sup>. Offe thinks trustworthy public institutions can enhance interpersonal trust by creating an institutional space that reduces risk<sup>32</sup>. Both Levi's and Rothstein's work suggests the state might play an important interpersonal trust building role because of its capacity to monitor laws, sanction violators, and promote information and guarantees<sup>33</sup>. Taken

<sup>28</sup> Putnam; and Delhey and Newton, 110.

<sup>29</sup> Newton, 353; and Dietlind Stolle, "Clubs and Congregations: The Benefits of Joining an Association," in *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen Cook (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001).

<sup>30</sup> Margaret Levi, "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*," *Politics and Society* 24 (1996); and Bo Rothstein, "Social Trust and Honesty in Government: A Causal Mechanisms Approach," in Kornai, Rothstein and Rose-Ackerman, *Creating Social Trust*.

<sup>31</sup> Rothstein and Stolle, 454–456.

<sup>32</sup> Offe, "How can we trust," 71.

<sup>33</sup> Margaret Levi, "A State of Trust," in *Trust in Governance*, eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, 77–101 (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998), 95–6; and Rothstein, "Social Trust and Honesty," 16.

together, these authors suggest trust in the state and public institutions could have positive, indirect effects on interpersonal trust; in other words, trust in the public or political sphere spills over into the social sphere.

**H8: An increase in the trustworthiness of public institutions and the government positively contributes to social trust.**

In sum, this section explicated several testable hypotheses regarding indirect and direct social trust building mechanisms. Reducing inequality and promoting economic growth could enhance interpersonal trust. Promoting institutional trust could also promote social trust. Changing the competency and fairness of government could contribute to social trust. The next section turns to our central task, testing whether transitional justice affects social trust while also controlling and testing for these other possible relationships.

## **Data and Methods**

### ***Countries***

This paper focuses on twelve countries in the post-communist space that have either opted for or rejected lustration policies and/or transitional justice programs as part of their post-authoritarian transitions. These include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Albania, Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Table 1 lists the countries in the study and provides details about their lustration policies. The sample includes countries with a variety of approaches to both transitional justice in general and lustration in particular, as well as a range of socioeconomic and political conditions. There are countries that were and were not part of the USSR and are or are not currently EU members, thereby providing variation in country groupings and historical and current political alliances. There is also a range of economic experiences post-transition, thereby providing variation in political and economic conditions across the country sample.

### ***Lustration Measures***

The coding of lustration and transitional justice measures is highly controversial, reflecting the country specific nature of program assessments, and the problems placing specific programs within a broader comparative context. Table 1 shows the results of a coding scheme in which the programs are organized according to whether lustration was compulsory and wide (4), narrow and voluntary (3), largely symbolic (2), or non-existent (1). There are many factors used to determine the categorization of the countries along these criteria, including the degree to which the laws are wide or narrow in scope, fairly and consistently implemented, subjected to politicization or manipulated by political parties against their opponents, overturned by parliaments, Constitutional Courts,

and/or presidents, and actually implemented in a manner reflecting their design and purpose. While no single factor trumps all the other considerations, the degree to which the laws force compulsory institutional change as opposed to limited or voluntary change is a primary variable. Augmenting the institutional change factors are symbolic change measures and moral cleansing practices. These are also considered in the categorization of lustration programs, reflecting the important moral cleansing goals of the laws. The focus is on creating a relative categorization strategy, comparing the regional experience with lustration and emphasizing institutional and symbolic change measures.

**TABLE 1.**  
Classifying the Countries by Lustration Measures

| <p><b>WIDE and COMPULSORY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</b></p> <p><b>Required Bureaucratic Change and Public Disclosures (4)</b></p>  | <p><b>NARROW and VOLUNTARY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</b></p> <p><b>Public disclosures with voluntary Bureaucratic change (3)</b></p>  | <p><b>PRIMARILY SYMBOLIC CHANGE</b></p> <p><b>Limited and/or Informal Vetting through public disclosure (2)</b></p>  | <p><b>NO CHANGE/ SYMBOLIC OR INSTITUTIONAL (1)</b></p>   |
|---|--|--|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lustration laws passed and implemented</li> <li>• Some screening of individuals (either public or private sector or both)</li> <li>• Some removal from office or positions</li> <li>• Employment penalty for previous collaboration or regime involvement</li> <li>• Early timing of measures confers legitimacy to their symbolic moral cleansing intent</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lustration or lustration type laws passed;</li> <li>• Some implementation but limited scope of positions;</li> <li>• Political manipulation leads to implementation problems;</li> <li>• Limited bureaucratic change;</li> <li>• Emphasis on symbolic truth telling, paired with some bureaucratic change;</li> <li>• Limited penalty for disclosures since not forcefully removed from office;</li> <li>• In some cases, penalty only for lying about collaboration</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Failure to implement lustration laws that are passed;</li> <li>• Lustration laws passed but repeatedly vetoed, not adopted, or declared unconstitutional;</li> <li>• Minimal removal from office;</li> <li>• If laws in place, emphasis on symbolic truth telling without bureaucratic change</li> <li>• No penalty for disclosures of collaboration, since shaming about past not effective</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Lustration laws either never passed or passed but not implemented;</li> <li>• Active rejection of lustration;</li> <li>• Files sealed and remain closed;</li> <li>• Even memory politics efforts limited or hindered;</li> <li>• Avenues for revisiting any form of transitional justice are closed;</li> </ul> |

| <p><b>WIDE and COMPULSORY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</b></p> <p><b>Required Bureaucratic Change and Public Disclosures (4)</b></p>  | <p><b>NARROW and VOLUNTARY INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE</b></p> <p><b>Public disclosures with voluntary Bureaucratic change (3)</b></p>  | <p><b>PRIMARILY SYMBOLIC CHANGE</b></p> <p><b>Limited and/or Informal Vetting through public disclosure (2)</b></p>   | <p><b>NO CHANGE/ SYMBOLIC OR INSTITUTIONAL (1)</b></p>  |
|---|--|---|---|
| <p><b>Czech Republic</b> – 1991 – longest and most comprehensive program in region. Police vetting expanded in 2007 and increased file transparency; but active lustration largely ended.</p>                           | <p><b>Hungary</b> – early but limited lustration; narrowly focused on president and parliament in practice although laws were broader; some removal from public office and public truth telling; citizen fatigue with lustration concluded use of laws.</p>  | <p><b>Bulgaria</b> – several lustration related laws (1992, 1997, 2002), but minimal lustration of public officials; focus on academics and scientific institutions; no real lustration of political elites. Public disclosures started in earnest in 2009.</p>                     | <p><b>Albania</b> – several lustration related laws passed (1995, 1998), but no real implementation; 2008 lustration law declared unconstitutional; <i>no de facto</i> lustration.</p>  |
| <p><b>Latvia</b>–lustration and citizenship laws (1994, 1995); mixture of anti-Russian policies and lustration; actively vetted individuals from local and national elections; vetting for public sector positions.</p> | <p><b>Poland</b> – multiple starts and stops to lustration, caught in cycles of political manipulation (1989, 1992, 1997, 2006); some implementation in practice; expansive round of lustration launched 2006; multiple constitutional court rulings block and amend laws; continued popular calls for vetting.</p>                  | <p><b>Romania</b> – much lustration debate but no agreement on laws; symbolic rulings by CNSAS but little lustration in practice; 2006 expansive lustration program to enact “real” lustration; Constitutional Court blockage of laws 2008; continued citizen support for laws.</p> | <p><b>Russia</b> – Parliament made lustration a criminal offense in 1991; lustration bill proposed 1992 but set aside. No public identification of KGB collaboration; general file access denied but since 1991 selected individuals have access.</p> |
| <p><b>Estonia</b> – 1992 oath of conscience to disclose past; 1995 citizenship criteria used as vetting tool for public positions; truth telling about past complicity becomes forced disclosure of collaboration.</p>  | <p><b>Lithuania</b> – several lustration laws (1991, 1999); 1999 grants period of confession with no employment penalties, after grace period then both private and public sector employment bans for lying about past; some individuals removed and prevented from taking jobs; delayed lustration; politicized implementation.</p> | <p><b>Slovakia</b> – 1991 Czechoslovak lustration law expired without implementation; no formal lustration law; 2004 some files published; stormy history of rejecting memory institute; but once institute in place did work to disclose info about citizens and complicity.</p>   | <p><b>Ukraine</b> – After Orange Rev in 1995, two lustration bills proposed and rejected by both President and Parliament. Secret archives remain closed. 2005 purge of opposition not lustration. No accountability for past</p>                     |

Countries categorized as *Wide and Compulsory Lustration* programs have a required bureaucratic change or public disclosures central element to them. In these countries lustration laws passed and were actually implemented. There was some screening of individuals as well as removal from office or positions. In essence there was an employment penalty for previous collaboration or regime involvement involving either removal and/or disclosure. The early timing of lustration measures in these countries confers a legitimacy to their symbolic moral cleansing intent as well. The *Narrow and Voluntary Institutional Change* category includes countries that enacted programs with voluntary bureaucratic change components. Lustration laws passed in these countries and there was some implementation of the laws, albeit across a limited scope of positions. Countries in this category experienced political manipulation of the laws, leading to implementation problems, which in the end resulted in limited bureaucratic change. The emphasis on symbolic truth telling, paired with less bureaucratic change meant there was a very limited penalty for the disclosure of past collaboration. Without forceful removed from office there was little to encourage bureaucratic change.

The *Primarily Symbolic Change* category includes countries with limited and/or informal vetting through public disclosures. All countries had lustration or pseudo-lustration laws but implementation remained a problem. Lustration laws were passed but repeatedly vetoed, not adopted, or declared unconstitutional, resulting in minimal removal from office. If the laws were in place, the emphasis was on symbolic truth telling without bureaucratic change. There is no official penalty for disclosures of collaboration, with these countries relying on shaming as a change device. Finally, the *No Change* category includes countries that either failed to pass lustration laws or had no implementation. The files were sealed and remain closed in these countries. Even memory politics efforts were limited or hindered and avenues for revisiting any form of transitional justice were closed. This categorization allows us to compare countries according to their lustration measures and provides a way to test the impact of these measures across the post-communist space.

### *Truth Commissions*

It is of some interest that across the region few countries employed truth commissions as a way to address their communist past. Since truth commissions have proliferated around the world as transitional justice choices, the absence of truth commissions from the CEE experience bears addressing. Lustration programs include a truth telling component via symbolic cleansing and public disclosures. Therefore in some ways there is already an explicit truth telling aspect in the most prevalent transitional justice choice in the region. The “truth telling” has been primarily about the Nazi not Communist past, except for Romania. This further indicates that truth commissions were primarily used to augment the truth telling aspects of lustration not substitute for them. Nonetheless, truth commissions have been enacted by several CEE countries, and they are included in Table 2. The dates of the enactment of truth commissions are provided in

parentheses. Given the paucity of cases, it is not possible to assess the quality of the truth commissions. The simple dichotomy—presence or absence of truth commissions—is included in the models in order to conduct a preliminary assessment of the impact, if any, of this alternative and possibly complementary form of transitional justice.

**Table 2.**  
Truth Commissions

|                                 |  |                                       |
|---------------------------------|--|---------------------------------------|
| <b>No truth commissions (0)</b> | Albania<br>Poland<br>Bulgaria<br>Russia<br>Ukraine   | Czech Republic<br>Slovakia<br>Hungary |
| <b>Truth Commissions (1)</b>    | East Germany (1992)<br>Estonia (1998)<br>Latvia (1998)<br>Lithuania (1998)<br>Romania (2006) |                                       |

Does interpersonal trust vary?

A first order question is does interpersonal trust vary? The fragility and/or mutability of interpersonal trust is a topic of some debate, because it directly affects potential policies designed to change or build trust. For example, Uslaner conceptualizes interpersonal trust levels as stable and enduring, not readily reflecting changes in society or government performance<sup>34</sup>. Cleary and Stokes question the stability of interpersonal trust within countries, showing substantial variability within countries in a way that would not be consistent with interpersonal trust conceptualized as a stable, deeply held set of core national beliefs<sup>35</sup>. If interpersonal trust or social trust cannot be changed or is highly resistant to direct change, it is hard to make an argument for policies, such as transitional justice measures, designed to enhance social trust. More concretely, if it is very difficult to overcome a low trust equilibrium, something observed in all the post-communist countries, what is the utility of directly targeting social trust? Do national level laws and policies, such as transitional justice measures impact a society's level of interpersonal trust?

One conventional measurement of interpersonal trust is the percentage of people who say that 'most people can be trusted' on the World Values Survey (WVS) standard questionnaire. The WVS also suggests constructing a trust index by taking the difference of the percentage of people who say 'most people can be trusted' from people who say 'you can't be too careful' in order to better capture the interpersonal trust dynamic.<sup>36</sup> Both the raw WVS interpersonal trust measure and the constructed WVS trust index

<sup>34</sup> Uslaner, "Democracy and Social Capital," 66.

<sup>35</sup> Matthew Cleary and Susan Stokes, *Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006), 317–8.


<sup>36</sup> It is represented by the formula: trust index= 100+ % most people can be trusted -% can't be too careful.

are used in this analysis. The sample size is small because of the infrequency of the survey and the aggregated nature of the data.

Looking at WVS unaltered measures of interpersonal trust between 1990–2005, there is substantial variation both within and between countries in the region. Lithuania's interpersonal trust measure declined by 19%, the Czech Republic's declined by 20%, Bulgaria's declined 22%, Russia's decreased by 30%, Slovakia's declined by 32%, and Poland's decreased by 35%. This suggests a substantial change in interpersonal trust measures over the post-transition time period. This is consistent with Mishler and Rose's findings that there are substantial differences both within the post-communist countries and between countries in terms of interpersonal trust<sup>37</sup>.

Using the WVS trust index alternative measure, Figure 2 shows there is substantial variation in interpersonal trust across the region and within countries, although no clear patterns emerge. Trust in Bulgaria consistently declined, while trust in Russia plummeted and then started to rise, and trust in Romania has risen and fallen. There are visible and large between country differences observed over the nearly 30 year time period. Uslaner argues that interpersonal trust is static, and should not be impacted by changes in information or the immediate economic and political environment, however these figures do not support that conclusion. Since interpersonal trust varies both within and between countries, we can explore possible causes for its variation, and use it as a dependent variable for our analysis of a possible impact from transitional justice measures.

**Figure 2.**  
Interpersonal Trust Index World Values /survey



<sup>37</sup> William Mishler and Richard Rose, "What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies," *Comparative Political Studies* 34, 1 (2001): 45.

## Lustration and interpersonal trust

The second order question is do we see a relationship between lustration and interpersonal trust? I turn first to aggregate level data to address this question. Limited regression analysis is possible because of the small overall sample size. The inclusion of many controls, such as trust in government, or institutional trust, or even democracy, dropped the sample size too much to permit reliable statistical analyses<sup>38</sup>. However, Table 3 provides some limited results using models with simple control variables and testing the impact of lustration measures on interpersonal trust. The models include all twelve countries in our analysis, covering the period 1990–2005. The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regressions are clustered by country to take into account intra-country variation and trends.

In all three models, lustration measures are not statistically significant predictors of interpersonal trust. Truth commissions were also not robust predictors of interpersonal trust. Although both lustration and truth commissions were negatively signed, again we cannot draw conclusions because of the lack of statistical significance in the models.

**Table 3.**  
Transitional Justice and Interpersonal Trust – National Level (1990–2005)

| Variable                               | Model 1            | Model 2            | Model 3            |
|--|--------------------|--------------------|--------------------|
| Lustration measures                    | -1.07<br>(1.27)    | -1.25<br>(1.43)    | -1.20<br>(1.12)    |
| Truth Commission                       | -2.46<br>(6.04)    | -1.01<br>(5.75)    | ---                |
| Inequality                             | .09<br>(.32)       | ---                | .07<br>(.32)       |
| Government Effectiveness               | ---                | 1.30<br>(10.14)    | ---                |
| Economic Growth<br>(GDP change lagged) | .11<br>(.35)       | ---                | .08<br>(.33)       |
| Constant                               | 46.64**<br>(11.59) | 48.93***<br>(8.01) | 47.13**<br>(11.49) |
| Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>                | .04                | .04                | .03                |
| N                                      | 41                 | 36                 | 41                 |

Ordinary Least Squares Regression (OLS) of WVS Trust Index, clustered by country –12 countries included  
\*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001

<sup>38</sup> Because the dataset is incomplete in terms of annual coverage of the measures, the inclusion of democracy or strength of civil society as controls drops the sample to 30, and the inclusion of corruption drops the sample to 27. Including trust in government or trust in public institutions drops the samples to 6. These sample sizes are too small to provide reliable results, and therefore are not included in this analysis.

It is of some note, that in none of the OLS regression analyses did any of the controls rise to the level of statistical significance either. Economic growth, levels of inequality, and government effectiveness were not statistically significant. This is probably due to the same sample size, which dilutes a possible relationship between some variables traditionally hypothesized to affect interpersonal trust (such as democracy, civil society, inequality, and quality of governance). We will be able to examine these controls using the large N survey dataset, providing additional tests of the possible drivers of interpersonal trust.

In sum, there is no relationship between transitional justice measures – either lustration or truth commissions – and interpersonal trust. They do not have a positive effect and they do not have a negative effect, contrary to the voices that have alternately praised or demonized the measures. As an explicit social trust builder, lustration falls short. The sample size is too limited to draw definitive conclusions here. We turn to the survey data analyses to examine a potential trust impact using more data and a different dataset.

## Survey Data and Interpersonal Trust

The *New Europe Barometer* is a compilation of a series of surveys of citizens in post-communist countries from 1991–2007<sup>39</sup>. The dataset is in many ways unique because it surveyed citizens about their attitudes toward each other and communist institutions immediately after the transition and continued to survey citizens regularly for almost 15 years. In this way, it is invaluable in capturing a range of trust variables, from public institutions through interpersonal trust dimensions, starting in the post-transition euphoria replete with all the communist institutional legacies, through a series of political, social, and economic transitions. *The New Europe Barometer* includes several survey questions related to interpersonal trust, including the traditional question “Do you trust most people in this country?” (Question 5f). The possible responses are designed to measure “degree of interpersonal trust,” and range from 1 for “completely trusting” through neutral or skeptical, to 7 for “distrustful”<sup>40</sup>. This question mirrors the benchmark interpersonal trust question asked by the *World Values Survey* used previously, and therefore provides an alternative means of testing whether lustration and truth commissions affect interpersonal trust.

Table 4 presents the results of a series of regression analyses using interpersonal trust as the dependent variable. First, we turn to our transitional justice measures. Lustration measures are never statistically significant, irrespective of model specification. The eleven countries included in this data subset cover a range of lustration experiences

<sup>39</sup> Richard Rose. *New Europe Barometer I-XV Trend Dataset, 1991–2007*. [computer file]. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. (Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor]), July 2010. SN: 5241.

<sup>40</sup> The Codebook explains the questions related to interpersonal trust under the series A5.

from wide and compulsory institutional change through symbolic change, as well as the absence of lustration measures altogether. In none of the models is there evidence of a direct relationship, either positive or negative, between lustration and interpersonal trust. This comports with our previous national level findings, leading us to conclude that lustration does not undermine interpersonal trust nor does it improve interpersonal trust through any direct relationships. Truth commissions are also never statistically significant. In none of the models do we see a relationship between transitional justice and interpersonal trust.

Second, trust in social institutions could affect interpersonal trust. To test this hypothesis I constructed a composite of social institutional trust by combining trust in unions and the church<sup>41</sup>. We see a strong and consistently positive relationship between trust in social institutions and interpersonal trust, regardless of the additional controls included in the models. More trust in social institutions is associated with higher levels of interpersonal trust, confirming the relationship hypothesized in the literature.

Third, other voices in the trust literature suggest trust in political institutions can spill over into interpersonal trust, either improving or undermining the generalized way citizens trust each other. To test this I used the trust in public institutions composite in the *New Europe Barometer* dataset, comprised of a mean of trust in political parties, the courts, the police, the army and the parliament. There is a consistently and highly significant relationship between trust in public institutions and interpersonal trust. Model controls do not affect the direct relationship between these two forms of trust. In general there are strong and direct trust relationships observed between interpersonal trust and social trust and political trust. Fourth, basic demographic variables were included to see if they affected generalized trust propensities. Age was consistently significant; older people were more trusting than younger people. Gender was also significant with males more trusting than females. Education was not a statistically significant predictor of trust. Education level did not systematically affect trust. Here we see demographics are predictors of social trust.

Fifth, material factors, fairness and inequality considerations are also included as possible explanatory variables. As previously mentioned, there is evidence in the trust literature that fairness and inequality affect citizens' trust propensities<sup>42</sup>. The *New Europe Barometer* survey asked people for their perceptions of government fairness (Question A12f), allowing us to test for a possible relationship. As *Model 4* shows, we do not have evidence that perceptions of fairness affect interpersonal trust. Corruption perceptions are also examined in *Models 3 and 5*. Again we find no evidence that corruption affects

<sup>41</sup> These are the only two social institutions for which data is available in 2004 – the only year with comprehensive interpersonal trust data. I created a composite by taking the mean trust score of each of the social institutions for a given individual in a given year. I use the *egen avg* command in STATA, which treats missing variables as 0.

<sup>42</sup> Rothstein and Uslaner. See also Bo Rothstein, *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).

interpersonal trust, although it was a consistently powerful predictor of political trust. Finally, inequality (*Models 2 and 4*) does not appear to affect interpersonal trust despite contentions that it is particularly salient in the post-communist sphere. In sum, we do not have evidence that material factors, fairness perceptions, or corruption systematically affect interpersonal trust.

Six, the survey also includes questions on attitudes about the past, present, and future. We know from the literature that there is a strong positive relationship between life satisfaction and interpersonal trust, and we find evidence for that in these analyses. *Models 2, 3, 4 and 5* demonstrate a weak but consistent relationship between life satisfaction and interpersonal trust, with those reporting higher levels of life satisfaction also reporting more interpersonal trust. This confirms that post-communist interpersonal trust propensities do comport to some of the attitudinal trends observed in other states. However, opinions about the current regime and the future are not statistically significant predictors of interpersonal trust. Nostalgia was associated with interpersonal trust, or more specifically the lack of nostalgia for the communist past is associated with more interpersonal trust.

In conclusion, neither transitional justice measure was associated with interpersonal trust. Lustration was not a trust builder but it also did not undermine interpersonal trust. Most economic, material, and attitudinal factors also could not explain or predict interpersonal trust. In general, the traditional variables did not explain variation in interpersonal trust. However, there was a consistent and robust relationship between institutional trust and interpersonal trust, hinting at a possible indirect trust building mechanism.

**Table 4.**  
**INTERPERSONAL TRUST ( Survey year 2004; 11 Countries)**  
**OLS Regression Models Using Survey Dataset Specification**

|   | <b>Model 1</b>   | <b>Model 2</b>   | <b>Model 3</b>  | <b>Model 4</b>   | <b>Model 5</b>   |
|---|------------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------|------------------|
| <b>Lustration Measures</b>  | -.002<br>(.06)   | -.03<br>(.05)    | .008<br>(.06)   | -.03<br>(.05)    | .02<br>(.07)     |
| <b>Truth Commissions</b>  | .06<br>(.15)     | .36<br>(.33)     | .11<br>(.20)    | .37<br>(.33)     | ---              |
| <b>Trust Public Inst Composite</b><br>(Political Parties, Courts, Police, Army, and Parliament) | .34***<br>(.02)  | .32***<br>(.03)  | .33***<br>(.03) | .32***<br>(.02)  | .32***<br>(.03)  |
| <b>Social Trust Composite</b><br>(unions, church)   | .24***<br>(.05)  | .23***<br>(.04)  | .23***<br>(.04) | .23***<br>(.04)  | .24**<br>(.06)   |
| <b>Age</b>  | .004**<br>(.001) | .005**<br>(.001) | .005*<br>(.002) | .005**<br>(.001) | .007**<br>(.002) |
| <b>Gender</b><br>(male=1/female=2)  | -.10**<br>(.03)  | -.11**<br>(.03)  | -.10**<br>(.02) | -.11**<br>(.03)  | -.10***<br>(.02) |

|   |              |                |                            |                |                            |
|---|--------------|----------------|----------------------------|----------------|----------------------------|
| <b>Education</b>  | .03<br>(.02) | ---            | ---                        | ---            | ---                        |
| <b>Citizen Perceptions of Govt Fairness</b><br>(1=fair, 4=not fair) | --           | --             | ---                        | .006<br>(.03)  | ---                        |
| <b>Corruption Transparency</b><br>International-CPI                 | --           | ---            | .07<br>(.10)               | ---            | .04<br>(.07)               |
| <b>Inequality</b><br><i>2 yr lag, national measure</i>              | --           | -.06<br>(.04)  | ---                        | -.06<br>(.04)  | ---                        |
| <b>Life Satisfaction</b><br>(1=satisfied, 4=not satisfied)          | ---          | -.10*<br>(.04) | -.13 <sup>†</sup><br>(.06) | -.11*<br>(.04) | -.11 <sup>†</sup><br>(.06) |
| <b>Nostalgia</b><br>(not nostalgic for Communist past)              | ---          | .05*<br>(.02)  | .05**<br>(.01)             | ---            | .06**<br>(.02)             |
| <b>Opinion of Current Regime</b>                                    | ---          | ---            | .0001<br>(.0001)           | ---            | ---                        |
| <b>Views of Future</b><br>(1=positive, 4=negative)                  | ---          | ---            | ---                        | ---            | -.01<br>(.03)              |
| <b>N</b><br>(number observations subpopulation)                     | 10622        | 9619           | 9047                       | 9681           | 8346                       |
| <b>R-squared</b>  | .19          | .21            | .20                        | .21            | .20                        |

Survey data specification across 11 primary sampling units (countries). All countries included except Albania. Total number of observations=72,999.

Standardized regression coefficients (b) reported, with linearized standard errors in parentheses. 95% confidence interval, two tailed <sup>†</sup>p<.10, \*p<.05, \*\*p<.01, \*\*\*p<.001.

Source: Rose, Richard. *New Europe Barometer I-XV Trend Dataset, 1991–2007* and author additions.

## Conclusion: Reflections on Interpersonal Trust

Since there are vitriolic arguments in the transitional justice literature about the positive and negative implications of lustration on interpersonal trust, this paper used maximal techniques and two different interpersonal trust datasets to test for a relationship. Using two data sources we were able to examine interpersonal trust changes over the period 1990–2005, providing more than two decades of variation in trust and a significant period after the transition in which to observe lustration induced changes. Despite arguments that suggest lustration will negatively impact interpersonal trust, we find no evidence of that here. Additionally, there was no indication that truth commissions, another type of transitional justice mechanism, had an impact on interpersonal trust either. In some ways the lack of an effect is good news, as a non-effect is better than a bad effect. Although it fails to support policymakers' claims about the overall elixir

qualities of lustration, it also does not provide support for the critics' worries about negative downstream implications.

This study demonstrated that interpersonal trust in the post-communist space is quite resistant to direct policy changes. Not only is interpersonal trust unaffected by lustration or truth commissions, but economic material factors also did not appear to impact interpersonal trust. Perceptions of fairness, government effectiveness, levels of inequality, and corruption did not resonate as explanatory variables. Moreover, the attitudinal variables capturing citizens' assessments of the present or future were not robust predictors of interpersonal trust, except for nostalgia and life satisfaction. In general, interpersonal trust is resistant to simplistic policy remedies, although clearly not immutable even in the post-communist environment. There is nothing inevitable about the low trust environment, as was clear with the amount of intra-regional and intra-country variation observed in interpersonal trust.

This returns us to our central motivating question, how to affect social trust? This study demonstrated that we do find consistently strong and positive relationships between trust in institutions and interpersonal trust. More trust in public institutions and/or social institutions is associated with higher levels of interpersonal trust. This is an important finding on its own, since there is so much disagreement in the literature surrounding whether these different forms of trust co-vary in the post-communist space<sup>43</sup>. These findings hint at possible indirect, trickle down trust effects from trustworthy public institutions, as seen in other non-communist environments. More trustworthy public institutions are associated with more interpersonal trust, therefore improving trust in public institutions presents itself as a policy option for *indirectly* building social trust.

In sum, transitional justice measures were not direct social trust builders, and therefore policy decisions should not be based on the assumed impact of lustration on social trust—either negative or positive. However, this paper hinted at alternative trust building options. If post-communist countries are worried about their interpersonal trust levels, improving the trustworthiness of government and public institutions presents one policy option to address the regional trust deficit. Transitional justice measures might have a role to play in that political trust building process.

## Data sources

Corruption Measures –Transparency International. *Corruption Perceptions Index*. Various Years. <http://www.transparency.org/cpi2011/>

Economic Change variable----International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook Database*, October 2012. Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund.

<sup>43</sup> See Rose-Ackerman, Uslander, and Rose and Mishler for various arguments over whether the different forms of trust covary in post-communist countries.

- Government effectiveness variable---Teorell, Jan, Marcus Samanni, Sören Holmberg and Bo Rothstein. 2012. *The Quality of Government Basic Dataset made from The QoG Standard Dataset version 6Apr11*. University of Gothenburg: The Quality of Government Institute, <http://www.qog.pol.gu.se>
- Inequality measures--- UN-WIDER (World Institute for Development Research). Through 2006 only.
- New Europe Barometer trust data-- Rose, Richard. *New Europe Barometer I-XV Trend Dataset, 1991–2007*. [computer file]. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2010. SN: 5241.
- World Values Survey trust data-- *World Values Survey (1981–2008) Official Aggregate. v.20090901, 2009*. World Values Survey Association ([www.worldvaluessurvey.org](http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org)). Aggregate File Producer: ASEP/JDS, Madrid.

## Bibliography

- Almond, Gabriel and Sidney Verba. *The Civic Culture*. New York: Sage Publications, 1963.
- Austin, Robert and Jonathan Ellison. "Post-Communist Transitional Justice in Albania." *East European Politics and Societies* 22, 2 (2008): 373–401.
- Bertschi, C. Charles. "Lustration and the Transition to Democracy: The Cases of Poland and Bulgaria." *East European Quarterly* XXVIII, 4 (1995): 435–451.
- Cepl, Vojtech. "The Transformation of Hearts and Minds in Eastern Europe." *The Cato Journal* 17, 2 (1997).
- Cleary, Matthew and Susan Stokes. *Democracy and the Culture of Skepticism: Political Trust in Argentina and Mexico*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2006.
- David, Roman and Susanne Choi. "Getting Even or Getting Equal? Retributive Desires and Transitional Justice." *Political Psychology* 30, 2 (2009): 161–192.
- Delhey, Jan and Kenneth Newton. "Who Trusts? The origins of social trust in seven societies." *European Societies* 5, 2 (2003): 93–137.
- Fithen, Casper. *The Legacy of Four Vetting Programs: An Empirical Review*. New York, International Center for Transitional Justice, 2009. February.
- Gibney, Mark. "Prosecuting Human Rights Violations From a Previous Regime: The East European Experience." *East European Quarterly* 31, 1 (1997): 93–110.
- Hardin, Russell. "Trust in government," in *Trust in Governance*, eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, 9–27. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998.
- Hayner, Priscilla. *Unspeakable Truths: Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions*. New York: Routledge Press, 2002.
- Horne, Cynthia M. "Assessing the Impact of Lustration on Trust in Public Institutions and National Government in Central and Eastern Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 45, 4(2012): 412–446.

- . "Late Lustration Programs in Romania and Poland: Supporting or Undermining Democratic Transitions?" *Democratization* 16, 2(2009): 344–376.
- Ingelhart, Ronald. "Trust, well-being and democracy," in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren, 88–120. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Kiss, Csilla. "The Misuses of Manipulation: The Failure of Transitional Justice in Post-Communist Hungary." *Europe-Asia Studies* 58, 6(2006): 925–940.
- Kornai, János, Bo Rothstein and Susan Rose- Ackerman, eds. *Creating Social trust in Post-Socialist Transition*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan Press, 2004.
- Kornai, János and Susan Rose- Ackerman, eds. *Building a Trustworthy State in Post-Socialist Transition*. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan Press, 2004.
- Letki, Natalia. "Lustration and Democratisation in East-Central Europe." *Europe-Asia Studies* 54, 4 (2002): 529–552.
- Levi, Margaret. "Social and Unsocial Capital: A Review Essay of Robert Putnam's *Making Democracy Work*." *Politics and Society* 24 (2006): 45–55.
- Levi, Margaret. "A State of Trust," in *Trust in Governance*, eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, 77–101. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998.
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. "Trust, Distrust, and Skepticism About Institutions of Civil Society." *Studies in Public Policy*, No. 252 (1995).
- Mishler, William and Richard Rose. "What are the Origins of Political Trust? Testing Institutional and Cultural Theories in Post-Communist Societies." *Comparative Political Studies* 34, 1 (2001): 30–62.
- Newton, Kenneth. "Social and Political Trust," in *The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior*, eds. Russell Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, 342–361. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007.
- Offe, Claus. "Coming to Terms with Past Injustices: An Introduction to Legal Strategies Available in Post-communist Societies." *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 33, 1(1992): 195–201.
- . "How can we trust our fellow citizens," in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren, 42–87. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Putnam, Robert. *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993.
- Rose-Ackerman, Susan. "Trust and honesty in post-socialist societies." *Kyklos* 54:2–3 (2001): 415–443.
- Rose, Richard. *New Europe Barometer I-XV Trend Dataset, 1991–2007*. [computer file]. 2<sup>nd</sup> Edition. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive [distributor], July 2010. SN: 5241.
- Rose, Richard, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer. *Democracy and its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998.
- Rothstein, Bo. 2004. "Social Trust and Honesty in Government: A Causal Mechanisms Approach," In *Creating Social trust in Post-Socialist Transition*, eds. János Kornai, Bo

- Rothstein and Susan Rose- Ackerman, 13–30. New York: Palgrave/Macmillan Press, 2004.
- Rothstein, Bo. *The Quality of Government: Corruption, Social Trust, and Inequality in International Perspective*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011.
- Rothstein, Bo and Dietland Stolle. “The State and Social Capital: An Institutional Theory of Generalized Trust.” *Comparative Politics* 40, July (2008): 441–459.
- Rothstein, Bo and Eric Uslaner. “All for All: Equality, Corruption, and Social Trust.” *World Politics* 58 (2005): 41–72.
- Stan, Lavinia, ed. *Transitional Justice in Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union: Reckoning with the communist past*. New York: Routledge Press, 2009.
- Stolle, Dietlind. “Clubs and Congregations: The Benefits of Joining an Association,” in *Trust in Society*, ed. Karen Cook, 202–244. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001.
- Sztompka, Piotr. “Trust, Distrust, and the Two Paradoxes of Democracy.” *European Journal of Social Theory* 1:1(1998): 19–32.
- Tyler, Tom. 1998. “Trust and Democratic Governance,” in *Trust in Governance*, eds. Valerie Braithwaite and Margaret Levi, 269–294. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998.
- United Nations. *Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict States: Vetting: An Operational Framework*. Office of the UN High Commission on Human Rights, New York, United Nations HR/PUB/06/5, 2006.
- Uslaner, Eric. “Democracy and social capital,” in *Democracy and Trust*, ed. Mark Warren, 121–150. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Uslaner, Eric. *Corruption, Inequality and the Rule of Law: The Bulging Pocket Makes the Life Easy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
- Warren, Mark, ed. *Democracy and Trust*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.





## Eastern Partnership: View from Ukraine

NATALIA L. IAKOVENKO

*Taras Shevchenko National University, Kyiv, Ukraine*

The topic of the given paper is not new, the Eastern Partnership was and is being widely discussed and commented on both in Ukraine and abroad in every detail. To tell the truth, the Ukrainians are far from being unanimous in the matter: many pros and cons have been expressed, lots of arguments have been put forward, because the Eastern Partnership (EaP) seems to have both negative and positive aspects for Ukraine. Ukraine was one of six post-Soviet nations to be invited to cooperate with the EU within the new multilateral framework that the Eastern partnership was expected to establish.

Eastern neighbours of the European Union (EU) are European countries. At the 2002 Copenhagen European Council, the European Union unveiled its strategy for managing relations with its eastern neighbours to the East following enlargement. It was based on a long-term approach to promote sustainable development, economic and political reform and trade with the countries on its eastern periphery. Being frank the professed aim of the strategy is to allow such some neighbouring states to come as close to the EU as possible without actually giving them the perspective to become EU members.

Since May 2004 Ukraine has become a direct neighbour of the enlarged EU. The process of the EU enlargement caused the EU's institutions to adjust to new formulation of its internal and external policy. The accession of economically less-developed and relatively poor countries forced the Union to develop new solidarity instruments in order to maintain the political stability and economic prosperity of its new members<sup>1</sup>. The EU policy towards all European countries that are not members of the EU became the one of particular importance. So the *Eastern Partnership* (EaP) may be considered as one of the natural interim solutions in the course of the EU enlargement and adoption of new members, which brought a new dimension into its external policy.

For many in Ukraine, *the Eastern Partnership* (EaP) is known as a project which was initiated by the European Union (the EU). It was presented by the Foreign Minister of Poland with assistance from Sweden at the EU's General Affairs and External

---

<sup>1</sup> Grigoriy Perepelytsia, *Transformation processes in the Visegrad Group countries and Ukraine: comparative analysis* (Kyiv: Stylos Publishing House, 2012), 255.

Relations Council in Brussels on 26 May 2008. The Eastern Partnership was inaugurated in Prague on 7 May 2009<sup>2</sup>.

Thus, if there is any European neighbouring country that wants to follow the EU way of modernization by importing its standards, the Union shall assist it in this effort. To cut a long story short, that is exactly what the EU's Eastern Partnership initiative is. Promotion of human rights and rule of law in former Soviet states has been reported to form the "core" of the policy of the Eastern Partnership. The EU draft of the EaP states that "shared values including democracy, the rule of law, and respect for human rights will be at its core, as well as the principles of market economy, sustainable development and good governance"<sup>3</sup>. The Partnership is to provide the foundation for new Association Agreements between the EU and those partners who have made sufficient progress towards the principles and values mentioned. Apart from values, the Declaration says the region is of "strategic importance" and the EU has an "interest in developing an increasingly close relationship with its Eastern partners..."<sup>4</sup> Thus Ukraine was no longer labelled a "neighbour" but a "partner".

The Partnership foresees stronger political engagement with the EU, namely:

- the prospect of a new generation of Association Agreements;
- integration into the EU economy with deep free trade agreements;
- easier travel to the EU through gradual visa liberalisation, accompanied by measures to tackle illegal immigration;
- enhanced energy security arrangements;
- increased financial assistance;
- deeper cooperation on environment and climate issues;
- increased people-to-people contacts and greater involvement of civil society.

It should be mentioned that the Eastern Partnership marks the first attempt to build a significant and institutional role for civil society into a major political process, in the form of the Civil Society Forum (CSF). The first meeting of the CSF was in Brussels on 16 and 17 November 2009, where its first Steering Committee was elected.

It should be also stressed that the Eastern Partnership (EaP) completes the EU's foreign policy towards Eastern Europe and Southern Caucasus countries as a specific Eastern dimension of the *European Neighbourhood Policy* (ENP) which had been presented in Brussels as far back as 2004<sup>5</sup>. On the one hand, the Eastern Partnership has been praised as a step forward towards further differentiation between Southern and Eastern neighbours within the ENP and a timely initiative to reinforce the ENP's Eastern dimension. It happened just after the Southern one was reinvigorated through the

<sup>2</sup> Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit. Prague, 07/05/2009, Council of the European Union No.: 8435/09 (Presse 78). Accessed April 30, 2013. <http://www.eu2009.cz/event/1/3553/>

<sup>3</sup> Joint Declaration of the Prague Eastern Partnership Summit. Prague, 7 May 2009.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> European Neighbourhood Policy. – Strategy Paper, Communication from the Commission 12 May 2004, COM (2004) 373 final.

Union for the Mediterranean as a result of French Presidency active support of the idea in the European Council.

On the other hand, however, the EaP has been criticised as having little potential to stimulate change in Eastern Europe, as it offered too little to the more advanced countries (such as Ukraine and Moldova) in terms of democracy and aligning with the EU, and too much to those with hardly any political reform achievements (such as Azerbaijan and Belarus). For Georgia for example the threat of military aggression from Russia has remained a primary concern.

Another real drawback of this initiative is that none of the region's 'frozen' conflicts have seen any movement towards a solution since it's been launched. Conversely, Russia enhanced military support to unilaterally recognised Abkhazia and South Osetia. Turkish-Armenian rapprochement – widely seen as progress towards achieving long-awaited peace in Nagorno-Karabakh – has stalled. The attempts to solve Transdnistrian conflict in the format 5+2 have not brought any concrete result yet.

Some may argue that there were some reasonable reasons that prevented EaP from approaching desired levels of 'security, prosperity and stability'. One of them is that during 2009–2010 the EU states as well as Eastern neighbours experienced the most serious economic crisis since the 1990s. The average economic decline has been deeper than one could have analyzed.

The EaP objectives are to be achieved through the 'bilateral track', which aims to deepen the relations between the EU and each partner country through the conclusion of bilateral agreements such as the Association Agreement and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, and the 'multilateral track', which advances the EaP objectives through the four policy (thematic) platforms, namely:

- democracy, good governance and stability;
- economic integration and convergence with EU sectoral policies;
- energy security;
- contacts between people.

Anyway, one can't but admit the Eastern Partnership presents a symbiosis of 'the most generous ENP offer for all ever' (the bilateral track) and support to mutual co-operation (the multilateral track). The advantage also is that bilateral track lies at the heart of the EaP. As far back as June 16, 2009, a practical instrument was adopted – the *EU-Ukraine Association Agenda*. The main goals of the EaP – political association and economic integration of the participating countries with the EU – are to be implemented through bilateral instruments such as association agreements (AA), deep and comprehensive free trade areas (DCFTA) and visa liberalisation.

From the other point of view, the EaP is considered to be a weak instrument to transform the region, as it relies on enlargement policy tools without offering a prospect of accession to the Eastern neighbours. While the EaP is also built on conditionality, its main incentives – free trade and free travel – remain too distant, while the available aid is not sufficient to compensate stakeholders for what they feel would be lost through

reforms, or to incentivise cooperation with the EU at the expense of traditional foreign policy alliances.

Concerning FTA Ukraine is rather sceptical of the EU for keeping the single market fenced off from competition in a 'selfish' and 'asymmetric' plan (especially concerning services and agriculture). Some observers say free trade will not be a real incentive for the EaP countries, but could ultimately prove more of a threat if the EU does not liberalise trade in agricultural products (especially in the cases of countries such as Moldova, Armenia or Georgia). The EU's highly protective agricultural market policy prevents the Union from making strong trade offers to its neighbours.

Human mobility could be the most tangible incentive for the Eastern neighbours, but the EU is reluctant to fully deploy it. So far Ukraine and Moldova have visa facilitation and readmission agreements with the EU in force. However, visa facilitation is far from able to foster greater people-to-people contact, as it is not an incentive that will affect reform of law enforcement agencies and the judiciary in the partner countries. The agreement is limited in scope. It facilitates visa access only to some categories of citizens while the majority of Ukrainians have little knowledge about living standards and values in Western European societies.

As to the real benefit of a visa free travel regime, the EU members are reluctant to offer the prospect of doing away with visas completely, even in the case of the ENP frontrunners. While Ukraine launched a visa dialogue with the EU in 2008 and had fully abandoned visas to EU citizens in 2005, the EU even hesitated to offer a roadmap setting clear benchmarks towards a visa free regime of the Balkans type. However, during the 14<sup>th</sup> Ukraine–EU Summit on 22 November 2010 the parties endorsed Action plan setting out conditions for establishing a visa-free travel regime for Ukrainian nationals.

Moreover, the Eastern Partnership has not overcome the weakness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in transforming the EU's Eastern neighbours. The EU's offers in terms of bilateral relations with its neighbours are too distant and vague to push the partners to reform. Phrases such as 'stake in the EU market', 'visa liberalisation as a long term goal' and 'political association' might feature in a plethora of EU documents, but they still lack substance. Thus, the new EU policy towards the region remains weak in terms of incentives, while the gap between the institutions and policies of the EU 27 and the EaP 6 remains large<sup>6</sup>. The lack of progress in political reforms – constitutional, judicial, electoral – and the reform of the energy sector stand out as the most vivid examples in Ukraine.

The EaP is deemed to be a powerless response to democracy, security and economic development challenges arising from the region. Unfortunately, the EU does not invest in foundations for democracies in the EaP six countries. Civil societies, independent

<sup>6</sup> Victoria V. Khaladgy, Natalia L. Iakovenko, *European Neighbourhood Policy: Role and Place of Ukraine* (Kyiv: Naukovy Svit, 2012), 159.

media and local communities in the neighbouring countries receive mere dribs and drabs of the support that the EU pumps into their respective governments.

