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FOREWORD

Foreword

The Warsaw East European Review (WEER) publishes some of the best papers presented at the Warsaw East European Conference, as well as articles written by scholars affiliated with the Centre for East European Studies. Usually the authors are both young and experienced researchers specializing in Central and Eastern European, Russian, Balkan, Turkish, Caucasian and Central Asian issues. This time we decided to divide the new volume into three sections: “Ukraine, Moldova and the EU”, “Georgia’s Reforms and Euro-Atlantic Aspirations” and “Central and Eastern Europe: From Communist Utopia to Post-Communist Realities”.

This year’s volume of WEER is especially dedicated to Ukrainian issues. It opens with the article of Galyna A. Piskorska and Natalia L. Yakovenko from Taras Shevchenko National University on Ukraine in international relations. The authors underline that forming a positive international image of Ukraine is a necessary part of effective promotion and realization of the state’s national interests. As Piskorska and Yakovenko emphasize, this issue became especially important for Ukraine after Russian aggression in Crimea and later in the Donbas region, after “the system of international agreements (as well as the post-war security system) has been destroyed, and divisional lines have once more appeared in Europe”. In her article, Olga Brusylovska from Odessa Mechnikov National University focuses on various experiences of the cross-border cooperation between the EU and its Eastern neighbours: Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. Monika Ślęzak summarizes data from various sources on the demographics of ethnic groups in Ukraine and Ukrainian minorities in the countries of the region (Poland, Belarus and Baltic states). Nataliya Chahrak deals with the issue of aging society and compares situations in Ukraine and Poland, whereas Nataliia Drozd analyses Ukraine’s economic situation in the period of global financial instability.

The second section of articles contains studies on Georgia, its relations with NATO and the reforms related to the country’s democratization process, as well as the security

sector's transformation. Marion Kipiani, an Austrian scholar based in Tbilisi from summer 2009 until early 2015, reviews the long record of Georgia's efforts to become a member of NATO. She also analyses the current chances of the government in Tbilisi to speed-up this process. The article by Marcin Rutowicz evaluates the successes and failures of Mikheil Saakashvili presidency. At the end of the Georgian section, Krzysztof Łukjanowicz, from the Caucasus Bureau of the Centre for East European Studies in Tbilisi, pays tribute to Alexander Rondeli, director of the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS), who passed away on June 12th, 2015. It is worth mentioning that Dr. Rondeli participated in many events organized by the Centre for East European Studies. In recent years, more than a dozen Polish students and academics completed internships in Alexander Rondeli's organization, GFSIS. He also published many excellent articles in WEER.

The last section's articles deal with various topics related to the Communist past and current realities in Central and East European countries. Marius Tăriță, from Chisinau's Institute of History, describes the mutual fascination of Moldovan and Ukrainian Soviet writers. The former, nevertheless, had to participate in the gloomy spectacle of condemning the Ukrainian poet, Volodymyr Sososura, staged by the totalitarian regime. The Moldavian Union of Soviet Writers was forced to emphasize its "fight against bourgeois nationalism in literature". In his article, former Polish Ambassador to Belarus, Mariusz Maszkiewicz, analyses the effectiveness of non-violent methods of social resistance against authoritarian regimes. He examines the experience of recent revolution in Kyiv and draws upon the thought of Lithuanian philosopher Gražina Miniotaitė, who already in the 1990s formulated the concept of civilian-based defense. Palina Prysmakova from Florida Atlantic University compares public service motivation in Central and Eastern Europe in her article; still shaped to a large extent by the Communist past.

I

UKRAINE, MOLDOVA AND THE EU

Ukraine in International Relations

GALYNA A. PISKORSKA, NATALIA L. YAKOVENKO

Taras Shevchenko National University, Kyiv

World globalization processes, which are especially reflected in the communication sphere, mean that Ukraine must consider general tendencies of world information space development, the integral part of which is the image of the state – fast turning into one of the key problems of information security. The point is to essentially increase the regulative influence of the modern state on the formation process of such specific information resources as its international reputation, as well as its public and political images, which should reflect basic national values and goals of the state, up to and including stereotypes and various other representations.¹ The tasks mentioned above have become especially topical for Ukraine after signing the Association Treaty with the EU, which has caused the need for new important tasks to be solved concerning national security, the strengthening of Ukraine's political and economic positions of the state on the international arena, as well as the development of equal and mutually beneficial cooperation with other subjects of international relations.

The image of the nation as a subject for research came about in response to the need to clearly define between “ours” and “not ours – stranger’s”, as well as to create an image of the enemy based on stable ideological stereotypes, often unreal and artificially produced.² After gaining independence, the new post-Soviet states faced acute problems to overcome such stereotypes, and create a positive convincing and characteristic image in world policy and amongst the international community. In Ukraine in particular, the coordination of positioning technologies and their assessment was dealt with by many official institutions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the State Committee on Tourism, State Agency on Investments and National Projects of Ukraine, as well as specialized departments of governmental structures, such as the the O. Razumkov Centre of Economic and Political Research, and the Ukrainian Agency of International Development, not to mention corporate and non-government structures of the state.

¹ Л.В. Губерський, “Імідж України міжнародний”, *Українська дипломатична енциклопедія у 2-х т.* (Київ, 2004), Vol. 1, 542-543.

² U. Bronfenbrenner, “The Mirror-Image in Soviet-American Relations”, www.cas.buffalo.edu/classes/psc/fczagare/PSC%20346/Bronfenbrenner.pdf

Tendencies and results of Ukraine's positioning in the international arena were studied in papers by national scholars, such as A. Gutsal,³ M. Pashkov,⁴ V. Chalyi,⁵ T. Pashukova,⁶ S. Gnatyk⁷ and many foreign researchers as well. Thus, Professor R. Sonders from New York University wrote his article for "Foreign Affairs" on the Ukrainian state brand. The central idea was the forming of a positive international image of Ukraine, while determining its main values and deeply rooted foundations that direct socio-political development of the state. This positive image in the mass consciousness of both internal and external audiences is a necessary and integral part of effective promotion and realization of the state's national interests.⁸

In many papers, experts conclude that there is lack of clearly formulated and consecutive state image-making policy in Ukraine, cemented by a national idea and unanimously accepted by all strata of society.⁹ It should be taken into consideration that human thinking and methods of forming images are very inflexible in response to unexpected external intrusion fraught with changes. In fact, no single event can change stable representations or stereotypes during one or two decades for 40% of the population. According to experts, if a campaign on image transformation is not at an official level, this process may go on for a hundred years. Moreover, because many official enterprises do not address the real state of affairs in the country, distrust towards Kyiv, and Ukraine as a state, has been spreading in the world information space.¹⁰

An image-creation campaign must be formed in the international consciousness and its core should consist of a generalized image-idea of the state, which in turn must be understandable, positive and maximally laconic. The main parts of a state's international image associated with its integral instruments are considered to be: a) investments climate; b) tourism potential and corresponding infrastructures; c) social characteristics (quality of life, security, level of human development, etc.); d) national symbols (internationally known representations of the state, historic events and places, stars, brands and so on); e) images of government and/or state leaders.

The image of Ukraine in the global information space was determined by a number of controversial factors of both internal and external origin. They are rather influential

³ О.Ю. Гребінченко, С.А. Гуцал., О.А. Скляренко, "М'яка безпека" та сучасні виклики міжнародному іміджеві України держави", *Україна в системі міжнародної безпеки: монографія* (Київ, 2009), 517-542.

⁴ М. Пашков, В. Чалий, "Міжнародний імідж України: погляд з Польщі", *Національна безпека і оборона*, (2000), No. 3, 27-30; М. Пашков В. Чалий, "Міжнародний імідж України: погляд з Росії", *Національна безпека і оборона* (2000), No. 3, 31-48.

⁵ Доповідь Секретаря РНБОУ Р. Богатирьової щодо питання забезпечення національної безпеки в інформаційній сфері, <http://www.rainbow.gov.ua/news/662.html>

⁶ Т. Пашукова, "Імідж України і Росії в умовах політичних змін", *Соціальна психологія* (2005), No. 5, 3-15

⁷ С.Л. Гнатюк, "Публічний імідж держави в Україні: напрями та чинники покращання", *Стратегічні пріоритети* (2011), No. 2, 49-53.