Promotion of regional cooperation – the main novelty of the EaP – has been very promising so far. This multilateral track has created new channels for socialisation and learning for EaP states and societies as well as for EU member states, which can now become more engaged in the region through the EaP operational structure. What's more, The Comprehensive Institution-Building Programme is a positive EaP innovation, which draws upon the EU's experience of Europeanising candidate states. This program is to help reform institutions in selected policy areas. Although funding remains modest the European Commission envisaged EU norms and standards in eight priority sectors including energy, transport and institutional changes which are of great importance for meeting the EU standards.

On the whole, one should not expect too much from this initiative as regional cooperation in the Eastern neighbourhood is hampered by difficult political relations between neighbours and regional actors, territorial conflicts and, in some cases, physical barriers. Security remains the main challenge for most of the Eastern partners, especially in the Caucasus.

Another difficulty is that the partner countries have different expectations of the EaP. This makes the EaP's regional approach to the Eastern neighbours a difficult matter for the EU. Such partners as Ukraine which are closer to the EU in terms of democratic development and aspirations are not eager to consider the Eastern Partnership as a political framework for Ukraine–EU relations but only as a tool of strengthening cooperation. It becomes clear that EaP does not respond to Ukraine's aspirations for EU membership. The point is that any arrangement which falls short of the prospect of EU membership is neither sufficient nor attractive for Ukraine. Although up till now Ukraine's aspirations have been mainly declarative and not accompanied by reform processes, the prospect of EU membership has always been a criterion according to which Ukraine assessed the EU's policy. Lots of Ukrainians are gradually disappointed in the final success of their country to join the European family of nations. According to the data of sociological polls held by Razumkov Centre, Ukraine's aspirations were supported by over 65% of respondents in November 2002, while the number of supporters was essentially diminished by the end of 2012 and made up only 49% (29% said “no”, for 22% it was difficult to answer)<sup>7</sup>.

Meanwhile all East European neighbours including Ukraine are eligible to apply for EU membership according to Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union<sup>8</sup> and they are willingly waiting for their chance to come. Ukraine has claimed to be seeking EU membership since L. Kuchma's presidency (1994–2005) though its desire to join appeared to be left just a kind of rhetoric.

<sup>7</sup> Sociological poll. Accessed May 14, 2013. [http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll\\_id=387](http://www.razumkov.org.ua/eng/poll.php?poll_id=387)

<sup>8</sup> “Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007,” Official Journal of the European Union Vol. 50 (December 17, 2007).

In this respect, Ukraine is rather special and it differs much from CEE states. In contrast to them, as A. Shapovalova mentions, in its transitional agenda Ukraine “had primarily to affirm its very statehood and establish its national and political identity”<sup>9</sup>.

While doing this Ukraine’s leadership has failed to implement important changes and reforms needed for the country to correspond the EU criteria and standards. Ukraine’s ruling elite appeared too much corrupted, sovietised and colonized. The society appeared to be split into the supporters and opponents of pro-western orientation being inclined to the “Russian World”.

As a result the EU has not so far acknowledged Ukraine as a prospective member of the EU.

Of course, the Eastern Partnership as well as ENP can be further ‘strengthened’, ‘rebranded’ or ‘repacked’. But a genuine commitment is needed if the EU is to play a strategic role in promoting ‘security, prosperity and stability’ in its backyard.

Relations between the EU and Ukraine are still based on the *Partnership and Co-operation Agreement*<sup>10</sup> (PCA) which entered into force as long ago as 1998 and has become obviously outdated. A renewed agreement was urgently needed. Only ten years later, at the 2008 Paris Summit the leaders of the both sides (EU and Ukraine) agreed that an Association Agreement should be the successor agreement to the PCA. Meanwhile an *Association Agreement* (AA) between Ukraine and the EU was negotiated from 2009–2011.

So Ukraine and the EU are currently in an important phase of their relationship, having negotiated an *Association Agreement* (AA)<sup>11</sup>. It was firstly anticipated that it would be signed by the end of 2011, or at least that the finalization of the negotiations would be announced. However, the sectorial part of the AA could not enter into force until negotiations on a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), which was to be part of the AA, were concluded.

The package of sectorial reforms consisting of 31 sectorial segments was agreed at the level of working delegations in October 2009, and in October 2011 the both sides (the EU and Ukraine) managed to complete negotiations on the DCFTA on a technical working level. Once was done so, Ukraine became the first country in the Eastern neighbourhood able to establish “political association and economic integration” with the EU.

Nevertheless *the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement*, which included provisions on the establishment of DCFTA as an integral part, was completed in December 2011 only to be left unsigned by both parties. The signature of the Agreement, fell short due to the

<sup>9</sup> Alexandra Shapovalova, “European Integration of Ukraine: Motivation, Implications and Prospects,” in *Transformation Processes in the Visegrad Group Countries and Ukraine: Comparative Analysis*, ed. Grigoriy Perepelitsya (Kyiv: Stylos Publishing House, 2012), 264.

<sup>10</sup> Partnership and Cooperation Agreement between the European Communities and their Member States, and Ukraine, 1994. Accessed May 4, 2013. <http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/prepareCreateTreatiesWorkspace/treatiesGeneralData.do?step=0&redirect=true&treatyId=217>

<sup>11</sup> Text of Association Agreement between EU, Ukraine. Kyiv Post, December 5, 2011. Accessed May 4, 2013. <http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/text-of-association-agreement-between-eu-ukraine-317197.html>

EU's concerns over the jailing of former Prime Minister Yu. Tymoshenko. EU leaders decided to wait until the October 2012 Parliamentary elections as a test of the vitality of democracy and rule of Law in Ukraine.

The EU had issued many statements and warnings calling for free and fair elections – but it did not have any effect. Democracy appeared to finally lose in those elections. The campaign was very far from European and international standards. Such sad development had shown also a failure of EU Ukrainian politics regarding President V. Yanukovich, who carried main responsibility for the undemocratic elections with his Party of Regions. Europe recognized that its influence on the Ukrainian leadership was close to zero and was not sufficient to prevent Ukraine from slipping down to authoritarianism. Moreover, the Russian vector became the priority in Ukrainian President's foreign policy.

However the AA text was initialled in late March 2012 by two officials who didn't even hold a press conference afterwards. Besides, the initialling must be followed by ratification procedures in the parliaments of Ukraine, the EU and all its member states.

For Ukraine signing the Association Agreement would have been of paramount significance: it would be an insurance against coming back under Russia's sphere of influence. The agreement could also be an instrument for Ukraine's modernization and deep economic integration into EU's single market. The Association Agreement would significantly deepen Ukraine's political association and economic integration with the EU.

Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich said our country planned to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in the course of 2013. But he also stressed that the country would develop its relations with Russia's Customs Union in areas which do not contradict other "international obligations".

On 25 February 2013, the EU set a three-month deadline for Ukraine to carry out the required changes to its justice and electoral systems in order to enable the formal signing of agreements with the EU. Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy Štefan Füle warned Ukraine that the agreements could be abandoned if the required reforms are not made quickly. He also stated that Ukrainian membership in the Customs Union of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia would be incompatible with the agreements with the EU.

Nevertheless the EU would like to remain optimistic concerning Ukraine. As Štefan Füle said, "We have seen a number of processes launched in Ukraine to address the EU's expectations and the Ukrainian government's own commitments and we look forward to see tangible progress in areas such as selective justice, electoral code and judiciary reforms. Our joint task is also to improve the business and investment climate in Ukraine, to be able to use to the full extent the foreseen economic integration of the Ukraine into the EU"<sup>12</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Štefan Füle's speech at the meeting of EU-Ukraine Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, 4 June 2012. Accessed May 1, 2013. [http://www.eurpa.eu/rapid/press-release\\_SPEECH-12-448\\_en.htm](http://www.eurpa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-448_en.htm)

It is worth while stressing that it is first and foremost the domestic factors which determine the controversial character of Ukraine's European integration. An important factor which would inspire Ukraine on the right track is the political and practical support of the European Union in the course of reforms' implementation. The efficiency of these reforms could provide further momentum and speed up the progress in the top priority areas of Ukraine-EU agenda. Namely these are the finalization of the Association Agreement including its deep and comprehensive Free Trade Area part and elaborating the visa-free Action Plan.

Ukraine needs to acknowledge that the prospect of EU membership could be given as much as a reward for domestic efforts as a means to influence the pace and shape of reforms. Some historical period is needed for Ukraine to overcome the burden of the past and create necessary preconditions for returning to Europe. We should keep in mind that both Ukraine and the European Union have a great common mission of ensuring stability and prosperity for Eastern Europe and for the whole European continent.



## Democratic Transformation in Lithuania: Still Post-Soviet?

DIANA JANUŠAUSKIENĖ

*Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania*

Twenty two years have passed since Lithuania has restored its independence in 1991, following occupation by the Soviet Union in 1940–1941 and 1944–1991. After a generation of regained independence, is it still possible to label Lithuania as post-Soviet or post-Communist? Using the same logic, Germany in 1967 would still be called post-Nazi.

To a large extent, a “post” discourse is “made in the West”. It is applied to “the rest of the world” producing such labels as “post-colonial Africa” and “post-communist Europe”. Going back to Lithuania, would it not be correct to say that joining the European Union and NATO in 2004 marks the end of post-Soviet / post-Communist period?

Linked to the issue of definition are the specificity of democratic transformation in Lithuania in comparison to other cases, and the question of attribution of this case to the general (global) pattern of democratisation and political development.

As Wolff points out, “the revolutionary collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War rendered meaningless the conventional terms that formulated the sharp separation of Europe into opposing halves: Churchill’s iron curtain, the Soviet sphere, the ominous shadow. The division of Europe suddenly appeared to be over, erased, abolished, the halves all at once reunited as one continent.”<sup>1</sup> Yet, the post-Communist / post-Soviet discourse still exists. The scientific and political discussion about post-Soviet / post-Communist transformation in Lithuania reflects the continuing political value of this concept. The Soviet period tends to be conveniently perceived as an occupation by a foreign power, while Sovietism and Communism is not considered as an internal characteristic of the Lithuanian state and society. This opinion is best represented by the former president of Lithuania Valdas Adamkus, who states that “why cannot we be called the Post-Soviet? We have never been Soviet. We were occupied”<sup>2</sup>. Another mainstream view is of a former Soviet republic that did better than many others after the collapse of the Soviet Union, yet it is analysed within the framework of ex-Soviet Union area, often together with Latvia and Estonia as a group with similar char-

<sup>1</sup> Larry Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe. The Map of Civilization on the Mind of the Enlightenment* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 3.

<sup>2</sup> Valdas Adamkus, “From Common History to Common Future,” *Warsaw East European Review*, Vol. I (2011): 13.

acteristics of political development. Meanwhile the comparative analysis of the group of all eight Central Eastern European countries that have joined the European Union in 2004 is quite rare.

This article argues that from a comparative point of view political development of Lithuania after the restoration of independence is well within the trend of political developments of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, while grouping Lithuania with Ukraine, Belarus, Russia and Moldova, offers little added value as there are few commonalities except if not to count the same point of departure as former republics of the Soviet Union. Thus, the mode of democratic transformation and the outcome of changes in Lithuania is most comparable to the cases of Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Even though these countries had different status in late 1980s when the democratic transformations have started, and Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were part of the Soviet Union while the others were satellites of the Soviet Union, the mode of their transformation and subsequent political development are similar. Nationalism was a key driving force in all mentioned countries.

## Mapping Lithuania's Place in Europe

Lithuania is ascribed as belonging to Eastern Europe, Central Eastern Europe, post-Soviet region, Baltic region, new EU member states, North Atlantic area, or Baltic Sea area. The criteria of ascription are overlapping. The “post-communist” insiders tend to map their countries outside “Eastern Europe”, whereas to many a Western European they are all located in Europe’s east. Thus looking from Berlin, Warsaw is in Eastern Europe; looking from Warsaw, Vilnius is in Eastern Europe (the East starts at the eastern border of Poland); while looking from Vilnius, Eastern Europe represents Moscow, Minsk and Kyiv.

The term “Eastern Europe” is not simply geographical or political, it is also ideological, psychological, and stereotypical. As Frucht puts it, “the story of Eastern Europe <... > is always written or at least directed by outsiders.”<sup>3</sup> “Eastern Europe” as a mental and political construct presupposes a distinction between “us” and “them”, West and East, civilization and barbarism. As Wolff notes, “it was Western Europe that invented Eastern Europe as its complementary other half in the eighteenth century, the age of Enlightenment. <...> It has flourished as an idea of extraordinary potency since the eighteenth century, neatly dovetailing in our times with the rhetoric and realities of the Cold War, but also certain to outlive the collapse of Communism, surviving in the public culture

<sup>3</sup> Richard Frucht, ed., *Eastern Europe: An Introduction to the People, Lands, and Culture* (Santa Barbara, Denver, Oxford: ABC CLIO, 2005), X.

and its mental maps.”<sup>4</sup> “In the Renaissance the fundamental conceptual division of Europe was between the South and the North. <...> The polarization of Europe between Italy and the northern barbarians, was so obvious to the Ancient Romans, so convenient to the Renaissance Italians, survived into the eighteenth century as a rhetoric form. <...> Yet this geographical perspective has begun to appear seriously anachronistic, and it was the intellectual work of the Enlightenment to bring about the modern reorientation of the continent which produced Western Europe and Eastern Europe”<sup>5</sup>.

Thus, Eastern Europe is not only a different reality but also a mental and stereotypically formed category that survives despite dramatic political changes in Europe and the enlargement of the European Union. Importantly, this cognitive demarcation between Eastern and Western Europe now lies within the European Union. Meanwhile, the North-South demarcation within the European Union becomes important again as it was in Europe during the Renaissance. The economic development in the Northern countries of the European Union is continuing while the southern countries such as Greece, Cyprus, Spain, Portugal and Italy experience economic slow-down or crisis. Although Szűcs’s division into three Europes according to political culture<sup>6</sup> is still relevant in the broader historical context, the once famous *Mitteleuropa* has lost much of its relevance after the NATO and EU enlargement.

The mental demarcation of Europe into East and West has its roots in the eighteenth century and was reinforced after the Second World War. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia disappeared from the political map of Europe. The communist regime spread and, in 1946, Winston Churchill defined the post-war division of Europe as “an iron curtain [that] has descended across the Continent”<sup>7</sup>. The political reality of the “Iron Curtain” split Europe. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, the mental construct of two Europes has survived, as well as the mental border between the Baltic states which had been former republics of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and states that had belonged to the Warsaw Pact, on the other hand. These mental maps are common both to outsiders and insiders, especially to the older generations. The younger generation in independent Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia the mental map is different: East starts at the borders of Russia and Belarus, and due to visa requirements of traveling there, little is known about these countries, partly also due to declining knowledge of Russian as a foreign language especially in Lithuania where Russian ethnic minority makes up only 5.3% of the population or 171,100 people<sup>8</sup>.

Geographically Lithuania is in the east of the European Union and its capital Vilnius is one of the easternmost capitals of the European Union, yet culturally and politically the definition “Eastern” is untenable.

<sup>4</sup> Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 4.

<sup>5</sup> Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Jenő Szűcs, *Trzy Europy* (Lublin: Instytut Europy Środkowo Wschodniej, 1995).

<sup>7</sup> Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 1.

<sup>8</sup> Statistics Lithuania, accessed May 1, 2013, db1.stat.gov.lt/M3010215

The tendency to rethink the mapping of regional belonging is also present in authoritarian Belarus. The idea that Belarus belongs to the North of Europe<sup>9</sup> is developing even though it is far from being dominant.

### **Path Dependency and Favourable Conditions**

The formation of favourable conditions for democratisation and its consolidation to a large extent depends on a previous historical experience of a country as well as a social value system. Both factors frame a nation's long-term development and form its path dependency. If one looks at the contemporary political and economic development of countries that were on the Eastern side of the "Iron Curtain", it is obvious that countries that have belonged to the Habsburg Empire (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, and Croatia), belonged to the Lithuanian-Polish Commonwealth or affected by German and Nordic influences (Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia) are doing better in democratisation than those that belonged to the Ottoman empire (Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria, Albania, Romania, Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Path dependency factor has proven itself in the 2004 enlargement of the European Union.

Importantly, eight of the ten countries joined the European Union in 2004 are either Catholic or Protestant, the other two (Cyprus and Malta) were former British (i.e. "Western") colonies. The path dependency is exemplified in Lithuania which enjoyed the "democracy of nobility" in XV–XVIII c. and a brief democratic experience in 1918–1926.

Some other important conditions for a successful democratisation in these countries were present. To apply Huntington, it was high levels of education and literacy, low levels of violence, high levels of modernisation and urbanisation, low levels of political polarisation and extremism (at the initial phase of transformation)<sup>10</sup>. Individualistic value system as a basis of democracy was present there as well. Nonetheless, compared to former Soviet satellites, Lithuania experienced a deeper degree of Sovietisation, state penetration and russification. Yet, the sustained national identity counterbalanced these circumstances.

### **The Mode of Transformation**

During the Soviet occupation, Lithuania, as well as Latvia and Estonia, maintained strong national identity and aspiration of independent statehood. The peculiarity of the Lithuanian case was the pro-reform stance of the Communist Party of Lithuania.

<sup>9</sup> *Almanah Vialikay Paunachi* (Smalensk: Universum, 2013).

<sup>10</sup> Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave. Democratisation in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993), 37.

Several characteristics of the pre-reform Lithuanian society, such as the anti-Communist underground and the mainly Catholic dissident tradition, a relatively small Russian population, and the individualistic value system of the people, as well as a rather large proportion of university graduates within society who were capable of flexibility and could quickly accommodate changes all played a significant role in the transformation. An important factor was that ethnic Lithuanians occupied key positions in the Communist Party of Lithuania. During the initial phase of the transformation in 1989, for every 1,000 people in the adult population, 78 were members of the Communist Party, while in Estonia – 98, and Latvia – 92. In Lithuania, 71% of communists were representatives of the titular nation, while in Estonia – 50%, and in Latvia – 40%. In Lithuania, ethnic Russians made up 17% of all communists, in Estonia – 39%, and in Latvia – 43%<sup>11</sup>. This made the process of reforms much easier. After Stalin's death, the Soviet authoritarian regime in Lithuania was not as strict as communist rule in Romania, for example. The society adapted to the Soviet ideology, which led to nativisation of the communist party. Therefore, during the first years of Perestroika, there was no clearly expressed hostility against it, with the exception of some groups who were considered extreme, like the dissident Lithuanian Freedom League.

The peculiarity of democratisation in Lithuania is its initiation of changes from 'above', employing favourable conditions of the Perestroika, an extraordinary role of pro-reform political elites that were present in both sides – the Communist party as well as the national movement Sajudis, rather weak block of hard-liners, high support of masses, and strong nationalism. A pre-war generation was still alive and could remember the independent pre-war Lithuania. In such a way, the country possessed necessary conditions for regime change and national liberation at the same time and was able to transform towards a stable liberal democracy.

In Lithuania, local political elites using the beneficial conditions of Perestroika, supported by masses, played the lead role. Importantly, the ideas of change were not only in the minds of the opposition but also the moderate wing of the Communist Party who initially advocated "step-by-step" changes, and declared independence of the Communist Party of Lithuania from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1989. It is important to note that moderate communists have intensively participated in the activities of Sajudis, and there was no disagreement between Sajudis and the Communist Party of Lithuania on independence. In the initial phase of the transformation, the division "communists versus non-communists" was much less important than the division into pro-reform and pro-independence oriented actors what were in a majority and hardliners-conservatives that were in a minority. Nationalism united communist and non-communist elites towards independence and democratic changes and accelerated the formation of the Lithuanian political elite.

<sup>11</sup> Algis Krupavičius, "The Post-Communist Transition and Institutionalisation of Lithuania's Parties," *Political Studies* 46 (1998): 9.

On the whole, the favourable historical conditions of Gorbachev's Perestroika, and the activities of local elites supported by the masses formed the basis for the restoration of the independent state and democratic reforms in Lithuania. These two factors are interrelated: the existence of only one could not have resulted in a "happy ending". Elites would not have been able to achieve what they did without Gorbachev's perestroika, which softened the communist regime and provoked ideas about reforms and the possible political autonomy and later restored independence. But Perestroika would not have ended in independence had this goal not been articulated by the Lithuanian elites. The political elites and their decisions were of key importance for the direction and content of the Lithuanian transformation<sup>12</sup>.

Gradually democracy became "the only game in town". Even though there are some small extreme political parties, the anti-systemic parties failed to get support. The largest and most influential players have remained, and some populist parties gained influence due to a general dissatisfaction of the people with public policies and the distribution of the burden of reforms relative to their benefits. This matches the familiar pattern of political evolution of other members of the European Union of 2004 vintage.

### Concluding Remarks

The goal of this article was to analyse the specificity of democratic transformation in Lithuania and to show that it belongs to a group of countries that have undergone a successful transformation towards democracy. The success of transformation towards democracy in Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland Slovakia, and Slovenia could be explained by a long-term path dependency (previous political development and experience of being a democratic state) and shared social characteristics that favoured transition to sustainable democracy in the post-Cold War environment. This group of countries forms a separate unit of analysis which differs from other cases of democratisation in European countries that have experienced Communism and authoritarian or totalitarian regimes after the Second World War.

In this article, the categories of "Eastern Europe" and "post-Communist / post – Soviet Europe" are perceived as outdated constructs that no longer reflect the changed political reality, though they are sustained in the mental maps of the people and therefore they are reinvented and used in the political discourse. Why this perception still survives? According to Wolff, "the iron curtain is gone, and yet the shadow persists. The shadow persists, because the idea of Eastern Europe remains, even without the iron curtain. This is not only because the intellectual structures of half a century are slow to

<sup>12</sup> For more details on transformation in Lithuania see Diana Janušauskienė, *Post-Communist Democratisation in Lithuania. Elites, Parties and Youth Political Organisations. 1988–2001* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2011).

efface themselves, but above all because the idea of Eastern Europe is much older than the Cold War.”<sup>13</sup> This legacy view survives even though within the European Union one could see the growing importance of North – South demarcation which originates in the Renaissance.

As for contemporary Lithuania, it belongs more to the northern region of Europe within the European Union as well as to the Baltic sea region where Germany, Sweden and Poland belong too.



---

<sup>13</sup> Wolff, *Inventing Eastern Europe*, 3.



# Has international conditionality worked in Central and Eastern Europe

KRZYSZTOF KOKOSZCZYŃSKI

*St. Antony's College*

*University of Oxford, England*

‘Conditionality’ is a long-standing method of presenting certain requirements to prospective members of the European Union; they are expected to adhere to the EU’s standards in all aspects of policies. In this work I will argue that it has worked quite well in the penultimate enlargement (2004)<sup>1</sup>, although there were some issues with it in the last enlargement (2007)<sup>2</sup>. I will analyze the possible reasons for success and failure of the conditionality as a policy, based on these two cases. Given the limits of this essay, I will focus only on certain selected countries, rather than every EU member state from the region of Central and Eastern Europe.

To answer the question stated in the topic, we need to start with certain important definitions, just to ensure that there are no conceptual misunderstandings. The two terms that definitely have to be explained are ‘conditionality’ and ‘worked’, that is to say that precise definitions of what was done and with what goal in mind it has been done, have to be presented.

‘Conditionality’, as mentioned above, is a name given to requirements that a candidate country must fulfil in order to become a member of the EU. The whole process, and it is very much a process not just list of requirements, is based on a well-known psychological mechanism of “reinforcement by reward”<sup>3</sup>. However, Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, among others, point out that we should differentiate between democratic conditionality (that is, requirements related to a political system in a given country, its mechanism of power distribution and so on) and *acquis* conditionality (that is adaptation of given country’s laws and regulations to the EU’s ones)<sup>4</sup>. I will argue in this work that the former kind of conditionality has proven to be especially effective in countries which already had exhibited some forms of democratic tendencies before the beginning

---

<sup>1</sup> Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovenia, Cyprus, Malta

<sup>2</sup> Romania, Bulgaria

<sup>3</sup> Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (2004): 662.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, 663.

of the accession process, while countries with a less-than-ideal democratic mechanisms and institutions even now still exhibit certain issues in that respect.

As for the goals of the conditionality, most of the obligations to be fulfilled by the prospective members of the EU are often referred to as Copenhagen criteria (as they were drawn out for the first time in a summit in Copenhagen in 1993, since then they were refined and clarified multiple times by various EU bodies, currently they are now articles 6 and 49 of the Treaty on the European Union)<sup>5</sup>. They aim at ensuring that the prospective member states converge with the EU countries on the most important matters, namely “stable institutions that guarantee democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; a functioning market economy [...]; the ability to assume the obligations of membership, in particular adherence to the objectives of political, economic and monetary union”, as well as well-functioning institutions able to oversee these processes<sup>6</sup>.

Let us start the analysis of the success of the conditionality with the its democratic component, a more difficult to implement part of the accession requirements. As it is directly related to composition and functioning of a political system in a given country, its introduction can be a very complicated matter. There are usually many actors involved in a country’s politics and each of them has already a certain position within an existing system that they might be unwilling to change. It is a government’s role to try to gather enough support for the change and to appease any potential opposition, something than can be very difficult to achieve, if there are enough stakeholders standing to lose from a democratic transformation<sup>7</sup>. More often than not it is done through arguing the necessity of adoption of such changes if the country is to join the EU which, while effective, does not provide for sustainability of implementation after an accession, when such argument would no longer hold true and so pressures to roll back some changes (or introduce new ones with similar effect) would appear (an illustration would be the case of Hungary, recently criticized by the EU for undemocratic reforms in its political system).

Furthermore, changes brought on by these requirements might invoke feelings of frustration at the EU, especially if the institutional changes go against established systems and political cleavages. The effects of conflicts arising from such situations could recently be seen in Bulgaria which had her Structural and Cohesion Funds transfers halted due to increasing corruption: Bulgaria entered the EU, as she formally fulfilled the conditions, but the democratic conditionality has not been internalised by the population and so the laws were not actually followed (and actually lowered “public

<sup>5</sup> European Commission, “Enlargement Criteria,” October 27, 2011, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement\\_process/accesion\\_process/criteria/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm).

<sup>6</sup> European Commission, “Conditions for Enlargement,” January 30, 2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm).

<sup>7</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” 669–670.

confidence in the government, police, army and judiciary”<sup>8</sup>, thus leading to such unfortunate results.

On the other hand, if the country is following a path to democratization that is roughly similar to the Western model, the conditionality can provide a useful set of guidelines, as well as strengthen a country’s motivation to press on with the reforms. Such was the case in Poland and the Czech Republic, for example, both of which embarked on democratic reforms as soon as the transition process began. However, what counts more than a democratic tendency of whichever party is in power in a given moment, is a democratic (or non-democratic) leaning of a society; if the society is generally pro-reformist, democratic conditionality will be far more successful in strengthening the democratic reforms. As Schimmelfennig and Seidelmeier noted: “Even if EU incentives failed to affect authoritarian governments directly, (the threat of) exclusion by the EU signalled to the societies in these states that the incumbent government was the main obstacle to their country’s EU accession. These signals undermined the authoritarian governments’ credentials as reformers, mobilized the electorate against the authoritarian governments, and induced a weak and fragmented opposition to join forces. In many cases, these changes brought reform-oriented parties to power – such as in [...] Slovakia between 1997 and 2000”<sup>9</sup>. In addition to explaining why the democratic conditionality worked in a such case as Meciar’s Slovakia<sup>10</sup>, it can also explain why it was introduced without such pressures in other countries with less democratic tendencies, such as Romania – the government was afraid of losing its power due to not being seen as pro-European anymore.

On the contrary to the democratic conditionality, the *acquis* conditionality has proven to be rather enthusiastically adopted by the prospective members. *Acquis communautaire* was especially eagerly adopted in such areas as, for example, regulations such as health and safety in the workplace, or adopting country border regulations directly to the Schengen area<sup>11</sup> requirements rather than more lenient internal market regulations<sup>12</sup>. This has proven to be quite profitable for the governments involved, given how popular

<sup>8</sup> AFP, “EU Condemns Bulgaria over Corruption, Freezes Funds,” *Google News*, accessed March 26, 2013, <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i2jpSUCzPyn-axr2Pufn8JzUQdDA>.

<sup>9</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” 670.

<sup>10</sup> A government with an authoritarian tendencies but pro-democratic society.

<sup>11</sup> “The Schengen area represents a territory where the free movement of persons is guaranteed. The signatory states to the agreement have abolished all internal borders in lieu of a single external border. Here common rules and procedures are applied with regard to visas for short stays, asylum requests and border controls. Simultaneously, to guarantee security within the Schengen area, cooperation and coordination between police services and judicial authorities have been stepped up. Schengen cooperation has been incorporated into the European Union (EU) legal framework by the Treaty of Amsterdam of 1997” (European Union 2008)

<sup>12</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” 672.

new countries has become with the foreign investors, a mark of trust placed into working administrative and legal systems<sup>13</sup>.

However, Grzymała-Busse and Innes noted that “the *acquis* is internally inconsistent – and that it requires structures (such as “devolved” and “efficient” administration and general state capacity for the disbursement of structural funds)—without specifying how those structures should be constituted should not be mistaken as facts that leave Eastern European states considerable room for manoeuvre [in implementing it]” which, they further observe, development of such structures can be counterintuitive to the initial tendencies in the region, namely decreasing the role of the state<sup>14</sup>. Thus, they conclude, even the *acquis* conditionality can sometimes, in certain respects be hard to implement by the Central and Eastern European countries, as the decrease of the role of the administration, connected with the legacy of inefficiency from the Communist period can be a challenge in realising some policies.

Going back to the both kinds of conditionality, the EU and the governments themselves did not do a good job in explaining why adopting these conditions may be beneficial (more than a simple ‘it will allow us to join the EU’). Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier reminded us that “[...] we know from British and Spanish experiences, accession deals that are considered unfair impositions lead to disgruntled newcomers who spend much of their early accession years trying to renegotiate perceived wrongs”<sup>15</sup>. While there was not as much renegotiation of conditions after the last two enlargements, still people in the region harbour certain resentment towards the EU, as observed by Paweł Świeboda: “The popular perception of benefits drawn from European integration has never been lower”<sup>16</sup>. These words echo Grzymała-Busse and Innes and support their claim that the conditionality has led to rise in populism and technocracy in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. two eurosceptical parties becoming a part of a coalition government in Poland in 2005, just a year after the enlargement), consequences of which will be determined in the future.

Even a Polish government’s own report bring attention to the fact that the carrot of the accession was necessary to keep introducing changes in the country’s political and legal systems: “[...] Political situation has changed. After reaching the goal of accession to the EU, adaptation of legal system began to become less of a priority. Before the day of accession, the most of the legislative conditions were met on time, as any tardiness

<sup>13</sup> European Commission, “Securing Jobs and Opening Markets: German and Austrian Firms Doing Business in Central and Eastern Europe,” October 30, 2010, [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5th\\_enlargement/securing\\_jobs\\_and\\_opening\\_markets\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5th_enlargement/securing_jobs_and_opening_markets_en.htm).

<sup>14</sup> Anna Grzymała-Busse and Abby Innes, “Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe,” *East European Politics and Societies* 17, no. 64 (2003): 71.

<sup>15</sup> Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, “Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,” 676.

<sup>16</sup> Paweł Świeboda, “Europe from Scratch,” *DemosEuropa – Centre for European Strategy* (February 2012): 8, [http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/Pawel\\_Swieboda\\_Europe\\_from\\_scratch\\_policy\\_paper.pdf](http://www.demosservices.home.pl/www/files/Pawel_Swieboda_Europe_from_scratch_policy_paper.pdf).

might have result in delaying the membership in the EU. Such danger was no longer present after Poland became a member and so first delays began to appear”<sup>17</sup>. So one can discern certain symptoms of a forced change, rather than a change that was properly internalized by all the actors within the political system of the countries in the region. Such lack of internal motivation can be quite detrimental to both the countries (as noted above, through the rise in populism and technocracy), and the EU itself (through discontent and disunity these countries might bring to the Union).

Despite all these negative factors, countries’ behaviour and development after the accession to the European Union can be considered as a measure of the effectiveness of the conditionality in terms of grounding the Western model of democracy and development in the countries of the discussed region. Basing on the HDI measurements from the past decade, the EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe kept improving their living conditions in the period immediately before and immediately after the accession, with the rate of growth usually doubling (at least) the rate of the old member states, thus proving the new countries continue their development in socio-economic terms. Unfortunately, as could be predicted from the previous arguments, the same cannot be said about the improvements in democratic governance with some countries stagnating or even declining in their performance as democratic countries (as judged by the outside agencies, such as the Freedom House). Such a contrast proves that while socio-economic, civilizational conditions set up by the EU worked very well and were eagerly adopted, but the conditionality aspects relating to democracy and institutions were introduced reluctantly, and only as far as necessary for the accession. It can be explained by strong internal pressures and high political costs of such changes, and consequently, when the accession, the proverbial carrot, was reached, the momentum for such transformations dwindled down significantly or even was reverted.

The conditionality of the EU accession was a significant factor in shaping policies of the countries in the Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s and the 2000s. They gave a sense of directions to the policymakers but at the cost of limiting the debate, as there was very little discussion about the alternatives to the EU. Additionally, the democratic reforms proved to be much harder to be introduced before the accession and to be kept dynamic and ongoing after the enlargements. Ultimately, the conditionality nudged the countries in direction of converging with the West but still worked best in the countries that were already on their way there – it worked as an additional motivation, a lighthouse showing the way, or at least useful excuse to explain to the domestic public costs of reforms – but it did not push any of the Central and Eastern European Countries on a track they had not already been on.

<sup>17</sup> Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (Office of the Committee of the European Integration), *Pięć Lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej (Five Years of Poland in the European Union)* (Warszawa: Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (Office of the Committee of the European Integration), 2009), 498.

## Bibliography

- AFP. *EU condemns Bulgaria over corruption, freezes funds*. 23rd July 2008. <http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i2jpSUCzPyn-axr2Pufn8JzUQdDA> (accessed February 25th, 2012).
- European Commission. *Conditions for Enlargement*. 30th January 2012. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/the-policy/conditions-for-enlargement/index_en.htm) (accessed February 25th, 2012).
- . *Enlargement Criteria*. 27th October 2011. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement\\_process/accesion\\_process/criteria/index\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/enlargement_process/accesion_process/criteria/index_en.htm) (accessed February 24th, 2012).
- . *Securing jobs and opening markets: German and Austrian firms doing business in Central and Eastern Europe*. 30th October 2010. [http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5th\\_enlargement/securing\\_jobs\\_and\\_opening\\_markets\\_en.htm](http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/5th_enlargement/securing_jobs_and_opening_markets_en.htm) (accessed February 26th, 2012).
- European Union. *The Schengen area and cooperation*. 3rd August 2008. [http://europa.eu/legislation\\_summaries/justice\\_freedom\\_security/free\\_movement\\_of\\_persons\\_asylum\\_immigration/l33020\\_en.htm](http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33020_en.htm) (accessed February 26th, 2012).
- Grzymała-Busse, Anna, and Abby Innes. "Great Expectations: The EU and Domestic Political Competition in East Central Europe." *East European Politics and Societies* 17, no. 64 (2003): 64–73.
- Schimmelfennig, Frank, and Ulrich Sedelmeier. "Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe." *Journal of European Public Policy* 11, no. 4 (2004): 661–679.
- Świeboda, Paweł. "Europe from scratch." *DemosEuropa – Centre for European Strategy*. 13th February 2012. [http://www.demoservices.home.pl/www/files/Pawel\\_Swieboda\\_Europe\\_from\\_scratch\\_policy\\_paper.pdf](http://www.demoservices.home.pl/www/files/Pawel_Swieboda_Europe_from_scratch_policy_paper.pdf) (accessed February 25th, 2012).
- Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (Office of the Committee of the European Integration). *Pięć lat Polski w Unii Europejskiej (Five years of Poland in the European Union)*. Warszawa: Urząd Komitetu Integracji Europejskiej (Office of the Committee of the European Integration), 2009.



### III

## **SOUTH CAUCASUS AND CENTRAL ASIA**



# Fluctuating Images of Enemies and Friends: Abkhazia, With Turkish Cyprus' Lens<sup>1</sup>

MAGDALENA DEMBINSKA

*Université de Montréal, Canada*

Since the 2008 Russian-Georgian war over breakaway regions, journalists talk about the undergoing colonization of Abkhazia by Russia through a number of processes: financial and military aid, missiles installation in the region, infrastructure and telecommunications control, Russian business and migration. Although, for various security reasons, welcomed by the Abkhaz elites while building their political entity *against* Georgians, one cannot but think of parallels with the Northern Cyprus developments over the last 30 years. In a similar process, Turkey sponsored the construction of the Turkish Cyprus *de facto* state. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, considerable resources were used to 'prove' the affinity with Turkey and Turks, to construct the enemy image of Greek Cypriots and, in so doing, to legitimate the separatist cause and friendship with the sponsor-State. However, anthropological studies in the North of the island show how living side by side with settlers from Turkey modified Turkish Cypriots' self-identification as distinct from their new neighbours. Turkish Cypriots of all political convictions are uncomfortable and count critical stories about "people from Turkey." They distinguish "us" Cypriots from "them" the settlers and simultaneously the image of former 'enemy', the Greek Cypriots, is vested with less hostile shapes. A civic identification develops as collective perceptions change. This, in turn, has implications for political cleavages as new options for (de)constructing the *de facto* state and new party programs emerge. How this identity transformation occurs? What triggers changing policies towards our enemies and friends?

The article's objective is to map and compare the 'colonization' process that took place in Northern Cyprus and the one observed in Abkhazia and to detect changes that occur in the image of 'friends and enemies of the nation' during this process and in the ethnic versus civic State-building endeavours. How external factors affect these transformations? Following Anthony Smith and George Schöpflin, enemies and friends are constantly rediscovered and re-interpreted, and their (re)construction account for

---

<sup>1</sup> Previous version of this article was presented at the Association for the Study of Nationalities (ASN), Columbia University, New York, April 2011, and at the Warsaw East European Conference (WEEC), Warsaw University, July 2011.

“our” territory, justify collective claims and mobilize collective action. These fluctuations adapt to the needs of the moment, to an external threat, and to structural changes. When fluctuations in perceiving the ‘Other’ take place and how do they translate into the political construction of *de facto* states? Although the Abkhazian case is recent and in the making, establishing parallels with the Turkish Cyprus case may shed light on patterns of fluctuating nation-building processes, and by the same token, in (*de facto*) state-building.

Abkhazia and Northern Cyprus (TRNC), together with some ten other cases, constitute *de facto* States. Scott Pegg defines a *de facto* state as an “organized political leadership, which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capacity, receives popular support and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a specific territorial area, over which effective control is maintained for a significant period of time”<sup>2</sup>. *De facto* independent territories are thus entities which present a permanent population, a formally autonomous government over a defined territory, which are able to enter into informal relations with other states and which seek full constitutional independence and international recognition as sovereign states. The claim for Abkhaz and Turkish Cypriot self-determination collide with the territorial integrity principle claimed by the central state, Georgia and the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) respectively. The lack of solution to the violent conflict – ended with cease-fire agreements in 1993 and 1974 respectively -, accounts for these conflicts being labelled as ‘frozen’. Indeed, when studying Abkhazia and Turkish Cyprus through the lens of geopolitical and international relations dynamics, which is the preferred perspective in the literature, led to over-emphasize institutional deadlocks and situations of disagreements between national elites. Most of the existing investigations are concerned with bilateral negotiations or with the role played by third-party mediators and international institutions to settle the political disputes.

As argued by Dov Lynch in 2004, although external and internal logics account for the survival of *de facto* States and for the continuous *status quo*<sup>3</sup> *these conflicts are far from being static and understanding endogenous processes of state- and nation-building can contribute to modify the ways the frozen conflict evolves and the conditions under which political agreements can be reached. Frozen conflicts should not only be considered as diplomatic stalemates, but also as structures of opportunities for political elites and social actors in de facto independent territories to reinforce internal sovereignty – or to contest it – and to strengthen their own positions. State- and nation-building refer respectively to the “hard” and “soft” aspects of state construction, that is to say, to the “establishment of the administrative, economic and military groundwork of functional states” on the one hand, and to the “construction of a shared identity and a sense of unity in a state’s*

<sup>2</sup> Pegg, Scott. *International Society and the de facto State*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 1998: 26.

<sup>3</sup> Kolsto, Pal. “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States.” *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no 6 (2006): 723–740; King, Charles. “The Benefits of Ethnic War. Understanding Eurasia’s Unrecognized States.” *World Politics* 53 (2001): 524–552.

population, through education, propaganda, ideology, and state symbols,” on the other hand<sup>4</sup>. The aim of this article is to re-evaluate situations of frozen conflicts by concentrating on state- and nation-building processes on the ground. The mainstream literature treats *de facto* states as united entities and most studies take for granted the existence of a collective identity. Most ignore evolving social and political internal constraints, struggles for power, competition for alternative political avenues and/or resources, and say almost nothing of the erratic identity construction process. The purpose is to offer an analysis of the internal dynamics behind state- and nation-building processes. In doing so, the research aims at contributing to the transformation approach to conflict resolution (first section).

The article starts from the common assumption that, since the 2008 war and the recognition of Abkhazia by Russia, the Abkhaz conflict is more frozen than ever. It has set back the formal peace process with Abkhazia as this territory, along with South Ossetia, is almost certainly lost to Georgia for decades – if not for ever – and may become *de facto* part of Russia<sup>5</sup>. The aspects taken for ‘frozen’ are presented in the second section. The author notes, however, that the Turkish Cyprus case was judged in very similar terms: as frozen conflict with impossibility of reunification with the Greek Cyprus and as an entity *de facto* part of Turkey. And yet, in 2004, the referendum conducted in both parts of Cyprus gave a paradoxical result: the separatist Turkish north voted for reunification (while the Greek south voted against). Before that, in 2003, the new Turkish Cypriot government rewrote school history books shifting the Turko-centric narrative towards a Cypro-centric one and adapting a model of civic nationalism, preparing ground for a future Cyprus for all Cypriots – Greek and Turkish. How can we account for such a transformation? Are the conditions present in Abkhazia? To answer this question the article is proceeding with a comparative method *à la* Tocqueville<sup>6</sup> (for Tocqueville’s own explanation of the method he employed, see his memoirs and letters published in 1961): by looking at Abkhazia through Turkish Cyprus. The latter case, shortly presented in the third section, serves us to identify the mechanisms of the transformation that occurred in the image of the enemy and friend<sup>7</sup> (based on secondary sources and on the 2010 field research). The article proceeds then, in the fourth section, to examine Abkhazia through these mechanisms, exploring the similarities and differences of the two cases.

<sup>4</sup> Kolsto, Pal and Helge Blakkisrud. *Nation-Building and Common Values in Russia*. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Cooley, Alexander and Lincoln Mitchell. “Engagement without Recognition: A New Strategy toward Abkhazia and Eurasia’s Unrecognized States.” *The Washington Quarterly* 33, no. 4 (2010): 59–73.

<sup>6</sup> (De) Tocqueville, Alexis. *Memoir, Letters, and Remains of Alexis de Tocqueville*. 2 vols. Cambridge, 1961: 359.

<sup>7</sup> Dembinska, Magdalena. “Societal Responsiveness to Top-Down Politics: Frozen Conflicts and Peace-building (in Cyprus).” Paper presented at the International Studies Association (ISA), Montreal, March 16–19, 2011.

## Transformative Approach to Conflict Resolution and to Identity

Faced with irreconcilable claims of self-determination and territorial integrity, international organizations based on academic research, tend to propose various forms of federal structures<sup>8</sup>. After over thirty years of trying to create some form of federal structures in Cyprus and some fifteen years in post-Soviet frozen conflicts, one should consider some alternative ways out of the impasse. The failure of conventional institutional solution<sup>9</sup> pushed some researchers to consider alternatives. Instead of putting structures in place, they propose to transform the context, structures, actors, objects of dispute and/or cultural elements, in order to transform relations between the communities in conflict at the societal level<sup>10</sup>. In sum, conflict transformation approach accounts for conflict's dynamic nature and puts emphasis on the alteration of relations, of interests and of discourses which are conducive to a resolution in the long-run<sup>11</sup>.

This transformative perspective fits nicely the social-psychological approach to conflict resolution and reconciliation<sup>12</sup>. Indeed, although strategic studies privilege rational and instrumental accounts of identity conflicts, some authors consider affective elements as constitutive of inter- and intra-societal wars. Recent work by Kaufman on symbolic politics<sup>13</sup>, Ross on the role of culture<sup>14</sup>, Crains and Roe et al. on collective memories<sup>15</sup> and Petersen on hate, fear and resentment resulting from historical myths<sup>16</sup> are some examples. Kaufman argues that ethnic conflicts are a result of "each side's goals, and expectations about the other, [which] came from hostile interpretations of history encoded

<sup>8</sup> Stepan, Alfred. "Federalism and Democracy." In *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages*, edited by Amoretti U.M and Bermeo N, 441–456. Baltimore and London: John Hopkins University Press, 2004; Fearon, James D. and Laitin David. "Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War." *American Political Science Review* 97, no 1 (2003): 75–90; McGarry, John and O'Leary Brendan. "Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation." In *From Power Sharing to Democracy: post-conflict institutions in ethnically divided society*, edited by Noël Sid, 263–296. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2005; Lijphart, Arend. "Political theories and the explanation of ethnic conflict in the western world: falsified predictions and plausible postdictions." *Ethnic conflict in the Western world* (1977): 46–64.

<sup>9</sup> Kaufman, Stuart J. "Escaping the Symbolic Politics Trap: Reconciliation Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Ethnic War." *Journal of Peace Research* 43, no 2 (2006): 201–218; Ryan, Stephen. *The Transformation of Violent Intercommunal Conflict*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007:22.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 16–24; Lederach, John Paul. *Building Peace: Sustainable reconciliation in divided societies*. Washington, D.C: US Institute of Peace Press, 1997: 81–84; Väyrynen, Raimo. *New Directions in Conflict Theory*. London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1991.

<sup>11</sup> Miall, Hugh. "Conflict Transformation: A Multidimensional Task." In *Transforming Ethnopolitical Conflict: The Berghof Handbook*, edited by Austin Alexander, Martina Fischer and Norbert Ropers, 67–90. VS Verlag, 2004. Accessed June 4, 2008. [www.berghof-handbook.net](http://www.berghof-handbook.net).

<sup>12</sup> Kelman, Herbert C. "Reconciliation as Identity Change: A Social-Psychological Perspective." In *From Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation*, edited by Bar-Siman-Tov, Yaacov. Oxford University Press, 2004.

<sup>13</sup> Kaufman, Stuart J. *Modern Hatreds. The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War*. London: Cornell University Press, 2001: 39.

<sup>14</sup> Ross, Marc Howard. *Cultural Contestation in Ethnic Conflict*. Cambridge University Press, 2007.

<sup>15</sup> Crains, Ed and Micheal Roe. *The Role of Memory in Ethnic Conflict*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003.

<sup>16</sup> Petersen, Roger D. *Understanding Ethnic Violence*. Cambridge University Press, 2002.

in each group's myth-symbol complex<sup>17</sup>." If a group's myth-symbol complex encourages cooperation, the conflict won't arise. Therefore, in an effort of bringing groups together, ethnic conflict prevention has to take into account the underestimated peace building<sup>18</sup> that is "changing the hostile myths and attitudes in the long run"<sup>19</sup>.

How can the transformation occur? Myths are narrations of a community's history by the community itself. They are not historical truth; they are interpretations<sup>20</sup>. Myths constitute community's integrative elements because they create a sense of belonging and pride. They account for "our" territory, "our" Golden Age, for the causes of a nation's decline and victimization. Myths determine the borders of "us" versus "them," justify collective claims and mobilize collective action. Myths are inherent to group identity. However, myths are flexible. Nations – social constructions and imagined communities<sup>21</sup> are not static entities but rather imbued with fluidities and change. In fact, "different myths receive emphasis at different times to cope with different challenges". The salience of one myth over another at different times is strongly related to identity fluctuations, such as conceptualized by Hutchinson<sup>22</sup>. Constitutive elements of an ethnic identity undergo mutations: culture, language, accounts of history, traditions, rites modify in response to external stimuli. Our identity is composed of multiple identifications which form a whole but which are sometimes in conflict<sup>23</sup>. Indeed, different stimuli transform our identity by transforming some of its dimensions or by acquiring additional identifications – **iden-**tifications that may neutralize, without erasing, all/some other identifications. They all cumulate and co-exist. They co-exist and may collide when exposed to different contexts and choices. Depending on the needs of the moment, one identification takes precedence over others. We can thus observe over time 'fluctuating salience of national identities with respect to other social allegiances'<sup>24</sup>. Inspired by Hutchinson, Vural and Rustemli<sup>25</sup> write:

events that bear significance for people alter their perceptions and priorities leading to identity fluctuations. Identity fluctuation can be associated with a change in the prevailing components of identity. Such a change constitutes a departure from the crucial component of the existing collective identity leading to partial demotion or even elimination of the official or politically supported component of identity ... [Different] components may coexist in collective identity with differing degrees of significance for group members....both ethno-national and civic conceptualizations may be used sepa-

<sup>17</sup> Kaufman, *Modern Hatreds*, 20.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid*, 215.

<sup>20</sup> Schöpflin, George. *Nations, Identity, Power*. New York: New York University Press, 2000: 98.

<sup>21</sup> Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities*. New York: Verso, 1991.

<sup>22</sup> Hutchinson, John. "Ethnicity and modern nations." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23, no 4 (2000):651.

<sup>23</sup> Hale, Henry. "Explaining Ethnicity." *Comparative Political Studies* 37, no 4 (2004): 458–485.

<sup>24</sup> Hutchinson, "Ethnicity and modern nations," 651.

<sup>25</sup> Vural, Yucel and Rustemli Ahmet. "Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot Community." *Mediterranean Politics* 11, no 3 (2006): 330.

rately by the members of the group ... fluctuations ... are likely to culminate in a radical or moderate shift in the hierarchy of collective identity components.

What elements may contribute to the change of myths and to the development of new layers/components of collective identity? Myths adapt to the needs of the moment, to an external threat, and to structural changes<sup>26</sup>. Following Brubaker's argument<sup>27</sup> developed subsequently by other authors, policies by external actors, such as the kin/patron-State and regional/international organisations, should be taken into the analysis together with the host-State<sup>28</sup>. In sum, "external incentives – offered for example, by international organisations or by economically, politically, or militarily powerful states – may favour trans-ethnic state- and nation-building strategies, oriented to the citizenry as a whole rather than to one ethnationally qualified segment of that country"<sup>29</sup>. What threats and/or structural changes account for the Turkish Cypriot transformation? Are similar conditions reproduced in Abkhazia? Last but not least, identity transformation, i.e. developing a civic identification, needs responsiveness at the society level<sup>30</sup>. Myths transformation is about a parallel reimagining process at the societal level. The society should be ready for alternating stereotypes, and this would depend on the real-life perceptions of the "other". Before exploring the question of when do fluctuations in perceiving the 'Other' take place and how do they translate into the political construction of *de facto* states, let's recapitulate in more detail the received wisdom about the frozen case of Abkhazia.

## More Frozen than Ever: Ethnic Distance and 'Colonized' *de facto* State of Abkhazia

### *History and Conflict Narrative: Constructing Enemies and Friends*

The Abkhaz and Georgians have coexisted in a common political space for centuries. Ghia Nodia affirms that the modern conflict cannot be traced back to any medieval grievances, although appeals to medieval history are common on both Abkhaz and Georgian sides in justifying today's political claims. Present day clashes are not incited by ancient memories or ethnic hatred<sup>31</sup>. The conflict is about statehood: about territorial integrity

<sup>26</sup> Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power*, 98.

<sup>27</sup> Brubaker, Rogers. *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

<sup>28</sup> Smith, Anthony.D. *Myths and Memories of the Nation*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999; Ieda, Osamu. "Post-communist Nation Building and the Status Law Syndrome in Hungary." In *The Hungarian Status Law*, edited by Zoltán Kántor et al. Slavic Research Center. Hokkaido University, 2004. Accessed November 28, 2007. [http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4\\_ses/contents.html](http://src-h.slav.hokudai.ac.jp/coe21/publish/no4_ses/contents.html)

<sup>29</sup> Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*, 47.

<sup>30</sup> Schöpflin, *Nations, Identity, Power*, 98.

<sup>31</sup> Nodia, Ghia. "Causes and Visions of Conflict in Abkhazia." *Berkeley Program in Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies* (2007). Accessed December 31, 2007: 10–11. <http://escholarship.org/uc/item/4qr0m8wn>

on the one hand and self-determination on the other. The Abkhaz see the Georgian state as 'imperialist' and ethnic Georgians living in Abkhazia before the war as settlers, sent by Stalin and Beria in order to outnumber the Abkhaz<sup>32</sup>. Indeed, Beria's resettlement programme in the 1940s dramatically altered the demographic balance in the region, resulting in the Abkhaz becoming a minority in their titular Autonomous Republic. This was in addition to perceived economic and political discrimination against the Abkhaz population by the Georgian titular elite and cultural oppression, including, for example, severe restrictions on the use of the Abkhaz language. Tensions continued, particularly with the growth of popular nationalist movements in both Georgia and Abkhazia in the 1980s, until relations finally came to breaking point in 1992 with the outbreak of war<sup>33</sup>.

The elements of Georgian and Abkhaz national identities that are in collision, which are both myths justifying the claims and points of contention, are those concerning the 'ownership' of this indivisible territory, the role of each group in the medieval common state and the groups' civilizing role as expressed by the use of language<sup>34</sup>. The Abkhaz trace their presence in the region long before Jesus Christ and the founding political entity back to the Abkhazian Kingdom, and thus insist on "1200 years of independent statehood"<sup>35</sup>. According to Georgian radical historiography, the presumed lack of terms "sea" and "boat" in the Abkhaz language is evidence of the Abkhaz late arrival in the region. The medieval state is presented, on the one side, as being dominated by the Abkhaz since it was an Abkhaz dynasty who reigned there, on the other side, dominated by Georgians as evidenced by the use of the Georgian language. According to Gigineishvili, the two accounts are heavily biased: first, Abkhazian language includes the terms 'sea' and 'boat' and, second, the medieval Kingdom an entity constituted by a multitude of diverse groups. It had been constituted in order to unite forces against common enemies. In addition, the use of the Georgian language was also a voluntary act since the Georgian was widely known; the Abkhaz language was missing script, while the Georgian was used since long in religious writings<sup>36</sup>.

In today's Georgian school textbooks, language continues to be extensively employed to link Georgian ethnic group to the past of the disputed territories. For example, the Abkhazian language is listed in the same group as the Georgian language or, in other

<sup>32</sup> Ibid, 4–5.

<sup>33</sup> Clogg, Rachel. "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia: Managing Diversity and Unresolved Conflict." *Nationalities Papers* 36, no. 2 (2008): 322.

<sup>34</sup> Dembinska, Magdalena. "Briser les logiques du 'gel': approche différenciée et transformative en Abkhazie et en Transnistrie." *Études internationales* 40, no 4 (2009): 611–629; Nodia, Ghia. "Nationalism and Subnationalism in Georgia." Paper presented at the Caucasus Conference, University of California, Berkeley, May 2–3, 1997. Accessed September 17, 2006. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=iseecs/bps>

<sup>35</sup> Dale, "The Politics of Representation in the Abkhaz Conflict," 59.

<sup>36</sup> Gigineishvili, Levan. "Conflicting Narratives in Abkhazia and Georgia. Different Visions of the Same History and the Quest for Objectivity." *Harvard Graduate School of Education* (2003): 5. Accessed April 14, 2007. [http://gseweb.harvard.edu/~t656\\_web/peace/Articles\\_Spring\\_2003/Gigineishvili\\_Levan\\_ConflictingNarrativesAbkhaziaGeorgia.htm](http://gseweb.harvard.edu/~t656_web/peace/Articles_Spring_2003/Gigineishvili_Levan_ConflictingNarrativesAbkhaziaGeorgia.htm)

places, emphasize the use of Kartli (Georgian) language as lingua franca in the Western Georgia (including Abkhazia) as early as in 4–3 centuries BC (for school books' analysis see Rouvinsky<sup>37</sup>). History textbook published in Abkhazia states on the contrary that, 'as it is widely acknowledged, the Abkhaz language is one of the oldest languages in the world' and is truly autochthonous to the territory of Abkhazia. There can be thus no linguistically-based claim of Abkhazia being a Georgian territory<sup>38</sup>.

The civil war of 1992–93, a fresh memory, represents for Abkhazians a "cultural genocide"<sup>39</sup>. The lack of apology for the destruction of Abkhaz cultural sites, including the Institute of Abkhazian Language, Culture and History as well as the National Archives of Abkhazia, is a major grudge<sup>40</sup>. Abkhazian public spaces are full of visual reminders of war. As enumerated by Sabirova<sup>41</sup>, war-time graffiti and notices about ongoing land-mine clearance remain in public view; monuments and memorial plaques have been erected; books are published recording the memories of those who witnessed the fighting. The war is thus part of the everyday lexicon and is linked to 'victimization', 'heroification', 'romanticization', and 'patriotization'<sup>42</sup>. There is an enduring perception throughout the population of Abkhazia that the Georgians conducted the war of 1992–1993 with genocidal intent. Garb quotes Viacheslav Chirikba, a non-governmental activist in Abkhazia and present-day *de facto* Minister of Foreign Affairs, saying: 'During the war of 1992–1993, Georgians killed 4% of the entire Abkhazian population and destroyed the small republic's national archives, museums, monuments of culture, and socioeconomic infrastructure... [they were prepared] to exterminate the entire Abkhazian nation'<sup>43</sup>.

The distance between Abkhaz and Georgians grew even wider after the 2008 war over South Ossetia. Disillusioned with years of never-ending peace talks, Saakashvili's government wanted quick results. As one Georgian civil society representative explained to Nicu Popescu: "The government wanted everything at once: accession to NATO, good relations with Russia, and reintegration of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. There was little patience for dialogue and long-term rebuilding of trust." But this only increased the mutual mistrust between Georgia and Abkhazia<sup>44</sup>. Chirikba adds that 'if

<sup>37</sup> Rouvinski, Vladmir. "Ethnic Enclosure in Soviet and Post-Soviet School Textbooks." *IPSHU English Research Report Series* 20 (2007): 53–63.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>39</sup> Dale, Catherine. "The Politics of Representation in the Abkhaz Conflict." Paper presented at the Caucasus Conference, University of California, Berkeley, May 2–3, 1997: 60. Accessed September 17, 2006. <http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1016&context=iseees/bps>.

<sup>40</sup> Euroclio. "Abkhazia and Georgia Mission History". *European Association of History Educators* (2005). Accessed January 25, 2007: 8. [www.euroclio.eu/joomla/index.php/component?option, com\\_docman/Itemid,102/gid,62/task,doc\\_details](http://www.euroclio.eu/joomla/index.php/component?option=com_docman/Itemid,102/gid,62/task,doc_details).

<sup>41</sup> Sabirova, Guzel. "Both War and Peace in the 'Country of the Soul': The Young People of Abkhazia on War, Tradition, and Independence." *Anthropology of East Europe Review* 26, no. 1 (2008): 51–68.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>43</sup> Garb, Paula. "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze." *Central Asian Survey* 28, no. 2 (2009): 238.

<sup>44</sup> Popescu, Nicu. "The EU and Civil Society in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict." *MICROCON Policy Working Paper*, no. 5 (2010):9.

Saakashvili's war on South Ossetia had been successful and if he'd won, there is no doubt that the territory of South Ossetia would have been cleansed of its indigenous Ossetian population . . . and, whatever the Russian motives, Russia prevented this from happening<sup>45</sup>. As Western countries did not react for several days, they are seen as giving green light to Georgia to use force, and Russians are the only ones – for whatever reason – ready to protect the Abkhaz population<sup>46</sup>.

### *Russia's Patronage and Presence*

Abkhazians, fearing they would be Georgia's next target after South Ossetia, welcomed the reinforcement of Russian troops' presence. They regarded Russia as the guarantor of peace<sup>47</sup>. Moreover, the presence of Russian forces gave Abkhazians the opportunity to re-conquer the Upper Kodori Gorge, lost two years earlier to Georgians. They also gained a strip of land along the Abkhazian side of the Inguri River<sup>48</sup>.

*De facto* States need external support to develop and survive<sup>49</sup>. The Russian presence in Abkhazia since the 1992 civil war is a well known fact and with the 2008 Abkhazia's unilateral recognition it deepens fast. In February 2010, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a report that documented the deepening dependence of Abkhazia on Russian security protection, budgetary subventions and investments<sup>50</sup>. On 15 September 2009, the Russian and *de facto* Abkhazian authorities signed a military cooperation treaty that enables the Russian military to use, upgrade and build military infrastructure and bases in Abkhazia for the next 49 years. The former Soviet airfield facility at Bombora near Gudauta is probably to become the premier military airbase in the South Caucasus. A new Russian naval base on the Black Sea is also envisaged. Under the treaty, Russian troops will retain the right of unrestricted mobility throughout Abkhazia and will remain immune from Abkhazian criminal law as well as exempt from taxation<sup>51</sup>. Russian forces control the security of the *de facto* border with Georgia, with Abkhaz officials serving merely as control agents.

Russian state companies got many contracts to upgrade Abkhazian infrastructure. In May 2009, the plan to transfer the management of Abkhazia's railways and Sukhum/i airport to Russia has been announced in exchange for investment and loans. At the same time, the Abkhazia *de facto* Ministry of Economy signed an agreement with the Russian state-owned oil company Rosneft that ceded the rights to explore the Abkhaz continental shelf for five years<sup>52</sup>. A change to the law in June 2009 opened the way for Russian inves-

<sup>45</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 238.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid, 239–240.

<sup>47</sup> Ascherson, Neal. "A chance to join the world." *London Review of Books* 23 (2008). Accessed March 1, 2009. [http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n23/asch01\\_html](http://www.lrb.co.uk/v30/n23/asch01_html)

<sup>48</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 241.

<sup>49</sup> Lynch, Dov. *Engaging Eurasia's separatist states. Unresolved conflicts and de facto states*. Washington: United States institute of Peace, 2004.

<sup>50</sup> International Crisis group. "Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence." *Europe Report*, no 202 (2010): 1–22.

<sup>51</sup> Cooley and Mitchell. "Engagement without Recognition," 64.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid, 65.

tors and others to purchase long-term leases to Abkhazian property<sup>53</sup>. Russia and Abkhazia worked out “a complex plan of social-economic development of Abkhazia for 2010–2012” whose total cost is about 330 million US dollars<sup>54</sup>. The Russian ruble remains Abkhazia’s official currency. Since October 2009 Abkhazia has Russian telephone prefixes (7) replacing its Georgian ones. Russia is responsible for up to 95% of Abkhazia’s trade<sup>55</sup>.

In addition, Russia provides direct budgetary support to the Abkhaz state. In 2009, this was estimated at 60%<sup>56</sup>. And in socio-economic terms, there seems to be improvement. Average salaries are ten times up compared to the 1997 level although 40% of the population lives beneath the official subsistence level. Without the Russian assistance, pensioners would live in destitution (about 80% of the Abkhaz have double citizenship<sup>57</sup>). In sum, Abkhazia depend on Russia’s support. Facing international isolation and the perceived Georgia’s threat, Russia’s involvement in security matters and in economy is judged necessary for the *de facto* state’s survival. At the same time, this dependence on Russia’s protection and patronage is interpreted by Georgia and external observers as a form of colonization, i.e. *de facto* integration of Abkhazia into the Russian Federation. But is Abkhazia merely Russia’s puppet? Is the conflict frozen once and for all? Or is 2008 a turning year pointing to new dynamics with a potential to transforming actors and their perceptions and opening thus a new ground for politics and for the study of the conflict? I propose to take a loop by looking into the Turkish Cyprus case – a frozen conflict and ‘colonized’ by Turkey *de facto* State where changes can be traced over time – in order to detect similarities and differences with Abkhazia and the latter’s potential to transform its seemingly ‘frozen’ enemies and friends.

### Similar Wisdom about Turkish Cyprus and Yet Dynamic Process of Identity Change

The 2004 referendum in Turkish Cyprus is puzzling. Although for external observers the conflict seemed frozen -with the enemy image fixed on Greek Cypriots and friends fixed in Turkey-, a transformation occurred. Not only the majority of the northern island voted for reunification but they elected a pro-peace government in 2003 which proceeded with the change of the official history narrative. What happened and how to explain the societal responsiveness to such a shift<sup>58</sup>?

<sup>53</sup> *Nezavissimaya Gazeta*, quoted in O’Loughlin, John and Vladimir Kolossov. “Inside Abkhazia : Survey of Attitudes in a de facto State.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 27, no 1 (2011): 7–8.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid*, 21.

<sup>55</sup> Cooley and Mitchell, “Engagement without Recognition,” 65.

<sup>56</sup> International Crisis Group, “Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence,” 5.

<sup>57</sup> Kolsto, “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States,” 494.

<sup>58</sup> The 2009–2010 shift back to the previous Turkish nationalist official narrative will be addressed briefly. The author addressed this puzzling return to the hard-line positions in her 2011 ISA paper. For the purpose of this article which aim is to ‘extract’ indicators for transformation in order to explore the Abkhaz case, only

*Ethnic Turkish narrative and its 2003–2004 shift*

The Turkish Cypriot school textbooks used until 2003 present the history of Cyprus as part of Turkish history. They recount that Cyprus used to be attached to Anatolia but geological transformations broke it apart from Turkey<sup>59</sup>. History begins with the arrival of the Ottomans in Cyprus and its account aims at proving that Cyprus has been Turkish until the British came in 1878. The Ottoman period is glorified: the Ottomans came to Cyprus in order to save the Greek Cypriots from Venetian cruelty. Then, Greek Cypriot revolts betrayed Ottoman tolerance. Turkish 1974 intervention equals glorious victory (in the Greek Cypriot narrative it is a tragic ending). “Our Motherland Turkey” is used throughout the books. Turkish Cypriots are presented as “Turks” and Greek Cypriots as the primary other, the occupiers, the invaders, the enemy<sup>60</sup>. Pre–2004, there is no such thing as a purely Cypriot identity as the divide is fixed across the Greek–Turkish axis.

In July 2004, however, the Turkish-Cypriot Educational Planning and Programme Development Department recognized: ‘Our texts encourage the student to make enemies’<sup>61</sup>. The new 2003 textbooks depart from the old enemy image and introduce a new strategy by redefining identity in order to sustain a united federal Cyprus. They do so by incorporating the territorial element into the collective identity and reducing ‘self-other’ confrontation<sup>62</sup>. **The cover shows Cyprus map with no dividing line (previously, divided island was presented with Turkey included in the map).** The usage of more inclusive terms such as “Cypriots” and “people” imply both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots<sup>63</sup>. The two Cyprus people are presented as having many similarities and are divided because of nationalism and of the British “divide and rule” policies<sup>64</sup>. How could such a shift from ethnic to civic perspective occur in the context of a frozen conflict and how could people be responsive to it?

*External incentives for change*

After years of putting forward the need for reunification as a condition for Cyprus to join the EU, the European Commission decided that the RoC should be accepted even if the island is split and even if Turkey is not accepted at the same time. Greek Cyprus

---

the 2004 Turkish Cyprus changes will be put forward. Note that the purpose is not to determine when and if peace settlement between the parties in conflict is possible, but rather when and how the context transforms and accounts for identity transformative fluctuations, developing thus a civic layer of group identity.

<sup>59</sup> Navaro-Yashin, Yael. *Faces of the State: secularism and public life in Turkey*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006: 86.

<sup>60</sup> Calleja, Isabelle. “Education and the Teaching of History in the Light of Encouraging Conflict Resolution in Cyprus.” *Mediterranean Journal of Educational Studies* 13, no 2 (2008): 57.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid*, 56.

<sup>62</sup> Vural, “Identity Fluctuations in the Turkish Cypriot Community,” 133.

<sup>63</sup> Papadakis, Yiannis. “Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison on the ‘History of Cyprus.’” *History and Memory* 20, n° 2 (2008):128–149.

<sup>64</sup> Chrysanthou, Anastasia. *A Comparative Analysis of the Teaching of History in the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Communities of Cyprus*. Masters thesis, Department of European Studies and International Relations, University of Nicosia, Cyprus, 2007: 64.

position has been thus reinforced: knowing that they did not need to break a deal to gain EU membership, the South could allow itself to refuse the reunification. However, the force of Europeanization did have its effects: (1) because of the EU conditionality, Turkey changed its position towards the island; (2) EU economic incentives had their impact on the Turkish Cypriot society.

Turkey has always considered Cyprus as inherent part of Turkey. For decades Turkey supported financially, militarily and diplomatically the *de facto* State. However, the Turkish 2002 elections brought in a moderate reformist government, which recognized that Cyprus represented an obstacle to the ultimate Turkish objective: the EU accession<sup>65</sup>. This objective accounts for a new external context. Another major element changed Turkey's role within TRNC: "the fallout of the 2001 financial crisis in Turkey led to further economic hardship in the TRNC, and accelerated the domestic discrediting of the political-economic foundations of the Turkish Cypriot state"<sup>66</sup>. In the context of the economic crisis, material benefits of EU integration represented a great incentive<sup>67</sup>. Massive demonstrations were organized in Northern Cyprus under the slogan 'This country is ours', denouncing the close relationship between the TRNC nationalist government of Rauf Denktaş and Ankara<sup>68</sup>. This together with a general disenchantment with the kin-State patronizing policies contributed to the shift on the political spectrum.

### *Internal political splits*

These external developments account for the results of the 2003 parliamentary elections in TRNC. The peace-oriented, left-wing opposition party CTP (Republican Turkish Party) defeated Denktaş government with the slogan "Europe within sight"<sup>69</sup>. Contrary to the received wisdom featuring the conflict as one between two homogeneous nationalist communities, identifying with their respective "motherlands," namely Greece and Turkey, the inner identity divisions are more complicated. On both sides of the island, right-wing political parties expressed the nationalist Greek/Turkish belonging (DIKO and UBP respectively) while left-wing parties (AKEL and CTP respectively) proposed a Cyp-

<sup>65</sup> Robins, Philip. "Turkish Foreign Policy Since 2002: Between a Post-Islamist Government and a Kemalist State." *International Affairs* 83, no 1 (2007): 297.

<sup>66</sup> Lacher, Hannes and Erol Kaymak. "Transforming Identities: Beyond the Politics of Non-Settlement in North Cyprus." *Mediterranean Politics* 10, no 2 (2005): 156–157.

<sup>67</sup> Bahçeli, "Saying Yes to EU Accession: Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome," 63.

<sup>68</sup> Carkoglu, Ali and Sozen Ahmet. "The Turkish Cypriot General Elections of December 2003: Setting the Stage for Resolving the Cyprus Conflict?" In *Reflections on the Cyprus Problem: A Compilation of Recent Academic Contributions*, edited by Sozen Ahmet, 34. Cyprus Policy Center, Eastern Mediterranean University Printing-house, 2007; Bahçeli, Tozun. "Under Turkey's Wings. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Struggle for International Acceptance." In *De Facto States. The Quest for Sovereignty*, edited by Bahçeli Tozun, Bartmann Barry and Srebrnik Henry, 283. London and New York: Routledge, 2004b.

<sup>69</sup> Diez, Thomas, Stephan Stetter and Mathias Albert. "The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of Integration." *International Organization* 60 (2006): 580.

riot-centred alternative<sup>70</sup>. As argued by Loizides<sup>71</sup>, the growth of the nonviolent pro-peace movement among the Turkish Cypriots in 2002–2004 period against Denktash can be explained through the following TRNC internal politics. First, opposition grew when the nationalist party could not rely anymore on patronage through allocation of properties left by Greek Cypriot refugees and appointments in the Turkish Cypriot administrative structures<sup>72</sup>. Second, subsequent administrations failed to prevent the exodus of young Turkish Cypriots and to stop the influx of Turkish settlers. Third, Denktash's nationalism had limited appeal among the young Turkish Cypriots who did not experience violence. Finally, the Turkish Cypriots realized that the goal for independence and international recognition proved to be a chimera while at the same time they risked losing EU accession<sup>73</sup>. CTP, led by Mehet Ali Talat, portrayed an all inclusive identity combining the vision of joining the EU with equal citizenship for all<sup>74</sup>. Favouring reunification, CTP soon changed the history books that clearly promoted the Cyprus civic goals.

### *Identity transformation*

Actually, the 2004 political shift would not have been possible was it not for “a reconstruction of patterns of individual and collective [Turkish Cypriot] identity [which] prepared the ground for ... pro-settlement parties”<sup>75</sup>. In their concluding remarks of a statistical research of values of the Cypriots, Yesilada, Noordijk and Webster say that “while the island certainly contains distinct communities, they are more similar to one another than they are to their respective mainland counterparts... [R]ecent immigrants from the mainland probably pushing intolerance scores in Northern Cyprus higher”<sup>76</sup>. Three reasons are usually referred to when speaking critically of the settlers from Turkey: (1) “they threw us out of here”<sup>77</sup>; (2) they outnumbered us; (3) they occupy high administrative and military positions. Living for over 30 years in isolation from the Greek Cypriots but with people from Turkey, Turkish Cypriots distinguish “us” Cypriots from “them” the settlers; living together brought into light certain distinctive cultural traits, such as the different manner of wearing the head-scarf or of arranging gardens in the

<sup>70</sup> Papadakis, Yiannis. “Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison on the ‘History of Cyprus.’” *History and Memory* 20, no 2 (2008): 262; Papadakis, Yiannis, Nicos Peristianis and Gizela Welz. *Divided Cyprus. Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006: 9.

<sup>71</sup> Loizides, Neophytos. “Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus.” *International Studies Perspectives* 8 (2007):181–182.

<sup>72</sup> Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities,” 154–156.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid*, 156–157.

<sup>74</sup> *Ibid*, 158–159.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid*, 149.

<sup>76</sup> Yesilada, Birol, Peter Noordijk and Craig Webster. “Religiosity and Social Values of Cypriots.” *Social Compass* 56, no. 1 (2009): 30.

<sup>77</sup> Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities,” 155; Navaro-Yashin, Yael. *Faces of the State: secularism and public life in Turkey*, 87.

backyards. This is most obvious among young Turkish Cypriots who never lived with or even met a Greek Cypriot<sup>78</sup>. **Vural and Rustemli sustain that historically ‘socio-economic interactions were the most important factors contributing to the development of the notion of ‘territorial togetherness’ which engendered the incipient concept of ‘Cypriotness’ as a common sense of belonging that provided a basis for civic conceptualization of collective identity**<sup>79</sup>. In 2009, “Cyprus 2015 – Research and Dialogue for a Sustainable Future” survey finds that<sup>80</sup>

as far as the *perception of the other community was concerned* ... there was a very strong convergence between the Turkish and Greek Cypriots who preferred to view the current problem looking through the ‘others’ lenses and with the emphasis of the notion of compromise rather than a win-win stubbornness. This is a very promising finding for the future as the two Cypriot communities believe that ‘empathy’ is a *sine qua non* for the prospect for success of the settlement talks and negotiations.

Vural and Rustemli argue that

Turkish Cypriot identity encompasses various components and that identity descriptions opt to change in response to changing political environment<sup>81</sup>... There is thus a ‘possibility of identity fluctuations that transcend an ethno-national construction of ‘community boundaries’ in the ‘Turkish-Cypriot’ community’<sup>82</sup>... Despite official support to define and preserve collective identity in reference to ethno-national origin (Turkishness), a civic–territorial notion of ‘Cypriotness’ gained saliency<sup>83</sup>.

In sum, the transformation of the Turkish Cypriot identity by the development of the Cypriot civic identification was possible because the perception of the mainland Turks and of the kin-State patronage had modified. For the transformation to be politically salient and expressed in the State-building policies, opportunity windows needed to open<sup>84</sup>. This was possible because of the changed external configuration of influences and incentives. For these to be used however, an internal political split has to be in place. Is there any change in the external environment to the Abkhaz frozen conflict?

<sup>78</sup> Lacher and Kaymak, “Transforming Identities,” 155.

<sup>79</sup> Vural, “Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks,” 331.

<sup>80</sup> Sözen, Ahmet. “A Paradigm Shift in Turkish Foreign Policy: Transition and Challenges.” *Turkish Studies* 11, no 1 (2010):103–123.

<sup>81</sup> Vural, “Redefining Identity in the Turkish-Cypriot School History Textbooks,” 332.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid*, 335.

<sup>83</sup> *Ibid*, 344.

<sup>84</sup> The Turkish Cypriots have been disappointed by the 2004 ‘No’ from the Greek Cypriots and by the international community who failed to deliver its promises. Hence, they moved back in 2009 towards the preferred two-state solution. But the transformed identity offers an optimist perspective for the future, whether within one state or two.

Are political divisions taking place? How does the society respond? Is there any sign of developing a civic layer to the Abkhaz identity?

### **Turkish Cyprus' Dynamics in Abkhazia?**

Since the 2008 war and recognition by Russia, re-integration with Georgia is less probable. But Abkhaz (perceived) security threat is diminished and that changes political dynamics. From security concerns and emphasis on Georgia's 'imperialism', people may now turn their attention to a set of so far scarcely addressed problems. There is a shift on the political agenda to cope with internal socio-economic issues, the issue of the degree of economic and security dependency, and on the issue of democracy and inclusion of the ethnic diversity among the Abkhaz population. This new context, similarly to the 2004 Turkish Cyprus case, is responsible for the search of a multi-vector foreign policy to distance itself from Russia (as Turkish Cyprus from Turkey), for internal political splits (as observed on the TC political arena) and for the process redefining the Abkhaz identity in both ethnic and civic terms (as the transformed TC identity where a civic identification has been developed over time and co-exists with the ethnic layer of identity).

#### ***Abkhazia between Russia-EU-Turkey Triangle Poles (along frozen relation with Georgia)***

Notwithstanding its close ties with Russia, Abkhazia is eager to have options. Indeed, Abkhazia's interests do not always go hand in hand with Russia. Take for example the Kosovo precedent. Faced with its own separatist regions in the North Caucasus, Russia is opposed to Kosovo's recognition; Abkhazia, however, is naturally in favour of the ruling. O'Loughlin and Kolossov record their conversation with the *de facto* President of Abkhazia, Sergei Bagapsh, in 2009, who stressed that Abkhazia was "a European country" committed to a non-aligned policy<sup>85</sup>. In fact, the isolation of Abkhazia from the global community, the quasi absence of Western presence in the *de facto* State, pushed Abkhazians increasingly closer to Russia<sup>86</sup>. After interviewing a number of Abkhazian leaders and activists, Garb<sup>87</sup> asserts that:

Abkhazians are fairly certain that Russia does not want an independent Abkhazia that is recognized by any other country. Russia, they say, is happy that the rest of the world does not follow it in recognizing Abkhazia. This gives Russia exclusive rights to Abkhazia by default. It also prevents Georgia from having any influence over Abkhazia. If Abkhazia's isolation continues, the people fear that eventually Russia will buy up and

<sup>85</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolossov, "Inside Abkhazia," 37.

<sup>86</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 244.

<sup>87</sup> Ibid.

occupy Abkhazia like the former colony it once was. Abkhazians want to be a neutral buffer zone between their two neighbours. They want to dilute their dependence on Russia, and engage with the US and Europe to overcome their international isolation.

These findings concord with Clogg's observations: Abkhazia possesses a European identity, and aspirations for closer links with the political and cultural institutions of Europe; if by necessity it is dependent on Russia, Abkhazians wish for more room for manoeuvre<sup>88</sup>. Although anti-Western sentiment was observed in the wake of the 2008 war as Abkhazians resented Western countries inaction while Georgia undertook violent actions against South Ossetia, Abkhazians still see the European Union as a potentially positive actor in the region<sup>89</sup>.

For the purpose of lessening Russia's influence in Abkhazia while meeting local expectations, a new Western (EU and US) policy is embraced, at least at the discursive level: "engagement without recognition". According to this strategy, the isolation of Abkhazia would be lessened by creating opportunities to engage with the West on economic, social, and cultural issues, despite non recognition. Following Cooley and Mitchell, 'by separating the international legal dimensions of sovereignty from its governance aspects, the West can attempt to gain some needed strategic leverage over Abkhazia'<sup>90</sup>. The EU engagement is meant to develop a "multi-vector" foreign policy, and offer Abkhaz decision-makers credible alternatives when negotiating with Russia<sup>91</sup>. The results of this policy are to be seen, but – if consequently applied – it has the potential to modify Abkhazia's opportunity structures.

But there is now another attracting pole in the region, Turkey. Abkhazia's economic exchanges with Turkey and its interest in the kin Abkhaz population living there, make the *de facto* State look increasingly in that direction. Moreover, Turkey – a NATO member aspiring to join the EU – has a record of good relations with Georgia mostly through the 1990s, and since mid-2000s has had friendly arrangements with Russia, making this country an attractive partner for peace-building and stability in the region. This is a new configuration in the Black Sea region.

After the 2008 war, Turkey has attempted to play a more active role in the South Caucasus, and proposed the Caucasus Security and Cooperation Platform for the region which failed, however, to gain adherence. As sustained by Taymaz<sup>92</sup>, there are two important factors behind Turkey's initiatives and policies in the region. First, Turkey is indeed in a strategic location for energy transportation between main user and supplier countries. There is a demand to build pipelines both in the East-West and in the

<sup>88</sup> Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 324.

<sup>89</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 240.

<sup>90</sup> Cooley and Mitchell, "Engagement without Recognition," 60.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibid.*, 66.

<sup>92</sup> Taymaz, Erol. "Economic Cooperation for Stability in the Caucasus. Prospects for Abkhazia-Turkey Economic Relations." *Caucasian Center for Strategic Studies Discussion Paper*, no. 0903 (2009): 7.

North-South directions, and Turkey is located just at the intersection of these routes. Second, Turkey has adopted an active policy stance in international relations to become a regional player. The new policy adopted by AKP as of 2001 was based on the principles of “zero-problem” with neighbours and “multi-dimensional foreign policy”. Turkish foreign policy seeks to maintain close ties with both the West and the non-Western world.

In the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey considered Georgia as a strategic ally. Georgia provided the only route for transporting Azeri oil/gas to Turkey because Armenia was not an option as a result of the Nagorno Karabakh problem. Turkey needs Georgia and seeks stability there. It has been nervous about the Saakashvili government’s confrontational position towards Moscow<sup>93</sup>. In fact, after the EU granted Turkey candidate country status in 2004, Turkey’s Black Sea priorities were secondary. But when the Turkey-EU accession process has stalled, Turkey began paying attention to the Black Sea region, but this time in partnership with Russia<sup>94</sup>. After decades of political competition, Turkey and the Russian Federation started to establish a new bilateral relationship. Since 2003, President Putin and Prime Minister Erdogan have held multiple meetings, and Russia and Turkey seem to have found common ground on once contentious issues<sup>95</sup>. In fact, Russia became Turkey’s second-largest trading partner, although Turkey’s relationship with Russia is characterized by a mixture of competition and cooperation in the region<sup>96</sup>.

Turkey established direct trade with Abkhazia. Even if the Georgian government intercepts Turkish vessels sailing to Sukhum/i, business relations between Turkey and Abkhazia have grown. For Abkhazia, it is a premium partner not only for the purpose of lessening dependence from Russia, but because ‘direct links with Turkey could persuade thousands of Turkish Abkhazians to return to the land of their fathers and repopulate the empty countryside’<sup>97</sup>.

So, there is interdependence between Turkey and Russia. At the same time Turkey needs Georgia. But Georgia needs a European Turkey too. Indeed, having an EU member state right on its border would be a huge boost to the country’s economic and political development<sup>98</sup>. Finally, Abkhazia needs Turkey. In line with Cooley and Mitchell’s argument, if the West does not engage in Abkhazia, it may miss an opportunity to exploit Abkhaz reservations about their increasing ties and overwhelming dependence on Russia. These links are important to understand Turkey’s role in the region and the potential for transforming relationships, including between Abkhazia and Russia, in the future.

<sup>93</sup> Baran, Zeyno. “Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region.” In *The Wider Black Sea Region in the 21st Century*, edited by Daniel Hamilton and Gerhard Mangott. Washington DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 2008: 101.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid, 93.

<sup>95</sup> Hill, Fiona and Omer Taspinar. *Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus: Moving Together to Preserve the Status Quo?* Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, Research Programme Russia/CIS, 2006.

<sup>96</sup> Baran, “Turkey and the Wider Black Sea Region,” 94–95.

<sup>97</sup> Garb, “The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze,” 243.

<sup>98</sup> Hill and Taspinar, *Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus; Economy and conflict research group of the south Caucasus. From war economies to peace economies in the south Caucasus. Pensord: International alert. 2004: 61.*

### *2004 Abkhazia's stand against Russia and further internal splits*

Similarly to the Turkish Cyprus case, Abkhazia enjoys a relatively open and democratic public space. It has opposition media critical of the administration and a number of different political parties along with influential public organisations (People's Party, Amtsakhara, Aytayra, United Abkhazia)<sup>99</sup>. Following Lucan Way's argument on 'failed authoritarianism', the causes of such a pluralistic nature of the Abkhaz society lay maybe less in the 'robust, vibrant and good civil society' than in Abkhazia's weak regime, but that is not the point here. The 2004 presidential elections represent a test for the regime<sup>100</sup> and for the civil society:

The Abkhazian civil society community is proud of having stood up to Putin's government and the pro-Russian elites in Abkhazia during their presidential election in October 2004, when the pro-Russian party and its supporters in Moscow did not want to accept the defeat of their preferred candidate, Raul Khajimba. Abkhazia's tiny civil society stood by the voters who wanted a new leader, Sergey Bagapsh, who was subsequently elected<sup>101</sup>.

The first tour of the elections took place on 3 October 2004. No serious differences could be discerned in the candidates' programmes. They all embraced reforms in state institutions, independence of Abkhazia, a degree of pro-Russian orientation and hard-line approach to negotiations with Georgia. The election was thus about personalities rather than about ideas<sup>102</sup> the then-prime minister Raul Khajimba was supported by the then president of Abkhazia Ardzinba and by Russia, as he was more sympathetic to the latter business interests<sup>103</sup>. Khajimba was even campaigning with posters depicting him and President Putin shaking hands<sup>104</sup>. However, Khajimba lost elections to Sergei Bagapsh (who won votes in Georgian-inhabited Gal/i region, apparently because of his more flexible attitude towards this ethnic group as his wife is Georgian), whose victory has been contested by the authorities. The dispute lasted two months with Russia firmly supporting Khajimba<sup>105</sup>. It applied open pressure on Abkhazia requesting a re-run of the elections: threatening to close the border, to stop paying pensions, to stop the rail communications and blocking the import of agricultural goods to Russia. In the end a deal has been imposed on Bagapsh who accepted to run together with Khajimba for

<sup>99</sup> Skakov, Alexander. "Abkhazia at a Crossroads: On the Domestic Political Situation in the Republic of Abkhazia." *Iran & the Caucasus* (2005): 160.

<sup>100</sup> Popescu, Nicu. "Democracy in Secessionism: Transnistria and Abkhazia's Domestic Policies." *CPS International Policy Fellowship Program, Open Society Institute* (2006): 16–17.

<sup>101</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 240.

<sup>102</sup> Skakov, "Abkhazia at a Crossroads," 177.

<sup>103</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 244.

<sup>104</sup> Popescu, "Democracy in Secessionism," 14.

<sup>105</sup> Skakov, "Abkhazia at a Crossroads," 182.

a new round of elections, where Khajimba would become vice-president. Bagapsh was re-elected in tandem with Khajimba in January 2005 and in time he managed to rebuilt his relations with Russia<sup>106</sup>. Both candidates were pro-Russian, but the point is that Abkhazians resisted direct Russia's pressure showing that they are not mere puppet of its Northern neighbour. The election opens also a new space for contesting the degree of Russia's influence in Abkhazia.

Indeed, Abkhazia's overwhelming dependence on Russia raises concerns among Abkhaz politicians, media commentators, and civil society resulting in an emergence of political splits. For example, members of the opposition voiced some objections to the law allowing Abkhazians to apply for Russian passports, on the grounds of "reduced sovereignty"<sup>107</sup> or the May 2009 border protection treaty which was signed without warning by the Abkhaz authorities and the Russian Ministry of Defence, and was not submitted to the Abkhaz parliament for deliberation, lead to criticisms by Abkhaz parliamentarians and journalists<sup>108</sup>. These splits became salient during the 2009 presidential campaign and elections. Candidates, such as Beslan Butba of the Economic Development Party or Raul Khadjimba, accused the then President Bagapsh of eroding Abkhaz independence and selling Abkhazia's sovereignty<sup>109</sup>. Ironically, even the Abkhazian opposition figures closer to Russia than Bagapsh, sought to make an issue out of deepening dependence on Russia in the these elections<sup>110</sup>. This indicates, however, the receptiveness of the electorate for such an 'anti-Russian' discourse.

### ***Society responsiveness to Russia, to Georgia and to internal ethnic diversity***

Open, public debates are possible and present in the Abkhaz society. Nicu Popescu finds the Abkhaz civil society quite active and developed given the circumstances and the size of the *de facto* state. As of his writings in 2006, there were some 10–15 active NGOs; civil society publishes its own periodic journal; has more or less regular civil society roundtables where political issues are discussed openly, and even monitored the 2004 elections by creating a broad NGO Coalition "For fair elections"<sup>111</sup>. It is thus rather easy to observe changes in the perceptions of enemies and friends at the level of the society.