⁸ R.A. Saunders, "Ukraine's Nation Brand – Why It Matters", *Зовнішні справи* (2008), No. 7, 38-39.

⁹ Т. Пашукова, "Імідж України і Росії в умовах політичних змін", *Соціальна психологія* (2005), No. 5, 3-15.

¹⁰ Т. Пашукова, "Імідж України і Росії в умовах політичних змін", *Соціальна психологія* (2005), No. 5, 3-15.

for the acceptance of Ukraine as an international actor. Being causally and effectively connected, these factors form political, diplomatic and external economic grounds for the development of the Ukrainian state and its society on the one hand, while on the other, they become uppermost in the minds of the outside world exerting influence on the level and intensity of relations with leading political structures, businesses and civic organizations in Ukraine. Since Ukrainian political and public opinions were ideologically split for a long time in their attitude towards strategies of political reform, economic transformation and foreign political orientation toward Ukraine, the outside world has not yet seen prospects for the national development of the country.

The image of Ukraine was determined by the following characteristics: the domination of state power by the oligarchy, which formed through the distribution of state property from the industrial period – mainly raw materials (extractive industry, metallurgy); business raiders; corruption; neglect of the constitutional principles of power division; the neglect of citizens' rights; the failure of state bodies to execute legislation on social protection of the population; the reduction of constitutional rights by employers; a great increase in the material difference between rich and poor, and so on.¹¹

Today the main elements of Ukraine's image are mainly connected with the civil recalcitrance of Euromaidan participants and the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The events of November 2013-February 2014 are known in the world as the Revolution of Dignity and are proof of the European aspirations of Ukrainian society.

September 2014 was marked by two significant events which might have potentially been able to halt the rise of crisis tendencies and mark the crucial moment in the socio-economic development of Ukraine. The first was the ratification of the Treaty on Association with the EU (and government approval of the Plan of Measures on its implementation up to 2017). The second was the presentation of Strategy of Reforms-2020 by the President of Ukraine. Taken together, they created certain conditions for abandoning the so-called "policy of short-term horizons" – until recently the Achilles heel of Ukrainian statehood – and forming a strategically oriented policy of long-term transformations necessary for Ukraine to occupy its proper place in the European and world space.

A positive image of the state in the eyes of its citizens is able to consolidate a state-making nation to oppose any external influence, to unite them to secure constant purposeful social development in unity, and to improve self-identification of the population as a single nation and community; despite differing ethnic origin and property status of its subjects. In such a case, destructive state images created by its opponents are successfully neutralized or met by adequate opposition, leading to consolidation of the people. One extremely positive result of Euromaidan is the fact that the world has started to clearly distinguish between the Ukrainian authorities and Ukrainian citizens.¹²

¹¹ "Російсько-український конфлікт: стан, наслідки, перспективи розвитку подій: Аналіт. доповідь Центру Разумкова", *Національна безпека і оборона* (2014), Nos. 5-6. 2–39.

¹² "Євромайдан врятував імідж України у світі – експерт", <http://www.unian.ua/politics/862683-evromaydan-vryatuvav-imidj-ukrajini-u-sviti-ekspert.html>

Nevertheless, Ukraine has become the embodiment of the threat of world war and a challenge towards the established world order. As a result of Russian aggression in Crimea and later in the East of Ukraine, the system of international agreements (as well as the post-war security system) has been destroyed, and divisional lines have once more appeared in Europe. The Ukrainian problem has divided the world into two opposing groups – Russia and the USA (along with its allies), with both groups using military rhetoric.¹³ Thus, Ukraine has turned into a factor of instability and a source of various threats, thereby requiring the special attention of the international community.

As a geopolitically important state (not to mention the corresponding geopolitical interests of neighboring states), Ukraine was the focus of integrational projects of both the European Union and Russian Federation for a certain period. Fundamental differences with Russia are mainly caused by the differently vectored courses of the two states – Euro-Asian for Russia and European for Ukraine. The Association Agreement with the EU was being prepared while Russia actively tried to attract Ukraine into its integrational sphere of influences – the Customs Union, Single Economic Space, Euro-Asian Economic Community, Organization of Collective Security Agreement and Euro-Asian Economic Union.

The strategic importance of Ukraine for Russia is vividly illustrated by two well-known researchers. According to O. Litvinenko, “Ukraine is a key state of post-Soviet space. First of all, the transit of gas is connected with it. It is Ukraine which is the RF vector in the post-Soviet space. The final loss of influence in Ukraine in the not so distant future means the loss of Belarus, the real possibility of being deprived of the ability to form direct strategic relations with the EU and a change of political regime. A successful democratic Ukraine may become an obvious demonstrative example for Russia.”¹⁴ A.L. Shevtsova says that, “Ukraine is not an international subject for the Kremlin at all. It is an issue of internal stability for the Russian regime”¹⁵.

Among the weaknesses of the Euro-Asian political, economic and security space for the interests of Ukraine, its mosaic, fragmentary and vague nature should be mentioned, where certain elements of the space are in competition with each other. Others include obvious strong off-center tendencies, a lack of structural reforms, the destruction of infrastructure, evidence of a high level of corruption and organized crime, together with “space mobility”; enabling the possible migration of some participants to other regional systems. In addition, the formation of security elements on paternalistic principles, an accent on ‘rigid security’ and threats typical to it, not to mention military political resources as the main means of threat removal, are also causes for concern.

¹³ А. Єрмолаєв, С. Денисенко, О. Маркєєва, Л. Поляков, “Український конфлікт і майбутнє світової та європейської безпеки”, *Нова Україна*, http://newukraineinstitute.org/media/news/501/file/crisis_security%20UKR.pdf

¹⁴ “Національна безпека: порядок денний для України”, <http://www.niisp.org.ua/defa~100.php>, accessed on 6 April 2009

¹⁵ Л. Шевцова, “Интервью”, http://www.1in.am/rus/press_russian_38251.html, accessed on 7 December 2013.

Ukraine looks at European integration as a means to push the modernization of its economy, the establishment of high social standards and a positive guarantee of national security. Realization of the Association Treaty with the EU gives Ukraine competitive privileges in the process of continental integration. Rapid adaptation to more advanced European norms and technical characteristic, become incentives for the acceleration of the modernization of its national economy and social security system. An opportunity emerges to strengthen national positions in the regional division of labour, to preserve export niches and, in the future, to increase production volume. Here, Ukraine has tried to balance its western vector at the expense of the Free Trade Zone with the CIS and the realization of a “3+1” formula, in its relations with the Russian Federation and other states of the Euro-Asian Union; an entity which was rushed to completion.

Bearing in mind Ukraine’s complicated geopolitical situation, located at the crossroads of strategic interests of “great states”, for a certain period of time it was prudent to adhere to the “dynamic balance of powers” concept. However, because of the intensification of global competition, such a strategy caused the opposite effect. Objectively, Ukraine was faced with a choice of priority direction of integration, and that choice was not only stipulated by economic considerations. In fact, it was a civilizational alternative for Ukraine – the choice of fundamental values for its further development, which simultaneously created the foundations of a renewed image-making strategy of the state. Either Ukraine would join the EU project – uniting European states by means of democracy and law – or it would become a participant in various associations of post-Soviet states with transitional economies, mostly authoritarian political regimes and numerous problems in the field of democracy, initiated by Russia.

In the bill, “On the Foundations of Internal and Foreign Policy”, approved by the Verkhovna Rada on 1 July 2010, it is stressed that one of the main features of Ukraine’s foreign policy is “securing the integration of Ukraine into the European political, economic and legal space, aimed at gaining membership in the European Union.”¹⁶ At the same time, there is more than one example of strategic course alteration in the contemporary history of Ukraine, caused by the political situation which made a negative impact on Ukraine’s international image. The beginning of Ukraine’s crisis was formally caused by the President refusing to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. A fast “U-turn” towards the Customs Union put an end to all hopes of the active, thinking part of Ukrainian society for democratic development of the state based on European values and, correspondingly, to personal expectations.

At the beginning of the crisis, social stratification of the population reached a critical level. According to the estimations of various experts, incomes of so-called “decimal groups” (10% of the richest and 10% of the poorest Ukrainians), were separated by a difference of 35 times. At the beginning of 2013, Ukraine (and Russia as well) occupied

¹⁶ Закон України, “Про засади внутрішньої і зовнішньої політики” (2010), <http://www.president.gov.ua/documents/12069.html>

first place in Europe as to the number of people who had rapidly enriched themselves – 397 individuals possessed assets of over USD 30 million. A massive amount of the population was living below the poverty line (according to UN data, 80% of Ukrainian are poor). Such a significant difference in incomes can, not only lead to grave economic consequences, but also to the violation of the democratic foundations of a market economy, as well as basic human rights. A decimal coefficient of 10:1 is recognized as evidence of the possibility for social instability to emerge and is regarded as critical to national security.¹⁷ The most active and productive part of the Ukrainian population, mainly entrepreneurs and workers, were ready to embark on the path of protest.

The Russian Federation possessed a complete set of effective instruments to form and promote a positive image of its own state to the cultural and educational spaces of Ukraine, Europe and the world. The Russian strategy of informational influence on the post-Soviet space is grounded in the so-called “Russian world” doctrine. It is not contained in any official documents, but it concentrates the moods of active supporters around the messianic role of Russia. The doctrine envisages Russia turning into “a world state and the center of united East Slavic lands, artificially disunited in 1991.”¹⁸ In other words, according to this doctrine, Russia aspires to uniting all the former territories of historical Russia under one banner – territories Russia feels it possesses a historical and moral right to.

The Ukrainian search for a developmental path, considering a European experience in particular, gave rise to the issuance of counter-information by Russia. In these conditions, within the context of the information positioning of Ukraine, the impact of the Russian factor becomes especially contradictory, and the factor itself turns into an instrument of political and ideological struggle for domination in the post-Soviet space.

Tradition, various advantages and the “great-power” mentality of the majority of the Russian political elite determined the scale and intensity of Russian informational influence on Ukraine. The Russian Federation has no intentions of joining the EU. It does not share its values, but it actively promotes its own cultural heritage, forming a net of cultural centers intended to expand the presence of the Russian state in the European and world information space. Thus in 2005, the first state 24 hour English-speaking TV channel, “Russia Today” began its activity. It has its offices in all the main capital cities of the world, as well as in regions of the Russian Federation. Programs are broadcast in 32 languages to every continent, except South America.

To organize and secure the purposeful coordination of different state institutions and structures, the Federal Agency on CIS Affairs created “Rossotrudnichestvo” in 2008. This agency is mainly for administering civilian foreign aid to Russians living abroad. The agency is subordinate to the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and carries

¹⁷ А. Б. Качинський, “Індикатори національної безпеки: визначення та застосування їх граничних значень: монографія” (Київ, 2013), 62.

¹⁸ “Русский мир”, <http://www.ruskiymir.ru/ruskiymir/ru/fund>.

out its activities through representations or representatives of diplomatic missions in 74 countries. In total, there are 83 sub-departments of the Agency, including 58 Russian centers of science and culture. They closely cooperate with Russian and international non-governmental organizations, including the 'Russian World' Fund, Russian Cultural Foundation, International Council of Russian Countrymen and so on (there are over 70 partner-organizations, including news agencies, radio stations and publications, such as "ITAR-TASS", "RIA Novosti", "Golos Rossii", "Russki Viek", "Russkaya Mysl", "Russki Mir, etc.).

On 9 November 2013, Russian Presidential Decree No. 894, "On some measures on the improvement of state mass media activities" was published. It envisaged a series of measures such as the abolition of "RIA Novosti" news agency and "Golos Rossii" radio station, and the creation of an international agency, "Rossija Segodnia", instead. This new agencies main task was to be "the interpretation of the Russian Federation's state policy and public life abroad". Russian experts consider that this was caused by the political situation in Ukraine and is aimed at promoting and improving the image of Russia abroad.

The informational space of Ukraine was highly dependent on Russia and was filled with Russian mass media. In fact, Ukraine entered the international scene while still "informationally unprotected", as all former Soviet mass media bodies abroad remained in use by the Russian Federation. At the same time, Ukraine did not possess the means or possibilities to establish any mass media networks of its own abroad (though now the situation has changed). This is significant, as in order to succeed on the international arena and for the image of the state to exert a positive influence, it is necessary to be in control of your own information resources and means of information security.

The aspects of informational space security of Ukraine were dealt with in the document entitled, "Report of the CNS of Ukraine on Ensuring National Security in the Information Sphere".¹⁹ Attention was paid to the potential and effectiveness of other states' expansion; able to destructively influence Ukraine's internal and external image and the process of its formation. It was mentioned that certain parts of Ukrainian territory, especially littoral areas, are almost inaccessible for Ukrainian speakers, as those areas remain under the information influence of neighboring states. This causes the spread of biased interpretations of Ukraine's internal political processes and external political actions at the international level.

Thus, in the western littoral area, information emitted by 83 radio stations of Ukraine's three neighboring states – Slovakia, Poland and Hungary – is spread *hors-concours*, while in eastern littoral areas, opportunities for Ukrainian state TV and radio programs are much weaker in the Russian Federation, than for Russian programs in Eastern Ukraine. This is caused by the lack of an adequate technical foundation to expand Ukrainian TV

¹⁹ "Російсько-український конфлікт: стан, наслідки, перспективи розвитку подій: Аналіт. доповідь Центру Разумкова", *Національна безпека і оборона* (2014), Nos. 5-6, 2-39.

and radio programs into neighboring states, while the activities of “Goloss Rossii” and “Sodruzhestvo” several times exceed the broadcasting of Ukrainian state radio programs in relation to the amount of information and the capacities of their networks.

Since independence, Ukraine has failed to create an effective information network for 23 years. The situation of “Radio Ukraine” may serve as an example. It could have performed as a “window” to the state as, for instance, “Voice of America”, “BBC Radio International”, “Deutsche Welle” or “France Internationale”, but “Radio Ukraine” is only broadcast in four languages (compare: “Voice of America” – 50 languages, “Goloss Rossii” – 32 languages). It is evident that because of this, Ukrainian events are informed and commented on mainly by foreign information services and agencies with their own viewpoints and critical remarks.

According to analytical research, in Ukraine, about 80% of air time is filled by non-Ukrainian productions.²⁰ They mainly form images in the international, external space, but are accessible to Ukrainians chiefly through cable television and the Internet. A generalized view of European countries is presented by “EuroNews” channel, while “RTVI” broadcasts the position of the USA and Israel. In the eastern littoral zone – and on Ukrainian territory in general – transmissions of leading Russian TV companies (ORT, RTR, NTV), whose programs are of an anti-Ukrainian nature, are wide-spread.²¹ Purposeful information-psychological, anti-Ukrainian actions are realized by elaborating, preparing and spreading negative information. Special means and methods of influence are used, capable of blocking free thinking at a subconscious level.²²

Information expansion achieved its aim concerning propaganda influence on citizen consciousness in traditionally pro-Russian regions – the East and South, as well as in Donbas. In early 2014, 69 Russian TV channels were transmitting to Ukraine, while 1176 Russian-language periodicals were published on Ukrainian territory. Only as late as September was the transmission of 15 Russian TV channels discontinued, while the showing of contemporary Russian films glorifying Russian elements of force was forbidden.²³

Russian aggression in Crimea and Donbas, accompanied by strong information attacks, led to negative results – feelings of “traumatic experience” and “confrontational watershed” were formed in the consciousness of people in both states. In the opinion of experts, this unprecedented alienation will determine the content and nature of bilateral relations, as well as exert a negative influence on Ukraine’s image for a long period of time.²⁴

²⁰ Є. Макаренко, “Тенденції інформаційної політики України в контексті сучасної перспективи”, *Торунські студії* (Torun, 2009), 139–150.

²¹ Ibid.

²² E. Makarenko, “Bezpieczenstwo narodowe Ukrainy: wspolczesne wyzwania i zagrozenia dla suwerennosci państwa”, *Polityka bezpieczenstwa narodowego państw obszaru WNP. Wybrane problemy*, (Torun 2009), 143–161.

²³ “Російсько-український конфлікт: стан, наслідки, перспективи розвитку подій: Аналіт. доповідь Центру Разумкова”, *Національна безпека і оборона* (2014), Nos. 5–6, 13.