### ***Perceiving Russia: self-interested protector and too much of a patron***

Despite Russia being seen as the protector and security guarantor of the *de facto* state, as Turkey is for Turkish Cypriots, two other factors need to be combined in order to understand how Abkhaz people perceive Russia: the asymmetrical Abkhazian-Russian relations and past historical oppression. And these elements generate ethnic Abkhaz

<sup>106</sup> Popescu, "Democracy in Secessionism," 15.

<sup>107</sup> Skakov, "Abkhazia at a Crossroads," 162.

<sup>108</sup> Cooley and Mitchell. "Engagement without Recognition," 64.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid, 66.

<sup>110</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolosov, "Inside Abkhazia."

<sup>111</sup> Popescu, "Democracy in Secessionism," 16.

fears of domination<sup>112</sup>. Looking only at the security question, one would not understand why Kadjimba's ratings went down; he is considered 'as someone who's put his coming to power ahead of the vital interests of his own people. At the same time, the clumsy rhetoric emanating from Russia is encouraging anti-Russian sentiments in Abkhazia'<sup>113</sup>. The post-2008 governmental deals with Russia, mentioned above, further add to 'increasing people's fears that the Russians have already decided that Abkhazia's resources *de facto* belong to Russia'<sup>114</sup>.

Abkhazians did not forget Tsarist empire's russification policies and oppression forcing mass migration from Abkhazia to the Ottoman Empire in the 19<sup>th</sup> century<sup>115</sup>. Although their liberation movement was directed in the 1990s against the Georgian nationalizing state, Russian presence is resented. Abkhaz citizens expressed concern, for example, when during the 2009 presidential elections, Russia issued proposals to locate in Abkhazia dormitories for temporary workers installing 2014 Sochi Olympics infrastructures. Although this project may be helpful to boost the economy, ethnic Abkhazians fear for demographic consequences of this development<sup>116</sup>. Not representing majority population, but a mere plurality even after post-war massive displacements of Georgians, Abkhazians fear changing further demographic structures which would potentially render them a minority group within its titular *de facto* state (see below). Last but not least, the question of the development of the Abkhaz language is perceived as being endangered. It is in direct competition with Russian which is used as the region's lingua franca (most of non ethnic Abkhazians don't speak any Abkhaz) and which provides access to quality higher education<sup>117</sup>. Note that the Georgian language is no more on the agenda. The external context modified the scope of internal interests and fears.

### *Perceiving Georgia: a potential (trans-border) friend?*

Georgians returning to an independent Abkhazia could live in peace: 'in all honesty, these people [those living in Abkhazia] could even live together with the Georgians as they once did, but only with the assurance of no more Georgian initiated fighting'<sup>118</sup> 'In spite of the recent past, they still long for a close relationship with a stable, pacific, prosperous Georgia: two small Caucasian neighbours linked by a common interest in Europe, Turkey and the wider world'<sup>119</sup>.

<sup>112</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolossov, "Inside Abkhazia," 37.

<sup>113</sup> Skakov, "Abkhazia at a Crossroads," 182.

<sup>114</sup> Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 244.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid, 244.

<sup>116</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolossov, "Inside Abkhazia," 21.

<sup>117</sup> Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 310; Sabirova, "Both War and Peace in the 'Country of the Soul'," 56.

<sup>118</sup> Amza-Natia Hewitt quoted in Garb, "The View from Abkhazia of South Ossetia Ablaze," 247.

<sup>119</sup> Ascherson, "A chance to join the world."

Two studies deal extensively with the civil society question, one by Mikhelidze and Pirozzi<sup>120</sup> and the other by Popescu<sup>121</sup>. Since the mid-1990s, similarly to the Turkish Cyprus case, a number of international NGOs' projects permitted regular meetings between Georgians and Abkhazians. These included: the "Schlaining Process" (20 meetings between 2000 and 2007) organised by the Berghof Research Centre for Constructive Conflict Management and later by Conciliation Resources, London; meetings organized by the University of California Irvine that resulted in publications; the confidence-building initiative supported by the European Commission and run by the Toledo International Centre for Peace<sup>122</sup>. 'With time a network of Abkhaz and Georgian civil society representatives emerged. They met regularly and enjoyed some levels of mutual trust and understanding'<sup>123</sup>. But there are also active local NGOs meeting regularly with Georgian NGOs (and even officials) and producing together policy reports. Some carry out programmes for students in secondary schools and universities. Among these NGOs there are: Foundation for Citizens' Initiative and Future of Humankind, Centre for Humanitarian Programs, Center for Development of a Civil Society, Association of Women of Abkhazia, Rehabilitation Centre "Inva-Sodeistvie", Sukhum Media Club, Union of Businesswomen or the Fund of Civil Initiatives<sup>124</sup>. One important initiative was a campaign – "Sorry/Hatamzait" – launched by Human Rights in Georgia NGO admitting and apologizing for past wrongs and thus trying to deconstruct enemy images<sup>125</sup>. As in Cyprus, such dialogue with Georgia was controversial. Besides the above mentioned organisations, there are two other types of NGOs in Abkhazia: "socio-political organisations" and organization supported by Russia, some of which criticise the dialogue with the Georgians and the Western financing, i.e. presumed pro-Western orientation of the activities<sup>126</sup>.

Direct Abkhaz-Georgian encounters do not constitute the only reconciliation medium. Documentaries have been produced by Studio Re in Georgia showing Abkhaz and Georgian views of the conflict as well as the daily live on the two sides, 'as an attempt to "humanise" the image of the "other" across the dividing line of the conflict'<sup>127</sup>. Although, given the state control over TV, radio and the press, there are little mass media channels for information exchange, some journalists participate in bilateral meetings, trainings and seminars. There also exist at least two journal published independently by the Abkhaz civil society as well as a radio programme '*No Peace, No War*' on post-war life

<sup>120</sup> Mikhelidze, Nona and Pirozzi Nicoletta. „Civil Society and Conflict Transformation in Abkhazia, Israel/Palestine, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and Western Sahara.” *MICROCON Policy Working* November, no. 3 (2008).

<sup>121</sup> Popescu, "The EU and Civil Society in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict."

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.*, 7.

<sup>123</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

<sup>124</sup> Mikhelidze and Pirozzi, "Civil Society and Conflict Transformation," 27; *ibid.*, 11.

<sup>125</sup> Mikhelidze and Pirozzi, "Civil Society and Conflict Transformation," 28–29.

<sup>126</sup> Popescu, "The Eu and Civil Society in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict," 15–16.

<sup>127</sup> Popescu, "Democracy in Secessionism," 9.

in the Abkhaz and Georgian communities. However, internet is quasi non-existent and Russian television is still the dominant source of information in Abkhazia, heavily influencing public opinion<sup>128</sup>. Mikhelidze and Pirozzi note also that the above mentioned reconciliation initiatives have failed to ensure links and communications between top and grassroots levels<sup>129</sup>.

Popescu has a bit more positive assessment of the civil society activities. The dialogue, constrained as it may be, allowed the dismantlement of some negative stereotypes about the other. "These dialogues created a strong nucleus of people who communicate with each other. If there will be a political process leading to a deal, this group of people will be key in re-building bridges among the two societies" (Georgian civil society representative quoted in Popescu<sup>130</sup>); one may add: ... independently of the nature of the deal which may simply involve two neighbour political entities working for the stability in the region.

In a report, David Philips argues that, although there is not a lot of common ground between Abkhazia and Georgia, "business is the common language" and several projects, such as the Enguri Sand and Gravel Export Project, Black Sea Resorts and Project Entertainment Centers and agri-business enterprises, offer the potential for mutual benefits<sup>131</sup>. Indeed, opinion polls show readiness for business relations. 63% of displaced Georgians are prepared to participate in joint projects, 24% believe even that such projects are needed and only 13% are doubtful as to their necessity<sup>132</sup>. 86% of managers and co-owners of large companies in Georgia are greatly motivated to make investments in the economy of the conflict regions. There also is a large consensus (80%) that the process of rapprochement of the Georgians and Abkhaz depends on not only on the involvement of government representatives and international organizations but equally on individual and collective members of society.

These frail signs of rapprochement notwithstanding, since 2008, Georgia is less on the Abkhaz agenda. Secured within the *status quo*, Abkhazians turned more attention to internal politics and internal diversity, including the issue of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia.

### ***Abkhaz ethnic identity and State: is there any place for a civic identity layer?***

Although the Abkhazians in the political science literature appear to be one, unified whole, besides the political splits presented above, the question of group identity is far from the homogeneous image one gets. And although the Abkhaz *de facto* State is constructed by and for the Abkhaz titular people, Abkhazians themselves are aware of their fragile plurality and of the multi-ethnic character of their polity. Let's remem-

<sup>128</sup> Mikhelidze and Pirozzi, "Civil Society and Conflict Transformation," 28; Popescu, "Democracy in Secessionism," 16.

<sup>129</sup> Mikhelidze and Pirozzi, "Civil Society and Conflict Transformation," 24.

<sup>130</sup> Popescu, "Democracy in Secessionism," 20.

<sup>131</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolossov, "Inside Abkhazia," 10.

<sup>132</sup> "Georgian and Abkhaz Perspectives on Human Security and Development in Conflict-Affected Areas," 67.

ber that in 1989 ethnic Abkhaz constituted 17% of the population (considered as the 'state-forming nation'); since then it has grown as a result of 1992–1993 war displacements and of out-migration. According to the 2003 census, 43.8% are ethnic Abkhaz, 20.8% are Armenians, 21.3% are Mingrelians/Georgians, and 10.8% are Russians<sup>133</sup>. Skakov notes, however, that during the 10 years after the war, the number of ethnic Abkhazians has shrunk by 30,000<sup>134</sup>. In this context, ethnic Abkhazians fear for their survival as a distinct ethnic group and make up policies ensuring their group's political dominant position – nationalizing policies in Brubaker's terms<sup>135</sup>. They are thus reticent as to addressing the question of inter-ethnic relations within Abkhazia. The continued lack of resolution of the conflict with Georgia has tended to focus Abkhaz political attention towards external matters and only recently the issue of Abkhaz State-building with diversity and in civic terms gained attention. This is a difficult task as many people in Abkhazia still see their security as potentially undermined by the ethnic Georgian population in the Gal/i region<sup>136</sup>.

Sociological research conducted by O'Loughlin and Kolossov shows the sense of pride among the Abkhaz, reflected among other things in their ability to identify by name Abkhaz writers and other cultural figures, being at a much higher level than the pride vested in their ethnicity by other groups<sup>137</sup>. Language is a particularly sensitive issue for the Abkhaz. Abkhaz is constitutionally the state language of Abkhazia. For practical reasons, Russian is, however, mentioned as an official language. After all, Russian is the lingua franca in Abkhazia and is often used at home by Abkhaz and non-Abkhaz. As in nearly all post-Soviet countries, debates concerning a language law have been very heated and reflect the internal debate regarding the nature of the state-building project. The law envisages a shift away from Russian. It stipulates that Abkhaz must be widely used in the media, that all meetings with the president, government and parliament should soon be held in Abkhaz, and that by 2015 all state workers must know Abkhaz<sup>138</sup>. Based on language provisions as well as on the political representation of non-Abkhaz, many analysts identify Abkhazia in terms of 'ethnocracy', term first used by Smooha to describe Israel, re-appropriated by authors working on Estonia and Latvia. The general perception of the non-Abkhaz groups is that they are under-represented and that in the field of law enforcement, which is dominated by ethnic Abkhaz, different rules are applied to the Abkhaz and non-Abkhaz<sup>139</sup>.

<sup>133</sup> Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 307; Kolstø and Blakkisrud, "Living with Non-Recognition," 498.

<sup>134</sup> Skakov, "Abkhazia at a Crossroads," 174.

<sup>135</sup> Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*.

<sup>136</sup> Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 311.

<sup>137</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolossov, "Inside Abkhazia," 26.

<sup>138</sup> Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 315.

<sup>139</sup> O'Loughlin and Kolossov, "Inside Abkhazia," 28; Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 317.

Given the rather fragile demographic position of the titular nation, it is not surprising to see Abkhazians preoccupied with the demographic structure of the state. The question of the return of the IDP – all ethnic Georgians – is certainly very sensitive, but Abkhaz fears do not concern that ethnic group alone. The influx of Armenians from Nagorno-Karabagh into the Gagra region, inhabited mainly by Abkhaz Armenians, is quite controversial since 2002 when National Security made public its displeasure with Armenian organisations “Krunk” and “Mashtots”, which allegedly coordinated this immigration. The Abkhaz Internal Affairs Ministry puts the total number of “illegal migrants” in the district of Gagra at 2,000<sup>140</sup>. Sabirova<sup>141</sup> affirms that relations between the Abkhaz and the Armenians could become a source of tension and that the Armenian youth express concern about their future.

The perceived need for enhancing ethnic Abkhaz demographic superiority results in new policies turned towards the Abkhaz diaspora in Turkey. The *de facto* government invites and creates incentives for them to return to their historic homeland<sup>142</sup>. These Turkish Abkhazians are descendants of the 19<sup>th</sup> century migrants, forced by the Tsarist Empire to leave the region. If the return policies have any mass effect (which is not the case as yet), ethnic Abkhazians may constitute a majority. This, however, can have similar consequences on perceived difference as observed in the case of Turkish Cypriots distancing themselves from the settlers from Turkey. These returnees may come to represent another ‘other’, besides already present Georgians, Armenians and Russians.

The nation-building policies have their limits in the Abkhaz context. Abkhazia’s secessionist movement has been defined predominantly in ethnic terms of a struggle against the Georgians<sup>143</sup>, but on-the-ground research shows that there is a tension between an ethnic and a civic understanding of the Abkhaz nation. Research conducted by Sabirova shows that there is no consensus in society as to whether ‘Abkhazian’ can be not only a marker of ethnic but also of a civically based national identity<sup>144</sup>. Before 2008 nation-building policies were constructed to justify the separatist cause<sup>145</sup>, but the new context made obvious that there are latent internal tensions surrounding the Abkhaz state-building project and that there is a need to address the issue of ethnic diversity.

One the signs of the policy reorientation is the government’s position towards the Gal/i region and its Georgian inhabitants. Due to the unstable situation and hostile to the centre environment, this region was neglected by Sukhum/i. Government officials interviewed by O’Loughlin and Kolossov<sup>146</sup> in November 2009, however, indicated that

<sup>140</sup> Skakov, “Abkhazia at a Crossroads,” 174.

<sup>141</sup> Sabirova, “Both War and Peace in the ‘Country of the Soul’,” 60.

<sup>142</sup> Clogg, “The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia,” 319.

<sup>143</sup> Popescu, “Democracy in Secessionism,” 18.

<sup>144</sup> Sabirova, “Both War and Peace in the ‘Country of the Soul’,” 59.

<sup>145</sup> Dembinska, Magdalena. “Briser les logiques du ‘gel’: approche différenciée et transformative en Abkhazie et en Transnistrie.” *Études internationales* 40, no 4 (2009): 611–629.

<sup>146</sup> O’Loughlin and Kolossov, “Inside Abkhazia,” 178–201.

‘development in Gal(i) was now a state priority, with the region’s Georgian/Mingrelian population as Abkhazian citizens to whose needs and aspirations they should respond’<sup>147</sup>. The new official position is confirmed by Clogg who notes that there is a more positive attitude and more attention focused on improving inter-ethnic relations, particularly with regard to the Gal/i population<sup>148</sup>. Both studies note, however, that these policies have opponents: the work to promote reconciliation with the ethnic Georgian community and to reduce the enemy image is seen as placing Abkhaz at unnecessary risk<sup>149</sup>.

It seems though that ethnic Abkhazians in general see the need to integrate diversity. Armenians, Russians and Georgians constitute an important portion of the electorate after all. Skakov remarks *a propos* that, ‘as paradoxical as it may sound, the outcome of the 2004 presidential election in Abkhazia was in the hands of Armenian-Abkhazians and Megreles of the Gali district’<sup>150</sup>. Abkhaz political parties cannot do without appealing to the diverse ethnic segments of society. This assessment together with the 2010 opinion polls conducted by O’Loughlin and Kolossov<sup>151</sup>, indicate a space for inter-ethnic integration and for integrating even Abkhaz Georgians into the political community of Abkhazia.

Asked by O’Loughlin and Kolossov which solution to the frozen conflict they favour, 79% of Abkhaz supported independence and only 19% preferred integrating Russia. Armenians and Russians were split. 44% of the former group opted for independence while 51% for integration with Russia. 58% of the latter group opted for independence with 38% preferring integration with Russia. The main explanation for that split within the Armenian and Russian communities lies within their non-satisfaction with their political rights in present-day Abkhazia<sup>152</sup>: Arguably, their better inclusion within the political realm would shift the preferred options. Interesting results were gathered among Georgians/Mingrelians. Asked which solution to the frozen conflict they favour, 48% of them responded they preferred option was Abkhaz independence (28% opted for “hard to say” or “refuse to answer”). Integration with Russia was very problematic for quite obvious reasons: hostile relations between Georgia and Russia and poor treatment of ethnic Georgians in the Russia. Surprisingly, integration with Georgia was also problematic. O’Loughlin and Kolossov explain this result noting that only half of Georgians/Mingrelians thought that the economic situation was better in Georgia, and that residents of the Gal/i district have been actually poorly treated by Georgian authorities. Sabirova confirms this result. She finds that young people from the Gal/i region ‘project an image of themselves as marginal to both Georgia and Abkhazia. They belong neither here nor there. Some speak neither Abkhaz nor Georgian’<sup>153</sup>.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid, 22.

<sup>148</sup> Clogg, “The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia,” 234.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.

<sup>150</sup> Skakov, “Abkhazia at a Crossroads,” 175.

<sup>151</sup> O’Loughlin and Kolossov, “Inside Abkhazia.”

<sup>152</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>153</sup> Sabirova, “Both War and Peace in the ‘Country of the Soul’,” 61.

Turkish Cypriots distance themselves from Turkey allowing for a civic Turkish Cypriot identification. Georgians from Gal/i feel distance towards their kin Georgian state leaving a space for constructing a civic Abkhaz identification (or a space in limbo in Gal/i). The configuration is somewhat different though. Cypriot civic identification allows of thinking of island's reunification. In contrast, in the Abkhaz case the civic identification is rather to construct a separate multi-ethnic Abkhazia. Nevertheless, both transformations would enhance peace-building in the respective regions.

The idea of developing a civic identification receives support. The question of the need for integrating minorities was first raised in 1999 in the independent press. One of the theses is that 'the success of the Abkhaz state relies directly on consolidating the various ethnic groups in Abkhazia in one "people of Abkhazia."<sup>154</sup> What might unite them? Ethnic Abkhaz rate the preservation of the memory of the 1992–93 war (43.7%) and of *apsura* (Abkhaz code of conduct; 43.7%) highest, while non-Abkhaz rate 'equality of all ethnic groups' highest (49.7%)<sup>155</sup>. The memory of the 1992–93 war is chosen by 32.5% of non-Abkhaz, this however would be exclusive of Gal/i Georgians. Although the answers by young ethnic Abkhaz differ slightly from the answers given by youth from other ethnic communities, Sabirova's results indicate some common opinions. High percentage of both groups think that living on the same territory (both ca. 37%) and a strong government (both ca. 31%) should provide basis for integration. Inclusive policies, however, similarly to the question of refugees' propriety rights in Cyprus, are confronted with the dilemma of the Georgian IDPs.

### Potential for Conflict Transformation and for Fluctuating Identifications

Similarly to Turkey's presence in Northern Cyprus, Russia's growing presence in Abkhazia seems already to trigger opposition. The changing perception of patronizing Turkey and its settlers in Northern Cyprus, accounts for the transforming image of enemies and friends. This change translated into the political realm and into changing state-building policies when oppositional pro-peace political party made its way into the government in 2003 while taking opportunity widow presented by the EU incentive and Turkey's government reorientation of policies towards Cyprus. The change of Turkish Cyprus state-building policies was made explicit when the government introduced Cypriot-centred school books. The civic layer of the Turkish Cypriot collective identity was made salient in the public sphere and received a positive response from the society. This responsiveness is necessary and depends on the processes occurring prior to such an explicit shift: transformation of perceptions of the "other".

<sup>154</sup> Clogg, "The Politics of Identity in Post-Soviet Abkhazia," 324.

<sup>155</sup> Sabirova, "Both War and Peace in the 'Country of the Soul'," 55.

Extracting the above-mentioned mechanisms for conflict transformation allowed us to examine the Abkhaz case while exploring the question whether conditions for such an identity transformation exist there despite the frozen appearances. The year 2008 represents a turning point as Abkhazia does no longer perceive a security threat. This allows for a modified political agenda and for differentiated positions. Russia's presence is resented even if welcomed for security reasons. Turkey is a potential new ally and kin-State for the (small number) of returning Abkhazians. There is a political plurality, which allows for the institutionalization of opponent political parties, each promoting different degrees of friendship with Russia and adversity with Georgia; parties which seem to respond (instrumentally) to the electorate's needs and perceptions and to the economic interests. Integration with Georgia is still not an option, while informal cooperation at the societal level seems to receive some space. The perception of enemies and friends is not diametrically changed but some fluidity may be observed. The civic layer of the Abkhaz identity has some potential to develop, but with a quite different meaning for conflict transformation than in the Cypriot case. The Turkish Cypriot civic component allows for reunification with the former enemy, the Greek Cypriots. The Abkhaz civic identification, on the contrary, is constructed in separation from the Georgians in Georgia. It does not allow for reunification but rather for the Abkhaz independent state-building inclusive of other ethnic groups, significantly of the Georgian community in Gal/i also. Although not promising for the tenants if the territorial integrity of Georgia and the federative solutions proposed by the international organisations, such a transformation should be assessed positively for the region's stability as it dilutes ethnic components in conflict.

The transformative-fluctuating account offers an alternative to statist-institutional account of the frozen conflicts. It allows for internal dynamics and encompasses policy shifts, even the back-and-forth shifts, as in the Turkish Cypriot 2004 and 2009 case (the latter is studied elsewhere). It allows to study dynamic internal processes which evolve in response to changing contexts of choice. One of such processes consists in the development of a civic component of collective identity, transforming the nature underlying the 'frozen' conflict. The ethnic Turkish/Abkhaz and civic Turkish Cypriot/Abkhaz perceptions are not understood as 'either or'. Rather, they co-exist over long periods of time as different components of the same identity. They are not inherently contradictory but they can be in conflict when faced with difficult choices. Identity responds to political events 'choosing' one identity component over another in particular contexts. Identity transforms while acquiring additional identity layers or by a long process of replacing some identifications. It is not a panacea, though, as 'changing circumstances may trigger the old attitudes [ethnic hostile components] in their full force'<sup>156</sup>, but it allows for switching and for eventual – although rare – dilution of the hostile layers.

<sup>156</sup> Kelman, "Reconciliation as Identity Change," 2–3



# Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict in the South Caucasus (Instrumentalist Approach)

NATALIA KONARZEWSKA

*University of Warsaw, Poland*

## Introduction

Ethnic conflicts can be defined as prolonged conflicts between ethnic groups within a multiethnic state, which may appear to be unsolvable to the parties caught up in them. Many ethnic conflicts escalate into interethnic or internal war often resulting in a significant loss of life, a serious denial of basic human rights and material destruction<sup>1</sup>.

The collapse of the USSR caused major economical, political and social changes – political instability and social disintegration fueled a surge in ethnic conflict. Some of the territorial disputes such as Armenia – Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno Karabakh, Georgia – South Ossetia and Georgia – Abkhazia conflicts escalated into war and to this day pose a serious threat to domestic and regional security. Nationalism as the main driving force behind the aforementioned conflicts appeared to be the most successful ideology promoted by both *nomenklatura* and counterelites, as they strived to find alternatives for social and political mobilisation and legitimisation of their power<sup>2</sup>. Nationalism emphasized social and economic disparities as well as ethnic differences and fueled conflicts over territories, as ethnic elites advocated autonomy, self-determination or reunification of their ethnic groups.

In this paper I intend to use Ernest Gellner's definition of nationalism, in which he states that "nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent"<sup>3</sup>. According to Gellner, the underlying assumption of nationalism is that nations and states are destined for each other and neither is complete without the other. Moreover nationalism can emerge not only to pursue a goal, but also as a result of threat perceptions<sup>4</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> Michael E. Brown, "Causes and Implications of Ethnic Conflict," in: *Ethnic Conflict and International Security*, ed. Michael E. Brown (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1993), 5.

<sup>2</sup> Moshe Gammer, "Walking the tightrope between nationalism(s) and Islam(s): the case of Daghestan," *Central Asian Survey* 21(2) (2002): 133.

<sup>3</sup> Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell University Press, 2006), 1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

In my research paper I intend to test following hypothesis: *nationalism, as a strategy adopted by political and cultural ethnic elites in the South Caucasus, played crucial role in social and political mobilisation of ethnic groups after the collapse of Soviet Union*. In the first part of the paper I present scientific explanations of the causes of ethnic conflict and emergence of nationalism. In the second part I give an overview of Soviet national policy's historical background and its possible consequences during the transition to the democracy. In the third part I analyse strategies adopted by political elites in the state- and nation-building process and attempt to explain the role played by political elites in the articulation of goals of the ethnic mobilisation as well as its importance for the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in the region.

## Theoretical Framework

Scientific explanations of the causes of ethnic conflict and emergence of nationalism fall into three schools of thought: primordialist, modernist (constructivist), and instrumentalist. Proponents of primordialist account (C. Geertz, D. Horowitz) argue that existence of ethnic groups and nationalities is based on traditions of belief and action towards primordial objects such as biological factors and especially territorial location. Primordialist accounts are based on the concept of kinship, shared characteristics, origins and blood ties between the members of ethnic group. According to primordialists ethnicity is fixed – this belief led to the essentialist concept of the causes of ethnic conflict, that certain ethnic groups are doomed to fight each other<sup>5</sup>.

Proponents of constructivist account (B. Anderson, E. Hobsbawm) reject the concept of fixed ethnic identity, stressing the importance of socially constructed nature of ethnic groups and argue that ethnic identity is largely internalised in the process of accommodation<sup>6</sup>.

In this paper I use instrumental account (N. Glazer, D. Moynihan) which is based on the concept that ethnic conflict is the result of ethnic leaders and ethnic elites actions, who are using their ethnic communities as sites of mass mobilisation and as constituencies in their competition for power and resources, effectively using intercommunal ethnic and cultural differences. From this point of view, although ethnic identity is viewed as fixed, it is used as an instrument in reaching political goals<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>5</sup> Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1973); Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, Berkeley (Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1985).

<sup>6</sup> Eric Hobsbawm, Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of the Tradition*, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso, 2006).

<sup>7</sup> Nathan Glazer, Daniel P. Moynihan, Corinne Saposs Schelling, eds., *Ethnicity: Theory and Experience* (Harvard University Press, 1975).

## Soviet National Policy and Its Possible Consequences during the Transition to the Democracy

I intend to examine three ethnic conflicts that have taken place in the South Caucasus after the collapse of the Soviet Union: conflict in Abkhazia and South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh. Aforementioned conflicts escalated into war and therefore have a greater impact on internal and regional security, than other ethnic and territorial disputes in the region (Adjara, Javakheti, Kvemo Kartli), which have never entered the military phase. Outbreak of conflicts in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh can be attributed to Soviet nationality policy, particularly to the system of institutionalisation and territorialisation of ethnicity<sup>8</sup>. National policy of the Bolsheviks was influenced by Marxist philosophy and regarded formation of nations as a result of the capitalist methods of production. Lenin treated ethnic issues instrumentally and supported national liberation movements in order to gain power (*Imperialism as the final stage of capitalism*)<sup>9</sup>. However, Joseph Stalin's thoughts had crucial impact on the process of constructing Soviet system of institutionalised national heterogeneity, which was based on the ideas of classification and categorisation of ethnic and national communities<sup>10</sup>. The process of homogenisation of nations was divided into stages and meant to be achieved with the help of institutionalisation and territorialisation of ethnicity<sup>11</sup>. Bolsheviks' goal was to objectify and gain control over national expression, which initially took place in the form of promoting „prosperity” of the nations, remove national particularities (*stiranje*), the rapprochement (*sbližhenie*) and merging (*sliianie*) into one “Soviet nation”<sup>12</sup>. Early Soviet national policy based on the nativisation advocated equal rights for all of the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union through promoting national language, culture and economy and creating national cadres and elites in order to gain control over national expression. Nonetheless, regional policies were fully determined by Moscow and non-Russian republics were actually objects of central policy. Nativisation provided opportunities for nationalities constituting non-Russian population to create ethnic political elites within formally autonomous homelands. As a result, despite eliminating full political sovereignty, Soviet national policy made it possible for titular nations to dominate in institutions, in political and educational system and expand their national production<sup>13</sup>. Philip Roeder argues that: “the indigenous cadre was given an institutionalised monopoly on the public expression of ethnic identity, that is, it defined

<sup>8</sup> Ronald G. Suny, *The Revenge of the Past. Nationalism, Revolution and the Collapse of the Soviet Union* (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1993), 4–5, 116–117.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nacjonalizm inaczej: struktura narodowa i kwestie narodowe w nowej Europie*, trans. Jan Łuczyński (Warszawa ; Kraków : Wydaw. Naukowe PWN. Oddział, 1998), 34–37.

<sup>11</sup> Suny, *The Revenge of the Past*, 116.

<sup>12</sup> Ronald G. Suny, *The Making of the Georgian Nation* (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994), 294.

<sup>13</sup> Philip G. Roeder, “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilisation,” *World Politics* 43 (Oct. 1990-July 1991): 204.

the ethnic markers that distinguish the nationality. These markers were then central to communicating the socialist message in national cultural forms and propagandizing populations being brought into the modern sector. For many Soviet citizens undergoing social mobilisation the first sustained contact with the great traditions of their own ethnic group was in the form of this national-Soviet hybrid<sup>14</sup>. Thus, Soviet territorialisation and institutionalisation of ethnicity may be regarded as underlying cause, that not only made situation in Abkhazia and South Ossetia more predisposed to conflict and violence, but also led to calls for self determination by the respective minorities, as they gained their own political and administrative institutions, which were used as a institutional platforms for raising their own nationalist agendas.

Institutionalisation of ethnicity was complimentary to ethnoterritorialisation. Ethnoterritorial entities were legally granted political and administrative institutions, which form was largely dependent on the degree of autonomy given to the territory. Territorialisation of ethnicity was reflected in the constitution of the USSR from 1924 and the constitutions of the Armenian, Azerbaijani and Georgian Soviet Socialist Republics. According to the aforementioned legal acts Abkhazia obtained status of autonomous republic, and South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh an autonomous region (*oblast*).<sup>15</sup>

Territorialisation and institutionalisation of ethnicity in the South Caucasus may be listed among the reasons of a surge in ethnic nationalism after the collapse of the Soviet Union, which is based on the belief in a common culture and ethnic roots of the nation, and points to the need for congruence of ethnic and political boundaries. First, ethnoterritorial division in the region proved to be arbitrary and did not take into consideration either historical and ethnic criteria or the aspirations of national minorities, ethnic groups and small nations. Instead, autonomies were constructed to convey demands of the centre<sup>16</sup>. Bolsheviks decided to incorporate Nagorno-Karabakh, inhabited by 75% of the Armenians into Azerbaijani Socialist Soviet Republic<sup>17</sup>. South Ossetia became a part of Georgia, although initially Bolsheviks planned to establish South Ossetian autonomous republic. Abkhazia, inhabited by 14% Abkhazians, in 1921 was initially proclaimed Abkhazian Soviet Socialist Republic. However, in 1931, Abkhazia was incorporated into the Georgian SSR as an autonomous republic<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> Roeder, "Soviet Federalism," 196.

<sup>15</sup> Helene Carrere d'Encausse, *Bolszewicy i narody czyli Wielkie uragowisko 1917–1930*, trans. Krzysztof Kowalski (Warszawa: "Most", 1992), 111–112.

<sup>16</sup> Slavoj Žyžek, "Mythologized Representations In Soviet Thinking on the Nationalities Problem," *Anthropology Today* 2 (1990): 2–3.

<sup>17</sup> Thomas de Waal, *Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan through Peace and War* (New York: New York University Press 2003), 131–132.

<sup>18</sup> Wojciech Materski, *Gruzja* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo TRIO, 2010), 121–123.

## Political Elites and Their Strategies

In the initial stages of the ethnic and national revival during *perestroika*, ethnic *intelligentsia* played role of ethnic activists and advocated for independence of their communities. Beside shaping new institutional designs, that were meant to replace Soviet ones, political elites and ethnic *intelligentsia* were called upon to engage in nation-building process, which meant relinquishing ideology of homogenous Soviet nation in favor of a model of national community based on ethnic or civic ties<sup>19</sup>. National objectives have been achieved primarily by primordial mode of social mobilisation, which promoted ethnic revival, “assertion of the ethnic group’s identity, usually in the context of issues of culture, identity, or belief and in reaction to threats to the identity from assimilative policies”<sup>20</sup>. Aforementioned strategies of social mobilisation were used by members of *nomenklatura* as well as counterelites. Official indigenous cadre had the greatest ability to sustain large scale political action as they were in control of political institutions. For example, Armenian local Party and state leadership supported demonstrations on behalf Armenian annexation of the Karabakh, which started in early 1988 – moreover the cause received legislative endorsement by local soviets<sup>21</sup>.

Political entrepreneurs used myths as important instrument in political competition and propaganda. Myths are a form of a specific ethnic narrative and have been used by ethnic elites in the process of advocating nationalist ideas. Moreover, ethnic myths were used to justify the national community’s claims to the particular territory by the fact of being indigenous. Ethnic mythology was created primarily by ethnocentric academics and later became the basis for the historical policy pursued by ethnic elites. Myths, with their normative and highly emotionally engaging character, contribute to the reconstruction and consolidation of ethnic identity during the periods of systemic change<sup>22</sup>.

Pursuing independence, nationalist elites mobilised the masses on the basis of shared idea of nation, homeland or historical identity and operate under the shared goal of liberation. Political reality of the South Caucasus republics after independence was shaped largely by ethnic nationalism, according to which the nation is a community defined by ethnic identity, cultural and historical heritage. Politisation of ethnicity as a strategy adopted by political elites regarded ethnicity and cultural heritage as a political category. Abkhazian, Armenian and South Ossetian political elites operated largely according to this scheme, mobilising their ethnic communities while pursuing separation. Paradoxically, ethnic categories and differences in each of these disputes were treated instrumentally to reach a political goal.

<sup>19</sup> Ghia Nodia, “Political transformations and nation-building in the post-Soviet South Caucasus,” in: CIMERA final research report (2003): *Re-inventing citizenship in south Caucasus: exploring the dynamics and contradictions between formal definitions and popular conceptions*, 25–39.

<sup>20</sup> Roeder, “Soviet Federalism”, 202–203.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid., 211–212.

<sup>22</sup> Viktor Šnirelman, *Wojny pamâti-mify, identičnost i politika na Zakavkaze* (Moskva: IKC Akademkniga, 2003), 48–49.

Adopting ideology of ethnic nationalism led to ethnicisation of the republics. According to A. Wierzbicki ethnicisation can be described as a demographic, linguistic and cultural domination of particular ethnic group or nation in structures of the multiethnic state<sup>23</sup>. In the South Caucasus republics ethnicisation mainly took the form of linguistic and cultural dominance of the titular nation, but also meant adopting the concept of an ethnic nation, which was part of mobilising ethnic groups and mythologisation of own past through the marginalisation of the history of other nations inhabiting the newly created state<sup>24</sup>. In some cases ethnicisation can turn into ethnocracy, which is a form of unofficial policy where representatives of a particular ethnic group hold a number of government posts disproportionately large to the percentage of the total population that the particular ethnic group(s) represents and use them to advance the position of their particular ethnic group(s) to the detriment of others. The minority ethnic groups are systematically discriminated against by the state and may face repressions or violations of human rights at the hands of state organs. Ethnocracy can also be a form of institutional design which is constituted on the basis of qualified rights to citizenship, with ethnic affiliation (defined in terms of race, descent, religion, or language) as the distinguishing principle<sup>25</sup>.

It is worth to note that, the re-nationalisation of the republics and outbreak of the conflicts “frozen” in the Soviet era had a negative impact on democratisation in the republics, as the power of the newly elected legislative bodies was significantly reduced in favor of a strong executive branch, usually the president. In some instance, consolidation of the authoritarian system was connected to a reproduction of the old elite<sup>26</sup>. It can be noticeable in the cases of Azerbaijan and Georgia, where after the period of chaos, governments elected in first free elections were replaced by the members of the former *nomenklatura*.

## Conclusions

Nationalism understood as a desire to unify the national territory and construction of the nation-state based on ethnic affiliation proved to be an attractive strategy for the ruling elites in the South Caucasus after 1991. Regardless of the personal motives of political leaders, their experience and beliefs or political calculation, nationalism appeared to be effective strategy to mobilise ethnic community members and a basis

<sup>23</sup> Andrzej Wierzbicki, “Przywództwo i elity krajów WNP w perspektywie badań etnopolitycznych,” in: *Przywództwo, elity i transformacje w krajach WNP. Problemy metodologii badań*, ed. Tadeusz Bodio (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR, 2010), 123.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> Tadeusz Bodio, „Etnokracja i etnoelity w Azji Centralnej,” in: *Przywództwo i elity polityczne w krajach WNP*, ed. Tadeusz Bodio et al. (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza ASPRA-JR), vol. II, 225–227.

<sup>26</sup> Peter Rutland, “Democracy and Nationalism in Armenia”, *Europe-Asia Studies* 5 (1994): 839.

for nation-building process. It should be noted that the dominance of ethnic nationalism as a strategy in the state- and nation- building had far reaching consequences for the South Caucasus republics. Firstly, dominance of the titular nation in the state-building process marginalised and encouraged radicalisation of ethnic minorities. Secondly, chosen strategy proved to be a serious obstacle to the state-building process and democratisation, thereby contributing to the weakness of state structures and strengthening authoritarian system of government. Furthermore, it appears that the political elite's nationalism could be one of the factors contributing to outbreak and reproduction of ethnic conflicts in the region, due to the instrumentalisation of ethnic antagonism, which is used as a political instrument in order to strengthen ruling elites power both in terms of domestic policy and in peace negotiations.





# Collective Memory, History, Identity in the Bukharan Oasis in Post-Soviet Period

AZIM MALIKOV

*Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Halle (Saale), Germany*

## Introduction

While ethnic groups have been the main focus of study among ethnologists interested in social identity, study of lower level social units e.g. clans and lineages is also important for understanding identity formation process. Frequently the same clan can be found in more than one ethnic group<sup>1</sup>. Understanding processes of identification requires familiarity with the contexts in which they occur. Such contexts include, particular geographical and infrastructural conditions, a wide variety of institutions, different kinds of social relations, material resources, and also the kinds of symbolic and discursive resources<sup>2</sup>.

Nowadays the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Turkmens and Tajiks in Central Asia share some distinct groups – Khojas<sup>3</sup> some lineages<sup>4</sup> of which occur in two or more of them. A lineage is usually taken to be a group of people who trace descent unilineally from a common ancestor through a series of links which can be enumerated. The genealogies (nab-nama) of some *Khoja* groups make clear is that the present genealogical charters of some *Khoja* communities typically emphasize descent from an intermediate saintly figure, from whom a particular *Khoja* group will often take its specific name<sup>5</sup>. According to

<sup>1</sup> Günther Schlee, *Identities on the move: Clanship and pastoralism in Northern Kenya* (Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Pr. 1994), 2–5.

<sup>2</sup> Brian Donahoe, John Eidson, Dereje Feyissa, Veronika Fuest, Markus V. Hoehne, Boris Nieswand, Günther Schlee, Olaf Zenker, *The Formation and Mobilization of Collective Identities in Situations of Conflict and Integration*, Working Paper No. 116 Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers (Halle / Saale 2009), 10.

<sup>3</sup> The term *Khoja*, *Khwaja*, *Khodja* has been taken to imply, variously, descent from “Arabs”, descent from the Prophet or Ali, descent from the first caliphs, or descent from Islamizing saints. Term *Khoja* (which means “master” in Persian) was mentioned in written sources in the 10<sup>th</sup> century, it was used for some government officials. The term *Khodja* as a name of religious descent group started to be used since the 15<sup>th</sup> century.

<sup>4</sup> Ladislav Holy, *Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship (Anthropology, Culture and Society)* (London and Chicago: Pluto press, 1998), 74–75.

<sup>5</sup> Devin DeWeese, “The politics of sacred lineages in 19<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia: descent groups linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in shrine documents and genealogical charters,” *International Journal Middle Eastern Studies*, 31, (1999): 507–508.

traditionalist Islamic doctrine there can be no more prophets, however, in Sufi traditions the world and human society still require spiritual guides and guardians: *walis* (“friends” of God) with assigned each a specific territory of the world to watch over<sup>6</sup>.

In this paper I analyze various aspects of collective memory, history and identity *Khoja* group in Bukhara province of Uzbekistan in post-Soviet period<sup>7</sup>. Memory being central to individual and collective identity, provides individuals and collectives with a cognitive map, helping orient who they are, why they are here and where they are going<sup>8</sup>. I would like to discuss the centrality of the past and of memory in identity formation.

I decided to focus my research on Bukhara province in Uzbekistan because of existence of *Khoja* of various lineages and ethnic affiliation. The oasis of Bukhara is probably the best known in Central Asia and has been one of its major political and cultural centers for a long time. The city of Bukhara, known in much of the Islamic world by epithet *Bukhara-yi sharif* (Bukhara the Noble). Bukhara’s religious significance derived above all from the city’s Sufi associations as an abode of saints and a source of sanctity<sup>9</sup>.

If to categorize *Khoja* according to linguistic principle one can find the following groups of *Khoja* in Bukhara province: the Uzbek-speaking, the Kazakh-speaking and the Tajik-speaking. Some of them are bilingual: the Uzbek-speaking – Tajik-speaking and the Kazakh-speaking – Uzbek-speaking. If there are enough other elements (political, economic, cultural) on which a feeling of ethnic belonging and commonality is based, such an ethnic unit can tolerate a high degree of linguistic diversity. For *Khojas* it is real or imagined or constructed idea of common origin, genealogies. I conducted interviews with members of various religious elite groups of *Khoja* in Bukhara province of Uzbekistan, using participant observation, and the collection of oral traditions and family stories.

In order to differentiate various groups of *Khoja* I use two criteria: descent and linguistic. My conclusion is that the group relationships between the Uzbek-speaking, the Kazakh-speaking, the Tajik-speaking *Khojas*, i.e. the descent group relationships, are due to a common or believed origin. The strongest arguments for a common origin have been derived from comparisons of group-specific cultural features. Common origins and subsequent splits are also reported by oral history, so the two types of evidence used confirm each other.

In order to trace identity changes, memory transmitting I talked to old and young informants of *Khoja* of various lineages and ethnic affiliation. In discussing about age

<sup>6</sup> Katherine Ewing, “The politics of Sufism: redefining the saints of Pakistan”, *Journal of Asian studies*, Volume XLII, no.2, (1983): 254.

<sup>7</sup> I would like to express my gratitude to Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology for scientific and financial support of my research.

<sup>8</sup> Ron Eyerman, “The past in the present: culture and transmission of memory”, *Acta Sociologica*, volume 47, no.2 (June 2004): 161.

<sup>9</sup> Frank Allen, *Bukhara and the Muslims of Russia: Sufism, education, and the paradox of Islamic prestige* (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 1–2.

groups, problems of definition have to be taken into consideration. A clear-cut distinction between the generations is not possible and I make a difference between three age groups: 1. Those who was born in 1920s–1930s; 2. Those who was born in 1950s 3. Those who was born in 1990s. First two groups actively shaped the ways the past is understood, remembered and forgotten in Soviet period. The majority of the villagers in Bukhara province are young: inhabitants aged below 30 years make up roughly 60 per cent of the whole population.

I argue that the Soviet policy to homogenize the society in Central Asia and to create the national identities could not eliminate some specific identities in the region. For some Khojas groups ethnicity has been rather fluid while group identity is a comparatively conservative principle. My data shows that the language is not important criteria in drawing boundaries between various Khoja lineages.

### Theoretical approach

I would like to define some terms: descent group, memory which I will often use in my paper. Descent group is a socially recognized group of persons, all of whom trace real or putative descent from a common ancestor with parent-child links between every generation<sup>10</sup>.

Collective memory is a term that is understood and defined in many different ways. It consists of many overlapping and, at times, competing social memories. The concept of collective memory originated with the work of Maurice Halbwachs<sup>11</sup>. According to his concept the memories of the individual became merged, and submerged, within group, or collective, memory. Memory functions as a mechanism that unites groups and cements identity. His theory therefore ignores conflicting memories, and tends to suggest that those memories that do not accord with the group gradually fade from memory<sup>12</sup>. An individual can be a member of more than one group and so can have access to a number of different collective memories<sup>13</sup>. Some scholars suggest that memories attributed to more than one person are collective memories<sup>14</sup>. Following this definition one can say that family memory is also some kind of collective memory. Collective memories are shaped by social, economic, political circumstances and by belief, values etc.

<sup>10</sup> Robin Fox, *Kinship and Marriage* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1967), 49.

<sup>11</sup> Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory*, Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter, trans. (New York: Harper and Row, 1980).

<sup>12</sup> Anna Green, "Individual Remembering and 'Collective Memory': Theoretical Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates," *Oral history*, volume 32, no.2, Memory and society (autumn 2004): 38

<sup>13</sup> Nicholas Russel, "Collective memory before and after Halbwachs," *The French Review*, volume 79, no.4 (March 2006):797.

<sup>14</sup> Paul Ricoeur, *La Memoire, l'histoire, et l'oubli* (Paris: L'Ordre Philosophique-Editions du Seuil, 2000), 152–163.

Memory, can be constructed by sharing with others 'sets of images that have been passed down to them through architecture, monuments, ritual etc. Individual remembrance, collective memory, and narrative history interact in highly complicated ways, shaping each other as different versions of the past are constructed and reconstructed, modified, and invented'<sup>15</sup>.

In practice, individual and collective memories are often in tension, and the recollections of individuals frequently challenge the construction of partial accounts designed primarily to achieve collective unity.<sup>16</sup> The transmission of memory from one individual to another and from member of old generation to younger one is complicated, and depends on the cultural context. It is noticeable that processes of remembering and forgetting are involved in this transmission. In some cases memory is actually defined by the process of forgetting the past.

I attempt to answer the question: What do Khoja remember from their own experience of remembering, and what do they forget, and for what reason? Jenkins stressed that the selfhood is socially constructed: in the process of socialization and in the ongoing processes of socially interaction within which individuals define and redefine themselves and others throughout their lives. He assume the internal-external dialectic of identification (self-definition – definitions of oneself offered by others) and make a difference between nominal identity and virtual identity. The former is the name, and the latter the experience, of an identity, what it means to bear it<sup>17</sup>. In case with Khoja I attempt to study internal identification and process of how they were identified by non-Khoja groups.

## Historical background

Group identities in pre-Soviet Central Asia presented a complex mosaic of fragmented identities intimately intertwined with social and economic conditions of the region<sup>18</sup>. Along with the question of blurred boundaries between ethnic groups, there was the matter of multiple levels of identity. Identities such as a people identification with a village, district, city-state may be essential in the composition of identities within a region<sup>19</sup>. Most people preferred to classify themselves primarily in local term as *Bukhorolik* (Bukharan) or, depending on their origin within the oasis. According to the concept of native Bukharan scholar Timur Kocaoglu, before 1924 the Uzbeks, Tajiks, Turkmens of

<sup>15</sup> U. Linke, "Collective memory, Anthropology of", in: *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes, Vol. 4. (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001), 2219, 2221.

<sup>16</sup> Anna Green, "Individual Remembering and 'Collective Memory': Theoretical Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates", *Oral history*, volume 32, no.2, Memory and society (autumn 2004): 41.

<sup>17</sup> Richard Jenkins, *Social identity* (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), 19–20,24.

<sup>18</sup> Adeeb Khalid, *The politics of Muslim cultural reform. Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, Oxford: University California press, 1998), 190.

<sup>19</sup> John Glenn, *The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia* (New York: St. Martin's press inc., 1999), 51.

Bukhara are believed that they are belonging to the Bukharan nationality<sup>20</sup>. Bukharan oases was multiethnic region. There was no clear-cut territorial basis for the different ethnic groups, whatever the definition of those ethnic groups. People used different levels of identification which were not always symmetrical. People who claimed a common history or descent did not necessarily speak the same language; people, who spoke the same language and lived on the same territory did not necessarily consider themselves as belonging to the same ethnic group.

Khoja was a distinct category in Central Asia. Sadriddin Aini (1878–1954) who was one of the Bukharan reformist intellectuals (*Jadids*) in his unfinished „Reminiscences” gave panorama of rural life in Bukhara of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. He considered Khoja as a distinct group differ from the Tajiks of the region and he gave the classification of Khoja in his village Soktere which was near Ghijduvan town of modern Bukhara province. Khoja of the village constituted four clans: Mirakoni, Sayyid Atoi<sup>21</sup>, Ghijduvoni and Sokteregi. Aini’s father Sayid-Murod Khoja belonged to Sokteregi Khojas<sup>22</sup>.

Soviet ethnographer Karmisheva considered Khojas as privileged estate group (*soslovnaya grupp*)<sup>23</sup>. Abashin consider Khojas as a part of big religious elite group<sup>24</sup>. According to Peter Finke, the Khoja is a distinct group which some described as a kind of “holy clan” of people with alleged Arab descent. Others wanted to assign them the status of an ethnic group that has not succeeded in being officially recognized<sup>25</sup>. Kazakh scholar Ashirbek Muminov in his last monograph on Khoja genealogies attempted to apply ethnic categories for Khoja lineages differentiating Kazakh, Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen Khojas as distinct primordial entities. He classified Khojas according to their genealogies<sup>26</sup>.

Some Central Asian *Khoja* became leaders of Naqshbandi and Yassavi Sufi orders in the region. In some areas term Khoja was the synonym of *Ishan*,<sup>27</sup> which means “they” in Persian. In the 19<sup>th</sup> century the most famous and noble lineages of *Khoja* in Bukhara

<sup>20</sup> Timur Kocaoglu, “The existence of a Bukaran nationality in the recent past,” in *The nationality question in Soviet Central Asia*, ed. Edward Allworth, (New York. Washington. London, Praeger publishers, 1973), 158.

<sup>21</sup> Sayyid Atoi is the same as Sayyid ota.

<sup>22</sup> The sands of Oxus. Boyhood reminiscences of Sadriddin Aini. Translated from the Tajik Persian with an introduction by John R. Perry and Rachel Lehr. (Mazda publishers, 1998), 31–32.

<sup>23</sup> B.Kh. Karmisheva, *Ocherki etnicheskoy istorii yujnikh rayonov Uzbekistana i Tajikistana* (Moskva: Vostochnaya literatura, 1976), 64, 148.

<sup>24</sup> S.M. Abashin “Les descendants de saints en Asie centrale: elite religieuse ou nationale?,” in *Cahiers d’Asie Centrale*, no. 13–14, Gestion de l-independance et legs sovietique en Asie Centrale. Tachkent-Aix-en-Provence, 2004, 214–228.

<sup>25</sup> Peter Finke, “Variations on Uzbek identity, concepts, constraints and local configurations” (Habilitation diss. Leipzig, 2006), 171–175.

<sup>26</sup> A.K. Muminov, s uchastiem A.Sh. Nurmanovoi, S.Sattarova, *Rodoslovnoe drevo Mukhtara Auezova* (Almati: Jibek joli, 2011), 52–60.

<sup>27</sup> *Ishan* was a title or a name given to respected religious figures – the heads of *Sufi* brotherhoods of various levels and their descendants.

oasis were *Djuybori Khoja*, *Sayyid Ota*,<sup>28</sup> descendants of Sufi leaders: *Ahmad Yassavi*, *Bahauddin Naqshband* etc. Many Khoja fulfilled eminent religious and social duties in pre-Soviet Central Asian society and were held in very high esteem. They performed the religious services at ritual celebrations, acted as healers and have been the care-takers of Sufi shrines. In pre-Soviet period the people of the region believed that due to their descent the Khojas endowed with supernatural powers and could, among other things, cure the sick. People believed that the Khojas could by their prayers help infertile women to have children. The attitude shown to the same group of the Khojas could, however, be different in various areas of the region.<sup>29</sup> Not all *Khojas* were *mullas* (priests) even in pre-Soviet times, many *Khojas* were simply peasants, some nomadized with the Kazakhs, and others like in Bukhara were successful merchants.

Khoja in Kazakh society adopted the language of nomads. They controlled religious rituals, customs: wedding ceremonies, funeral ceremonies, circumcision and etc. While the Kazakh tribal confederations of the Great, Middle, and Young *zhuzes* (hordes) are regarded as the “Black Bone” (*qara suyek*), the Khojas (as well as the *Töre*, the offspring of Chingiz Khan) are considered honor groups belonging to the “White Bone” (*aq suyek*). As a distinct descent group, Khojas regard themselves as standing outside the traditional tribal structure of the former Kazakh hordes and are therefore often referred to as non-Kazakhs<sup>30</sup>.

While discussing role of state in identity formation Barth says, “the power represented by the state is a specifiable third player in the processes of boundary construction between groups”<sup>31</sup>. State played a crucial role in identity changing process, modernization of society in Central Asia in Soviet period. In 1924 the existing political-administrative organization was broken up through the national-delimitation of Central Asia and replaced by ethnically defined republics. Language was viewed as the central criteria for affiliation to one or other ethnic group<sup>32</sup>. This laid the structural foundations for reformulation of the parameters of identity. Tribal/regional designations which were important in pre-Soviet period, were now subsumed under institutionalized ‘nationalities’ (e.g. Uzbek, Kazakh,

<sup>28</sup> Sayyid Ota Khodja derive their name from famous Islamic missionary in Golden Horde Sayyid Ahmad (first half of 14th century).

<sup>29</sup> Bruce G. Privratsky, “‘Turkistan belongs to the Qojas’: local knowledge of a Muslim tradition in Devout societies vs. Impious states? Transmitting Islamic learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the 20<sup>th</sup> century,” Proceedings of an international colloquium held in the Carre des sciences, French ministry of research, Paris, November 12–13, 2001. Edited by Stephane A. Dudoignon, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004), 167.

<sup>30</sup> Bruce G. Privratsky, “Turkistan belongs to the Qojas”, 167.

<sup>31</sup> Frederik Barth, “Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity”, in *The Anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond “ethnic groups and boundaries”*. Edited by Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers. (Amsterdam: Het Spi, 1994), 19.

<sup>32</sup> Fedtke Gero, “How Bukharans turned into Uzbeks and Tajiks: Soviet nationalities policy in the light of a personal rivalry”, in *Patterns of transformation in and around Uzbekistan*. Edited by Paolo Sartori and Tommaso Trevisani. (Diabasis, 2007), 21,24.

Turkmen, Tajik, etc.). Similarly, the dialect groupings were codified and elaborated into standardized national languages<sup>33</sup>. The Soviet authorities tried to destroy Muslim culture in Central Asia, first with an anti-Islamic, anti-Persian compulsory romanization, then, in Stalin's 1930s, with compulsory Cyrillicization<sup>34</sup>.

The Soviet policy had dramatic consequences for Khojas in Central Asia, who lost their privileged rights in society. In 1920s–1930s, many Khojas were persecuted (especially between 1927 and 1937) and their property was expropriated. Significant part of Central Asian *Khoja* intellectuals were arrested and killed especially if they were mulahs and teachers of Islam. It appears that the less distinguished and well-to-do Khoja families were more likely to escape persecution. Some later generations Khojas adapted or even joined the Communist Party, thus gaining the same high social status and prosperity that their ancestors had enjoyed as religious authorities<sup>35</sup>. It was often considered dangerous in the Soviet anti-religious environment to acknowledge affiliation with such sacrally defined descent groups<sup>36</sup>.

In post-Soviet period there was a transition from strict, centralized control over collective memory to open, if not chaotic public debate and disagreement. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union and the independence of the Central Asian republics in 1991, the Khojas particular in Kazakhstan have recovered some of their former prestige. The situation in Uzbekistan is different because of different ethnopolitical conditions and cultural diversity of the country. After Uzbekistan has acquired its independence, in the process of choosing an official ideology on the formation of Uzbek identity there was a struggle between adherents of various concepts. Multinational Uzbekistan excluded the state policy of ethnic nationalism. The authorities are supporting promotion the idea of Uzbekistani identity. Government policy plays a privileged role in the socioeconomic arena, exerting a tremendous influence on ethnic change and identity. Nevertheless, one can say that the ideological policy to homogenize the society is not as strong as in some neighbour countries.

So called oblast (*viloyat-province*), rayon (*tuman-district*) identity shaped in the region in Soviet period. Most people preferred to classify themselves primarily in local terms as *Bukhorolik* or, depending on their origin within the province, as *Shofirkonlik*, *Gijduvonlik* and etc. Nowadays when people meet each other they firstly ask each other where they are from and only after that do they ask about their ethnicity. The system

<sup>33</sup> Shirin Akiner, "Social and political reorganization in Central Asia: transition from pre-colonial to post-colonial society" in *Post-Soviet Central Asia*. Edited by Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane. (London. New York: Tauris academic studies, 1998), 12–13.

<sup>34</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London and New York: Verso, 1991), 26.

<sup>35</sup> John Schoeberlein – Engel, "Identity in Central Asia: construction and contention in the conceptions of "Ozbek", "Tajik", "Muslim", "Samarqandi" and other groups". (PhD diss., Harvard university, 1994), 259.

<sup>36</sup> Devin DeWeese, "The politics of sacred lineages in 19<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia: descent groups linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in shrine documents and genealogical charters," *International Journal Middle Eastern Studies*, 31, (1999), 520–521.

of community support and protection, that works without question, takes into account family links first, and then regional connections.

If we use the language criterion, Bukharan oases is populated by Persian or Tajik speakers (Tajiks, Persians, Tajik-speaking Arabs, Gypsies) and Turkic speakers (Uzbeks, Turkmens, Kazakhs, Karakalpaks). The remaining part of Arabs retain their original language. According to my observations tribal identity still exists in some areas. For example, I could recorded tribal stories of descendants of the Uzbek tribes: *Durman* and *Saray* in Jondor district of Bukhara province<sup>37</sup>. Apparently, they changed their dialect from Qypchak to Bukharan dialect of Uzbek few centuries ago.

Bukharan province of Uzbekistan is divided into 11 districts-*tumans*. The *tuman* of Shofirkon, where most of the field research was conducted, is located in the north-eastern part of the oasis. It is one of the largest districts in the province, which is mainly due to the fact that some part of the Bukharan *Qizil-Qum* (red sank in Uzbek) belongs to Shofirkon. Shofirkon *tuman* is comprised of six urban and twelve rural municipalities (*qishloq fuqarolar yigini*). The district centre Shofirkon is sub-divided into neighborhoods (*mahalla*).

Till 1926 the name of the district center was Khoja Orif,<sup>38</sup> then it was renamed into Shofirkon<sup>39</sup>. The largest rural population groups apart from Uzbeks and Tajiks are Kazakhs and Turkmens. More than twenty nationalities lived in Shofirkon district twenty years ago<sup>40</sup>.

The district of Shofirkon of Bukharan province is predominantly Uzbek. According to oral tradition, sizeable part of the Uzbeks of Shofirkon came from Khorezm in the 17<sup>th</sup> – early 19<sup>th</sup> centuries. In pre-Soviet period they were known as *Urgenji* (those who from Urgench, which was the capital of Khorezm). Mixing with local population they changed their Khorezmian dialect to Bukharan dialect of Uzbek in previous centuries. According to my informants 80 % of population in Shofirkon district are Uzbek-speaking. The Arabs live in some *qishloqs* (village) in Shofirkon district. Because Arabs in Shofirkon have traditionally exchanged women with the Uzbeks, and Tajiks, they have very strong ties with the population of these villages. The Tajik-speaking Arabs highly respect Uzbek-speaking Khojas in Shofirkon district. They were clients of some famous Sayyid ota Khojas in the past.

Khojas live compactly in some villages and dispersed in various villages, inhabited by mixture with speakers of other languages. Majority of Khojas of Shofirkon are Uzbek-speaking.

The majority of Kazakh bordered the Shofirkon dictrict on the north. Most of the Kazaks live in the isolated settlements of Aghitma and Churuk in the *Qizil-Qum* desert. These settlements, in spite of the distances between them, foster very intensive social relations

<sup>37</sup> Interview in Jondor district, March 2011.

<sup>38</sup> Khoja Orif was the name of local Sufi saint – Khoja Orif Revgari (13<sup>th</sup> century).

<sup>39</sup> Salim Mukhtor, Karim Bobomurod, *Shofirkon tarixi* (Toshkent: Yozuvchi, 1998), 58–59.

<sup>40</sup> Shofirkon xaqiqati, 19 avgust 1992 yil. (in Uzbek).

with each other as well as with the Kazaks of the neighbouring Navoiy province. Some Kazakh-speaking Khojas in Aghitma claimed that they had come from Uzgend (village on contemporary territory Southern Kazakhstan) around 1900. Kazakh families in Aghitma belong to the Young zhuz which divided into different Kazakh tribes (*ru*) and Khojas.

### Local definitions of Khoja

I observed diverse picture of emic identification of Khojas depending on geographical, social and cultural specifics of the regions. There is some kind of hierarchy in the minds of Uzbek-speaking and Tajik-speaking Khoja intellectuals. On the top of it one can find Sayyids – descendants of Prophet.<sup>41</sup>

When I asked some old scholars of Khoja descent how Khojas differentiate the various groups of Khojas, they had similar answer: “Those who were born as Khoja and those, who became Khoja”. (*Khoja nasabi* and *Khoja hasabi*)<sup>42</sup>. *Khoja nasabi* – real Khojas who were descendants of Prophet or first Caliphs, whose status derives from blood and family ties. They have genealogies (*nasab-noma*). *Khoja hasabi* – descendants of activists of Sufi brotherhoods. They are just descendants of “black-bone” *Ishons* – leaders of Sufi brotherhoods, who got right to train disciples. There is no marriages between *Khoja nasabi* and *Khoja hasabi*. There was also third category so called “faked Khojas”, who bought their name and status in the past – during the Bukharan Emirate<sup>43</sup> period<sup>44</sup>. These definitions were important in pre-Soviet period but not now. Young generation never heard about this internal classification of Khoja. During research of several members of same family I discovered that some knowledge of family and Khoja history had not been transmitted to descendants.

The next criteria for categorization of Khojas is their lineage affiliation through genealogy, linking them with Prophet or first Caliphs. In Shofirkon old and middle age Khojas differentiate Sayyid ota Khojas, Khojas – descendants of famous Sufi leader Ahmad Yasavi and Kazakh-speaking Khojas, which includes Khorasan<sup>45</sup> Khojas and Sabult Khojas.

The Khojas of Shofirkon district are Turkic-speaking. Majority of them are Uzbek-speaking, others are Kazakh-speaking. Uzbek-speaking Khojas in most cases have similar culture with surrounding Uzbek and Tajik population. Kazakh-speaking Khojas have similar culture with Kazakh population. Sayyid ota Khojas living in Bukhara city

<sup>41</sup> In Central Asia Sayyid is the title given in Islamic culture to people descended from Husayn, grandson of Prophet through his daughter Fatima.

<sup>42</sup> Interview, April 2011, Samarkand and Bukhara

<sup>43</sup> Bukharan Emirate (1756–1920) was the Central Asian state ruling by the Uzbek dynasty of Manghyt. It was destroyed by the Red army in 1920

<sup>44</sup> Interview, Shofirkon, March 2011.

<sup>45</sup> Khorasan was historical province in North-eastern part of Iran, North-western part of Afghanistan and South-eastern part of Turkmenistan.

are bilingual: they speak Uzbek and Tajik. According to my observations Sayyid ota Khojas live on the vast territory from northern Kazakhstan in the north to Qashqadarya province (Uzbekistan) in the south. They live in the Southern Kazakhstan, Samarkand, Bukhara, Khorezm, Tashkent, Djizakh provinces of Uzbekistan. Some groups of Sayyid ota Khojas live in Qaraqalpakistan and even among Siberian Tatars<sup>46</sup>. According to some sources, Sayyid ata Khojas is the most numerous group among other Khoja in Central Asia<sup>47</sup>. Nowadays they lost economic and political status, but still enjoying social and moral authority in some areas.

Khoja are dividing into *tups* in the Bukharan oases. In local interpretation the *tup* is a community of relatives living in one village<sup>48</sup>. Also the term *avlod* appeared to be central to people's construction of kin relations in the Bukharan oases. Khoja *avlods* are more particular than the non-religious *avlods* in tracing genealogical lines. In accounts of many informants was their emphasis on some Islamic saints – Khoja-Ishon, to whom my informants would usually trace their lineage back. In some cases, an entire village belonged to the same lineage. The Kazakh-speaking Khojas were made up of lineages operating as components of complex, segmented societies. Describing their social organization they use different terms which includes the following: *Avlyad* – kin, *Ru* – clan, *El* – tribe, clan. Among Kazakh-speaking Khojas the idea that each person should know his/her lineage for seven generations (*jetti ota*) is widespread. The question of the exogamous marriages is of crucial importance in defining the concept of *ru* and the nature of social groupings. One might not marry a girl with whom one had a common male ancestor within seven generations<sup>49</sup>. My informants agreed that the Kazakh-speaking Khojas intermarry beyond five fathers in Shofirkon because of small size of their group.

## Khoja and Their Memory on The Past

### *Oral stories on the origin*

According to historical accounts sheikh Sayyid-ota was a member of Yassavia Sufi brotherhood and he was an active preacher of Islam in the Golden Horde during the rule of Uzbek-khan (1312–1342)<sup>50</sup>. His real name was Sayyid Ahmad, however he was popular under the name Sayyid ota<sup>51</sup>. *Ota* means 'father' in Uzbek.

<sup>46</sup> Alfrid Bustanov, "The sacred texts of Siberian Kwaja families. The descendants of Sayyid Ata", *Journal of Islamic manuscripts* 2 (2011), 87

<sup>47</sup> Interview, April 2011. Samarkand.

<sup>48</sup> Interview, January 2011

<sup>49</sup> Alfred E. Hudson, *Kazak social structure* (Yale University Publications in Anthropology, Number 20) (Reprinted by Human relations area files press, 1964), 43

<sup>50</sup> Mirzo Ulughbek, *Turt ulus tarixi* (Toshkent, 1994), 226.

<sup>51</sup> *Rashahot: (obi khayot tomchilari): Tarixiy-marifiy asar. Tabdil va song soz muallif M.Khasaniy, B.Umrzoq* (Toshkent: Abu Ali ibn Sino nomidagi tibbiyot nashriyoti, 2003), 21–22.

Sayyid ota Khojas scattered all over the district. There is a place of visit – *qadamjoy* – shrine of Sayyid ota in Shofirkon district. Many of Khoja except of some intellectuals don't know historical information about Sayyid ota. Old age Khojas of Shofirkon claimed to be descendants of Prophet or Bibi Fotima (daughter of Prophet). They have an idea that they belong to Khoja group, some of them stress their Sayyid origin. In oral tradition of Khoja mentioned their ancestor – Mir Sulaymon, who migrated from Khorezm to Bukhara two centuries ago. Khojas of Shofirkon often mentioned the name of their ancestor – saint Shomuhammad Khoja. His second name or nick-name was Chaqar ota. He graduated from madrasa in Bukhara and at the same time he had supernatural power and was famous for his miracles. One of the Bukharan emirs recognizing his skills granted him a big piece of land in Shofirkon district<sup>52</sup>. So, the name of local saint is important for them to demonstrate their high status in pre-Soviet period and emphasize the sacredness of their lineage.

During my fieldwork I observed that old informants often mentioned the Bukharan Emirate (1756–1920) as a symbol of period when Khoja had high social prestige<sup>53</sup>. During this study I found the blanks in the history of some families, mostly in the memories of the young generation. Some events in the pre-Soviet and Early Soviet past, people have been completely erased from the family stories passed down to them.

In pre-Soviet period title of Khojas was hereditary. Until 1970–1980s, they protected the purity of their 'blood' by not merging with outsiders<sup>54</sup>. Khojas use various explanations of prohibition marriages with non-Khoja groups. According to the most popular story, the descendants of Prophet settled in the villages of Bukharan oases in order to teach Islam in Early medieval period. Khoja believe that one day the descendants of prophet should come back to Arabia. Therefore they should preserve purity of their blood and have not right to mix with local non-Khoja population. Contrary to some other Khojas they call themselves Sayyid-Khojas.

Some old Khoja believe that marriages with non-Khoja families will harm future seven generations, it will offend the Prophet and his descendants. Obviously this is the discourse whereas one of the main reasons of endogamous marriages was laid in access to economic resources in the past. Although there has been an overall preference for inter-group marriages, men were in principle free to take wives from the ranks of the 'common' people (*qoracha*) because of the rule of patrilineal descent. In contemporary practice, however, only some families appear to adhere to the rule of group endogamy. Until 1970s Khoja families followed strong endogamous marriages. Nowadays it has become commonly accepted that the social behavior of youths is differ from old cultural pattern. It is interesting to note that the older generation sees the reason for this in external influences. "What can we do in the epoch of soup operas and romantic movies,

<sup>52</sup> Interview, January 2011.

<sup>53</sup> Interview, January 2011.

<sup>54</sup> Interview, April 2011.

youth have their own opinion on marriage etc.” one old Khoja complained. I asked young Khoja to describe the general values of Khoja and their difference from commoners. She said, that old Khojas try to explain everything from the religious point of view. Young Khoja label this type of interpretation as *eskilik* – old approach in Uzbek. “Khoja don’t drink alcohol, don’t eat pork. They express respect to little brothers, sisters, children and grandchildren (*bolalarini sizlaydi*)”<sup>55</sup>.

Some families of Sayyid ota Khoja live in Bukhara, where some of them intermarry with other groups of Khoja, including Tajik-speaking lineages like Djuybori Khoja. They established friendship relationships with Kazakh-speaking Khojas, but never intermarry<sup>56</sup>. Informant was invited to Kazakh aul (village), where Kazakhs, including Kazakh-speaking Khojas expressed their respect. They asked him to sit at the respectful place (*yugori* or *tiir* – higher place in Uzbek) around the table. During the feast they got high valued gifts.

Khorasan Khojas claimed to be descendants of third son Ali – Muhammad Khanafiya. They say that their homeland is Uzgend in Southern Kazakhstan. They came to Bukhara more than a century ago. They have genealogy, which was confirmed by Bukharan Emir Sayyid Alim-khan (1910–1920)<sup>57</sup>. The most popular Kazakh proverb about Khojas is: “if you are Khoja create the miracle”.

The Kazakh-speaking Khojas follow exogamous marriages. Nevertheless until 1950s they did not allow daughters to marry commoners. Khorasan Khojas of Aghitma village intermarry with Khojas (with the distance of 4–5 generations) and Kazakhs of Young zhuz and local Qaraqalpaks<sup>58</sup>.

Khorasan Khojas of Aghitma have disciples among Kazakh clans and Qaraqalpaks of the region<sup>59</sup>. Nowadays any people do not care much about Khojas, however, there are others who regard the Khojas as potential bearers supernatural power (*karomat*), especially if they are healers. Non-Khoja say that Khoja is a closed group, they never will tell you about their life and traditions<sup>60</sup>.

The genealogies of Khoja groups served as juridical documents proving their status and privileges in the past. The genealogies of Khoja were commonly traced back to the Caliphs and the Prophet. Nowadays they lost former importance and many of them have been destroyed during the Stalinist period. Therefore transmission of traditional knowledge about descent lines is difficult for the *Khojas*. Nevertheless, most *Khoja* know at least the rough outlines of their genealogy from the oral tradition of their kinship network. In majority cases Uzbek-speaking Khoja families preserved nothing more than a vague memory of their once privileged descent. Most of them could not trace their ancestors back more than four or five generations.

<sup>55</sup> Interview, March 2011.

<sup>56</sup> Interview, January 2011.

<sup>57</sup> Interview, March 2011.

<sup>58</sup> Interview, Khorasan Khoja. March 2011.

<sup>59</sup> Interview, Khorasan Khoja. March 2011.

<sup>60</sup> Interview, village Mirzoqul, March 2011.

### *The Soviet period*

In my opinion some Khoja families particular in sedentary regions suffered from cultural trauma in early Soviet period. Sztompka defines cultural trauma as the culturally defined and interpreted shock to the cultural tissue of a society. The traumatogenic change exhibits four traits: 1. sudden and rapid, 2. wide and comprehensive scope, 3. radical, deep, fundamental change touches the core aspects of social life; 4. unbelieving mood, change unexpected, “shocking”.<sup>61</sup> Khoja lost property and privileges as a result of state policy, breakdown of political and economic regime. Collective trauma means when people start to be aware of the common plight, perceive the similarity of their situation with that of others, define it as shared<sup>62</sup>. In my case, Khoja intellectuals emphasized that their grandfathers highly suffered from Stalinist repressions which had dramatic traumatic impact on society, especially in Bukhara which was a center religious learning in Central Asian region. Khoja was defined officially and stigmatized as ‘socially alien elements’ or ‘class enemy’. Khojas of Bukharan oasis suffered a lot from Stalinist repressions and later this factor had strong impact on transmission of memory from one generation to another. Old informants in the region mentioned this fact many times and stressed that they lost their knowledge concerning their past and Islamic values during the Soviet period. I assume that the selection and presentation of information to the young so as to foster integration to society and political system of the country. The older generation seeks to maximize the welfare of Khoja community and makes selection in transmitting of memory about the past to young generation. Transmitting of knowledge was dangerous especially for some families of Khoja, who were under the strong control of KGB. In the Soviet period one can find counter-memory<sup>63</sup> of some Khoja families. In my case studies some Khoja families who were not suffered in Stalinist period were able to maintain the counter-memory. They maintained the practice of endogamous marriages and memory on their glorious past.

Schools play an important role in shaping collective memory. In Soviet period school textbooks actually provided students with a history from a Soviet, antireligious and atheistic point of view. History or religious elite groups like Khoja was always interpreted in these textbooks in a negative sense. The Soviet authorities supported creation of jokes, the proverbs which were negatively interpreting the Khojas and their history. Some informants told how it was a shame to them to hear jokes about Khoja from the schoolmates in Soviet times.

### *Role of places – shrines in memory*

Cemeteries and tombstones are one of the more forms of symbolic expression which represents aspects of a community’s collective history. In pre-Soviet period among the

<sup>61</sup> Piotr Sztompka, “The trauma of social change: a case of postcommunist societies,” in Jeffrey C. Alexander, Ron Eyerman, Bernhard Giesen, Neil J. Smelser, Piotr Sztompka, *Cultural trauma and collective identity* (University of California press, 2004), 160, 163.

<sup>62</sup> Sztompka, “The trauma of social change”, 160, 163.

<sup>63</sup> Foucault defined counter-memory as an resistance against the official versions of historical continuity.

symbols of Uzbek-speaking Khodja were cemetery, shrines and tombstones of some outstanding Khodja with *tugh* – top of the banner which they stuck on a grave of famous saint – *wali*<sup>64</sup>. Nowadays the interpretations of the past through symbols are part of the memory of some old Khojas. For the majority of young generation they lost their significance as a group symbol.

During Soviet period the pilgrimage for shrines was prohibited and prosecuted by authorities. In this period shrines lost their official standing, but continued to exist within the framework of popular Islam<sup>65</sup>. Since **Uzbekistan has become the independent state** the citizens obtain freedom and possibility to worship saints. Shomhammad Khoja's shrine is famous in the Shofirkon district and it was restored in recent years. *Qadamjoy* (a place visited by a saint) of Sayyid-ota is one of shrines worshiped by the population in Shofirkon district. It was destroyed in 1930s and restored in independent period. These shrines are worshiping by Uzbek-speaking and Kazakh-speaking Khoja.

## Conclusion

Nowadays Khoja identity is one of the multiple identities of Khoja group. Nevertheless, the group relationships between the Uzbek-speaking, the Tajik-speaking and the Kazakh-speaking Khoja, i.e. the descent group relationships, are explained and justified with a common origin which can be factual or fictional. Some of these, which are consciously used as group-identifying symbols (shrines, genealogies, etc.), are shared between 'brother' descent groups in different ethnic groups. The knowledge of genealogy is especially important for Kazakh-speaking Khoja because the choice of the marriage partner is connected with it. Every Kazakh-speaking Khoja must know the names of seven ancestors and their link to genealogical tree.

While in some cases ethnic and linguistic units are coterminous, at the other extreme we find ethnic units, well defined by other criteria, which have nothing to do with language. The Khojas of one real or putative lineage are divided in three linguistic clusters: Uzbek, Tajik, and Kazakh. This has nothing to do with this linguistic differentiation, since old aged speakers of all three languages are maintain group solidarity. My data shows that the language is not important criteria for identity of Khojas in my case studies. The Khojas of the region speak the dialect, prevailing among local population. For example, in Shofirkon district Khoja speak Bukharan dialect of Uzbek. They consider descendants of Tajik-speaking religious elite groups in the region and outside as their relatives.

There is a break between different generations in knowledge of the historical past of Khoja in contemporary period. The old generation in the first decades of Independence

<sup>64</sup> Interview, April 2011.

<sup>65</sup> A.K. Muminov, "Veneration of holy sites of the Mid-Sirdarya valley: continuity and transformation," in *Muslim culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18<sup>th</sup> to the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1996): 366.

of Uzbekistan tried to restore memory of the past. However young generation in current situation is not so concerned with the history of Khoja. It does not mean that they forgot their history but one can observe the construction of a new history, which closely depends on political, cultural and economic context. I assume that the selection and presentation of information to the young so as to foster integration to society and political system of the country. The older generation seeks to maximize the welfare of Khoja community and makes selection in transmitting of memory about the past to young generation.

## Bibliography

- Abashin S.M. Les descendants de saints en Asie centrale: elite religieuse ou nationale? in Cahiers d'Asie centrale no 13–14. Gestion de l'indépendance et legs soviétique en Asie Centrale. Tachkent-Aix-en-Provence, 2004.
- Akiner, Shirin. "Social and political reorganization in Central Asia: transition from pre-colonial to post-colonial society." In *Post-Soviet Central Asia*. ed. Touraj Atabaki and John O'Kane. London. New York: Tauris academic studies, 1998.
- Anderson, Benedict. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Revised Edition. London and New York: Verso, 1991.
- Barth, Frederik. "Enduring and emerging issues in the analysis of ethnicity." in *The Anthropology of ethnicity. Beyond "ethnic groups and boundaries"*. ed. Hans Vermeulen and Cora Govers. (Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis, 1994).
- Brian, Donahoe, John Eidson, Dereje Feyissa, Veronika Fuest, Markus V. Hoehne, Boris Nieswand, Günther Schlee, Olaf Zenker. "The Formation and Mobilization of Collective Identities in Situations of Conflict and Integration". Working Paper No. 116 Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology Working Papers Halle / Saale 2009.
- Bustanov Alfrid. "The sacred texts of Siberian Kwaja families. The descendants of Sayyid Ata." *Journal of Islamic Manuscripts* 2 (2011): 70–99.
- DeWeese, Devin. "The politics of sacred lineages in 19<sup>th</sup> century Central Asia: descent groups linked to Khwaja Ahmad Yasavi in shrine documents and genealogical charters." *International Journal Middle Eastern Studies* 31 (1999): 507–530.
- DeWeese, Devin. "The descendants of Sayyid Ata and the rank of naqib in Central Asia." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 4 (1995).
- Ewing, Katherine. "The politics of Sufism: redefining the saints of Pakistan." *Journal of Asian Studies* 2 (1983).
- Eyerman, Ron. "The past in the present: culture and transmission of memory" *Acta Sociologica* 47, no.2 (2004): 159–169.
- Finke, Peter. Variations on Uzbek Identities: concepts, constraints and local configurations. Habilitation diss. Leipzig: University Leipzig, 2006.
- Fox Robin. *Kinship and Marriage*. Baltimore, Md.: Penguin, 1967.
- Glenn John. *The Soviet Legacy in Central Asia*. New York: St. Martin's press inc., 1999.

- Gero Fedtke. "How Bukharans turned into Uzbeks and Tajiks: Soviet nationalities policy in the light of a personal rivalry" in *Patterns of transformation in and around Uzbekistan*. Edited by Paolo Sartori and Tommaso Trevisani. Diabasis, 2007.
- Halbwachs, Maurice. *The Collective Memory*. Francis J. Ditter Jr. and Vida Yazdi Ditter, trans. New York: Harper and Row, 1980.
- Holy, Ladislav. *Anthropological Perspectives on Kinship (Anthropology, Culture and Society)*. Pluto press, 1998.
- Hudson Alfred E. *Kazak social structure*. Yale University Publications in Anthropology, Number 20. Reprinted by Human relations area files press, 1964.
- Green, Anna. "Individual Remembering and 'Collective Memory': Theoretical Presuppositions and Contemporary Debates." *Oral history* 2 (2004): 35–44.
- Jenkins Richard, *Social identity*. London and New York: Routledge, 1996.
- Karmisheva B.Kh.. *Ocherki etnicheskoy istorii yujnikh rayonov Uzbekistana i Tajikistana*. Moskva, 1976.
- Kocaoglu Timur. "The existence of a Bukaran nationality in the recent past." In *The nationality question in Soviet Central Asia*. Edited by Edward Allworth. Praeger publishers. New York. Washington. London. 1973.
- Linke U. Collective memory, Anthropology of. in: Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (editors-in-chief). *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*. Vol. 4. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2001, 2219–2223.
- Mirzo Ulughbek. *Turt ulus tarixi*. Fors tilidan B. Akhmedov, N. Norqulov, M. Khasaniylar tarjimasi. Tashkent, 1994.
- Muminov A.K. s uchastiem A.Sh. Nurmanovoi, S. Sattarova. *Rodoslovnnoe drevo Mukhtara Auezova*. Almati: Jibek joli, 2011.
- Muminov A.K. "Veneration of holy sites of the Mid-Sirdarya valley: continuity and transformation" in *Muslim culture in Russia and Central Asia from the 18<sup>th</sup> to the early 20<sup>th</sup> centuries*. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1996: 355–367.
- Privratsky Bruce G. *Turkistan: Kazak religion and collective memory*. Ph.D. Diss. The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1998
- Privratsky Bruce G. "Turkistan belongs to the Qojas": local knowledge of a Muslim tradition in Devout societies vs. Impious states? Transmitting Islamic learning in Russia, Central Asia and China, through the 20<sup>th</sup> century. Proceedings of an international colloquium held in the Carre des sciences, French ministry of research, Paris, November 12–13, 2001. Edited by Stephane A. Dudoignon, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2004.
- Rashahot: (obi khayot tomchilari): Tarixiy-marifiy asar. Tabdil va song soz muallif M. Khasaniy, B. Umrzoq*. Toshkent: Abu Ali ibn Sino nomidagi tibbiyot nashriyoti, 2003
- Schlee Günther. *Identities on the move: Clanship and pastoralism in Northern Kenya*. Nairobi: Gideon S. Were Pr., 1994.
- Schoeberlein – Engel John. Identity in Central Asia: construction and contention in the conceptions of "Ozbek", "Tajik", "Muslim", "Samarqandi" and other groups. Ph.D. diss, Harvard university, 1994.

# Trends in Gender (In)equality in Azerbaijan

SVAJONĖ MIKĖNĖ

*Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius, Lithuania*

## Introduction

The problem of gender inequality exists all over the world: there is no such country, where women would be in better state than men according to distribution of welfare, power and prestige. Therefore various women's organizations and the states themselves put efforts trying to ensure better gender equality in all important spheres of life; analyze, and observe the changes in women status. During the last 6 years about 85 percent of all countries improved the indicators of gender equality, but in other 15 percent of countries the status of women became worse<sup>1</sup>.

The research on gender equality in Azerbaijan is not elaborated, only few authors can be mentioned: Farideh Heyat investigated women status during the period of transformation, Mehrangiz Najafzadeh and Lewis A. Mennerick analysed influence of non governmental organizations on improvement of women social status.

The aim of this presentation is to reveal present situation of women in Azerbaijan in most important spheres of societal life: participation of women in politics, education, labour market, and to find out why Azerbaijan women still face with high level of inequality, what are the main factors having impact on their status, and what can be done in order to increase gender equality in Azerbaijan.

Research methods: scientific literature, legal documents' and statistical data analysis.

## Peculiarities of The Country: Post-Soviet Heritage and Transitional Processes

### *Soviet heritage*

During the Soviet era, all former Soviet states experienced the same influence of soviet ideology and policy, which to some extent had levelling effect. In all former republics of Soviet Union there was decreased illiteracy level, increased participation in labour

---

<sup>1</sup> Ricardo Hausmann, Laura D. Tyson and Saadia Zahidi. *The Global Gender Gap Report 2011*. World Economic Forum. 1 November 2011, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/>

market (everyone had to be employed and all people were insured against social risks)<sup>2</sup>, however, political participation and acceptance of decisions remained as prerogative of men – soviet participation of women in politics was only phenomenon of declared and decorative political ideology; the authority was concentrated into apparatus of communist party and cabinets of ministers, where women made declining minority<sup>3</sup>.

Residents of former Soviet republics experienced the effect of soviet propaganda, which asserted that “ideal woman, first of all, is married, devoted to her husband wife and devoted mother to her children. Besides that, ideal woman had to have diploma of special or high education and be occupied in state work. Soviet woman combined triad: wife – employee – mother. Woman which wanted to correspond to this ideal had to be able to reconcile all three roles”<sup>4</sup>. Concerning the situation in Azerbaijan, as Heyat summarizes, „what in fact, accounted for much of the present-day culture of Azerbaijan, and the position of women in particular, was the impact of many decades of the Soviet system and the social policies enacted at different phases of it”<sup>5</sup>.

### *Peculiarities of transition*

Transition period in all post-soviet countries can be characterised by some common features. It is transition from totalitarian rule to democratic regime, from centralised to market economy, from strictly regulated norms of freedom to embedding of human rights, including gender equality. Speaking more in detail, as Gillian Pascall and Nick Manning pointed out, all countries have suffered economic shocks which have reduced the capacities of states to collect revenue and challenged the basis on which care supports rested. All have experienced some change to the public enterprises and the welfare systems and employment levels that went with them. All have also experienced political change with greater access to western ideas and greater freedom to organize. These ideas include the supposed superiority of private enterprise over public spending, and thus undermine ideologically the basis of the old gender regimes, even as the economic and revenue crises undermine it economically. They are also countries in which suppressed national, cultural and religious identities are resurgent. While the impact of these transformations has been different across the region, they create some common background against which different regimes are emerging<sup>6</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> Jolanta Aidukaitė, „Welfare reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: a new type of welfare regime?” *Ekonomika*. Vol. 89(4) (2010): 7–24.

<sup>3</sup> Irmina Matonytė, „Politinio atstovavimo galimybių plėtra? Lietuvos parlamentarų požiūrio į moterų kvotas analizė”. *Parlamento studijos* No. 10 (2011), accessed 24 February, 2012. [http://www.parlamentostudijos.lt/Nr10/10\\_politika\\_1.htm](http://www.parlamentostudijos.lt/Nr10/10_politika_1.htm)

<sup>4</sup> Dalia Marcinkevičienė, *Lietuvių šeimos ideologijos: nuo 19 a. tradicijos ir nacionalizmo iki sovietinės šeimos politikos 1940–1970 m.* (Vilnius: Vilnius university, 2009), accessed 29 February, 2012, [http://vddb.library.lt/fedora/get/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02-2009-D\\_20090409\\_090031-09389/DS.005.0.01.ETD](http://vddb.library.lt/fedora/get/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02-2009-D_20090409_090031-09389/DS.005.0.01.ETD)

<sup>5</sup> Farideh Heyat, *Azeri Women in Transition. Women in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan*. (Routledge Curzon: London, New York, 2002), 2.

<sup>6</sup> Gillian Pascall and Nick Manning, “Gender and social policy: comparing welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union”. *Journal of European Social Policy* (August 1, 2000) vol. 10 No. 3: 263–264.

Soviet period in Azerbaijan lasted seven decades, from 1920 to 1991, so Azerbaijan is still very young country in its democratic practices. The years under communist regime has not helped the proper development of democracy in the country. With the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan experienced economic disintegration and political turmoil. Economic growth has since picked up pace, driven by the country's rich reserves in oil and gas. Conflict with neighbouring Armenia led to the displacement of almost one million people, with 20 percent of the current population living as refugees and internally displaced persons. Poverty affected people in Azerbaijan. However, this period brought positive changes as well. During the period of Independence Azerbaijan Government created new democratic laws regulating all spheres of life, including establishment of equal human rights *de jure*.

I will review what legislative means were taken to ensuring of gender equality in this country and what is the real situation concerning gender equality in most important spheres of societal life- in policy, labour market and education.

### **Legislative Base Concerning Gender Equality**

The meaning of gender equality differs in various countries and/or depends on social, economic, political, cultural context. In some countries it is understood only in sense of equal opportunities or equity, in other countries it includes equal participation, it is observed, how gender equality policy is prosecuted, which effect it has on gender status, there are executed reforms in state institutions<sup>7</sup>. In other words, it depends on the progress of the country in gender equality policy. During the period starting at 1995, in Azerbaijan the concept of gender equality transformed from feminised perceptions about gender equality to gender equality as inseparable part of human rights; gender equality in economics, societal life and in the processes of acceptance of decisions is established in laws, there are executed various educational programs concerning gender equality, there are operating about 90 non-governmental organizations which present assistance for women and performs education<sup>8</sup>, women's problems are represented in most political parties' platforms<sup>9</sup>.