²⁴ Ibid.

An important aspect of Ukraine's positioning in international relations is considered to be the formation and promotion of positive investment image, which is realized through the strategies of international investment cooperation.²⁵

Investment positioning is regarded as follows:

- the policy of image-making aimed at creating a unique and competitive investment image on the international scene, while the factor of investment positioning influences international cooperation (foreign policy of the state, its interaction at the integration union level, participation in international forums, promotion of investment image at the international level);
- influence on financial and economic relations (investment policy, forming an investment portfolio, “investment umbrella”);
- influence on public opinion and public relations (the use of technologies for vertical and horizontal investment positioning by government structures);
- influence on domestic policy (propaganda of political factors concerning investment positioning in society).
- Characteristics of investment positioning are considered as:
 - geographical parameters (geographical location, size of the territory, geopolitical characteristics);
 - demographic parameters (number of the population, level of urbanization, structural peculiarities – age, ethnicity, religion, etc.);
 - political parameters (political and administrative structures of state and society, stability of the political system, political reputation in international relations);
 - economic parameters (economic policy, provision of natural resources, level of technological development, potentials of industrial and agricultural production, professional level of labor resources considering geopolitical factors);
 - military parameters (armed forces, military complex capacities, current state of armed forces and military organization in general, military traditions);
 - scientific and technical parameters (scientific and military potential, innovation resource, level of infrastructure, use of information communication and other types of high technologies);
 - historical parameters (historical reputation of the state as a subject of international relations);
 - psychological parameters (historically determined mentality of the population);
 - parameters of formal or non-formal status in the international political hierarchy (super state, great state, middle state, small state, regional force, etc.);
 - parameters of diplomatic service organization and its traditions²⁶

²⁵ А.М. Єдамова, “Особливості Формування інвестиційної політики держави в умовах міжнародної політичної конкуренції”, *Актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин* (2010), 123-127.

²⁶ А.М. Єдамова, “Особливості Формування інвестиційної політики держави в умовах міжнародної політичної конкуренції”, *Актуальні проблеми міжнародних відносин* (2010), 123-127.

The international image of Ukraine is considered to be an integral part of national security. In the background of international competitiveness, it is the image which determines the place of a state in the world system. It also secures additional investments in the economy and concludes profitable international treaties and determines the direction of tourism. It is the authority of the state which secures its influence in the world.

According to some experts, the formation of Ukraine's positive image in the future will directly depend on the economic situation. With the advent of economic stabilization, the scale of corruption will be diminished and the country may become a reliable partner for European states. At the moment, Ukraine is surviving in war-like conditions – about 25% of industry has ground to a halt and 10% of enterprises are destroyed. This was mentioned by President Poroshenko in an interview with First National TV Channel on 9 March, 2015.²⁷ The President also stressed that in order to achieve economic stability, Ukraine requires conditions of political stability and the creation of effective mechanisms of human rights protection based on socially oriented reforms.

According to experts, today's economic decrease has not only been caused by short-term political and economic shock, as well as Russian aggression, but is mainly the result of weak economic policies of former governments in previous years.²⁸

In 2008-09, investment expenditures essentially deteriorated the willingness of world investors to enter Ukrainian markets, while an unsuccessful investment policy in 2010-13 completely discouraged investors (both national and international) away from the national economy, which resulted in further hollowing out investment potential. Thus, a weakened Ukraine entered the 2013-14 crisis possessing very little resources to oppose a new crisis wave. Ukraine became an investment outsider. Today there are no obvious effective methods to substantially improve its investment position, so in the nearest future, the weakness of investment processes will further hinder the state's general economic renewal. In the economic sphere, as a result of the conflict with Russia, Ukraine was vulnerable to the loss of Russian markets and diminished industrial potential as a result of war destruction. This makes it rather difficult to be competitive in European markets.

At the same time, some stimuli appear to bring some semblances of hope to the economy, such as the fight against corruption, the effective use of strategic resources (land in particular) and the creation of a more flexible system to rule the country. For a certain period of time – until effective state institutions are created and strengthened – active external assistance may appear to be needed on the part of those states and institutions which are its creditors. A new program of financial assistance on the part of the IMF, may prove an incitement to “defrost” and bring life to the economy.

²⁷ Офіційний сайт Президента України Петра Порошенка, “Об’єднані, ми виживемо–Президент”, <http://www.president.gov.ua/news/32438.html>– Назва з екрана.

²⁸ А. Єрмолаєв, С. Денисенко, О. Маркєєва, Л. Поляков, “Український конфлікт і майбутнє світової та європейської безпеки”, *Нова Україна*, http://newukraineinstitute.org/media/news/501/file/crisis_security%20UKR.pdf

The role of a “geopolitical profits merchant” – in civilizational opposition to Russia and the West, but chosen by Ukraine – failed to bring any of the privileges expected by certain experts and politicians. On the contrary, it turned Ukraine into a country of high investment risk, which limited the realization of high technology projects and investments into proper economic sectors. Disproportions in the development of different sectors of the national economy became more profound; deindustrialization, degradation of the social security system and falling living standards were precipitated. In turn, this led to the aggravation of demographic problems, the outflow of the population and changes in the ethnic landscape.

The risk of rapid socio-economic degradation and loss of statehood will rise. The inability of the state to regulate rudimentary contradictions – due to the lack of a clear political will or corresponding mechanisms to overcome them – will enable external forces with their own political or economic interests to interfere. Liberal theorist, S. Hoffman, determines these types of states as “failed”; ones which cannot (or do not wish to) achieve certain standards of stable development and security because of their weakness, corruption and fragmentation.²⁹ In such states, the external interference of international forces is acceptable to establish control over unstable territory and regulate socio-political processes. Thus, the issue becomes one of sovereign functions fulfilled by an external actor (UN, regional organizations, other states). The conflict is brought into an area where global powers clash and acquires international dimensions. The interference of external forces is able to preserve conflict and opposition for long periods of time and resolution becomes more problematic.

Another scenario – the termination of conflict escalation and the emergence of new incitement to integration – has little chance of being realized. However, the possibility to transform the situation into a course of dialogue and renewal of cooperation still remains. The contemporary system of Ukraine’s national interests provides, in particular, a balance of interests for the individual, community and state in economic, internal political, social, international, informational, military, littoral, ecological and other spheres. These interests are of a long-term nature and determine main goals, as well as strategic and current tasks of the state’s domestic and foreign policy. Here, it seems important to realize internal transformations in Ukraine and steps towards the normalization of a relations within the EU-Ukraine-Russian Federation triangle simultaneously, not step by step.

The positive image of Ukraine must demonstrate the correspondence of the state’s political system to recognized democratic standards. This is significant, as the creation of state’s image (in its widest sense) in the present world is subordinate to one of the most important aims – entering the community of developed nations.

Image is a general characteristic aimed at solving strategic tasks and realizing strategic priorities. For Ukraine, such priorities include the establishment of wider cooperation

²⁹ S. Hoffman, “The Politics and Ethics of Military Intervention”, *Survival* (1996), Vol. 37, No. 4, 37.

with European states and the renewal of a moderate and pragmatic dialogue with Russia. The Russian-Ukrainian crisis damaged the situational balance and had significant repercussions in the world. It threatened the goals, reputation and image of the Russian Federation, as well as its “victim-state”, Ukraine. In the conflict, Ukraine appeared capable of militarily opposing the aggressor by its demonstrations of patriotism and the loyalty of the civic state to the ideas of state independence. These factors make it possible to form a positive image of Ukraine providing that internal consolidation, cardinal reforms and external support are initiated.

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Abstract: In the article, tendencies and results of Ukraine's positioning in the world are analyzed in relation to modern realities. The role of the state's image on the international scene and the reasons causing its formation are determined. The integral parts of Ukraine's image, including its positive and negative components, are also indicated. In addition, ways of optimizing the image of Ukraine are put forward.

Keywords: image of the state, reasons causing the formation of the state's image, integral parts of the state's image, mass media, information space, information security.