I will review what was done by the government of Azerbaijan in order to abolish gender equality problem in society.

<sup>7</sup> Jolanta Reingardienė, „Europos lyčių lygybės strategija: kintančios lyčių politikos privalumai ir grėsmės“, Center for Equality Advancement (CEA), accessed 29 February, 2012, <http://www.gap.lt/main.php/id/766/lang/1>

<sup>8</sup> As Najafzadeh and Mennerick points out, participation in the NGOs remarkably increased women participation in social and political life. See Mehrangiz Najafzadeh and Lewis A. Mennerick, “Gender and Social Entrepreneurship in Societies in Transition: the Case of Azerbaijan”. *Journal of Third World Studies* (2003) Vol. XX, No. 2: 44.

<sup>9</sup> “Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges”, UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/eurothecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>

- In 1995, Azerbaijan ratified The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
- In 1998 the Government established a state Committee on Women's Issues to Protect Women's Rights and to enact measures to empower them according to the decree of the President.
- In the year 2006, the Committee was substituted by the new structure State Committee on Women Issues. The privileges of the newly established committee were broader than the first one. State Committee on Women Issues reports the Cabinet of Ministers and functions as a main tool in the elimination of inequality between genders. The State Committee on Family, Women, and Children's Affairs actively holds seminars and conferences with the involvement of international professionals and experts, where the issues of gender equality, discrimination against women in Azerbaijani society, and related programs aimed at women's adaptation to new job market opportunities.
- In the 2000, the Cabinet of Ministers approved a National Plan on Women Issues for the years 2000–2005. This plan, developed in accordance with the regulations of Convention on elimination of any kind of discrimination against women and Beijing Action Platform, considered various measures in gender politics on 12 strategic fields: economics, education, health, violence against women, women problems in armed conflicts, problems of women-refugees and IDPs, human rights, mass media, environment, problems of female teenagers, participation of women in decision making, and development of relations with international women's organizations. During this period, the project of the Law on Gender Equality was developed, gender expertise of national legislation and gender segregation of statistical data were begun, and events attempting to increase the interest.
- Presidential decree of March 6, 2000, on "Implementing State Policy on Women" was adopted. The decree was used as the basis of state strategy in the sphere of gender equality and for extending Women's political decision-making opportunities. The decree provided for equal representation of women with men in all state agencies in the country, as well as ensuring gender expertise in legislation. As a result, many ministries and organizations were required to become more active in their work and, at least in a formal way, to develop recommendations on priority areas for the country such as: women and economics (poverty, property rights problems, etc.); refugees and internally displaced persons; women and health; women and governance; women and labour; and women's rights. Responsibility for implementing the decree was entrusted to the State Committee on Women's Issues, which presented an annual report to the Cabinet of Ministers based on information received by corresponding ministries and organizations about the implementation process and progress of the president's decree.
- Law of the Republic of Azerbaijan On State Guarantees of Equal Rights for Women and Men in October, 2006.

- National action plan on development of women of Azerbaijan Republic for the years 2007–2011. This new plan also takes its basis from the previously mentioned convention. However, the specifics of the second National Action Plan, in regards to the scope of activity of the new committee, primarily focus on the problems of family, particularly to the position of women in the family. In the field of gender, this Action Plan considers measures for the elimination of judicial and economic inequality of men and women, social protection of women, the struggle against violations to women, and gender education.

Scholars state that deep traditions of women's political participation leads to equalization of gender disbalance<sup>10</sup>, so probably twenty years of new policy on gender equality was too short period for establishment of gender equality in the country. It would partially reveal the reason, why in despite of Government efforts, according to the Global Gender Gap Report 2011, Azerbaijan ranks 91st in the world on the level of equality between men and women.

## **Women Status in Politics, Education and Labour Market**

### ***Women participation in politics***

Equal participation of men and women in political life of society and state is not only the way to achieve their goals and interests; it is also the indicator of achievement of principal gender equality and non-discrimination based on gender. Women status in government and local self-governance institutions as well as share of women in managerial positions is presented bellow:<sup>11</sup>

### ***Women in parliament***

- On 2005 elections there were elected 11,2 percent of women. During elections in 2010 there were elected 125 members on parliament, 85 percent – men and 15 percent – women. Vice-president of the parliament is woman. There are 12 permanent committees acting in the Parliament, but only one chairman is woman (Committee of human rights) (8.3 percent).

<sup>10</sup> Irmina Matonytė, „Politinio atstovavimo galimybių plėtra? Lietuvos parlamentarų požiūrio į moterų kvotas analizė“. *Parlamento studijos* No. 10 (2011), accessed 24 February, 2012, [http://www.parlamentostudijos.lt/Nr10/10\\_politika\\_1.htm](http://www.parlamentostudijos.lt/Nr10/10_politika_1.htm)

<sup>11</sup> Data taken from “Report on the Monitoring of the Implementation of Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on Balanced Participation of Women and Men in Political and Public Decision-making”. Baku (2009), accessed 24 February, 2012, [http://www.gender-az.org/alter\\_m/eng/COE\\_recommendations\\_decision\\_making\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gender-az.org/alter_m/eng/COE_recommendations_decision_making_eng.pdf)

***Women in Government***

- No women in positions of ministers or vice-ministers. There is one woman in the Cabinet of Ministers; she is Chairman of the State Committee on the Problems of Women, Children and Family (2.5 percent). The total number of people working in the Cabinet of Ministers is 39.

***Women in managerial positions***

- 12 percent of the judges in the country are women. Five of these judges manage the courts and collegiums. Among more than 700 members of the Collegium of Advocates 105 are women. 615 women work in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, among whom 219 are officers, 19 among these officers hold managerial positions – deputy head of management, assistant to the head of management, heads of departments, and police clinics. In state service, among managers of subdivisions there are 14.4 times more men than women and 9.3 times more men among vice-managers of subdivisions.

***Women in international institutions***

- Azerbaijani parliamentarians participate in a couple of supranational legislative bodies: Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Parliamentary Assembly of CIS member-states. The best situation in regards to the gender balance is found in the Azerbaijani delegation in PACE. This delegation consists of 12 people, out of which 3 (25 percent) are women. Azerbaijani delegation in NATO Parliamentary Assembly consists of 5 people with only one woman (20 percent). Delegation to the PA of CIS member-states consists of 18 people with 2 women only (11 percent).

***Women in local self-governance bodies (municipalities)***

- In 2009, the councils of municipalities there were elected, the share of men was 74 percent and the share of women was 27 percent. However, women participation in municipality elections is changing to the positive direction: in previous councils of municipalities the share of women was only 4 percent.

The political participation of women is determined by country's political culture, traditions, prevailing stereotypes to the gender roles, and opinion of women about their own possibilities to actualize themselves in politics or to represent social group expressing certain expectations<sup>12</sup>. As CEDAW monitoring results show, the main factors preventing women from assuming a role in political and social life in Azerbaijan include the dominance of men in political structures, the concealed discrimination in the

<sup>12</sup> Virginija Šidlauskienė, „Moterų politinės socializacijos projekcijos savivaldos tarybų rinkimuose“, *Lyčių studijos ir tyrimai*, 7 (2009):17–18.

distribution of male and female roles at the decision-making level, and the generally poor level of social awareness of gender issues. Every third woman thinks that politics is men's business, other 30 percent are aware that they can't say out their opinion, so only the last 1/3 of women tries to participate in country's political life. Also, every third woman thinks that woman can be socially active but only under condition that her husband gives his consent. 46.5 percent of women which would like to participate in political activity do not participate in the elections to the local municipalities due to the lack of financial support, 5.5 percent – because women participation in municipalities is criticized by society, 21.3 percent – because women are too busy in housekeeping, 27 percent say that women have double load, both at work and home<sup>13</sup>.

The survey revealed that the higher the family income, the less likely are women to be interested in the decision-making of their municipalities. The highest percentage of female participation in municipalities (37.8 percent) was observed among women with average monthly incomes.

However, the results of last elections to the Parliament and to the Councils of Municipalities show considerable increase in women political activeness. The results of monitoring performed in 2009 reveal that the main obstacles for participation of women in decision making process there are not the stereotypes but the other obstacles which prevent women to include themselves into political processes, first of all- lack of corresponding education and burden of works at home<sup>14</sup>. Thus, into these problems the biggest attention and assistance for woman should be concentrated.

### *Women in education system*

Talking about women share in education it is worthwhile to mention the serious consequences of the conflict in and around the Nagorny-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The military operations on the territory of Azerbaijan resulted in the destruction of more than a thousand educational institutions; a great number of secondary and pre-school educational institutions are situated in the occupied territories. About 131,000 students as well as 20,000 employees of the educational system became IDPs<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>13</sup> "Monitoring of implementation of the Convention on Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in Azerbaijan", Public Union for Gender Equality and women's Initiatives, Baku (2009), accessed 20 February 2012, [http://www.gewi-az.org/eng/bulletin/alternative\\_report\\_CEDAW\\_GEWI\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gewi-az.org/eng/bulletin/alternative_report_CEDAW_GEWI_eng.pdf)

<sup>14</sup> "Report on the monitoring of the implementation of Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on balanced participation of Women and Men in Political and Public Decision-making", Public Union for Gender Equality and Women's Initiatives, Baku (2009), accessed 24 February, 2012, [http://www.gender-az.org/alter\\_m/eng/COE\\_recommendations\\_decision\\_making\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gender-az.org/alter_m/eng/COE_recommendations_decision_making_eng.pdf).

<sup>15</sup> "Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges", UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europhetecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>

Here I will present statistical data on women share in education system. Women share in general education institutions is 48.4 percent<sup>16</sup>. In secondary specialized educational institutions were studying 67.5 percent of women and 32.5 percent of men. In higher education (including doctoral studies) there were studying 45 percent of women and 55 percent of men. However, it should be noticed that there are very big discrepancies in education level between regions. According to data of the State Student Admittance Commission, the number of girls among university entrants from Yardimli, Lerik, Jalilabad and Masalli districts belonging to the same Southern region fluctuates from 8 percent to 33 percent, while the number of girls among university entrants from Zaqatala, Balaken, and Gakh districts in the North-West part of the Republic is 63–69 percent<sup>17</sup>.

Highest share of women was in following fields of studies: education (91 percent), public health (86 percent), technology of wide consumption goods (84 percent), natural and technical specialties (79 percent), highest men's share was in marine engineering and navigation (99 percent), technical and public utilities (97 percent), energy and energy machine building (88 percent), operation and exploitation of transport (87 percent), geology and exploration of minerals (87 percent).

In study year 2010/2011 totally in higher education were studying 140241 students, 46 percent of them were women. Most men and women obtain general education, and from population of 10,000, only 35 persons obtain higher education diploma<sup>18</sup>.

The education system is one the few fields of occupation in Azerbaijan where women are in the majority. Women make up 71 percent of all educators employed in this field, men – only 29 percent. At the same time, a vertical gender concentration exists despite the small number of men working in the education institutions. Men form the overwhelming majority (83 percent) among secondary school principals across the country. Between state higher educational institutions' teacher staff there are many women, however they occupy lower positions: 74 percent of women are teachers' assistants, 59 percent are lectors, only 33 percent are docents and 15 percent are professors<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>16</sup> Everywhere there are presented percents from total number of students in education system. Data covers 2009/2010 study year. Source: Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee, accessed 27 February, 2012, <http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/education/en/index.shtml>

<sup>17</sup> „Report on the monitoring of the implementation of Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on balanced participation of Women and Men in Political and Public Decision-making”, Public Union for Gender Equality and Women's Initiatives, Baku (2009):26, accessed 24 February, 2012, [http://www.gender-az.org/alter\\_m/eng/COE\\_recommendations\\_decision\\_making\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gender-az.org/alter_m/eng/COE_recommendations_decision_making_eng.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> Issue of Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://www.azstat.org/publications/azfigures/2011/en/007.shtml>

<sup>19</sup> It should be noticed that, concerning the percentage of women in highest positions, the situation in Azerbaijan is similar to European countries. E.g, in European Union in 2007 there were 17 percent of women in A grade positions. Source: “She figures 2009. Statistics and Indicators on Gender Equality in Science”. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009:76, accessed at 30 April, 2012, [http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document\\_library/pdf\\_06/she\\_figures\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/she_figures_2009_en.pdf)

In total, in higher educational institutions there are 48 percent of women and 52 percent of men<sup>20</sup>.

Summing-up, statistical data shows that gender gap of students in state higher education institutions is not big (45:55). Women tend to choose traditional feminine professions, by the same forming conditions for professional segregation in labour market. The main reason is lying in gender stereotypes, which are very strong in Azerbaijan<sup>21</sup>. The number of women occupied in higher education system is higher than number of men, but number women in grade A positions is much lower than that of men. However, it is tendency which exists in the European Union (EU) as well; though, vertical professional segregation in the EU is much lower than in Azerbaijan.

### *Women in labour market*

Women status in the labour market can be shown using three criteria: occupation, professional segregation and revenues.

### *Occupation*

According to the data presented by Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee<sup>22</sup>, in 2010 between all occupied persons, there were 48.5 percent of women and 51.5 percent of men. Unemployment level of women was higher than that of men and made 6.9 percent, unemployment level of men was 4.4 percent (total level of unemployment was 6.1 percent). In the beginning of 2012, according to State Statistics Committee's information, the level of unemployment was only 5.73 percent; basing on data of 2008, in 8 of 15 industry branches, monthly women work time was longer than that of men<sup>23</sup>. However, it should be noticed, that official data of state unemployment level can be not exact: as Mammadov argues, the concealed unemployment is still high in the country<sup>24</sup>. Though there is no official or unofficial statistics, it is assumed that the number of people involved in labour activities without any official labour relations is not less than the number of people involved in official labour relations<sup>25</sup>. Therefore employment indica-

<sup>20</sup> Data taken from Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee website, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/education/en/index.shtml#>

<sup>21</sup> "Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges", UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>

<sup>22</sup> Data taken from Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee website, accessed 28 February, 2012, [http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/002\\_1.shtml](http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/002_1.shtml)

<sup>23</sup> „Wage indicator“, accessed 27 February, 2012, <http://www.wageindicator.org/main/wageindicatorcountries/country-report-azerbaijan>

<sup>24</sup> „Official unemployment in Azerbaijan decreased by 0.24%“, Contact.az, accessed 22 February, 2012, <http://contact.az/docs/2012/Economics&Finance/02222207en.htm>

<sup>25</sup> Sahib Mammadov, „Employment policy in Azerbaijan“, Citizens' Labour Rights Protection League, Baku (2008):12, accessed 30 April, 2012, <http://clrpl.az/upload/file/Employment%20policy%20in%20Azerbaijan.pdf>

tors possibly do not reflect real situation in the labour market. However, statistics shows following tendencies: women are almost the same occupied as men, but they usually form the majority in jobs with low status and low wage, mostly in industrial enterprises. Women are taking any job, often worse than their education would allow, if she needs to contribute to the family's maintenance. The following tendency prevails: educated men are easier employed than non educated men or educated women<sup>26</sup>. Partially it is conditioned by still tenacious stereotype of man – breadwinner, which is supported by employers as well. As surveys show, 36.1 percent of women and 42.9 percent of men think that wife should not work if her husband's income is sufficient for family's maintenance<sup>27</sup>. Therefore man always gets priority over woman to be employed. Shortage of work places for women today is mostly reflected in insufficiency of flexible jobs (part-time, flexible working days and week, flexible schedule, work at home, etc.) relevant to the role of women both in society and in family<sup>28</sup>.

### *Professional segregation*

In Azerbaijan people divide jobs into “male“ and “female“ jobs. As data of UNDP survey shows<sup>29</sup>, traditionally professions which both by men and women are assigned to women are such as teachers, doctors, and other “light“ professions, mostly in health care, education and social services' sector, whereas “heavy“ jobs (e.g. work on the police force, at construction sites, in factories, in engineering) are identified as male. Statistical data of Azerbaijan State Statistics committee shows that in 2010 in rendering of health and social services sector there were working 77 percent of women, in education sector – 67 percent of women. Men in construction industry made 92 percent of all employed persons, in mining – 87 percent, in electricity, gas, water supply and distribution industry- 82 percent, in transport, storage and communications – 80 percent, in agriculture, hunting and forestry – 80 percent, in fishing, fish breeding- 77 percent. The smallest number of men was working in education system- 33 % and in rendering of health and social services sector – 24 percent<sup>30</sup>.

<sup>26</sup> “Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges”, 24, UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>.

<sup>27</sup> “Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges”, 26, UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>.

<sup>28</sup> Mammadov S. Employment policy in Azerbaijan. Citizens' Labour Rights Protection League, Baku, 2008:14. Accessed on 30 April, 2012. <http://clrp.az/upload/file/Employment%20policy%20in%20Azerbaijan.pdf>

<sup>29</sup> “Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges”, 22, UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>.

<sup>30</sup> Data taken from Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee website, accessed 28 February, 2012, [http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/002\\_1.shtml](http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/002_1.shtml)

### *Income*

Data for 2002 year shows that even in the sectors traditionally predominant by women – rendering of health care and social services, where 5.6 times more women than men are employed – female incomes were just 54.4 percent of equivalent male incomes. The reason is that women in the best case occupy positions in the average level, and senior decision-making positions are occupied by men. Similar pattern is found in the education sector, where twice more women than men are employed, but woman's average salary makes only 77.7 percent of man's salary<sup>31</sup>. Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee data for 2010 shows that after 8 years the situation became a bit better: woman's average monthly salary made 58.5 percent of man's salary<sup>32</sup>. It is determined by high vertical professional segregation- only small number of women occupies senior and by the same, better paid positions in most sectors of employment.

Summing up, first of all we can notice conditionally high level of employment of women, compared to men. It can be related with economic situation in the country. In 1999, the level of poverty in Azerbaijan was 60 percent<sup>33</sup>, so during the economic turmoil many women were forced to start working in order to help for their families to survive<sup>34</sup>. Till 2010, level of poverty was remarkably decreased and reached 15.8 percent<sup>35</sup>. Also we can notice high horizontal and vertical professional segregation. Horizontal segregation can be explained both by stereotypes what is female or male jobs, and by data of UNDP survey: 45.1 percent of men and 38.4 percent of women thought that a woman's job should be compatible with her housework, so women choose such professions which allow them easier reconcile professional and family life. Besides that, amount of free from work time is not very important for men, because, as surveys show, women in average 3.7 times more time devote for housework<sup>36</sup>. From the other side, the stereotypes play important role, due to of which women don't choose traditionally "male" professions. In despite of the fact that, as Vida Kanopiene points out "the same tendencies can be seen in all societies, no matter of social order and peculiarities of the

<sup>31</sup> „Country gender assessment. Azerbaijan“, Asian Development Bank, East and Central Asia Regional Department and Regional and Sustainable Development Department. December (2005), accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Country-Gender-Assessments/cga-aze.pdf>

<sup>32</sup> Data taken from the website of Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee, accessed 28 February, 2012, [http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/009\\_1.shtml](http://www.azstat.org/statinfo/labour/en/009_1.shtml)

<sup>33</sup> „Population below poverty line, Azerbaijan“, Index Mundi, accessed 29 February, 2012, <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=aj&v=69>

<sup>34</sup> „Monitoring of implementation of the Convention on Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in Azerbaijan“, Public Union for Gender Equality and women's Initiatives, Baku (2009), accessed 20 February 2012, [http://www.gewi-az.org/eng/bulletin/alternative\\_report\\_CEDAW\\_GEWI\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gewi-az.org/eng/bulletin/alternative_report_CEDAW_GEWI_eng.pdf)

<sup>35</sup> „Azerbaijan Statistics“, Rural poverty portal, accessed 23 February, 2012, <http://operations.ifad.org/web/guest/country/statistics/tags/azerbaijan>

<sup>36</sup> „Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges“, 27, UNDP Azerbaijan 2007, accessed 28 February, 2012, <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethesis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>

market: the specialisation of women in paid work sphere is closely related with their traditional roles in society and family. Women everywhere are predominating in social and other services' sector, men- in industrial sector"<sup>37</sup>, by the same determining the differences in salaries (traditionally "male" professions are also better paid), there are some possibilities to change the situation. There should be used the means, used in most of old welfare states, which are helping to involve men into accomplishment of practical and emotional care works; simultaneously the education on gender questions, services of psychological support to the partners, putting into practice educational programs should be developed<sup>38</sup>.

### **Influence of Religion on Women Status**

In many Muslims' societies women are not in equal status with men. At some extent it is determined by character of Islam religion itself: Islam attributes different social roles for women and men; strict moral code is applied for women's behaviour and dressing, it stimulates gender segregation in public space. However, as King points out, Azerbaijan is one of the most liberal countries with a Muslim majority. It is a secular society, controlled by civil political leaders. Even though more than 90 percent of Azerbaijanis consider themselves Muslims, many do not follow the practice of Islam closely<sup>39</sup>; presumably, it is the outcome of long period of atheism ideology. From the other side, as investigations show, after the country gained its independence in 1991, the religiosity of Azerbaijanis, especially young, revived. Partially it was influenced by "opened doors" to outside world and increasing contacts with surrounding Muslim countries (Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States, Iran and Turkey), from the other side, it was consequence of searching of inner peace and stability by people which felt disappointment due to growing social inequality, increasing corruption and social insecurity. During the period of transformation, in Azerbaijan there has been created practice of Islam, different from prevailing in the other Muslim countries: here religious practice is understood first of all as the path of personal spiritual perfection; equality under current laws (a legacy of the Soviet system) is taken for granted, polygamy is not spreading and restrictions for women under the Sharia law are dismissed as irrelevant<sup>40</sup>. The present-day rise in religiosity and intrusion of Islamist ideology into family life does not create conflict or tension in many aspects of everyday

<sup>37</sup> Vida Kanopienė, „Lietuvos moterų padėtis darbo rinkoje“, in *Moterys Lietuvoje*, (Vilnius: Moterų informacijos centras, 2000), 70.

<sup>38</sup> Aušra Maslauskaitė, „Lytis, globa ir kultūriniai gerovės kapitalizmo barjerai Lietuvoje“, *Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas* 3 (2004): 49.

<sup>39</sup> David C. King, *Cultures of the world. Azerbaijan* (Marshall Cavendish International (Asia) Private Limited, 2006), 73.

<sup>40</sup> Farideh Heyat, „New Veiling in Azerbaijan Gender and Globalized Islam“, *European Journal of Women's Studies* Vol. 15(4) (2008):361–376

life<sup>41</sup>, therefore, we can suppose, it does not stimulate the increase in gender inequality. From the other side, Islamist understanding of womanhood, women's behaviour code, gender segregation has been entrenched in country's traditional culture long before soviet period. Soviet era only partially changed society's mentality, ensuring women rights to have job and to be educated, however, it has not changed significantly the conception of traditional gender roles.

Globalisation has influenced the society as well. Azerbaijan was influenced both by Western culture (leading to interception of life styles, models of consumerism) and by Islamic practice being transferred by neighbouring Muslim countries<sup>42</sup>. As Inglehart and Norris<sup>43</sup> argue, „the real fault line between the West and Islam [...] concerns gender equality and sexual liberalization. As younger generations in the West have gradually become more liberal on these issues, Muslim nations have remained the most traditional societies in the world.” Previous findings confirmed by comparative researchers showed that after 1990, the position of women in post-Soviet society reflected a trend: a return to traditional relationships based on gender in all areas of life<sup>44</sup>. However, later (especially after 4<sup>th</sup> UN World Conference on Women (Beijing, 1995), where has been accepted Beijing's Declaration and Beijing's action platform) women all over the world started fighting more actively for getting equal rights with men. During the last few decades, Azerbaijan consolidated gender equality *de jure*, many women NGOs were created in order to help women to deal with various problems. However, analysis shows that in present time only highly educated women (especially in the capital Baku) have more economic facilities and higher potential of autonomy, they are also more mobile. The status of the majority of other women has not changed significantly<sup>45</sup>. Thus, probably we may conclude that Islamic cultural traditions, being favourable for prevailing of patriarchal attitudes, is one of important reasons due to of which the consolidation of gender equality in Azerbaijan is going quite slowly in comparison with other post-soviet countries (for example, Baltic republics). From the other side, we can observe the similarly strong patriarchal culture in some post-soviet Christian countries situated in Caucasus region as well: in Armenia (84<sup>th</sup> position according to Gender Gap Index, most inhabitants follow Christianity and belong to Armenian Apostolic Church) and Georgia (86<sup>th</sup> position according to GGI; most inhabitants belong to Christian Orthodox church). Therefore we can only emphasise the influence of various underpinning factors on present women's status in Azerbaijan: from

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid*

<sup>42</sup> Farideh Heyat, „New Veiling in Azerbaijan Gender and Globalized Islam“, *European Journal of Women's Studies* Vol. 15(4) (2008): 361–376.

<sup>43</sup> Ronald Inglehart R and Pippa Norris, *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World* (New York: Cambridge University Press), 2003.

<sup>44</sup> Olga Zdravomyslova, 'The Position of Women', in *Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality*, ed. David Lane (London: Longman, 1995), 195.

<sup>45</sup> Farideh Heyat, „Globalization and Changing Gender Norms in Azerbaijan“, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 8 (3 September 2006): 394–412.

one side, we can see post-soviet past's influence, still prevailing patriarchal society's norms and traditions, from the other side – effect of ongoing democratisation process and consolidation of women's rights in the legislation, other Government's efforts in order to ensure better gender equality in the country, from third side – effect of globalisation, bringing western life styles and attitudes (especially it is seen in capital<sup>46</sup>).

## Conclusions and Recommendations

- Soviet period had following impact on women status: decrease in illiteracy level, higher women participation in labour market. On that period political participation was prerogative of men. Woman had to keep “three corners”: to be a wife, employee, mother. During transition period all post-soviet countries experienced various economic, political, cultural changes leading to changes in all spheres of life.
- Country established provisions for gender equality in the laws, but 20 years' period of democratic regime was too short to establish gender equality *de facto*: still there are noticeable differences in gender status in all analysed spheres of life: in political life, in labour market, in education system. Worse status of women can be related with the influence of society's patriarchal attitudes, prevailing stereotypes on gender roles, problems of reconciling of work and family obligations.
- Women's political participation is relatively low due to social attitudes, difficulties, experienced in reconciling political activities with family life, lack of education. However, it is the sphere in which the women in Azerbaijan made the biggest progress in the last few years.
- Azerbaijani women are weakly represented in state governance, international institutions, state service, and various organizations. The status of women in mentioned institutions is determined by domination of men in political structures, continued discrimination in distribution of roles between genders in decision-taking level.
- Women choose for studies traditionally „feminine“, men- traditionally „masculine“ professions, in such way forming conditions for horizontal professional segregation.
- Women status in labour market is characterised by relatively high level of women occupation which is partially related with necessity determined by economical situation to contribute to the family's maintenance, and also by professional segregation. Though horizontal professional segregation exist in all countries of the world, however, in Azerbaijan we can observe very strong *Glass ceiling* phenomenon leading to high vertical segregation in all professional fields, including education sector, where the highest number of women is occupied.

<sup>46</sup> For example, in the capital you will not notice gender segregation in public space. For more details see Farideh Heyat, „Globalization and Changing Gender Norms in Azerbaijan“ *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 8 (3 September 2006): 394–412.

- Islamic meaning of womanhood, norms regulating women's behaviour and gender segregation was established in Azerbaijani culture much before soviet period. And in despite that during soviet period women got more rights (right to work, to get education), traditional meaning of gender roles have not changed significantly. However, other non-Muslim Caucasus region's states (Georgia, Armenia) also remained very patriarchal societies and women status there is not much better than in Azerbaijan. Therefore we can only state that present status of Azerbaijani women is influenced by various underpinning factors such as post-soviet past's influence, patriarchal society's norms and traditions, religious attitudes, ongoing democratisation, and globalisation.
- In order to improve the status of the women in the country it is suggested to give more attention to the education on gender equality (to stimulate better understanding of gender equality) and to special means applied in national level, inducing equal opportunities of both gender. In the labour market would be purposeful to increase practice of flexible forms of employment, to improve public child care services, social services for cared family members, in such way decreasing women's workload at home. Political participation may be increased by political socialization executed already in school level, in informal education, and also application of political quotas in political representation.

## References

- Aidukaitė, Jolanta. "Welfare reforms in Central and Eastern Europe: a new type of welfare regime?" *Ekonomika*. Vol. 89(4) (2010): 7–24.
- "Azerbaijan. Gender Equality and Cultural Policy". Compendium. Cultural policies and trends in Europe. Accessed 10 February, 2012. <http://www.culturalpolicies.net/web/azerbaijan.php?aid=4210>.
- "Azerbaijan Human Development Report 2007. Gender Attitudes In Azerbaijan: Trends And Challenges". UNDP Azerbaijan 2007. Accessed 28 February, 2012. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/nationalreports/europethecis/azerbaijan/name,3325,en.html>.
- Azerbaijan State Statistics Committee. Accessed 28 February, 2012. [www.azstat.org](http://www.azstat.org).
- „Azerbaijan Statistics“. Rural poverty portal. Accessed 23 February, 2012. <http://operations.ifad.org/web/guest/country/statistics/tags/azerbaijan>.
- Contact.az. "Official unemployment in Azerbaijan decreased by 0.24%". Accessed 23 February, 2012. <http://contact.az/docs/2012/Economics&Finance/02222207en.htm>.
- "Country gender assessment. Azerbaijan." Asian Development Bank. East and Central Asia Regional Department and Regional and Sustainable Development Department. December (2005). Accessed 28 February, 2012. <http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Country-Gender-Assessments/cga-aze.pdf>
- Hausmann, Ricardo, Tyson, Laura D. and Zahidi, Saadia. *The Global Gender Gap Report*

2011. World Economic Forum. 1 November 2011. Accessed 28 February, 2012. <http://reports.weforum.org/global-gender-gap-2011/>
- Heyat, Farideh. *Azeri Women in Transition. Women in Soviet and Post-Soviet Azerbaijan*. London, New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002.
- Heyat, Farideh. "New Veiling in Azerbaijan Gender and Globalized Islam". *European Journal of Women's Studies* Vol. 15(4), (2008): 361–376.
- Heyat, Farideh. "Globalization and Changing Gender Norms in Azerbaijan". *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 8 (3 September 2006): 394–412.
- Inglehart, Ronald, Norris, Pippa. *Rising Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around the World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Kanopienė, Vida. "Lietuvos moterų padėtis darbo rinkoje". In *Moterys Lietuvoje, 66–81*. Vilnius: Moterų informacijos centras, 2000.
- King, David C. *Cultures of the world. Azerbaijan*. Marshall Cavendish International (Asia) Private Limited, 2006.
- Mammadov, Sahib. *Employment policy in Azerbaijan*. Citizens' Labour Rights Protection League. Baku, 2008. Accessed 30 April, 2012. <http://clrpl.az/upload/file/Employment%20policy%20in%20Azerbaijan.pdf>.
- Marcinkevičienė, Dalia. *Lietuvių šeimos ideologijos: nuo 19 a. tradicijos ir nacionalizmo iki sovietinės šeimos politikos 1940–1970 m.* Vilnius: Vilnius university, 2009. Accessed 29 February, 2012. [http://vddb.library.lt/fedora/get/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02-2009-D\\_20090409\\_090031-09389/DS.005.0.01.ETD](http://vddb.library.lt/fedora/get/LT-eLABa-0001:E.02-2009-D_20090409_090031-09389/DS.005.0.01.ETD).
- Matonytė, Irmina. "Politinio atstovavimo galimybių plėtra? Lietuvos parlamentarų požiūrio į moterų kvotas analizė." *Parlamento studijos* No. 10 (2011). Accessed 24 February, 2012. [http://www.parlamentostudijos.lt/Nr10/10\\_politika\\_1.htm](http://www.parlamentostudijos.lt/Nr10/10_politika_1.htm).
- "Monitoring of implementation of the Convention on Elimination of All Types of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in Azerbaijan". Public Union for Gender Equality and women's Initiatives. Baku: 2009. Accessed 20 February 2012. [http://www.gewi-az.org/eng/bulletin/alternative\\_report\\_CEDAW\\_GEWI\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gewi-az.org/eng/bulletin/alternative_report_CEDAW_GEWI_eng.pdf).
- Najafzadeh, Mehrangiz, Mennerick, Lewis A. "Gender and Social Entrepreneurship in Societies in Transition: the Case of Azerbaijan." *Journal of Third World Studies* Vol. XX, No. 2 (2003): 31–48.
- Pascall, Gillian, Manning, Nick. "Gender and social policy: comparing welfare states in Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union". *Journal of European Social Policy* vol. 10 No. 3 (August 1, 2000): 240–266.
- „Population below poverty line, Azerbaijan“. Index Mundi. Accessed 29 February, 2012. <http://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=aj&v=69>.
- Reingardienė, Jolanta. *Europos lyčių lygybės strategija: kintančios lyčių politikos privalumai ir grėsmės*. Center for Equality Advancement (CEA): 2004. Accessed 29 February, 2012. <http://www.gap.lt/main.php/id/766/lang/1>.
- "Report on the monitoring of the implementation of Recommendation Rec (2003) 3 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe to Member States on bal-

- anced participation of Women and Men in Political and Public Decision-making”. Public Union for Gender Equality and Women’s Initiatives. Baku: 2009. Accessed 24 February, 2012. [http://www.gender-az.org/alter\\_m/eng/COE\\_recommendations\\_decision\\_making\\_eng.pdf](http://www.gender-az.org/alter_m/eng/COE_recommendations_decision_making_eng.pdf).
- “She figures 2009. Statistics and Indicators on Gender Equality in Science”. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2009. Accessed 30 April, 2012. [http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document\\_library/pdf\\_06/she\\_figures\\_2009\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/science-society/document_library/pdf_06/she_figures_2009_en.pdf).
- Šidlauskienė, Virginija. “Moterų politinės socializacijos projekcijos savivaldos tarybų rinkimuose”. *Lyčių studijos ir tyrimai* 7 (2009): 17–33.
- Zdravomyslova, Olga. “The Position of Women” in *Russia in Transition: Politics, Privatisation and Inequality*, edited by David Lane. London: Longman, 1995.





# Georgia and Russia: What's on Their Minds?

ALEXANDER RONDELI

*Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, Tbilisi, Georgia*

## Introduction

Will the new Georgian leadership that came to power in October 2012 change its position towards Russia? Will Georgia be more “cooperative” with Moscow and accept the latter’s vision of Georgia as an “amputated” state and a “friendly neighbour” or even a satellite of Russia? The fact is that within the post-Soviet space one cannot find a state more resistant to Russia’s hegemony than little Georgia, located in the center of the South Caucasus. The South Caucasus, because of internal and external threats and challenges, as well as unresolved conflicts, has been plagued by instability and a security deficit. Geopolitical competition for the region contributes to its instability. Ethnopolitical conflicts in Abkhazia, Samachablo (South Ossetia) and Nagorno-Karabagh, as well as the August 2008 war, once again demonstrated how much the region is in need of security<sup>1</sup>.

The region forms an arena of two competing integration visions. One is “the region’s anchoring and eventual integration into Euro-Atlantic security and economic systems.” The other model is Russia’s:

It [Russia] has sought to regain predominance over the South Caucasus through military presence, manipulation of ethnic conflicts, control over energy supplies, takeover of insolvent industries through debt-for-assets swaps, support for Moscow-oriented local political forces, and expansion of government-connected shadow business from Russia interpenetrating with local counterparts. Thriving on the insecurity and weakness of nation-states in the region, this integration model aims to draw them into a Russian-led political, military and economic bloc, in which Moscow would exercise *droits de regard* over these states’ policies<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> On the region see: Tomasz Stepniewski, “The European Union and the Southern Caucasus: Geopolitics and Security,” *Warsaw East European Review*, Vol. II, 2012, 101–111.

<sup>2</sup> Svante E. Cornell, Roger N. McDermott, William O’Malley, Vladimir Socor, S. Frederick Starr. *Regional Security in the South Caucasus: The Role of NATO* (Washington, D.C.: CACI, 2004), 16.

The dynamics and internal rivalries in the South Caucasus are exacerbated by the competing geopolitical agendas of so-called “regional superpowers” (Russia, Turkey, Iran) and also by such outside stakeholders as the EU and US.

Western support for the South Caucasus independent states’ territorial integrity is based on a principle enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act. As Jeffrey Mankoff notes, “While its broad range of initiatives gives Brussels a degree of leverage with the South Caucasus states, the EU’s overall effectiveness is limited by disagreement within Europe about the ultimate goal of engagement in the former Soviet region.”<sup>3</sup>

Russia remains the most powerful outside player, given its ability to project power on both sides of the Caucasus Range. The August 2008 war between Georgia and Russia strengthened Russian military presence in the region, as it “solidified the *de facto* separation between the Georgian state and its breakaway provinces and put Georgia’s NATO accession on indefinite hold.”<sup>4</sup>

Turkey is one of the three “regional superpowers,” with its own strategic and security interests in the South Caucasus. Turkey’s relations with each country of the region have their own distinct dynamics, yet the nature of relations with one country fundamentally affects relations with others<sup>5</sup>. “Despite the lack of clear-cut victories thus far Turkish traction in the region is gradually increasing on certain levels. . . as failures of the West and weakening Western resolve in the region have incidentally increased Turkey’s relative influence.”<sup>6</sup>

Closer ties have emerged between Turkey and Russia in the last decade, especially in the economic sphere, but as Stephen Larrabee notes, “Turkish and Russian goals and ambitions conflict in a number of areas, and particularly the Caucasus (a region in which Turkey has deep and long-standing strategic interests.) These conflicting interests and goals make any serious realignment unlikely.”<sup>7</sup>

Iran’s interest in the South Caucasus is mainly influenced by Caspian energy politics, but its role in the region so far is much less significant than Russia’s and Turkey’s. “One of the primary goals of Tehran in the Caucasus is to prevent events in the region from influencing Iran’s own ethnic minorities.”<sup>8</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Jeffrey Mankoff, *The Big Caucasus: Between Fragmentation and Integration*. CSIS, March 2012, 19.

<sup>4</sup> Mankoff, *The Big Caucasus*, 1.

<sup>5</sup> Nigar Goksel, “Turkish Policy towards the Caucasus: A Balance Sheet of the Balancing Act,” *Black Sea Discussion Paper Series* 2011/1, BST, 5.

<sup>6</sup> Goksel, “Turkish Policy towards the Caucasus,” 5.

<sup>7</sup> E. Stephen Larrabee, *Troubled Partnership: U.S. – Turkish Relations in an Era of Global Geopolitical Change* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2010), 50.

<sup>8</sup> Brenda Shaffer, “Partners in Need: The Strategic Relationship of Russia and Iran,” *Policy Paper*, No. 57, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., 2001, 41.

## From Confrontation to War

There are different geopolitical and geo-economic advantages and constraints on Georgia's sovereign existence, but the war with Russia in 2008 suggests that the most serious external constraint on Georgia's development as a sovereign, stable and democratizing state is Russian neo-imperialism. Moscow wants Georgia to accept Russian domination and its military presence in Georgia. This is not a new problem for Georgia. In 1918–1921, when the Democratic Republic of Georgia was trying to defend its sovereignty, Bolshevik Russia decided to meet its geo-strategic aspirations in the Caucasus by annexing the sovereign states of the South Caucasus one by one. The first victim was Azerbaijan in May 1920, then Armenia the following December, and, in February 1921, Bolshevik Russia took control of Georgia. Today's reality derives from a different set of historical circumstances, but post-Soviet Russia has the same geo-strategic ambitions. Russia is trying to undermine Georgia's sovereign statehood using separatism, economic blockades, military threats, energy blackmail, and direct aggression. Many believe that in August 2008, Russia came very close to repeating the 1921 annexation of Georgia.

Since Georgia's independence, Georgian-Russian relations have been difficult and conflict-ridden. Russia has tried to maintain military presence in Georgia and keep the country within its military political orbit. Moscow has always considered Georgia to be a key country in terms of Russia's political and military presence in the Caucasus. From the very beginning of independence, which was extremely difficult for the newborn state, Georgia found itself under Moscow's pressure, which tried to keep the country in its sphere of influence at any expense through political pressure, economic blackmail, and support of separatism in the Georgian provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia<sup>9</sup>.

By invading Georgia in 2008 Moscow wanted to show its neighbors and the world that in the so-called "near abroad" (the post-Soviet space) Russian rules would operate—and nobody else's. Georgia is a strategically key country for Moscow. If Moscow does not retain control over Georgia, it will be unable to restore its power in the South Caucasus and claim its role as the major power in the region. Power over Georgia allows Russia to feel more confident about its control over the unstable North Caucasus, and to slow Turkey's increasing influence over Turkic-speaking former Soviet republics and peoples. As a satellite of Russia, Georgia could cut energy-rich Azerbaijan and landlocked Central Asian states off from the West by closing access to the Black Sea. Russia would have a major military presence in the region and easy access to its ally in the South Caucasus—Armenia—which is hostile to Turkey and Azerbaijan. Finally, by controlling Georgia, the Kremlin blocks the penetration of European and Euro-Atlantic structures in the Caucasus. As Stephen Jones argues, "for Russia, the war was not fundamentally about Georgia.

<sup>9</sup> For Russian experts writings about those issues, see: A. Arbatov, *Bezopasnost': Rossiyskiy vybor* (Moskva: Epicentr 1999), 163–170, Sergei Oznobishchev, "Kogo lechit' 'ot Gruzii'," *Mezhdunarodnye protsessy*, Vol. 9, No. 2 (26), May – August 2011.

It was bound up with larger international issues, such as eastward expansion of NATO, the recognition of Kosovo, Russia's security in the North Caucasus, and the West's challenge to Russian control of oil and gas supplies in Eurasia.<sup>10</sup> These are all good reasons why the Kremlin believes Georgia must be kept in Russia's military-political orbit, and are also powerful factors in Moscow's efforts to put Georgia under constant political pressure. Regaining control over Georgia would restore Russia as an unchallenged hegemon in the entire region and strengthen Moscow's ambitions and efforts to dominate the post-Soviet space.

It is important to mention that after the collapse of the USSR, Russia remains the only neighbouring country with which Georgia still has not concluded a so-called framework agreement on friendship and cooperation. Both countries failed to sign it because of two paragraphs Russia insisted on including in the text of the agreement: one about Russia's special rights in the conflict regions of sovereign Georgia, and another about the obligation of the signing parties not to allow any third party to deploy its military or military infrastructure on the signing parties' territories. It was clear that in spite of numerous statements of respect for Georgia's territorial integrity, Russia was interested in maintaining leverage over Georgia from the very beginning. Moscow did not respect Georgia's sovereign rights, nor was it interested in acting as a friendly neighbour and fair mediator.

Russia's August 2008 invasion of Georgia showed that *Realpolitik* was still alive and well in the post-Soviet space. Analyzing the August 2008 war, Anthony Cordesman argues that "more powerful states will bend or break rules when they feel it is in their interest to do so and when there is no opposing power bloc that can pose a convincing threat."<sup>11</sup>

Little Georgia deals with the regional superpower, which "is playing a rough game of competitive international politics and coercive geo-economics . . ." Colin Gray argues, before going on to say that "Russia. . . is emphatically not post-modern, not post-military, and not post-geopolitical in its approach to international politics and security"<sup>12</sup>.

The action against Georgia was a logical step from the point of view of Moscow leadership. The recognition of Kosovo by the US and some other countries helped Russia to explain its aggression against Georgia. The main reason was Moscow's wish to show the West that Georgia is Russia's backyard and no one else's. Moscow was also irritated by the possibility of NATO's possible eastern expansion. As Stephen Jones mentions, "The war underlined the major security challenges Georgia faces. It was the culmination—not the beginning—of an 18-year conflict."<sup>13</sup> On February 6, 2007, long

<sup>10</sup> Stephen Jones, *Georgia: A Political History Since Independence* (London – New York: I. B. Tauris, 2013), 250.

<sup>11</sup> Anthony Cordesman, "The Georgia War and the Century of "Real Power," *CSIS Commentary*, August 18, 2008.

<sup>12</sup> S.C. Gray, "The 21<sup>st</sup> Century Security Environment and the Future of War," *Parameters*, Winter Issue, XXXVIII, (4) 2008-09, 21.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen Jones, *A Political History Since Independence*, 243.

before 2008 war, Russia's ambassador in Tbilisi, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, publicly called on Georgia to adopt a status of neutrality. He cautioned that Georgia might lose both breakaway regions, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, unless it desisted from its efforts to join NATO<sup>14</sup>. On March 21, 2007, in a speech to the Russian Duma, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov referred to Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria as “republics,” not long after his ministry had begun to refer to those regions' leaders as “presidents” in official documents<sup>15</sup>. Russia's envoy to NATO, Dimitry Rogozin, told Reuters on March 11, 2008: “As soon as Georgia gets some kind of prospect from Washington of NATO membership, the next day the process of real secession of these two territories from Georgia will begin.”<sup>16</sup> Recently, some revelations from Kremlin leaders have confirmed that the invasion of Georgia was premeditated<sup>17</sup>.

Despite certain periods of relative improvement in Georgian-Russian relations (one was immediately after President Saakashvili came to power), these relations have mostly been tense. The Russian propaganda against Georgia was extremely intense and reached a point where the majority of the population of Russia started to consider *Georgia* the more hostile and dangerous(!) country. Georgian authorities accused Russia of neo-imperialism, supporting separatism in Georgia, economic blackmail, and so forth.

As Russian expert Sergey Markedonov correctly mentions, the numerous problems between the two countries began accumulating in the 90s and were intensified by the Rose Revolution<sup>18</sup>.

Apparently the Georgian government somewhat underestimated Moscow's determination to obtain whatever it wanted and not to concede the post-Soviet space, and specifically the South Caucasus, to the West—and least of all to the US. Moscow managed to outmaneuver Tbilisi in August of 2008 and invaded Georgia not only with the aim of annexing the South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but with the goal of replacing the government in Tbilisi with one “friendlier” towards Russia. Diplomatic actions from the West forced Russia to stop while approaching the capital of Georgia. The West's intervention led to a peace agreement, but Russia has violated the conditions of the agreement by not leaving Georgia and by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two Georgian provinces, in August of 2008. On the basis of these agreements with Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia has deployed military bases in those regions, a *de facto* occupation of those two Georgian provinces, which contain around 20% of Georgian territory.

<sup>14</sup> *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, March 15, 2007.

<sup>15</sup> *Eurasia Daily Monitor*, March 23, 2007.

<sup>16</sup> *Civil Georgia*, March 11, 2008.

<sup>17</sup> Pavel Felgengauer, “Putin Confirms the Invasion of Georgia Was Preplanned,” *Eurasia Daily Monitor*; August 9, 2012, *Liberation*, August 10, 2012; *Le Figaro*, August 10, 2012.

<sup>18</sup> Sergei Markedonov, “Rossia-Gruzia: bez zavyshehnyh ozhidaniy,” October 10, 2012, <http://politcom.ru/article.php?id=14668>

## No War, No Peace

The 2008 war made relations between Russia and Georgia even more antagonistic. Georgia believes that its historic provinces, Abkhazia and Samachablo (South Ossetia) are occupied by Russia, and Russia should stop occupation, whereas Russia's stance is that there are currently three independent states: Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Georgia's position is broadly supported by the EC, the US and most part of the international community, while Russia's is supported only by Venezuela, Nicaragua, Vanuatu, Nauru, and Tuvalu.

Georgia's declared goals of defending its sovereignty and territorial integrity, fulfilling European and Euro-Atlantic integration, and ensuring the geopolitical importance of the South Caucasus transit corridor are predominantly considered unacceptable by Moscow. As Tengiz Pkhaldze and Nikolay Silaev argue, "Georgia considers the position of Russian Federation to be the main obstacle to implementing objectives that emanate from its national interests. . . furthermore, it sees Moscow as the main source of challenges and threats to its security."<sup>19</sup>

The positions of the West and Russia on Abkhazia and South Ossetia also are radically different, even mutually exclusive, and the West has no instruments to force Russia to abandon its position. Russia's goal is to defend its "gains" in the 2008 war, which it is difficult to imagine that Russia would abandon.

Georgian-Russian economic relations were dealt a serious blow in 2006 when, as a result of political crisis (spy scandal) between the two countries, Russia unilaterally banned imports from Georgia in order to suffocate Georgia's economy. Despite that fact, Russia's investments in the Georgian economy never stopped and even after the 2008 war were among the highest in the world. For example, Russia ranked third in FDI in Georgia in 2010, behind only the Netherlands and the US<sup>20</sup>.

## The "Georgian Dream" and Reality

The situation is in a deadlock, and it is extremely difficult to find the way out. Many in Moscow probably hoped the new government in Tbilisi would not manifest its pro-Western sympathy so apparently, and they did have a certain basis for such a judgment, as the new Prime Minister, Bidzina Ivanishvili, earned his billions in Moscow, knows the Russian elite quite well, and was thus expected to listen to Moscow. So far, from the statements of the new Georgian PM, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and other Georgian

<sup>19</sup> Tengiz Pkhaldze, Nikolay Silaev, "Russian-Georgian Relations in the Context of European Security," *Russia and Georgia: Searching the Way Out* (Tbilisi: Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 12.

<sup>20</sup> "Pranye inostrannye investicii v Gruziu v 2010 g. sokratilis' na 16%," March 12, 2010, <http://www.civil.ge/rus/article.php?id=21772>

officials, we observe calls for improving relations with Russia while maintaining the course towards the West, EU and Euro-Atlantic structures.

After the opposition coalition “Georgian Dream” came to power in Tbilisi, the Georgian authorities made several steps towards Moscow. It stopped broadcasting the Russian-language TV channel *PIK*, which irritated Russia; it made several statements regarding the necessity and desirability of improving relations between the two countries, first of all in the sphere of economy and trade, as well as culture; and it appointed an experienced diplomat, Zurab Abashidze, as a Special Representative of the Prime Minister for negotiations with Russia. So far, the most visible change has been the toning-down of anti-Russian rhetoric.

We should not forget the fact that even before the “Georgian Dream” came to power, Tbilisi did not block Russia’s accession to the WTO<sup>21</sup>.

In the beginning Russia behaved as if it did not get the signals from Tbilisi, and a number of Russian experts even started to assert that Georgia should petition Russia to improve relations, as it was Georgia, not Russia, that needed reconciliation<sup>22</sup>. Certain Russian experts even reacted aggressively to Tbilisi’s efforts<sup>23</sup>.

The fact that the new authorities in Tbilisi announced integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures as its strategic goal did not give rise to enthusiasm in Moscow, which does in fact need normal relations with Georgia. She needs a railway through Georgia, a transit route for military cargo for Russian bases located in Armenia, and many other things. But first of all, she needs Tbilisi’s refusal to follow the Western route and return to Russia’s “guardianship.”

Obviously, the improvement of relations between Georgia and Russia can be achieved through the direct dialogue between Moscow and Tbilisi, but to stand alone vis-à-vis Russia would not be an easy task for Georgia; diplomatic relations between two countries are suspended as a result of August 2008 war. The Geneva negotiations are the only existing form of relations between the two countries, but no progress is visible. Russia is stubbornly maintaining its position and is not going to relinquish anything it has conquered. Georgia, naturally, cannot recognize loss of two of its historic provinces and accept the situation Moscow created via the 2008 war as a new geopolitical reality. Until very recently, Moscow has shown that it is not bothered by the absence of normal relations with Tbilisi and will not have relations with Saakashvili, but instead blames him for the absence of bilateral relations.

Recent developments raise hopes for gradual progress towards normalization and the establishment of wider economic linkages between the two countries. As has already

<sup>21</sup> “Russia’s Accession to the WTO: the Perspective from Tbilisi,” December 20, 2011, <http://www.international-alert.org/print/3165>

<sup>22</sup> Andrei Epifantsev, “Davayte, razreshim Gruzii pouhazhivat’ za Rossiey,” November 4, 2012, <http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1589591.html?forprint>, January 14, 2013.

<sup>23</sup> Yana Amelina, “Komanda Ivanishvili – ‘vtoroe izdanie’ rezhima Saakashvili,” November 19, 2012, <http://www.regnum.ru/news/polit/1594982.html?forprint>

been noted, a reduced level of economic relations between the two neighbors still exists. As Vladimir Papava mentions, “Despite the difficulties and confrontations in Georgian-Russian relations, especially after the August 2008 war, the economic activities between two countries have not been interrupted. . . the Russian capital flow and investments in the Georgian economy have continued.”<sup>24</sup> There is already quite a significant economic basis for the improvement of relations between the two countries.

Is it possible to describe the signals and steps of Tbilisi authorities as a paradigm shift in Georgia’s policy towards Russia? Polish expert Konrad Zasztowt asks this question but suggests it is hard to imagine “any serious reconciliation between governments in Tbilisi and Moscow as long as the problems of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remain as complex and painful.”<sup>25</sup> One can add only that Georgia’s current flirting with Russia has not been backed up by the weakening of Georgia’s pro-Western position so far, which would have been a serious positive signal to Russia.

## Conclusion

Georgia has clearly made its choice in favor of the West. This choice is based on Georgia’s determination to transform its multi-ethnic and multi-confessional society into a viable, modern, inclusive and democratic state. It can be achieved only in close cooperation with European and Euro-Atlantic structures, and not through being Russia’s satellite. Nevertheless, because of the changing and volatile security environment and certain internal political shifts, the finality and irreversibility of this choice still remain in question. To a great extent, the answer depends on the ability of the local elite to deal with complex issues of nation- and state-building and socio-economic development in a Western style. Relations with Russia are one of the factors most capable of influencing Georgia’s ability to continue its pro-Western orientation.

It is clear that Moscow’s pressure on Georgia will continue in hopes of forcing Tbilisi not to follow pro-Western policy and, above all, to accept the so-called “new geopolitical reality,” i.e., the loss of its breakaway provinces and the stronger Russian military presence in Georgia’s sovereign territory. One can guess that this time Moscow will be more creative, combining its traditional blackmail with elements of soft power.

The new leadership in Tbilisi sends signals to Moscow that it wants to normalize bilateral relations with Russia, but it is not clear what it considers “normal” in the relations between the two countries and what cost Georgia is ready to pay for this normalization.

<sup>24</sup> Vladimir Papava, “The Evolution of Economic Relations between Georgia and Russia in the Post-Soviet Period: Past Trends and Perspectives,” *In Russia and Georgia: Searching the Way Out* (Tbilisi: Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, 2011), 64

<sup>25</sup> Konrad Zasztowt, “Georgian Dream’s Foreign Policies: An Attempt to Change the Paradigm?,” *PISM Policy paper*, Vol. 3 (51), February 2013, 6, <http://www.pism.pl/Publications/PISM-Policy-Paper-no-51>

It is difficult to imagine that Russia would change its demands on Georgia and soften its position.

Despite the fact that state institutions today are much more developed than a decade ago and Georgia managed to ensure a peaceful transfer of power through electoral mechanisms, personalities continue to play very significant, if not decisive, roles in Georgian politics. The political leadership will therefore largely determine Georgia's future strategic choices.

As is usually the case with weak states, external factors may decisively influence Georgia's foreign policy behavior and strategic orientation. These factors (Russia's role in the region, relations with the West, regional security problems, shifts in Europe's energy policy, and so on) are uncertain and volatile, and thus not easy to predict.





# Post-Communist Nation-State Building in the South Caucasus and the Challenges of the Consolidation of Demos

YALCHIN MAMMADOV

*University of Lorraine, France*

## Introduction

The nation-State model, as the basic foundation on which all modern political and legal institutions are constructed, is spreading all over the world since the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century and in particular following a wave of decolonization in the second half of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

The concept of Nation-state has a particular importance in the heterogeneous societies characterized by deep ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological cleavages. Today, when any State can pretend its ethnic purity, territoriality principle guarantees territorial unity of State and equality in juridical status of the whole population regardless of its ethnic, linguistic, religious etc composition. Thanks to the democratic character of this concept, the citizen, and not an ethnic group or other communities, is holder of the sovereignty as an individual. All the citizens become members of one nation in political sense of term. It's not proper to the nation-State to dissociate members of ethnic minorities and consider them constitutive elements of another nation in ethnic sense of term. In the basis of this approach stands French republican doctrine. The French concept of Nation is not ethnic but politic – it's the result of an imaginary pact of living together. Ernest Renan in his famous speech called "What is a nation" defined nation as a "daily plebiscite". It means that the citizen is not defined for his or her ethnic and cultural belonging but for voluntary adherence to republican values which's protector is the Republic. Hence, nationality and citizenship concepts are identical insofar as every person accepting republican values is a national of given state in spite of his/her ethnic origins. It can be resumed that there are no communities, therefore, mediators between the state and the individual. The isomorphism of the State and the Nation is explained by the hypothesis that "the State is the legal personification of the Nation and in personifying the Nation the State is destined to last as long as the Nation itself". In this respect, the nation appears as a de-ethnicized human substratum of the State: "The nation is the legal construction of a human society which the constitution posits as unified and

---

<sup>1</sup> Adhémar Esmein, *Eléments de droit constitutionnel français et comparé*, (Sirey, Paris, 8<sup>th</sup> edition), 5-6.

homogenous and of which the state is the political organization; that is the institution-ization of power<sup>2</sup>.” The Nation-State has to define precisely what is meant by “nation”. “The term “nation” must be understood as denoting not a natural phenomenon but, on the contrary, an entity constituted by the logic of the social contract”<sup>3</sup>. In other words, it must be seen not in the sense of *ethnos* but *demos*. The *demos* nation-State must assume the role of liberator of the individual, who is a contracting party to the social contract<sup>4</sup>.

According to research works lead on the application of this concept in Central and Eastern Europe, countries belonging to this region stick more to the notion of ethnic State than Nation-state understood in territorial sense. In these countries of various ethnic groups, still dominates ethnic approach or ethnic interpretation of the term of nation and people. Consequently, they are considered as ethnic states, which mean States of major ethnic group. This being so, members of ethnic minorities are in inferior position compared with major ethnic group. They are, therefore, citizens of the State but not constitutive elements of the Nation-State.

The situation of the Caucasian countries is different from that of Central and Eastern Europe, even though some parallelisms are possible. These three republics that were part of the Soviet Union have been living for a long time in a system where the terms such as nation or people had so-called *stalinian* interpretation that based on ethnic community. The Independence has been followed by the adoption of new national constitutions, cornerstones of the Nation-state, which stress the national unity and reject all cleavages. They don't recognize any intermediary between the State and the individual, declare the people as holder of the sovereignty.

### New Perceptions in the Wake of Soviet Heritage

The Soviet Union was considered as a state without nation. Neither in theory nor in practice was it designed as a nation-state<sup>5</sup>. The ideologists of the Soviet system were convinced that collective ownership would remove national categories, and socialism would unite peoples in an international multicultural state where nations would have lost their ethnic identities. In 1961, Nikita Khrushchev in his speech at the XXII Congress of the Communist Party declared that USSR established a new historical community, that of the different peoples with common traits – this community is the Soviet

<sup>2</sup> François Borella, Preface to *Nation et peuples dans les constitutions modernes*, by Stéphane Pierré-Caps, (Presses Universitaires de Nancy, 1987), 11.

<sup>3</sup> Yoichi Higuchi, *The concept of the Nation-State viewed from outside its birthplace*, in *The transformation of the nation-state in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century*, (Science and Technique of Democracy, No. 22, Council of Europe editions, 1999), 147.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the national question in the Soviet Union and the post-Soviet Eurasia: an institutional account,” *Theory and Society* 23.1, (1994): 52.

nation. The Constitution of the USSR said about it: “*The Communist Party, armed with Marxism-Leninism, determines the general perspectives of the development of society and the course of the home and foreign policy of the USSR, directs the great constructive work of the Soviet people, and imparts a planned, systematic and theoretically substantiated character to their struggle for the victory of communism*”<sup>6</sup>. The Soviet nation thus placed beyond the ethnic nationalities, while accepting their existence. Within the nationality policy of the Soviet years a pyramid of national territorial units was established. This allowed the maximum number of individuals to preserve their nationality without feeling minority within a Soviet Socialist Republic. An ethnic community found its place in the symbolic ethnic hierarchy. The Soviet national concept does not quite fit the traditional concept of national sovereignty. Right to sovereignty and self-determination was ensured in the Soviet Union’s administrative division in accordance with the lines of ethnic separation and constitutional representation in the organs of the country. “The relationship between citizens and the state was more like the relationship between subjects and rulers than a relationship based on participation and sovereignty of the people”<sup>7</sup>. Attempts to create a Soviet nation have failed and in any case, this nation would not replace Soviet nations in the plural, while remaining a supranational phenomenon.

After the dissolution of the Soviet Socialist Federative Republic of Transcaucasia in 1936, the formation of ethnic identity has been structured by the establishment of the national republics and a process of cultural construction that has fostered national consciousness based on the identification of the nation in a territory and in a given state administration. During Stalin’s period the consolidation of the hegemony of titular nations resulted in compartmentalization of other ethnic groups living in the Soviet republics. The number of titular nations corresponded to that of the United Republics, the rest being the minority who enjoyed this privileged status. But it has relatively changed after Stalin’s death and citizens have all become components of a single nation, the Soviet nation, also belonging to their ethnicity (*natsionalnost*). The big losers in this change, of course, were the Soviet Republics, federated units of the Union. Yet it was a double-edged policy because “... the Soviet state, far from removing the boundaries between national groups, has actually strengthened unwittingly giving each “nation” its own territory, government and political elite, official language and even its own official national history”<sup>8</sup>. Yet the idea of a “titular” has reinforced the idea that each national territory of the USSR or each united republic was a “homeland” for a single nationality. The rise of nationalism and the discourse of exclusion are partly explained by this phenomenon.

Unlike some countries in Eastern Europe, where the fusion of the people or the nation in the territorial sense could not be institutionalized, the territoriality principle

<sup>6</sup> Article 6.2 of the Constitution of the USSR (1977).

<sup>7</sup> Jonathan Wheatley, *Le nationalisme « civique » et « ethnique » revisité ; la conceptualisation de l’Etat, de la Nation et du Citoyen dans l’Ex-Union Soviétique*, (Annuaire Français des Relations Internationales, 2007, vol.VIII), 162.

<sup>8</sup> Jonathan Wheatley, *Le nationalisme “civique” et “ethnique” revisité*, 161–162.

is supported in the Constitutions of the South Caucasian republics. The difficulty of implementing of this principle is explained largely by the Soviet past where the ethno-territorial system was in a completely different shape. [...] In the ethno-territorial structure of the USSR, territoriality and individual nationality were more or less independent of one another, a link existed between the national group and “its” territory, but not between individual and territory – and, nationality included in the passport of an individual does not depend on the Republic where he lived, but his ancestry, and almost invariably coincided with his mother tongue. Because the ultimate goal was the creation of a “Soviet people”, there was no attempt to create a civic identity linked to the national territory where citizens lived<sup>9</sup>. Nationality and territory were in compliance neither in practice nor in theory. In addition, the massive and regular deportations of people had made vague sense of territorial belonging. In this regard, Brubaker says that “vast and largely state-sponsored migration, some ethno-demographically “clean” frontiers in areas of historically mixed settlement combined to engender a major mismatch between the frontiers of national territories and the spatial distribution of nationalities<sup>10</sup>.” Although nations are subject to a condition of territory, they don’t necessarily have well-defined political boundaries. This is clearly seen in the definition of the nation given by J. Stalin: “The nation is a human community, stable, historically constituted, created on the basis of a common language, territory, economic life and psychological training that results in a community of culture”

Within the Soviet system passports mentioned each individual’s citizenship and nationality (*natsionalnost*). According to Brubaker, “Ethnic nationality (*nationalnost*) was not only a “statistical category”, a unit of fundamental social accounting, employed in censuses and other social surveys. It was more distinctively, an obligation and mainly ascriptive “legal category”<sup>11</sup>, a key element of an individual’s legal status”. Nationality became “a mandatory and assigned status”<sup>12</sup>, it was possible to choose the nationality of father and mother, but it had to appear in the fluctuating and arbitrary list of nationalities. Some nationalities, although present on Soviet territory, were not recognized by the state (for example, the Assyrians). All internal passports contain the name, place and date of birth, *propiska* (place of legal residence) and nationality. The name and *propiska* could be changed, but the nationality could not. It evaluated into a strong biological category resistant to the cultural, linguistic or geographical changes. Awarded by the state authorities, it appeared to be inherited at birth<sup>13</sup>. This system favored dual allegiance, for the Soviet state and nationality, to the detriment of the Republic of residence.

<sup>9</sup> Jonathan Wheatley, *Le nationalisme “civique” et “ethnique” revisité*, 172.

<sup>10</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the national question,” 52.

<sup>11</sup> Rogers Brubaker, “Nationhood and the national question,” 53.

<sup>12</sup> Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed; Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe*, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), 18.

<sup>13</sup> Victor Zaslavsky, *The Neo-Stalinist State; Class, Ethnicity, and Consensus in Soviet Society*, (Armonk, N.Y. 1994), 92.

## Post-Soviet Constitutional Nation-Building

The constitutional nation-building has been defined as focusing on “enshrining the political values of a political community in a constitutional document that ought to become the focus of nation building initiative”<sup>14</sup>. Constitutional nation-building promotes the nation-building processes by incorporating into the constitutional text some of the traditional elements of collective identity (such as institutions or symbols). The inclusion of traditional symbols and values in the constitutional text offers opportunities for establishing the constitution as an expression, or reformulation of collective identity<sup>15</sup>.

The countries of the South Caucasus have faced the difficulty of establishing a shared civic identity due to Soviet traditions. This was most visible in Georgia because of deeper ethnic divisions and the share of minorities in the population. The absence of a strong vision of the citizen as a political actor made the concept of citizenship less effective and promoted the inferiority of the idea of a civic nation. The country is faced with specific institutional legacy of ethno-federalism based on ethnic lines.

With the collapse of the Union, the twin concepts of “being the nation” and nationality have taken a new form. The territorial and political crystallization of “being the nation” has emerged as national republics that had previously fixed their territories, governments, political and cultural elite, and most importantly, the pre-established right to secession. National constitutions of South Caucasus countries manage the “particularities of specific societies<sup>16</sup>” through constitutional means. The homogenization of the social base of the state through the neutralization of these peculiarities passes by subjecting them to the institute of civic citizenship.

The homogeneity of the social base of the post-communist state is primarily a matter of ideology. A dual task of nation building and realizing a transformation outside the Soviet system was a challenge for the post-communist countries of the South Caucasus. The starting point is the implementation of a new system of values that serves the nation without imposing ideology from outside. According to Stéphane Pierré-Caps “the political power of the liberal state is ideologically neutral, as it is a reflection of the unity of the society. This is exactly what the Soviet constitutionalism contested, opposing the artificiality of the liberal model and the diversity of social classes, but also proclaiming its ability to unravel the “web of national contradictions” in the words of the Declaration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [...]”<sup>17</sup>. “Ideologically neutral” implies the

<sup>14</sup> Daniel Weinstock, *Four Kinds of (Post-)Nation-building*, in Michel Seymour, *The Fate of Nation State*, (Mc. Gilles-Queen’s University press, 2004), 51.

<sup>15</sup> Armin von Bogdandy and Rudiger Wolfrum, (eds.), *State-building, “Nation-building, and Constitutional Politics in post-conflict Situations: Conceptual Clarification and an appraisal of different approaches”*, (Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Volume 9, 2005), 597.

<sup>16</sup> François Borella, *Réflexions sur la question constitutionnelle aujourd’hui*, (Civitas Europa, n.5-2000), 8.

<sup>17</sup> Stéphane Pierré-Caps, “Etat postcommuniste entre identité nationale et intégration supranationale,” in Slobodan Milacic (eds), *La Réinvention de l’Etat; Démocratie politique et ordre juridique en Europe centrale et orientale*, (Bruylant, 2003), 38

absence of an official ideology of the state, where there is no categorization of individuals. The component elements of the people are not communities, but men and women. The ruling parties in the South Caucasian countries have policies related to any particular ideology. But this cannot be compared to the existence of an official state ideology. Communities remain primarily a sociological but not legal reality. It is also a political phenomenon, because these effects are visible in both the state policy and in the political process. The community is, according to many definitions, “a natural category of intermediary bodies. Between the individual and the nation, they interpose a collective social reality in which political mediation in some cases can be decisive”<sup>18</sup>. But “the logic of the nation-state is the nation’s only allegiance of the individual link”<sup>19</sup>.

The ethnic composition the Armenian Republic is almost homogeneous, following qualitative changes in the course of last century. The military conflict and the emigration that goes on considerably modified the ethnic composition. Almost all the Azerbaijanis had been deported from the country. Muslim Kurds are gone as well. The Yezids, whose ethnic identity officially denied by soviet regime, are getting identified since the population census of 1989 as yezid nationality. It shows their ethnic belonging. They have been registered as an ethnic group in the census of 2001 and 2011 again. Following the changes in the demographic structure of Armenia the proportion of ethnic minorities drop from 6,7% to 2,2% of total population. Giving the fact that 2,6% were Azerbaijanis and the number of other minorities has diminished because of their massive emigration, nowadays minorities represent 1,9% of the population or more than 67 500 persons including Yezids, Assyrians and Kurds.

The term for describing the Armenian nation is *azg* (ազգ). Unlike the Western Republican terminology this term has nothing civic and territorial. *Azg* consists of citizens of the Republic of Armenia and of all ethnic Armenians of the world and is not inclusive. The Armenian Constitution does not refer to this term. In contrast, the term employment there *Azgayin* (ազգային), derived from *azg*, which translates as national. The people are defined by *joghovourd* (ժողովուրդ) in the Constitution (the preamble, Articles 2, 7, 8.1, 54 etc.).

We must distinguish, however, the Armenian case. Armenian society is homogeneous and the question of identity or that linked to membership of a nation never arises. In the case of post-communist construction, the shared ethno-religious attributes of the homogeneous society forge its collective identity in so strong way that significant internal political disagreements are not real.

Multiethnic country Azerbaijan has about fifteen ethnic minority groups in its territory. They represent, however, 9,4% of the total population, according to the last population census. It has to be noted that because of the armed conflict more than 300 000

<sup>18</sup> Jean Louis Quermonne, *Le problème de la cohabitation dans les sociétés multicommunautaires*, (RFSP, 1961, N 11), 34.

<sup>19</sup> Nicolas Maziau, *La notion de communauté à la confluence du droit constitutionnel et du droit international des minorités : essai de théorie juridique*, (Civitas Europa, N.2, mars 1999), 56.

ethnic Azerbaijanis had been deported from Armenia towards Azerbaijan, and inversely the number of Armenian population of Azerbaijan has been diminished (56,6%) following their massive exodus and deportation. According to estimations of 1999, there was 120 700 ethnic Armenians in Azerbaijan.

In Azerbaijan, terms such as nation and people which are often identical in the common language, have different functions. Two key terms can be translated as a nation and people depending on the context: *millət* and *xalq* [khalgue]. The explanatory dictionary of the Azerbaijani language defines *millət* as “stable union of persons historically formed on the basis of linguistic uniformity, territorial, psychological and economic life, which manifests itself in the specific nature of the culture<sup>20</sup>”. The second meaning of the term is state, the country. As for *xalq*, according to the dictionary, it means all inhabitants of the country, the state and the population. It is also synonymous with *millət*. But the Constitution makes no reference to *millət* designating *xalq* the sovereign. But the adjective *milli* derived from *millət* means both national and ethnical and employed in the Constitution in this way.

As for Georgia, political instability, armed conflicts, economic difficulties and insecurity pushed out of the country a big part of the population. Since 1990, 1,5 million Georgians would emigrate. This phenomenon affects particularly ethnic minorities. As reported by the population census of 2002, they represent 16% of the total population, versus one thirds in 1989. Since 1997 the ethnicity is not mentioned on the identity cards any more. In fact, this reform, which established the basic prerequisite of a civic nationality, has been followed by controversial debates. The members of the ethnic majority see this act as a loss of their identities, while minorities consider it as an attempt of assimilation. This question was raised in Azerbaijani parliament as well, but provoked a rapid reaction of those who called against “reopening of the enclosed affaire”.

The tragic events that changed the modern history of Georgia unveiled the defective nature of the Georgian national unity. Although the culture of a nation does exist, it is simply not sufficient to establish a basic political consensus for society as a whole. State building was completed in the antagonism of the process of nation building. The claims of all the component parts of society that are emerged during this process challenged the cohesion, necessary for state-building. This is called Georgia’s “trauma of statehood”.<sup>21</sup> The main difficulty of the consolidation of Georgian demos is lack of language that all the citizens, including the minorities, could speak.

The restoration of civic citizenship in Georgia has not changed the perception of ethnic nationality that prevails in the country, as elsewhere in the Soviet space. If an Italian in France (Spanish, Swiss etc.) is called “French” after obtaining French nationality, the situation in Georgia proves completely different. To designate a Georgian, we

<sup>20</sup> Azərbaycan dilinin izahlı lüğəti, (Explanatory Dictionary of Azerbaijani Language), (Şərq-Qərb, 2006)

<sup>21</sup> Stephen Jones, “Georgia: The Trauma of Statehood,” in J. Bremmer and R. Taras (eds.), *New States New Politics: Building the Post-Soviet Nations*, (Cambridge, 1997), 508.

employ the term *Kartveli*. This is primarily ethnic Georgians and translated into English as “Georgian”. That said, members of ethnic minorities can never be called (almost) *Kartveli*. The categorization of citizens not belonging to the ethnically Kartvelian majority remains intact both in the official and vernacular languages. For example, a Georgian citizen of Armenian origin, belonging to the Armenian minority or immigrant Armenian (even second or third generation) is called *somekhhi*. This term also refers to the Armenian of Armenia.

In this context, a passage of the program of the Republican Unity Party of Georgia published in 1996 is interesting: “Given that the Georgian people is indigenous to the territory of the Republic of Georgia, its members have specific obligations to ensure the interests of trans-historical Georgian people and the sustainability of the nation. [...] The territory of Georgia is this part of the globe where the Georgian people ensures the eternity of the nation and has the right to build a society based on natural or cultural features. [...] The indigenous territory is a unique territory for the self-realization of the people. [...] It is acceptable on some issues, the voices of citizens of Georgian nationality (*natsionalnost*) are considered differently from those of others”<sup>22</sup>.

Constitutions of Caucasian republics basically define them as unitary States, albeit sometimes with a system of local self government. However this system does not imply any autonomous status and does not therefore present any apparent contradiction with the nation-State. “As a form of State organization, and also as a principle of political action, [unitary state] seeks to ensure national indivisibility and exclusivity, while being capable of remaining indifferent to the idea of nation itself”<sup>23</sup>. The degree of emphasis placed on the unitary model is considerably high. As mentioned Stéphane Pierré-Caps “the greater the identity related tensions within a nation-State, the more strongly its constitution will affirm an aspiration to the unity inseparable from the concept of nation-State”<sup>24</sup>.

The efficiency of the Nation-state is under question following secessionist movements emerged after the collapse of the USSR. These movements turned into bloody conflicts which have not been resolved yet. The conflict of Mountainous Karabakh that put face-to-face Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as separatist movements in Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia in Georgia, express the reconsideration of the “will to live together”, support of the Nation-state. Azerbaijan and Georgia declared themselves ready to recognize the highest degree of autonomy for these separatist regions, which means that they would possess a partial sovereignty. The use of its money, its police forces etc in autonomous way and without any subordination would unquestionably contest the national unity. Does it mean the abandon of the Nation-state or the advent of multinational State? As Pierré-

<sup>22</sup> Thorniké Gordadze, “La Géorgie et ses «hôtes ingrats»,” *Critique Internationale*, No.10, January 2001, 162.

<sup>23</sup> Ivan Boev, *The Nation-State and minorities in Bulgaria*, in *The transformation of the nation-state in Europe at the dawn of the 21st century, Science and Technique of Democracy*, (No. 22, Council of Europe editions, 1999), 384.

<sup>24</sup> Quoted in Ivan Boev, *The Nation-State and minorities in Bulgaria*, 384.

Caps underlines, “the political and institutional handling of multinational phenomenon requires radically different terms from those which are in principles of the Nation-state; Multinational State should be based on entirely new constitutional architecture<sup>25</sup>”. Modifying the constitutional architecture would bring the Southern Caucasus Republics into new governance and it is contestable for several reasons that they need this new system. First of all, it is not in their traditions of Statehood (unless they were components of a multinational construction). National or ethnic minorities often shared the same destiny with their States. Hence, national constitutions don’t make reference to any ethnic group and take the people as one and indivisible. Secondly, the weight of minorities is less important than in the traditional multinational countries. In this case multinational model appears less reasonable insofar as individual liberties guaranteed and cultural rights are protected for everybody. It has also to be noted that these three countries cohere to the representative democracy and political parties based on ethnic, religious and racial foundations are forbidden with the law. In Georgia, for example, the law has already been used to refuse registration to a political association called *Virkeh* which aimed to represent the mainly Armenian population of Javakheti.

In the post-communist South Caucasus the presence of multi-state nations and ideologically different non-distant past make difficult the effective and efficient homogenization of the social base, in the same way that the heterogeneity of societies. Stéphane Pierré-Caps asks again, “if the nation-state based on the assumption of unity, homogeneity of the social basis of the state, that it is necessary to the existence of one, that is called people or nation, this assumption is not given when, in contrast to the geopolitics of western Europe post-communist nations [...] are divided by state borders, the majority in their own state, but a minority in the neighboring state ...”<sup>26</sup>. We can say that Armenia is in an advantageous position to build national unity because today it has an ethnically homogenous society. However, the presence of the Armenian communities in the neighboring country will question the exact match of the state and nation understood in the ethnic sense. This is also the case of Azerbaijan and Georgia. In addition, territorial conflicts that have plagued the region have subjected to discrimination groups living outside the states where they are “titular”.

The solution to avoid the sectarianism that will threaten national unity is the individualistic approach which advocates the principle of equality and its logical consequence, the principle of non-discrimination. The state recognition of the diversity of the population and cultures within it does not necessarily mean legal pluralism. Dominique Schnapper goes back on this issue by stating that “the modern idea of the nation is defined by the breakaway project citizenship ethnicities experienced as natural. The national project’s ambition – an ambition by definition never fully realized – to transcend

<sup>25</sup> Stéphane Pierré-Caps, *La multination, l’avenir des minorités en Europe Centrale et Orientale*, (Odile Jacob, 1995), 241.

<sup>26</sup> Pierré-Caps, “Etat postcommuniste,” 41.

the concrete citizenship and belonging and rootedness particular loyalties. The so-called “political nation” is, in principle, closer to this idea. Ethnic nation is a contradictory notion in terms<sup>27</sup>. Citizenship appears as the main tool, the mechanism of assimilation of the political nation.

Ethnic dimensions of Armenian citizenship are noticeable through certain sections of the Constitution and the Citizenship Act. This is an original mixture of *jus sanguinis* and *jus soli*. The Armenian Constitution also provides all citizens before the law regardless of their ethnicity, race, sex, language, religion, social origin, political affiliation or other distinctive character (Article 14/1). “*A child born of citizens of the Republic of Armenia shall be a citizen of the Republic of Armenia. Every child whose one parent is a citizen of the Republic of Armenia shall have the right to citizenship of the Republic of Armenia*”. (Article 30/1). Article 11.3 is very interesting from the point of view of the principle of *jus sanguinis*. “Armenians by birth shall acquire citizenship of the Republic of Armenia through a simplified procedure” (Article 11/3). However, the notion of “Armenian by birth” remains abstract.

Nationality issues in Azerbaijan are regulated by the Constitution of the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Law on Citizenship of the Republic of Azerbaijan (in force since 30 September 1998). Article 52 of the Constitution of Azerbaijan defines citizens as having political and legal ties with the Republic, as well as mutual rights and responsibilities. The same article states that the person born on the territory of Azerbaijan or parents themselves citizens of the Republic is a citizen of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nationality and is also unconditionally given to the person whose parent is Azerbaijani nationality. The constitution prohibits the deprivation of nationality (Article 53).

The Nationality Act establishes three requirements to become a citizen of Azerbaijan: the recognition, birth and naturalization. In general, national legislation on nationality is entirely based on the *jus soli* principle. Those who had the Azerbaijani nationality, those residing on the territory of Azerbaijan were of statelessness and refugees living in the territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan between 1st January 1988 and 1st January 1992 were recognized as citizens of the Republic of Azerbaijan by the Nationality Act. The ethnic dimension of this measure essentially granting citizenship to refugees located in the territory in the period indicated above. However, between 1988 and 1992, following the policy of ethnic cleansing by the Armenian authorities nearly 250,000 ethnic Azerbaijanis were expelled from Armenia and found refuge in Azerbaijan.

Georgian post-communist citizenship legislation includes contemporary democratic principles but still keeps marked the Soviet system. It was modeled in accordance with the requirements of the country and society and has undergone some changes. By adopting the Law on Citizenship 25 March 1993, the Georgian Parliament recognized all permanent residents of Georgia at this time as its citizens without any restrictions or requirement of knowledge of the Georgian language.

<sup>27</sup> Dominique Schnapper, *Entretiens*, in *Le Banquet*, (Revue du CERAP, first semestre 1994, N 4), 24.

The key document in this area is undoubtedly the Constitution, adopted in August 1995. It defines the main principles of the country's regulatory system. The Article 7 of the Constitution states that "The state shall recognize and protect universally recognized human rights and freedoms as eternal and supreme human values. While exercising authority, the people and the state shall be bound by these rights and freedoms as directly acting law". Equality and freedom of citizens are declared in Article 14: "Everyone is free by birth and is equal before law regardless of race, color, language, sex, religion, political and other opinions, national, ethnic and social belonging, origin, property and title, place of residence".

### **Ultra Territorial Approach**

The form of political organization, namely nation-State, obviously gave a new meaning to transnational references. The confusion of nationality and citizenship, the failure of clearly distinguish between the people and that principle of the nation-state, the political organization, and that demand for national patriotism, rendered suspect any transnational allegiances or loyalties. Since the nation was a territorial organization, Diaspora was becoming a source of anomie, troubling the notion of national allegiances and creating social spaces that escaped political control.

The criteria that can be used to identify who should be described as Azeri are given in Article 1 of the current version of the "Charter of Solidarity of Azeris of the World" headlined "The Ethno-Social and Philosophical Notion 'Azeri'", in which "Azeris are united by such ethnographic-cultural features as language, religion and spirituality". The structure of the notion of Azeri includes: first, Azeris themselves (here the authors apparently mean ethnic Azeris or, as it became commonplace to think in the post-soviet period, Azeri Turks), second, "Ethnic minorities who live in Azerbaijan and have merged with Azeris of Turkic origin"; and finally, in the spirit of modern liberalism, anyone that regards themselves as Azeri<sup>28</sup>.

The Charter reproduces, to a considerable extent, ideas that have already been laid out in the law "On state policy towards Azeris living abroad". Following the spirit of the law, the authors of the Charter point out that former (or those who have not lost that status) citizens of the Azerbaijani SSR or independent Azerbaijan who "think of themselves as Azeris in terms of their ethnic, linguistic and/or historical ties" are considered to be Azeris living abroad.

We can see some characters of ethnic approach in the Armenian legislation. Even though the constitution does not make any reference to the ethnicity, the law of the Republic of Armenia on Citizenship implies that "a person of Armenian ethnicity may acquire Armenian citizenship pursuant to a simplified procedure" (chapter 1), without

<sup>28</sup> <http://www.diaspora.gov.az/index.php?options=press&cid=184>

defining what the ethnicity might mean. In the constitution, the cornerstone of this provision is shown as “Armenians by birth” (article 11.3). The right to oversee is also mentioned in the constitution, implying the necessity of fostering relations with the Armenian Diaspora (Article 11).

The right to oversee had recently appeared in freshly adopted law on “Diaspora organization and compatriots living abroad”. The provisions of the bill will also apply to descendants of those Georgians who have been resettled from Georgia to Iran in the seventeenth century. People of Georgian origin living in Turkey, mostly in the northeastern part of the country are also covered by that bill. It, nevertheless, says that while pursuing the provisions of this document, Georgia is guided by the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other states<sup>29</sup>.

The homogenous character of Armenian society was the reason why the authorization of dual nationality for foreigners of Armenian origin has not been a problem of cohesion. But it undoubtedly challenges the substantive significance of the institute of Armenian nationality. It attempts to integrate the Diaspora to the “kin-nation” by giving it legitimacy and a privilege. Thus, the ethnic nationality acquires new dimensions to the detriment of the principles of the nation-state. The concept of nationality and allegiance goes beyond simple civic and territorial rules. Nationality is an attribute of the human person and assumes legal personality. It expresses a political link between a sovereign state and the individual in international law. The European Convention on Nationality of 6 November 1997 laying in Article 2 as “” nationality “means the legal bond between a person and a State and does not indicate the ethnicity of the person” (Note, however to date, no South Caucasus state signed the Convention).

## Conclusion

The South Caucasian republics are not “new born”, but their constitutional schemes are radically revisited. They tend to create that famous abstract nation, the political one, which is equivalent of the State. While opting for a demotic constitutional law, they asserted themselves as modern Nation State. The experience of the South Caucasus showed that there is no certified copy of the original nation-State model and socio-political realities render flexible some of its principles. In the globalizing world where the concept of the nation-State is undergoing a crisis, these States are more and more stick to the survival of their nation-States. We saw that in spite of numerous similarities, these three States adopted the nation-State model in different manners due to the ethnic composition of their societies.

<sup>29</sup> [http://www.diaspora.gov.ge/files/154\\_2643\\_302662\\_Law-English.pdf](http://www.diaspora.gov.ge/files/154_2643_302662_Law-English.pdf)

IV  
**RUSSIA**



# Information Security in Europe: Perspectives of EU-Russia Common Policy

YURY KABANOV

*Ivanovo State University, Russia*

## Introduction: Methodology

Information has always been an integral part of social, economic and political development. But at the turn of the 21st century its role drastically increased. Information is becoming one of the major values and recourses in internal and international relations. The information sphere formed a new dimension of international cooperation and rivalry – the “information space”, with all relevant phenomena, like “war”, “rivalry” and “security”.

Information security is a relatively new concept and hence its meaning is not always clear, though it's very actively used in theoretical discourses and political practice. Both European countries and Russia have their own concerns and approaches towards the threats from information, or in a narrow sense, cyber space. But, due to its global and transnational character, the information security can be much more efficiently provided on the regional and international level.

The main goal of this paper is to analyze the perspectives of the common European information security system's formation.

The paper is based on the ideas of scholars from Copenhagen school of international relations (B.Buzan, O.Waever, J.de Wilde), especially on their concept of securitization. By securitization B.Buzan et al. mean a “discursive intersubjective process, constructing the attitude towards the issue, as a threat to a referent object.”<sup>1</sup> It is a social process in terms of perception a referent object, and a political process in sense of providing legal and practical basis for the security policy. In other words, different actors form their own attitude towards various aspects of security.

In terms of securitization, regional security may be viewed as the policy of regional security complexes (RSC) – “sets of units whose major processes of securitisation, desecuritisation, or both are so interlinked that their security problems cannot reasonably be

---

<sup>1</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Waever, *Regions and Powers. The Structure of International Security*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 490.

analyzed or resolved apart from one another.”<sup>2</sup> Such RSCs are stable, set communities, with set institutionalized relations.

Another viewpoint on regional security might be seen in Karl Deutsch’s theory of “security community” – a group, where the security issues are solved by negotiation and formal structures, not the rivalry. They may be amalgamated and pluralistic. The formation of the “security community” is preconditioned by the common understanding of mutual interests in security issues.

Both approaches have much in common: they recognize the social factor in security, and assume the need of identity in security perception. However, the security complex is more institutionalized and legal-based, and community is more preconditioned by identical cultural, social grounds.

In the paper we consider Russia and the EU as leaders in their regional information security complexes (communities), which we call, after B. Buzan, the Post-Soviet Space<sup>3</sup> and the EU-Europe<sup>4</sup>.

The EU-Europe RSC is formed not only by the EU, but also by the NATO (hence shaped by the USA information security policy) and EU member-states. The Post-Soviet space is more structurally diverse, including Russia and other post-soviet countries, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization of Collective Defense Treaty (OCDT), and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization with the participation of China. The Council of Europe and the OSCE are common organizations for both complexes. Our tasks will be to compare these RSC (mainly the EU and Russia) in the information security sphere and analyze the prospects of their common policy, i.e. formation of the common information security system.

### **EU-Europe and Post-Soviet (Russia) RSCs: comparative analysis of information securitization.**

Europe is one of the leaders of the global information space, having long traditions of freedom of expression, speech and rather liberal attitude to the information. So the main task for Europe was to defend the ways the data is transferred and provide the secure channels for information exchange.

In the European Union, the notion of information security is rarely used, with other different terms instead.

The first one is the network and information security (NIS), first defined in the Communication from the European Commission “Network and information security: proposal for a European policy approach” (2001). It’s defined as a “the ability of a network or

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 44. *Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in the light of Historical Experience.*

<sup>3</sup> Buzan, Burns, *Regions*, 397.


<sup>4</sup> Ibid, 352.

an information system to resist, at a given level of confidence, accidental events or malicious actions that compromise the availability, authenticity, integrity and confidentiality of stored or transmitted data and the related services offered by or accessible via these networks and systems.” The main threats to NIS are the interception of communications, unauthorized access into computer and networks, network disruption etc.<sup>5</sup>.