Territorial and Cross-Border Cooperation of the EU with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova

OLGA BRUSYLOVSKA

Mechnikov National University, Odessa

1. Network Methodology in Cross-Border Cooperation Studies

The term network society describes several different phenomena related to social, political, economic and cultural changes. The network approach has developed relatively recently, but has already gained a wide following among political analysts. The basis of this concept is the idea that network forms of social organization become dominant because of the complexity of modern society. The term “network society” was first used by the known sociologist, Manuel Castells in “The Rise of the Network Society”, the first part of his “The Information Age” trilogy.

According to Castells, networks constitute the new social morphology of societies. The network society itself is, in fact, the social structure which is characteristic of what people had been calling for years the information society or post-industrial society. For Castells, networks have become the basic units of modern society. Pointing out that “the affiliation to a particular network, or lack thereof, along with the dynamics of some networks in relation to other, act as major sources of power and changes in our society”, Castells makes conclusions concerning the formation of network society. Characteristic of such a society is the domination of social morphology in social action. The formation of the new social morphology gradually leads to the fact that “the power of structure is stronger than the structure of power”.¹

In networks, both formal rules and informal “rules of the game” simultaneously operate and there is an intensive exchange of power, economic, informational and other resources based on corporate interests, social relationships and the contracts concluded between actors of these conventions.

When interviewed by Harry Kreisler from the University of California Berkeley, Castells said, “Let’s take the example of the European Union. Governments from the continent, the entire continent, decided to get together so that together they could have some level of bargaining power and some leverage to control global flows of

¹ Manuel Castells, “*The Rise of the Network Society*”, *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, Vol. I. (Cambridge; Oxford 1996), 494.

wealth, information, and power. And they built a series of institutions which is not a federal state".²

The space of flows plays a central role in Castells' vision of network society. It is a network of communications, defined by hubs where these networks criss-cross. Élités in cities are not attached to a particular locality, but to the space of flows. Castells puts great importance on these networks and argues that the real power is to be found within networks, rather than confined in global cities. This contrasts with other theorists, who rank cities hierarchically.

The interaction of border areas is amplified in conditions of globalization. Today, trans-boundary material, financial and human flows are active, but the barrier function of state borders is reducing. This is accompanied by the formation of informal networks between neighbouring border regions. Horizontal networks form the basis for new spatial forms of integration (Euro-regions, growth triangles, corridors of development, local forms of cross-border cooperation, cross-border clusters and industrial districts).

Network methodology is very perspective in the study of social, economic and political cooperation of European countries, including cross-border cooperation, especially in the study of cooperation of such unequal (in strength, capabilities and standards) entities as the EU and post-Soviet countries.

2. CBC as a Specific Variety of the EU's Regional International Activity

In the European Outline Convention from 1980 on Cross-border Cooperation (CBC), between territorial communities and authorities, to which the Republic of Moldova, Russian Federation and Ukraine, adhered to, CBC implies any coordinated actions, aimed at the consolidation and encouragement of good, neighbourly relations between territorial communities and authorities; being under the jurisdiction of two or more agreed parties and the conclusion of any agreements and arrangements necessary for fulfilling this aim. CBC is realized within the powers of territorial communities and authorities, while determined by the internal legal system of each party.

In the total length of terrestrial borders with EU countries, Moldova's share is 42%, Ukraine - 25% and the Russian Federation - 15%. The EU has borders with 5 regions of Russia, 6 regions (oblasts) of Ukraine and 12 rayons of the Republic of Moldova. A vital necessity today is the modernization of economic, social and nature conservation sectors, as well as state and territorial administration. CBC creates additional opportunities for this.³

² The Network Society and Organizational Change. Manuel Castells Interview: Conversations with History. Accessed July 7, 2014. <http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/people/Castells/castells-con4.html>

³ Olesya Sirbu, "Review - Cross Border Cooperation Development of European Union with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (2004-2010)", in *Cross-border cooperation as a tool of spatial integration and cooperation between EU and eastern partner countries*. (Maribor 2012). Accessed July 7, 2014. <http://www.iscomet.org>

CBC is considered one of the key priorities of European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI). It aims to reinforce cooperation between the member states and partner countries on the external borders of the European Union. The strategy of CBC has four main goals: 1) assisting economic and social development in border regions; 2) solving common problems; 3) establishing efficient and secure borders; 4) encouraging people-to-people cooperation.

Two programme models of CBC were developed: 1) a terrestrial borders program between two or more countries with common borders (or joined by a short sea crossing); 2) multilateral programs, covering maritime areas. Managing these programs is the responsibility of the local or national authorities, while the management models are chosen jointly by all the participant countries of the given program.⁴

The policy of enlargement is an EU success story and these benefits should continue. The latest accession of Romania and Bulgaria brought the EU to the borders of Ukraine and Moldova and raised new challenges for both countries. Ukraine must change old stereotypes like fear towards Romania. In many aspects, Romania is no longer an individual actor. In terms of community policies, competences have been transferred to EU institutions, including the EU Commission (such as the movement of goods, services, persons and capital, as well as other common policies). Therefore it is extraordinarily important to be a partner of the EU.

Despite the general policy implications, there are psychological barriers of internal political thinking behind them, including security, democracy, human rights, illegal migration and others. The Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have become new challenges for the EU, as it was previously in the case of Romania. Despite the fact that the ENPI does not give a European perspective to new neighbours, it has not established any “ban” for this process in the future. This partnership is orientated towards first achieving the goals of a free and democratic society, as well as a functioning economy orientated to the EU model. The support granted by the EU also compensates the “adverse” (collateral) effect of its extension on trade agreements, trans-border cooperation, etc. (GSP, visa agreements, autonomous preferences and others).⁵

Poland and Romania are the countries most interested in this dimension and could accept the responsibility of sharing the task of assessing, planning, and enforcing those policies at the border; firstly in the Black Sea region and secondly in the Baltic Sea region. The assistance of all European countries in this field would very much be welcomed.

The differences between the specific weight of two neighbouring spaces – in terms of values, way and means of leaving – are a common ground for encouraging and developing any emerging conflicts. At the same time, as differences disappear, the conflicts

⁴ *European Neighbourhood Policy. Country Report. Ukraine.* Commission Staff Working Paper. – Brussels, 12.5.2004. SEC (2004) 566. COM (2004) 373 final.

⁵ Iuri Chifu, “*The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Romanian approach*”. Accessed July 7, 2014. http://www.ieac.org.ua/pics/content/4/1184149091_ans.doc

and divergent positions are less probable to appear or escalate and could be solved by diplomatic means. Another axiom of democracy maintains that democratic nations do not haphazardly approach direct conflicts; they do not fight and do not use violence against others, but have the diplomatic tools to solve disputes. These are the theoretical grounds of the ENPI and for reforms and progress towards the convergence of values by neighbouring countries with economic advantages.

The new stage of cooperation reinforcement with countries bordering the EU began with the adoption in 2007 of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which includes components directly aimed at CBC. As such, CBC is regarded as the municipal and regional level of “Action Plan” implementation. The implementation of these programs started in 2004, and was financed from the funds of TACIS and INTERREG III programmes until 2006. From 2007, these programs were substituted by the ENPI. It is based on new principles of financing – participant-country joint programs must submit at least 10%, of the sum assigned by the EU for their implementation.⁶

For Moldova and Ukraine, separate “national strategic documents” (NSD) for 2007-2013 were worked out, which present the general overview on future priorities of EU support under the adopted programs. Simultaneously, the EU adopted national indicative programs (NIP) for 2007-2013, in which the priority activities are identified in detail within the framework of the national context of the ENPI for each country. The national indicative programmes determine the guidelines for project planning in priority areas.

From 2007, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and Republic of Moldova have the possibility to participate in the following CBC programmes: Black Sea, Estonia-Latvia-RF, Lithuania-Poland-RF, Latvia-Lithuania-Belarus, Poland-Belarus-Ukraine, Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine and Romania-Ukraine-Moldova. The joint development of these programs, (a major institutional innovation of European policy) within the framework of the ENPI and managing their implementation, is one of the components of European good neighbour policy, aimed to support the stability and development of regions on both sides of borders and oriented towards attaining the four major goals of EU strategy in cross-border cooperation. They are planned for a period from three to five years and based on European assistance programs.

On 1 January, 2007, Bulgaria and Romania joined the European Union, whose border, thus, reached the Black Sea coast. From the point of view of European leaders, this fact led to the necessity of developing a special strategy in relationships with the Black Sea region, generally on the basis of more active EU involvement in political and economic processes, as well as other processes that taking place. The European Commission submitted its new initiative on regional cooperation – “Black Sea Synergy” – for examination by the EU

⁶ Olesya Sirbu, “Review - Cross Border Cooperation Development of European Union with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (2004-2010)”, in *Cross-border cooperation as a tool of spatial integration and cooperation between EU and eastern partner countries*. (Maribor 2012). Accessed July 7, 2014. <http://www.iscomet.org>

Council and European Parliament. This new initiative applies to all the Eastern partners of ECBC, except Belarus, but includes Russia and Turkey.⁷

Thus, different models of bilateral CBC between the new EU member states and EENP countries have been introduced since the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the EU. They seek to maintain existing links in the areas of human contacts, cultural exchanges, trade and seasonal migration. The role of CBC in regional/spatial development is stipulated by its ability to mobilise and efficiently use the existing potential of border areas and to join resources of border regions of neighbouring countries to find solutions to common problems, as well as to foster cooperation within trans-border regions.

3. Cross Border Cooperation of the EU with Russia

The CBC Strategy Paper for 2007–2013, adopted in March 2007, identified areas eligible for 15 geographical programs along the external border of the EU and provided them with indicative financial allocations of approximately €1.1 billion in total. Russia can participate in 7 of these, corresponding with a Commission contribution of €307.488 million over a seven year period.⁸ At the Mafra Summit, Russia announced a contribution of €122 million for these CBC projects, bringing the overall amount to €429.488 million, not including some additional pledges made by EU Member States. The exact breakdown of the Russian contribution and the financing modalities are currently under discussion.⁹ Russia will allocate up to €105 million for the development of CBC with EU countries for 2010-2013.¹⁰

Moving on to some examples of trans-frontier cooperation of the EU with Russia, we can observe several other CBC programmes: “Kolarctic – Russia” (Nord/Russia), “Karelia – Russia”, “South-East Finland – Russia”, “Estonia - Latvia – Russia”, “Lithuania - Poland – Russia”, “Black Sea”. The border regions of Russia, such as the Republic of Karelia, St. Petersburg, Leningrad, Pskov and Kaliningrad regions, participate in regional organizations such as: the Council of the Baltic States, Nordic Council, the Union of Baltic Cities, Nordic Council of Ministers, the Forum of the Coast Regions of Europe, European Urban Association, Congress of Local Authorities of Europe and Local Governments, and Northern Dimension program.

The leader of CBC with Russia is certainly Finland. During the period of 1990-2009, Finland allocated about €293 million for joint projects with Russia,. The main partners of for adjacent cooperation with Finland are the North-West regions of Russia – including the Republic of Karelia, Leningrad region, Murmansk and St. Petersburg.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

The central Russian Federation, as well as the European Union and its agencies, currently pay heightened attention to the North-West region of Russia, due to its geopolitical and geo-economic attractiveness. The support for EU CBC is conditioned by strategic objectives, including the possibility of opening new markets, European security interests, political stability and economic cohesion, the ability to avoid negative effects of competition between regions and the development of national/regional economies in post-socialist countries. To achieve these goals, the creation of interstate agencies is encouraged to coordinate CBC. CBC not only helps create a positive political environment, but also fills the Russian-Baltic interstate relationship with concrete projects. Many issues depend on the initiative of regional authorities, their ability to attract the interest of local population and businesses, as well as to defend those interests at the federal level, when it is needed.

There are relation problems between Russia and the EU at the state level. Thus, periodically, there are emerging tensions with the EU (including with neighbouring Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania), which create an unfavourable political background for cooperation on a regional level. Officially, the stated goal of relations is a strategic partnership. However, under this conceptual vacuum, and the level of competition and even rivalry, it is difficult – even if the relevant documents are signed – to bring the relationship in correspondence with the long-term needs of all parties in a dynamic future world.¹¹

The readiness of the Russian Federation to finance the project on equal terms with the EU distinguishes it from other countries which do not possess the necessary financial resources. In particular, the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine are attempting to build relationships thus to increase the financial support for joint projects. The membership of Romania in the EU increases its chances to receive more financial funds for joint projects. Nevertheless, the present regulations on co-financing demand certain investments from these states.

4. Cross-Border Cooperation of the EU with Ukraine and Moldova

The EU is the key donor giving financial and technical aid to the South-West border regions of Ukraine (Odessa, Chernivetska, Ivano-Frankivska, Lvivska, Zakarpatska, and Volynska). In 1998-2002. the European Commission, through the TACIS CBC Progra, granted Ukraine €22.5 million [4]. The CBC Programs of 2007-2013, in which Ukraine's involvement had been approved in 2008, reached: 1) Hungary-Slovakia-Romania-Ukraine: €68.640 million; 2) Romania-Ukraine-Moldova: €126.718 million; 3) Poland-Belarus-Ukraine: €186.201 million; 4) The Black Sea CBC Sea basin program: €17.306 million.¹²

¹¹ Ibid..

¹² *Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2008. Progress Report: Ukraine.* Commission Staff Working Document. – Brussels, 23/04/2009. Sec (2009) 515/2.

The EU allocated €470.05 million to support reforms in Ukraine in 2011 - 2013. An indicative budget of €470.05 million was allocated to Ukraine through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI) for the financing of the National Indicative Program (NIP) 2011-2013. This results from the NIP, which was published by the European Commission. Thus, the average annual level of funding has increased by 25%, compared to the previous programming period. The overall objectives of bilateral EU-Ukraine aid are defined in the National Strategic Program (NSP) for 2007-2013. In the NIP, there are identified the following priority areas: Priority Area 1: Good governance and the rule of law; Priority Area 2: Facilitating the coming into force of the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (including an intensive and comprehensive Free Trade Zone); Priority Area 3: Sustainable development.¹³

Stages which influenced the development of cross-border cooperation of the EU with Moldova included the signing of the Agreements between Moldova and the EU on visa simplification and the readmission of persons found in the country illegally in October 2007; the adoption of the Regulation on the Introduction of Trade Preferences for Moldova by the EU in January 2008; and the signing of the Joint Declaration on Mobile Partnership between the EU and the Republic of Moldova in June 2008, in order to strengthen legal migration opportunities, manage migration and combat illegal immigration. About 40 initiatives are being implemented within the framework of the Mobility Partnership between the EU and Moldova.

In December 2009, the Republic of Moldova joined the Energy Community. In January 2010, negotiations started between the EU and the Republic of Moldova on the development of the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, one of the goals being the creation of a deep and comprehensive free trade area (DCFTA). A dialogue was also initiated to develop conditions for the visa-free movement of Moldovan citizens.¹⁴

On 29 November 2013, the EU-Moldova Association Agreement, including the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, signed during the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, will further strengthen political, economic and trade relations between the EU and Moldova. The Association Agreement (AA) will strengthen relations and cooperation between the EU and Moldova and their citizens. It is a concrete way to take advantage of the very positive dynamics in EU-Moldova relations. It focuses on the support of core reforms, economic recovery, governance, sector cooperation and the far-reaching liberalisation of Moldova's trade with the EU. The signing of the Agreement is an important step towards its eventual signature and subsequent implementation by all EU Member States and Moldova. The Agreement places great emphasis on democracy and the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms, good governance, market economy and sustainable development.

¹³ Olesya Sirbu, "Review - Cross Border Cooperation Development of European Union with Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova (2004-2010)", in *Cross-border cooperation as a tool of spatial integration and cooperation between EU and eastern partner countries*. (Maribor 2012). Accessed July 7, 2014. <http://www.iscomet.org>

¹⁴ Ibid.

Once signed and implemented, concrete benefits can flow from the Agreement. Examples include the better protection of consumers through improved safety and higher quality of locally-grown agricultural products; better business opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises through the opening of new markets; better access to improved health services and energy savings thanks to more efficient use of energy resources and the development of renewable energy sources; a better functioning judiciary and thanks to the strengthened rule of law- demanding accountability for public decision-makers and increased transparency.