The policy of NIS should imply: 1) awareness rising (information and education, experience exchange); 2) technological support; 3) support for market oriented standardisation and certification; 4) legal framework (national and supranational legal acts on cybercrime etc.); 5) international cooperation (dialogue with G8, OECD, UN etc.).

The NIS is highly interrelated with other aspects of information security, like cybercrime and data protection (see picture 1).

Picture 1. Elements of EU Information security system<sup>6</sup>.



Another important document on NIS is “A strategy for a Secure Information Society – Dialogue, partnership and empowerment”, adopted in 2007. The Strategy revises the information threats and outlines the principles of NIS policy. The policy should be based on the dialogue and partnership of different actors – enterprises, individual users and authorities, and on all levels – from individual to supranational<sup>7</sup>.

One more notion connected with information is **cybersecurity**. The notion has much in common with the NIS. The cybersecurity threats generally include: cybercrime, cyber terrorism, ideological and political extremism and cyber warfare of states<sup>8</sup>. This

<sup>5</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European economic and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “Network and information security: Proposal for a European policy approach.” 2001. Accessed 7 May 2012.

[http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001\\_0298en01.pdf](http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0298en01.pdf).

<sup>6</sup> Ibid.

<sup>7</sup> Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the European economic and social Committee and the Committee of the Regions “A strategy for a Secure Information Society – Dialogue, partnership and empowerment”. 2006. Accessed 7 May 2012.

[http://ec.europa.eu/information\\_society/doc/com2006251.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/doc/com2006251.pdf).

<sup>8</sup> Paul Cornish, *Cyber Security and Politically, Socially and Religiously Motivated Cyber Attacks* (2009), 10–19. Accessed 7 May 2012.

<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies.do?language=EN>

type of security is provided both on the national and supranational level. In 2008 – 2011 member-states adopted cybersecurity strategies, emphasizing the necessity of combating cybercrime, through regulative, educational, cooperation measures (e.g. Estonia 2008), cyber defense (e.g. France 2011) and innovational economy (e.g. the UK 2011)<sup>9</sup>.

As for the institutional features, despite the EU institutions, the main coordinating organs in the EU are the European Network and Information Security Agency (ENISA), EUROPOL and EUROJUST.

In general, the EU approach might be characterized as the “Comprehensiveness in diversity,”<sup>10</sup> meaning coordination instead of centralization and unification, which allows more flexibility. Though this concept is being replaced by a more binding EU cyber security legislature at the moment<sup>11</sup>.

The EU-Europe regional security complex, including the NATO, seems to be a stable coherent structure. The NATO began to revise the role of cybersecurity in 2008<sup>12</sup>, finishing its securitization with the adoption of the new strategic concept “Active Engagement, Modern Defense” in 2010. There was proclaimed, that cyber attacks can be of different sources (state and non-state), but are always increasing their damage potential<sup>13</sup>.

The cooperation and stability of the complex is preconditioned by several factors. First, the USA and the EU have the same views on cybersecurity as a technical term. Secondly, the functions of the EU and the NATO complement each other without doubling or overlapping (see picture 2)<sup>14</sup>.

**Picture 2.**

EU-NATO functional distribution.

|                 | EU | NATO |
|-----------------|----|------|
| Cyber Crime     | +  |      |
| Cyber Terrorism |    | +    |
| Cyber Warfare   |    | +    |

Russian approach is largely preconditioned by the Soviet Past, when the ideology was securitized and valued, that led to policing information and restricting the freedom of expression. The end of the Cold War and the 1990s were followed by the domineering

<sup>9</sup> See also: National Cyber Security Strategies. Setting the Course for National Efforts to Strengthen Security in Cyberspace. Enisa Report. 2012. Accessed 7 May 2012.

[http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/cyber-security-strategies-paper/at\\_download/fullReport](http://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/Resilience-and-CIIP/national-cyber-security-strategies-ncsss/cyber-security-strategies-paper/at_download/fullReport).

<sup>10</sup> Cornish, *Cyber security*, 33.

<sup>11</sup> “Parliament Demands Single EU Voice on Cyber-Security”. *The EU Observer*, 2012. Accessed 7 May 2012. <http://euobserver.com/871/116606>.

<sup>12</sup> Eineken Tiss. “Global Cyber Security – Thinking about the Niche for NATO,” *The SAIS Review of International Affairs* (2010): 1.

<sup>13</sup> Active Engagement, Modern Defense, Strategic Concept of the Members of the NATO. Brussels, 2010, 11.

<sup>14</sup> Eineken Tiss, “Global Cyber Security,” 3.

of other nations (mainly the United States) in Russian information space. Another negative outcome was the reduction of Russian information presence in the new sovereign states. Therefore, the main referent object of securitization became the information itself, what is different from the European viewpoint.

The first securitization of information occurred in 1992, in the federal law on security, as one of the Russian Security Council functions<sup>15</sup>. The main document on information security in Russia is the Information Security Doctrine, adopted in 2000. There the information security is defined as “the state of safety of Russian national interests in the information sphere”. The national interests are balanced interests of state, society and individuals<sup>16</sup>.

According to the Doctrine, information security policy has the following areas: 1) development of information potential; 2) providing information support of Russian internal and foreign policy; 3) proving the free access to information; 4) information recourses protection.

The information security in Russia, in contrast to EU, has been securitized not in a technological, but more in broader philosophical and political sense, including the issues of soft power and psychological security. The technology is perceived as only one of many components, not the most important. The term “Internet”, for instance, is not even mentioned in the Doctrine. The threats are consequently different, their list is larger, and the main are of state origin (information wars and rivalry between the states).

Other aspects of information security are touched upon in the Military doctrine 2010 (interstate information rivalry<sup>17</sup>), Foreign policy concept 2008 (problems of Russian information potential and its cultural influence<sup>18</sup>), Information society development strategy 2008 and different special programs.

Technical aspects of information security, which are closer to European understanding, are mentioned in several federal laws. But they again concentrate on information itself.

The information security in Russia is less flexible and suitable for the constant technological development. For example, the term of cybersecurity has mainly been used in theoretical papers and articles. Only in 2012 the need for cybersecurity strategy and policy was recognized on the political level<sup>19</sup>.

<sup>15</sup> Federal Law of the Russian Federation № 2446–1 “On Security”, 5 March 1992. Accessed 7 May 2012. [http://www.fstec.ru/docs/doc\\_1\\_2\\_002.htm](http://www.fstec.ru/docs/doc_1_2_002.htm)

<sup>16</sup> Doktrina Informatsionnoy Bezopasnosti RF. (The Doctrine of Information security of the Russian Federation), 2000, Accessed 7 May 2012. [http://www.rg.ru/OFFICIAL/DOC/MIN\\_AND\\_VEDOM/MIM\\_BEZOP/DOCTR.SHTM](http://www.rg.ru/OFFICIAL/DOC/MIN_AND_VEDOM/MIM_BEZOP/DOCTR.SHTM).

<sup>17</sup> Voennaya Doktrina RF. (The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), 2010. Accessed 7 May 2012. <http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/33.html>

<sup>18</sup> Kontseptsia Vneshney Politiki RF (The Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation). 2008 Accessed 7 May 2012.

<http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/25.html>

<sup>19</sup> “Rossia: Razrabotka Kontseptsii po Kiberbezopasnosti,” *Russian Council*. Accessed 8 May 2012. [http://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/cyberbersmd/?id\\_4=49](http://russiancouncil.ru/blogs/cyberbersmd/?id_4=49).

Another feature of Russian approach is that there are practically no specialized separate institutions in this sphere. Each ministry has its own department dealing with information security issues. The major role is given to the Federal Security Service. The specialized organs, like the Security Council or the Council for Information Society development – have little power for real measures, being of consultative nature. The first step towards the cybersecurity structure was made in 2012, with the appointment of special cyber-security coordinator within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>20</sup>.

Russia is more intended to build the international information security system. Since 1998 Russia contributed to this idea in the UNO, being one of the leaders of expert group on cybersecurity.

Russia is a leading actor in the Post-Soviet RSC; therefore the understanding information security in a political sense remains in the documents of the CIS and the OCDT.

Within the CIS the issue has been discussed since the middle of 1990-s, but the majority of decisions failed ratification. Only in 2008 the Concept of cooperation of the CIS members in providing information security was adopted. The concept aims at providing sovereignty and independence of states in the information space through legal measures and consultation. In the OCST information threats were securitized as the spread of information, prohibited by the national legislature (ideas of terrorism, extremism, separatism etc.). In 2010 the OCST launched the program “PROXIE” combating cybercrime.

However, in contrast to EU-Europe, the structures of Post-Soviet RSC are overlapping, and not effective in terms of real actions. The main problems are: the information and technological gap between the states, tension on the basis of the Russian language status, the unclear terminology of legal acts<sup>21</sup> etc. In our opinion, the real goal of these structures is to build a coalition for Russia to provide its ideas of information security.

The differences can be clearly seen on the matrix below:

#### Matrix of comparative analysis of European RSCs

| Criteria                                   | EU-Europe   | Russia (Post-Soviet)  |
|--|---|---|
| <b>Actors and international structures</b> | European Union, NATO  | Commonwealth of Independent States, Organization of Collective Security Treaty, Shanghai Cooperation Organization |
| <b>Common structures</b>                   | Council of Europe, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe, United Nations |   |
| <b>Terms used</b>                          | network and information security, cyber security                                      | information security, cybersecurity (not normative)   |

<sup>20</sup> “Rossiysky MID Obzavelska Kuratotom Interneta”. Open space. Accessed 9 May 2012. <http://www.openspace.ru/news/details/35328/>.

<sup>21</sup> Mikhail Vus, “O edinom informatsionnom prostranstve i terminologicheskikh kolliziih v zakonodatelstve SNG,” *Informatsionnaya bezopasnost regionov Rossii* (2011), 14.

|                        |  |  |
|------------------------|--|--|
| <b>Referent object</b> | Information systems and infrastructure   | Information  |
| <b>Features</b>        | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– Information security (NIS and cybersecurity) is a more technical term, dictating the policy of protection data and data systems.</li> <li>– Much attention is paid to the Internet space and other new technologies of data exchange.</li> <li>– The policy is distributed among state and non-state actors (government, enterprises, communities and individuals).</li> <li>– The securitized threats are more of the non-state origin (crime etc.)</li> <li>– Information security is regulated through normative and operative measures on all levels.</li> <li>– The information security system, though welcomes the international cooperation, is focused more on internal issues.</li> </ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>– broader, philosophical and political understanding of information security;</li> <li>– less attention to technological issues, the undeveloped notion of cybersecurity, less attention to the Internet on high political level;</li> <li>– no specialized organs, dispersive character of providing information security;</li> <li>– information security threats are mainly of state origin (infowars etc.);</li> <li>– more attention is paid to international law and perspective of global information space regulation.</li> </ul> |
| <b>Features of RSC</b> | Coherent, set structure; distribution of functions   | Multi-structural, doubling functions,  |

### Perspectives of EU-Russia common information security policy

The comparative analysis demonstrates the differences of the two RSCs in case of information security, making the prospects of their total merger in the nearest future unlikely to happen. However, we argue that the mutual interest in effective information security system will force both sides to compromise.

The minimum to be done is to construct a pluralistic security community, to eliminate a possibility of rivalry in the information space and provide a platform for a constant dialogue. Here some urgent measures should be done.

The first one is to stop viewing each other as a threat to one’s own information space and to create an atmosphere of trust, based on mutual interests. According to different reviews and papers, the problem of so-called Russian “hacker patriots” is one of the major risks to Europe. It’s often mentioned that they “seem to be closely connected to the government.” Russia was accused of cyber attacks on Estonia 2007, Georgia 2008 etc,<sup>22</sup> though there were no actual evidences found. Russia has concerns about the policy of Europe and the USA in the Russian information space, as well as about the risks of cyber

<sup>22</sup> Alexander Klimburg, *Cybersecurity and cyberpower: concepts, conditions and capabilities for cooperation for action within the EU*, 59. Accessed 8 June 2012. <http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/fr/studies-download.html?languagedocument=en&file=41648>.

or psychological campaigns against Russia. The war in South Osetia (2008) was followed by a real information war against Russia in Europe and the US.

The trust should be based on efforts of both actors. The Russian government must develop the legal footing on cybercrime and create an effective preventive mechanism against hackers and other information challenges. The EU policy should be revised as well, bearing in mind the principles of international law. The second measure is to develop common information and technological space, in order to reconcile legislature on the issue and to make the security of information more interdependent. Some constructive actions here have already been undertaken. Among them are the Roadmap on cooperation in science, technology and culture (2005) and the Roadmap for action “Cooperation in science, technology and innovation 2011–2013”. The latter one aims at further development of common scientific and cultural space<sup>23</sup>.

These two measures will facilitate the search for a mutually acceptable form of cooperation, depending on rather political flexibility of both sides.

The most likely and easy form will be the cooperation of judicial and police structures. The road map for the common space of freedom, security and justice (2005), provides the joint actions of EUROPOL and Russian police structures<sup>24</sup>. The fruitful collaboration on illegal migration and crime can lead to a spillover to cybersecurity issues. It is already discussed during the regular meetings of police representatives<sup>25</sup>.

Another form of cooperation in the sphere of information security is regional organizations, like the OSCE and the Council of Europe (the CoE). The CoE is now focused on cybercrime and provides an effective mechanism for international collaboration. In 2001 the member-states signed the Convention on cybercrime – the first international binding document to define the terms and classify the crimes in cyberspace. It regulates the principles of interstate cooperation and issues of jurisdiction. It was ratified by the majority of the CoE members and also non-members of organization<sup>26</sup>.

The document, though signed, wasn't ratified by the Russian parliament. The major concern is article 32, stating the possibility of one party access data from the computer system of another party without the permission of the latter.<sup>27</sup> This measure is considered in Russia to be a violation of principles of sovereignty and national security<sup>28</sup>.

<sup>23</sup> The Roadmap for Action “Cooperation In Science, Technology And Innovation 2011–2013” Accessed 8 May 2012.

[http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/russia\\_road\\_map\\_2011-2013.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/research/iscp/pdf/russia_road_map_2011-2013.pdf).

<sup>24</sup> The Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice. 2005. Accessed 8 May 2012.

[http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap\\_economic\\_en.pdf](http://eeas.europa.eu/russia/docs/roadmap_economic_en.pdf).

<sup>25</sup> “O Vstreche Predstaviteley Politseiskih Sluzhb ES I Rossii,” *Russian Mission to the EU (2012)*. Accessed 8 May 2012.

<http://russianmission.eu/ru/novosti/o-vstreche-predstavitelei-politseiskikh-sluzhb-es-i-rossii>.

<sup>26</sup> Convention on Cybercrime, Council of Europe, Budapest, 23.XI.2001. Accessed 17 April 2012. <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/html/185.htm>

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> “Pochemu Rossia ne Podpisivaet Konventsiu”, *GZ – Journal* (2011). Accessed 8 May 2012.

[www.gz-jurnal.ru/602](http://www.gz-jurnal.ru/602).

The non-participation of Russia in the Convention reduces its opportunities to develop a fruitful dialog with Europe and the USA. Nevertheless, Russia often cooperates with foreign police organizations when it is approached<sup>29</sup>, so there's a chance that with the development of Russia cybercrime legal footing and with the adoption of its own cybersecurity strategy, it will become a signatory of the convention.

But now Russia is more likely to promote the idea of the international information security within the UN. On November 1, 2011 on the London conference on Cyberspace, it presented a project of Convention on international information security. Earlier, Russia and the members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, presented the Code of Conduct in cyberspace.

The Code is not a binding document but a set of rules for states to follow: 1) to cooperate against cyber crime and terrorism; 2) to respect rights of citizens in the cyber space; 3) to promote understanding by the society of its responsibility for information security. On the contrary, the Convention should be an overall legal document. The step towards the European understanding is that by information space the act means cyberspace, and much attention is paid to cyber terrorism and cybercrime. However many measures are still devoted to the political and psychological aspects of interstate information rivalry<sup>30</sup>. Both documents are presented as drafts for further discussions that leave much space to finding the compromise. However, it is not a prospect of the nearest future as well.

One more way-out is to distance from the political level and concentrate on the non-state actors' interaction. The cooperation here may be conducted on the level of CERTs (computer emergency response teams), businesses and civil society organization. It will prepare both actors for common security policy on the operational level.

Whatever the form of cooperation will be, it is important for both sides to realize the necessity of their constant dialogue on information security issues.

## Conclusions

Based on the paper findings, we can conclude that:

- 1) Nowadays Europe comprises two regional information security complexes. The EU-Europe RSC is shaped by the interaction of EU members and NATO members, especially the USA. The Post-Soviet RSC is led mainly by Russia, though its link to China through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization is increasing.

<sup>29</sup> Maria Lewytkyj, "Tactics in cybersecurity: Russia & US – don't forget the Council of Europe Cyber-Crime Convention," *Examiner.com* (2009). Accessed 8 May 2012. <http://www.examiner.com/article/tactics-cybersecurity-russia-us-don-t-forget-the-council-of-europe-cyber-crime-convention>.

<sup>30</sup> Convention on International Information Security. Russia's Concept. 2011. Accessed 7 May 2012. <http://www.aciso.ru/news/3255/>.

- 2) Differences in attitude towards the technological and psychological aspects of information space consequently led to different securitization among the actors.
- 3) Europe has probability both for rivalry and for cooperation in information space. The outcome will depend on the political flexibility of partners.
- 4) The main task is to build the information security community, eliminating the potential conflicts in information space. It may be achieved by building the atmosphere of trust and common information space, using diplomatic, governmental, civil and expert channels of interaction.
- 5) The forms of common European security system differ from non-governmental interaction and police forces cooperation to common documents within international organizations.

# Post-Communist Giants – China and Russia: Partners and Rivals

KRZYSZTOF SZUMSKI

*former Poland's Ambassador to Indonesia*

## Heritage of the Past

Chinese historians judge, that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century Russia was more of a threat to China than Britain, as it strove to seize territory, while the British were interested rather in taking over China's financial resources through forced trade in opium and other goods.

The 20th century was characterised by dramatic and very diverse events in bilateral relations. In the mid-20th century, after the rise of New China, close political and economic relations were supported by a common ideology. Soon however both countries entered a period of competition, followed by hostility.

The consequences of this were dramatic. China made preparations for armed confrontation with the USSR and towards this modified 3 subsequent five-year plans, which resulted in a major slowdown of the modernisation process. The USSR, threatened by war in the west and east, increased military presence on its and Mongolian borders with China; and around one-third of its missile potential was aimed at China. The burden of expenditures this entailed contributed to later crisis and the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Experts in both countries agree that the lesson arising from the difficult history of bilateral contacts is a conviction that to maintain friendly relations and avoid confrontation is the only policy direction guaranteeing mutual benefit<sup>1</sup>.

## Breakthrough in Relations at the Turn of the 21st Century

The first symptoms of relaxation of the tension on the bilateral front appeared in the mid-1980s. In the 1990s, after the collapse of the USSR, China immediately recognized the new Central Asian states. Signing of "Agreement on Confidence Building in the Military Field in the Border Area" by leaders of Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,

---

<sup>1</sup> Feng Yujun, „Prospects for Sino – Russian Relations and China's National Interest in the Next Decade,” *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 18, No. 4, Beijing 2008, 26–28.

Tadzhikistan and China on 26 April 1996, contributed to improve Sino-Russian relations and consolidated their mutual confidence. Bilaterally, the two countries agreed on a mechanism of annual visits at the prime-ministerial level (which is still working well), established “strategic partnership” and signed a joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and Establishment of a New World Order<sup>2</sup>.

A fundamental significance had the conclusion of a Treaty on Good Neighbourliness and Friendly Cooperation in 2001. This accelerated resolution of border problems, and so in 2004 was concluded a Border Agreement which finally resolved conflict issues on some 4300 kilometres of the Chinese-Russian frontier/last dispute was settling in July 2008/. For the first time in history, relations between China and Russia were not burdened by border issues<sup>3</sup>.

These agreements paved the way for intensification of bilateral relations, the frequency of contacts on high and topmost levels amplified, trade and commercial relations grew, cultural, scientific and interpersonal contacts expanded. In 2009 the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations was used by both sides to endow contacts with new energy. Vladimir Putin, who visited China many times, on the threshold of his visit in 2011 assessed that “currently bilateral relations are probably the best in history”<sup>4</sup>.

## Growth of Trade and Economic Relations, other Spheres of Cooperation

Turnover began at around 5 billion USD at the beginning of the century, to balloon to some 56 billion in 2010 (China is Russia’s biggest trade partner and Russia is China’s 9th), and in 2011 this was almost 80 billion USD (increase of 42.7%); plans are 100 billion in 2015, and 200 in 2020. China has a trade surplus with Russia, in 2009 the relation was 29.6 to 25.8. Russian exports are mainly raw materials, including for energy (near on 50%), and Chinese are mainly processed products. On China’s initiative in 2010 were made first clearings in local currencies<sup>5</sup>.

Energy takes a key position in commercial and economic cooperation. A branch of the pipeline Tashet-Nakhodka as of 2011 carries oil to Daqing in China; supplies are to reach 15 million tonnes of oil annually over 20 years; the construction of the pipeline was financed to the extent of 6.5 billion USD by China. Due to this, and as Beijing reduced purchases in Iran, Russia rose to be China’s number three oil supplier. Russia is increasing exports of electric power and coal, participates in China’s nuclear energy programme (Tian Wan), increases coal extraction (Chinese loan of 6 billion USD) and constructs water power plants towards the needs of export to China. Because of differences

<sup>2</sup> Feng Yujun, „Prospects for Sino – Russian Relations...,” 34.

<sup>3</sup> Jean – Pierre Cabestan, „La politique internationale de la Chine,” (Sciences Po, Les Presses, Paris, 2010), 286–287.

<sup>4</sup> Cui Haimei, „Putin’s visit to strengthen bilateral ties,” *China Daily*, October 10, 2011.

<sup>5</sup> Mikhail L. Titarenko, Rebalancing Russia’s foreign relations,” *China Daily*, June 3, 2012.

on prices, a draft giant gas deal that was to be realized over 30 years has been stalled. The Chinese side is declaring interest in further development of cooperation on energy<sup>6</sup>.

Mutual investment reached 3.8 billion USD in 2011 and Russia has become China's ninth investment market.

Russia's arms exports to China, although still considerable, have been dropping for some years. Russians are complaining of unlawful copying of their planes, and the Chinese that the newest Russian constructions are being offered only to India or Vietnam. In spite of this, there are annual meetings of Defence Ministers and Chiefs of Staff, and joint exercises organised, also within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. In April 2012 the biggest naval exercise ever was held on the Yellow Sea<sup>7</sup>.

The proper services and institutions are collaborating in combating groups described as terrorist from the Southern Caucasus, Central Asia and Xinjiang.

Because of national prejudices and aversions, both countries are making efforts to develop cooperation on the plane of interpersonal contacts. Emphasis has been put on youth and students' exchange. In 2009, 18 thousand Chinese studied in Russia, and 9 thousand Russians in China (ranking 6th among foreign students). Cultural contacts were intensified, 2006 was Russia Year in China and 2007 China Year in Russia; 2009 and 2012 were dedicated to mutual language learning, and 2012 and 2013 are to be years of enhanced tourist exchange. In 2011, tourism figures reached 3.35 million (2.53 million Russians, 0.8 million Chinese). All these events were awarded intensified interest from top authorities and much media attention<sup>8</sup>.

For some years now both countries have been referring to wartime cooperation and brotherhood in arms. This found expression in a joint declaration for the 65th anniversary of the end of World War II; such initiatives are being continued<sup>9</sup>.

## Cooperation on the International Forum

On international matters, Russian-Chinese cooperation is quite intensive, but policies are not fully coordinated. Cooperation concerns selected domains and regions, results from factors of a general strategic nature as well as concrete interests. Both Beijing and Moscow do not want to be restricted in their strategic dialogue to talks with the American partner.

Russia describes itself as one of the independent centres of the emerging polycentric world. Cooperation and dialogue with China are elements of construction of this world, and simultaneously factors which strengthen both these countries. In this context, a fundamental improvement of relations with Beijing can be considered the biggest success

<sup>6</sup> Zhou Yan, „China -Russia cooperation in energy industry set to expand,” *China Daily*, April 28, 2012.

<sup>7</sup> Zhao Shengnan, „Sino – Russian drills enter live fire stage,” *China Daily*, April 25, 2012.

<sup>8</sup> Cui Haipei, „Xi stresses stronger ties with Moscow,” *China Daily*, March 24, 2012.

<sup>9</sup> Zhao Shengnan and Wang Huazhong, „China, Russia to boost relations,” *China Daily*, May 11, 2012.

of Moscow's foreign policy after the breakdown of the USSR. Russian political scientists underline that Putin, assuming the supreme post, from the earliest spoke of the need to balance Russia's European and Asian policies.

China speaks of reaching an "unprecedented" level of mutual trust in cooperation towards world peace and regional stabilisation. Both countries are decided opponents of policy from a position of force and excessive use of military power in international relations, which means joint resistance to political domination by the United States.

Convergent or similar positions by China and Russia concern, among others, the Korean Peninsula, nuclear issues vis a vis DPRK and Iran, cooperation within the UN on the Middle East (Syria), Asian and Pacific security, the new world order, disarmament (especially CTBT and preventing an arms race in space), reconstruction of Afghanistan. Sometimes they support each other, to mention China's backing of Russia on the missile defence shield, and Russia's of China on Taiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. Sometimes the positions are convergent only formally, e.g. on the reform of the UNSC, as the real objectives of either side are different.

Within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation both countries, as well as remaining partners, are involved in combating the so-called "three evil forces", i.e. separatism, extremism and terrorism. China, which is strongest economically, is making efforts to develop economic cooperation within the framework of the SCO, including establishment of a special development bank and a free trade zone that would expand beyond the members of the organization; nonetheless it is mostly interested in participating in the exploitation of the energy resources of the region. Russia would prefer to focus on security issues. Both partners agree to strengthen cooperation within SCO and limit US influence in the region. In Central Asia as nowhere else, beside real convergence of Russian and Chinese interests, there are profound differences and rivalry<sup>10</sup>.

Russia and China also collaborate within BRICS, APEC, G-20 and at East Asia Summits. China attaches increasing significance to cooperation with Russia within APEC, in connection with intensified competition with the USA on the form of integration in the Asia and Pacific region<sup>11</sup>.

## Problems and Obstacles in Developing Relations

On Russia's part, difficulties stem from real threats, as well as sentiment and prejudices. East of the Baikal, on the Russian side there are 7 million Russians, and on the other side of the border – 110 million Chinese. Some look for work and living space in Russia. Although border issues have been settled, in China there are sometimes voices raised regretting the loss of territories north of the Amur, causing some anxiety in

<sup>10</sup> Jean – Pierre Cabestan, „La politique internationale de la Chine,” 300 – 308.

<sup>11</sup> Wu Jiao and Zhang Yunbi, „Hu, Putin pledge to boost China – Russia ties,” *China Daily*, June 6, 2012.

Russia. Public opinion in Russia finds it difficult to accept that after 300 years of Russian dominance, China is now the stronger partner, and in spite of Russia's strengthened position after a weaker period in the 1990s, there are no prospects for the situation to change. Ultimately, in spite of the critical approach to US and NATO policies, the Russian society has a strong sense of belonging to Western civilization<sup>12</sup>.

Imbalance in the structure of commercial exchange, along with the threat that Russia might become only a source of raw materials for China, restrict the growth of economic relations.

In the international sphere, Moscow is concerned over the privileged partnership of Beijing and Washington, which might marginalize the role of Russia in the triangle USA-China-Russia and in the world. Over a long term perspective, the rise of China – political, economic, military – sets before Russia the fundamental question on possible threats in the future. All in all, relations with Beijing are for Moscow a strong card in multilateral diplomacy and in constructing Russia's position, but because of their ambiguous nature, these rather cannot be perceived as a strategic alternative to relations with the West<sup>13</sup>.

A problem in international relations which will increase in significance is cooperation and competition in Central Asia. As a rule, China respects the leadership role of Russia in the region as regards security, politics, culture etc., but where access to energy sources is concerned, Beijing takes advantage of all contingencies to exert influence, often against Moscow's interests.

China perceives obstacles to developing relations in the investment conditions in Russia (corruption), different interpretation of intellectual property rights (this particularly concerns armaments) as well as bitter competition in third countries on the arms market. Beijing also believes that Russia is maintaining a high concentration of forces and modern weaponry oriented at China, what points to anxiety in respect of China<sup>14</sup>.

Similarly as in Russia, psychological factors are important. China rebuilt relations with Yeltsin's Russia, torn by crisis and humiliated after the collapse of the USSR. Beijing was aware of its advantage and treated the other with some disregard. For more than 10 years now China has faced a partner who might be weaker but who has a firm foreign policy, is able to play out assets and stand by positions, sometimes without consideration for those of a close ally. One dramatic example is the recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia by Russia, without consulting China. China has had to learn – and is still learning – how to cooperate with the new Russia<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>12</sup> Jean – Pierre Cabestan, „La politique international de la Chine,” 296 – 297.

<sup>13</sup> Stephen Kotkin, „The Unbalanced Triangle,” *Foreign Affairs*, September/October 2009, 134.

<sup>14</sup> Zhao Mingwen, „China – Russia Relations Make Headway,” *The CIIS Blue Book on International Situation and China's Foreign Affairs*, (World Affairs Press, Beijing 2012), 339 – 343.

<sup>15</sup> Stephen Kotkin, „The Unbalanced Triangle,” 136 – 137.

## Future Prospects

Russia led by President Putin will aim for even more intensified relations with Asia, including with China. Cooperation with a fast-growing Chinese economy is to contribute to the modernisation and development of the economy of Russia, also in the Far East, where the government's efforts will focus. Political cooperation with Beijing will be developed, as Moscow does not have another potential partner in the world, with such a close position on global and regional matters. In this direction Moscow will be leaning because of the still difficult – in spite of President Obama's "reset" – relations with Washington (the Jackson-Vanik amendment was a symbol). China is also a vital partner in efforts to maintain stabilization in the "near abroad", from South-East and Central Asia to the Middle East in a wide sense<sup>16</sup>.

One should also expect intensified Russian activity in the Far East, attempts to balance cooperation with China by developing relations with Japan and South Korea. The role of Vladivostok will grow, as the city becomes the St. Petersburg of the 21st century. September's 2012 scheduled APEC summit there will be represented as a symbol of Russia's return to the region of Asia and the Pacific as a modern, fast-developing power.

China is also interested in developing relations with Russia. This dialogue strengthens Beijing's position in relations with the USA. In respect of many international issues, because of convergent positions, as well as Russia's aspirations to buttress its political role, China is more inclined to remain slightly in the shadow on controversial matters, giving the field to the partner (e.g. Syria). China is counting on long-term cooperation on energy, investment openings within the framework of development and modernisation of Russian infrastructure, cooperation in agriculture, including the use of Russian land for crops for Chinese needs, as well as support for constructing the international role of RMB<sup>17</sup>.

All in all, it can be expected that in a medium-term perspective Sino-Russian relations will develop in a dynamic fashion, as on both sides interest in cooperation prevails over distrust and differences. The intensity and nature of these relations will depend to a large degree on the relations of both partners with the USA and the EU. Of major importance will be the world economic situation, and especially the prices of energy resources.

<sup>16</sup> Wojciech Lorenz, „Groźny sojusz Rosji i Chin,” *Gazeta Wyborcza*, June 6, 2012.

<sup>17</sup> Zhao Mingwen, „China – Russia Relations Make Headway...,” 344 – 352.

# CONTRIBUTORS



**Klara Bruvere** graduated from the University of New South Wales (UNSW) in 2010 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Theatre and Film studies. Since 2011 she has been a PhD candidate at the same university. Currently she is tutoring at UNSW in Documentary Film and History. Her articles appeared in the film journals such as *Kino Kultura* and *Kino Raksti*. She attended a conference entitled '(Trans)national Subjects; Migration in Post-1989 Eastern European Film' at the Catholic University in Leuven, Belgium. She was also co-organizing a postgraduate symposium that was held at UNSW in September 2012.



**Galia Chimiak** is a research fellow (PhD) at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology at the Polish Academy of Sciences (IFiS PAN). Her educational background is English Philology, Sociology and Development Cooperation Policy and Management. She has lectured at Collegium Civitas, University of Warsaw, Graduate School for Social Research at IFiS PAN and Trinity College Dublin in Ireland. Her main research areas are civil society and development cooperation.



**Kazimierz Dadak** is a Professor of Finance and Economics at Hollins University, Roanoke, VA. He received a PhD in economics from Fordham University, New York. His primary areas of research interests include monetary integration in the European Union, the economic and political transformation in the East-Central Europe, the economic development of Poland, as well as the economic limitations to Russia's global influence. He presented numerous papers at professional conferences on these topics. His papers appeared, among others, in *Contemporary European History*, *The Cato Journal*, *The Wall Street Journal*, *The Independent Review*, *Panoeconomicus*, *Międzynarodowy Przegląd Polityczny*, *Krakowskie Studia Międzynarodowe*, and *Arcana*. Most of his shorter articles printed in *Gazeta Polska* and *Wprost*.

**Magdalena Dembinska** is an assistant professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Montreal. She completed a postdoctoral fellowship at McGill University (2007–2009), received her PhD in political science from the University of Montreal and her Masters in international relations from Warsaw University. Her research is squarely situated in the subject of ethnicity and democratic governance: identity politics and conflict, historical reconciliation, citizenship and state-(nation)-building, nationalism and diversity, in the Eurasia and Central Europe. She is currently working on two projects for which she received SSHRC research grants: (1) on ethno-political mobilization and the sociology of identity movements; (2) on historical politics and the changing image of the ‘Other’ in de facto states (Transnistria, Abkhazia and Turkish Cyprus). She published a book in 2012: ‘Vivre ensemble dans la diversité culturelle’, Presses universitaires de Rennes. She also contributed to a number collective books with her own chapters. Her recent peer-reviewed journal articles appeared, among others, in : *Nations and Nationalism*, *Ethnopolitics*, *Études internationales*, *Canadian Journal of Political Science* and *Comparative Political Studies*.



**Inga Gaizauskaite** is a lecturer at the Mykolas Romeris University. She holds MA degree in Sociology (Vilnius University) and MA in Society and Politics (Central European University). She was a PhD candidate at the Graduate School for Social Research at Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (Polish Academy of Sciences). She was working as a lecturer at Vilnius Academy of Business Law and she was a coordinator of social research projects at the Centre of Adult Education and Information (2006–2007) as well as a coordinator of a UNDP research project in Lithuania office (2006). Her interests include the following areas: society and politics (democratisation in post-communist countries, social and political trust, institutional change), media studies, and social research methodology. Currently she is focusing on her PhD research project concerning social and political trust in post-communist Lithuania.



**Ieva Gajauskaite** is a PhD candidate at the Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas. She graduated from the Faculty of Political Science and Diplomacy at the Vytautas Magnus University. Her doctoral thesis refers to the concept of the strategic partnership as speech act in the development of foreign policy. During last five years her research has addressed the understanding of strategic cooperation, the evolutionary analysis of the strategic partnership, the development of the cooperation intensity measurement models. She is currently working on Ukrainian and Polish case analysis. Her research interests include: methodology of political science, post-positivist international relations theories, security and foreign policy strategies.

**Beata Halicka** is an associate professor at the *Polish-German Research Institute* in Collegium *Polonicum*. She graduated from German Studies at the College of Pedagogy in Zielona Góra, and from 1998 to 2001 she was attending post-graduate studies in Germany. After completing her PhD, she took up the position as an academic researcher in history and culture of Eastern Europe at the Europa University Viadrina, in Frankfurt (Oder). Recently she has completed her habilitation with a study of forced migration and cultural transformation in the German-Polish border region from 1945–48. She was also involved in a research project entitled “Odra-Oder – the past, present and future of a European cultural region”. She is also an author of numerous publications, among others: *Krosno Odrzańskie / Crossen an der Oder 1005–2005. Wspólne dziedzictwo kultury / Das gemeinsame Kulturerbe* and *Oder-Odra. Blicke auf einen europäischen Strom* (with K. Schlögel, 2007 in German, 2008 in Polish), *Kozaky – Pyrehne. Polen, Deutsche und Ukrainer auf dem Erinnerungspfad erzwungener Migrationen* (with B. Mykietów, 2011).



**Cynthia M. Horne** is an Associate Professor of Political Science at Western Washington University. Her primary research interests include the post-communist transitions, with a focus on the intersection of economic, political and social reforms. She has published articles on related issues of lustration laws, transitional justice, rule of law and trust building in such journals as *Comparative Political Studies*, *Democratization*, *Law & Social Inquiry* and *Europe-Asia Studies* (forthcoming). She has contributed to edited volumes on issues of transitional justice, post-communist transitions and trust, including *Kornai and Rose-Ackerman* (eds.) *Honesty and Trust in Transitional Societies*; Stan and Nedelsky (eds.) *Encyclopedia of Transitional Justice*; and Hardin, (ed.), *Distrust*. She has been a visiting research fellow at the Center for the Study of Democracy, Sofia Bulgaria, the Max-Planck Institut, Cologne Germany, the Collegium Budapest, Hungary and the University of Bucharest, Romania.



**Richard J. Hunter** is an Associate Professor/Professor at the Seton Hall University. He has served as Associate Dean for Graduate Studies and Director of the Institute for International Business, Assistant Dean for Enrollment Management, Chair of the Department of Finance and Legal Studies, and he is Acting Chair of the Department of Economics. He graduated from the University of Notre Dame (BA) and Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (MA); he received also JD at the University of Notre Dame where he was working as an Assistant Professor (1977–1984). He is an author of more than 150 research articles and law reviews, 200 academic papers, and 8 academic/research books (including two on Polish economics/politics). He presented his articles at many international conferences (including the University of Warsaw) as well as at the United Nations Institute for Teaching and Research.

**Natalia L. Iakovenko** is a Professor of the Institute of International Relations at Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. She holds PhD in History. She graduated from Dnepropetrovsk State University, Faculty of English Language and Literature in 1976 and Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Faculty of History in 1985. She is also currently lecturing and teaching at Kyiv Institute for Translators and Interpreters. From 1992 until 2006 she was also working as a Senior Researcher at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine. Her interests include also foreign policy, Ukraine's EU integration, Great Britain's foreign policy and Ukrainian-British relations. She is an author of a number of research papers and books, among others: *European Neighbourhood Policy: Role and Place of Ukraine* (Kyiv, 2012), *Great Britain in International Organizations* (Kyiv, 2011), *British History: Advanced Reading* (Kyiv, 2007), *Great Britain within the System of International Relations: Claim for European Leadership* (Kyiv, 2003), *A Concise British History* (Kyiv, 1999).



**Diana Janusauskiene** graduated from the Central European University (1996), and from the Graduate School for Social Research (2000). She holds a PhD in Sociology (Institute of Philosophy and Sociology PAN, 2002) and was a CEP scholar at the Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius (2000–2002). Among her major publications are: *Post-Communist Democratisation in Lithuania: Elite, Parties, and Youth Political Organizations* (2011) and *Political Transformation and Changing Identities in Central and Eastern Europe* (ed. with A. Blasko, 2008). Her areas of research and interest include political sociology, transitology, comparative politics, academic writing.



**Yury Kabanov** is a graduate of Ivanovo State University, International Relations Department. His scholarly interests include foreign policy of Russia and the European Union as well as national and global security issues in general. Currently he is focusing his research on the international relations in cyber space, encompassing cyber wars and information security in the context of world politics. He is also an author of twenty academic publications.



**Krzysztof Kokoszczyński** is a graduate of the University of Alberta, Canada, where he studied Political Science with the focus on international organizations and security issues. Currently he is preparing for a MPhil degree in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford (St Antony's College). His interests include Russia and the EU as well as interaction and cooperation between the above mentioned. He is focusing his research on their role in Central and Eastern Europe and on security and energy issues.

**Natalia Konarzewska** is a PhD candidate at the Faculty of Journalism and Political Science (University of Warsaw, Poland), where she completed her Master's degree in political science. Her main areas of study are post-Communist transformations, nation building process in the South Caucasus and energy policy of the Caspian states.



**Azim Malikov** is a post-doctoral fellow at the Max Planck Institute's Department of Integration and Conflict. Before he held teaching positions at the Samarkand State University. He is a member of the Association for the Study of Nationalities, Central Eurasian Studies Society (CESS), International union of anthropological and ethnological sciences, China union of International union of anthropological and ethnological sciences (CUAES). From 2004 to 2005, he directed the Center for Study of History of Uzbekistan at Samarkand State University. From 2005 to 2009 he was a Chair of the Republican commission on Students Olympiads on History. He has conducted research on various issues concerning ethnic history, identity construction and nation-building process in Central Asia. He has especially focused on issues related to the local history, history of Samarkand, saint lineages, and shrines in Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Afghanistan. He is an author of more than 100 publications on history, identity, Islam and culture in Central Asia.



**Yalchin Mammadov** is a PhD candidate at the University of Lorraine (formerly University Nancy 2) in France. Before he also studied at the Academy of Public Administration under the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan. He received his Master degree in the University of Lorraine, the University of Strasbourg and the College of Europe in Bruges. Currently he is working on his doctoral thesis on the concept of Nation-State and its adaptation in the South Caucasus. He has published his articles in *Nationalism Studies* and *European Issues*. He is also a translator of books from French into Azerbaijani.



**Svajone Mykene** is an associate professor at the Mykolas Romeris University, Vilnius in the Department of Social Policy. Her academic interests include social change, sociology of work and gender studies. Recently she has been working on the labour flexibility in Lithuania and the EU, work-life balance as well as status of women in Lithuania and Azerbaijan.



**Alexander Rondeli** is the President of the Georgian Foundation For Strategic and International Studies. He holds a Ph.D. in Geography from Tbilisi State University (1974).

From 1997 to 2001 he served as a Director of the Foreign Policy Research and Analysis Center at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia. Prior to that, in 1991–1996, he was a Chair of an International Relations Department at the Tbilisi State University. Dr. Rondeli was a Research Fellow at London School of Economics and Political Science (1976–77), a Mid-career Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University (1993–94), a Visiting Professor at Emory University (1991), Mount Holyoke College (1995) and Williams College (1992, 1995 and 1997). He holds a diplomatic rank of an Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary.



**Leo V. Ryan**, CSV, is a Professor of Management at the DePaul University, a former Dean of the College of Commerce (School of Business, University of Notre Dame) and a Fellow at the St. Edmund's College, Cambridge. He holds honorary degrees from Seton Hall and Illinois Benedictine Universities and was a Fulbright Professor in Poland (1993–1995). In 1999, he retired at DePaul and was named professor emeritus and given the Via Sapientiate Award. He continued teaching another eight years at the Poznan University of Economics MBA program, introducing business ethics and human resource management. He is a co-author or co-editor of a number of books including: *Etyka Biznesu* (1997); *From Autarcy to Market – Polish Economics and Politics* (1998); *Students Focus on Ethics* (2000), (with Professor Enderle); *Praxiology and Pragmatism* (2002) and *Poland: A Transformational Analysis* (2003).



**Magda Stroińska** is a Professor of German and Linguistics at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. She holds MA in Applied Linguistics, Warsaw, and PhD in Theoretical Linguistics, Edinburgh. Her areas of research include cognitive linguistics, cross-cultural communication and sociolinguistics, in particular cultural stereotyping, political propaganda, language and identity in exile, second language attrition in the elderly and language and trauma. She edited and co-edited the following volumes: *Stereotype im Fremdsprachenunterricht* (with Martin Löschmann, 1998), *Relative Points of View: Linguistic Representations of Culture* (2001), *Exile, language and identity* (with Vikki Cecchetto, 2003) and *International Classroom: Challenging the notion* (with Vikki Cecchetto, 2006). She is currently working on a volume on trauma (with Vikki Cecchetto and Kate Szymanski, for Berghahn) and a manuscript on totalitarian propaganda and its effects in post-communist Eastern Europe.



**Krzysztof Szumski** is a senior diplomat, ambassador, specializing in international situation and Asian strategic issues. He is a former ambassador of Poland in the following

countries: the People's Republic of China (2005–2009), the Republic of Indonesia, to the Singapore and to the East Timor (2000–2004), the Kingdom of Thailand and to the Union of Myanmar (1993–1997), the Philippines (1991–1992). He was a Director of Asia and Pacific Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2009–2010 , 1997–2000) and a Director of Bureau of International Affairs in the Chancellery of the Lower Chamber of the Parliament (2004–2005). Currently he is a member of the Reflection Group on foreign policy to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.



**Alexander Tsimbal** is an Associate Professor at the Department of History, World Culture and Tourism at the State Linguistic University, Minsk. His PhD thesis title is *The policy of Polish authorities concerning the Orthodox Church in Western Belarus 1921–1939*. He also holds a university degree in History and Religion Studies (Belarusian State Pedagogical University). His academic interests include political, ethnic and religious relations in Central and Eastern Europe in the 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries as well as methodology of historical science.