The main factors restraining the development of CBC in Moldova are the following: 1) the direct interdependence of CBC intensification from political conjuncture emerging in any given period, rather than from pragmatic effectiveness and urgency; 2) the failure of measures aimed to develop small and medium private businesses, creation of joint ventures and- trade companies in border rayons, due to which, there are decreasing possibilities of resolving acute social and economic problems in border areas; 3) the results of the last territorial-administrative reform, which led to the fragmentation of the counties in rayons, significantly reducing the financial and organizational possibilities of small Moldovan border regions in cooperation with neighbouring Romanian counties of; 4) the need to co-finance joint projects in the amount of 10% of the budget, which in most cases is a major constraint for the administration of border areas of Moldova, due to their difficult economic situation and budget resources; 5) poor on-site activity in the border areas by civil society, institutions and economic agents, social partners, in the development, as well as in the process of decision-making concerning the programs projects and their implementation; 6) a major cause of restraining the projects development is the inability of officials and local entrepreneurs to use the instruments of business planning (strategic planning, SWOT-analysis, investment planning, preparation of investment documentation, financial management); 7) a lack of active dialogue aimed at achieving practical goals and tasks between the management of Euro-regions and the central authorities.¹⁵

The EU is a major financial “donor”, which supports the full range of reforms in Moldova. The EU will allocate €273.14 million to support reforms in Moldova for 2011-2013. An indicative budget of €273.3 million was allocated to Moldova through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership instrument (ENPI) for financing of the National Indicative Program (NIP) 2011-2013. This follows from the NIP, which is published by the European Commission. On average, this would represent €91.05 million per year, which is significantly more than the €66 million allocated to Moldova in 2010 under the previous programme period 2007-2010. The overall objectives of bilateral aid are defined in the EU in the National Strategic Program (NSP) for 2007-2013.¹⁶

Although official documents of the EU prefer not to yet mention the “regional dimensions” - instead concentrating on individual countries in the region - the number of

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

common weaknesses and obstacles makes necessary a regional approach and regionally oriented EU programs. A regional approach is strongly needed in order to bring multilateralism and transparent politics in this region.

5. EUBAM as an Efficient Reform Tool in the Field of Border Management

One of the tangible successes in the Ukraine-EU relations is fruitful cooperation on border and customs-related matters in the Ukraine-EU-Moldova triangle. The European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) to Moldova and Ukraine is probably the best and most efficient reform tool in the field of border management. On the other hand, it was an expensive exercise that proved the ability of the EU to set and organise a large mission rather quickly. It should also be mentioned that the necessary political will had to be created previously in both neighbouring countries of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, in order to allow operations on their respective territories.

The customs and border dialogue between Moldova and Ukraine has entered a new phase after the failed attempt in September 2001 to establish joint Ukraine-Moldova control posts on Ukrainian territory. Later dialogues on customs were focused on the reestablishment of joint control-posts, particularly on the separatist segment of the common Moldova-Ukraine border (including Kuchurgan-Pervomaiskoe and Kuchurgan-Novosavitskoe). This bilateral dialogue has been mediated since 2003 by the EU and continued by the OSCE. By that time, the Republic of Moldova's head of state announced that German, then British, etc. customs had agreed to substitute or observe cross-border traffic on the grounds of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. In March-May 2003 an observation and evaluation team, with an OSCE mandate, carried out a fact-finding mission in the separatist region and elaborated on some recommendations in favour of an international mission under an OSCE mandate.

The EUBAM is a compromise of "international customs control on the separatist segment of the state boundary line of the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine and assistance for an effective international mechanism of its monitoring ..." requested by a joint letter from heads of state of both Moldova and Ukraine on 2 June 2005.¹⁷ The launching of the EU Border Assistance Mission at the Ukraine-Moldova border (December 2005) and the establishment of a new customs regime on 3 March 2006, became the first example of such a successful multilateral cooperation under the EU's sponsorship. Despite the agreements that existed at that time between the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine, the initiation of demarcation processes by a joint Commission, as well as drafts of bilateral agreements, there were some difficulties in establishing effective communication. For illustrative purposes, it is worth mentioning: "joint control posts" in the separatist

¹⁷ Iuri Chifu, "The Eastern Dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy: A Romanian Approach". Accessed July 7, 2014. http://www.ieac.org.ua/pics/content/4/1184149091_ans.doc

region; border guard conflicts near the Novodnestrovsk Power Plant, territorial disputes in the demarcation Commission; Palanka border management, etc.¹⁸

EUBAM has no executive power and it cannot enforce legislation by itself, which is even prohibited by its mandate. However, there is an observer at the border who may require additional checks by request or upon the information of the respective competent services. Nonetheless, collateral effects should be mentioned. Firstly, this is an example of EU involvement on the ground and its presence in the region. It gives better knowledge of the situation and more effective policy orientation in the Republic of Moldova and Ukraine. Secondly, it has significantly improved the communication and trust between the competent border authorities of both neighbouring countries. The third element to be mentioned is the 41 recommendations of the Needs Assessment and Recommendations Report (NARR) that will guide the reform process. Despite its actual technical role, the impact on the modernisation of the Moldovan border authorities is most relevant. It may also be envisaged to extend or transfer this experience from customs and border management matters to cooperation on readmission procedures and investigations.

As a contribution to the fight against corruption, EUBAM strives to lead by example, espouse the most professional of standards in its daily work, and adhere strictly to the Mission's core values. The Mission has appointed an anti-corruption advisor to work with its partners, and developed an Anti-Corruption Assistance Strategy to guide its approach, based on the European principles of good governance, namely: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, and coherence. The main areas of assistance EUBAM provides in this regard are related to regulatory framework, transparency and openness, audits and investigations, code of conduct, human-resource management, and awareness raising and training. The first year's record of the monitoring mission of the Republic of Moldova-Ukrainian border was encouraging. Issues like illegal migration, drugs, trafficking of stolen (Western) cars and (chicken) meat smuggling offered positive statistics. Also, the implementation of modern container-checking techniques has proven fruitful in terms of discovering illegal weapons, firearms and bootlegged cigarettes.

Some points still to be improved, namely cooperation and free access to port areas, including container depots. Improvement is also needed in the quality of random checks at the border, as well as efficiency of Ukrainian and Moldovan border guards. Training and expertise for border guards, police officers, customs agents, not to mention sanitary and veterinary check workers, should be more extensively targeted. Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova are requested to adapt their border regulations to European standards for controlling persons and goods. In order to avoid duplication and to improve coordination, an integrated border control system should be in place according to European standards, including exchanges of intelligence and common control teams.

The EU has been preparing the second phase of its monitoring mission within the larger framework of the Concept on ESDP missions at the frontiers, drafted by the

¹⁸ *Official site of EUBAM*. Accessed July 7, 2014. http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what_we_do

General Secretariat of the Council. The latter document envisages a new approach towards new border security challenges and risks, brought forward by the eastward and southward expansion of the EU. Taking into account the fact that the European Commission is the main body governing the administration of customs, any initiative in this field has to be dual; the military and civilian bodies of ESDP dealing only with security issues. As a consequence, shortcomings in the first phase, like steel smuggling, were to be dealt with during the second phase with the help of the European Commission. The larger issue of combating organised crime was to be addressed by creating mixed teams of police officers and prosecutors.

In July 2006, the EU Border Assistance Mission expanded its presence: a new office and analytical centre were opened in Illichivsk and Odessa respectively, and Mission staff was increased by €40 individuals, not to mention the CEC allocated additional finances in the amount of 6 million. EUBAM conducts regular joint border patrols with its partners, as well as special Joint Border Control Operations (JBCOs), two of which were conducted in 2012 – a special JBCO carried out in conjunction with EURO 2012, and JBCO PODOLIA, which became the 10th EUBAM JBCO. EUBAM support was critical in the creation of the Pre-Arrival Information Exchange System (PAIES), which, since April 2008, has given the customs services of Moldova and Ukraine a way by which they can share, quickly access, and coordinate information on imports and exports, thereby helping to tackle customs fraud and other illicit activities. EUBAM had a budget of €21 million (2011-13) and a staff of approximately 100 seconded and contracted staff, mostly from EU member States, and more than 120 national staff from Moldova and Ukraine.¹⁹

However, the fundamental objective of this cooperation – settlement of the Transnistrian problem - has not been achieved so far, and the lack of progress in that issue gives rise to reasonable questions, whether the joint efforts of the EU, Ukraine and Republic of Moldova have been sufficient. The EU is not prepared to accept a quasi-settlement of the conflict or to see the setting up of an unviable model of a unified state under the control of Russia. The EU is also interested in neutralizing a grey and un-transparent zone in the shape of a breakaway republic. In addition to this, one of the EU priorities remains establishing control over freight traffic connected to Moldova, including what goes through ports in Ukraine, such as Odessa and Illichivsk. The main priority for the EU in the resolution of Transnistria is ensuring stability and regional security near its external borders. The EUBAM proposed that import flows not be forcibly reoriented from Transnistria to bypass the Transnistria portion of the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, and the presence of the EU mission on the border and the Agreement on the exchange of information between the Customs Services of Ukraine and Moldova dated 16 November 2006, be used to organize surveillance of all imports in the region.²⁰

¹⁹ *Official site of EUBAM*. Accessed July 7, 2014. http://www.eubam.org/en/about/what_we_do

²⁰ *Scenarios for the development of the Transnistria conflict. Challenges to European Security* (Kyiv 2011).

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New regional paradigms cause that “peripheral”, “rural”, “provincial”, in the condition of spatial cooperation networks, do not necessarily mean something that is structurally weak, not to mention the fact that a “central position” is not inevitably linked with economic prosperity. Currently, CBC is an efficient tool of border area development and is a means of fostering Ukraine’s move towards European integration.

There are several pressing problems of EU integration that influences CBC: corruption, lack of judicial independence, political inertia (gridlock), labor/demographics and mass emigration (brain drain). Any significant improvement in the current CBC situation is impossible without better planning, identification of the most effective instruments, determining viable directions, and better-financial support from the EU.

There are certain factors constraining the development of cross-border cooperation, such as: 1) the lack of harmonized legal acts between the parties involved, concerning the powers of authorities on trans-boundary cooperation issue; 2) the lack of political and institutional responsibility for the results of implementation or non- fulfilment of decisions, agreements, programs, projects in CBC; 3) differences in the development of regional economic independence; 4) insufficient funds for projects on trans-boundary cooperation and poor development of such projects; 5) limited capacity of participants in CBC in co-financing 10% of the amount needed for CBC project implementation; 6) low level of personnel training in trans-boundary cooperation and the lack of an integrated system of professional development in this sphere; 7) restrictions on visa-free movements of citizens across border regions; 8) low level of involvement of non-state institutions, enterprises and public organizations to implement actions under trans-boundary cooperation; 9) the lack of international transport corridors necessary for trans-boundary transport infrastructure.

For better CBC cooperation of the EU and Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine there is a need for: 1) formulation of clear positions of the EU in sensitive areas in order to avoid misuse and misinterpretation of EU goals, values and interests, in particular: stress on consolidation of democratic institutions and rule of law, diversification of energy sources, resolution of regional conflicts on the basis of territorial integrity; 2) continuation of specific regional initiatives, for example, on the basis of EUBAM experience; 3) stronger support for countries in the region, in the areas of border management, fighting corruption, dealing with soft security threats, etc.

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Abstract. The goal of this paper is to provide a complex analysis of the cross-border cooperation of the EU with Moldova, Russia and Ukraine, in order to present a set of ideas and activities which turned the EU into a key actor in territorial and cross-border cooperation. The aim of the article is analysis of the following: 1) the goals of national policy in the field of CBC; 2) CBC involvement in the border regions of Moldova, Russia, and Ukraine; 3) the example of the EUBAM as the EU mission experience in the sphere of CBC. Network methodology is the perspective of the study of cooperation of actors so unequal in strength, capabilities and standards as the EU and post-Soviet countries. There are problems of EU integration that have an influence on CBC: lack of judicial independence, political inertia, and brain drain. Any significant improvement in the current situation is impossible without better planning, identification of the most effective instruments, and better-financial support from the EU.

Keywords: cross-border cooperation, the EU, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine

Ethnic Structure of Ukraine and the Ukrainian Diaspora in Selected European Countries (Poland, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia)

MONIKA ŚLĘZAK

Academy of Special Education, Warsaw

1. Ethnic Situation in Ukraine

The territory of present-day Ukraine is made up of nine former south-western provinces of the Russian Empire. The Russian census of 1897 showed the following linguistic structure of the population living on Ukrainian lands:

Table 1.

Ethnic structure of Ukrainian lands according to the 1897 census ¹

Language	Number of people in thousands	Number of people in %
Ukrainian	17,005.7	72.6
Russian	2,767.5	11.8
Jewish	1,908.5	8.0
Polish	387.6	1.7
other	1,361.2	5.9
Total	23,430.5	100.0

At the time, Ukrainian lands were dominated by the Eastern Orthodox Church (84.7% of the population) which integrated Ukrainians with the Russian immigrant population. An estimated 23,430,500 lived on Ukrainian lands. They included Ukrainians, Russians, Jews, Poles, and other nationalities.

The territory of the present day Ukraine, which in the late 19th and early 20th century was under the rule of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was populated by 40,176,800 inhabitants, of which 64.8% used the Ukrainian language, 30.8% Polish and 4.4% other languages. In addition, 64.9% were Greek Catholics, 21.1% Roman Catholics,

¹ Piotr Eberhardt, "Między Rosją a Niemcami" (Warszawa:1996), 150.

13.0% Jews and 1.0% professed other religions.² It is evident that in this region, religion corresponded almost singularly with nationality.

Northern Bukovina was populated by 4,103,000 people, including 58.7% Ukrainians, 16.0% Jews, 14.9% Romanians, 6.8% Poles and 3.6% people of other nationalities. Carpathian Ruthenia was populated by 524,000 people, including 56.3% Ukrainians, 21.9% Hungarians, 14.7% Jews and 7.1% representatives of other nationalities. In all the discussed areas of the present-day Ukraine, Ukrainians made up more than 70% of the total population.³

According to data collected by I. Zhytetskyi in the second half of the 19th century and published in the journal “Kievskaya Starina” in 1883, the ethnographic region of Ukraine (there was no Ukrainian state at the time) spanned about 680,000 square kilometers and was inhabited by nationalities such as Ukrainians (78.7%), Jews (8.2%), Russians (6.3%), Romanians (1.1%), Germans (1%), Poles (1%), as well as Greeks, Bulgarians, Belarusians, Armenians, Gypsies and others.⁴

According to the census of 1926, during the interwar period, the territory of Ukraine was inhabited by 28,996,000 people, of which 80.1% were Ukrainians, 9.3% Russians, 5.4% Jews, 1.6% Poles, 1.4% Germans, 0.9% Moldavians, 0.3% Bulgarians, 0.3% Belarusians and 0.7% others.⁵ However, according to Eberhardt’s estimates,⁶ interwar Ukraine had a population of 38,337,700: 73.9% Ukrainians, 8.1% Russians, 6.4% Jews, 6.0% Poles, 1.8% Romanians and Moldavians, 1.3% Germans, 0.7% Bulgarians, as many Hungarians, and 1.2% others. The census of 1937 showed that the population diminished by a few million, compared to the census of 1926 (the effect of the artificial famine in Ukraine between 1932 and 1933). Obviously, that data has not been published. Furthermore, the census of 1939 showed the disappearance of 130 nationalities.⁷

At the time of the outbreak of World War II, the ethnic composition of Polish lands which would later become a part of Soviet Ukraine was as follows: 61% of the total population were Ukrainians, 27% Poles, 9.9% Jews, and 2.1% other nationalities (out of 7,650,000 people).⁸

The first post-war census in Ukraine revealed that the area was inhabited by 41,869,000 people, of whom 76.8% were Ukrainians, 16.9% Russians, 2.0% Jews,

² P. Eberhardt, “Miedzy Między Rosją a...”, 152-153.

³ P. Eberhardt, “Miedzy Między Rosją a...”, 154-156.

⁴ Mikołaj Roszczenko, “Kto Mieszka na Ukrainie (Skład Narodowościowy)”, *Nad Buhom i Narwoyu* (1993), No. 3-4, 38, (*Who Lives in Ukraine (Ethnic Composition)*).

⁵ T. Olesiewicz, “Tablice Statystyczne Ludności Ukraińskiej ZSRR. Według Spisu 17 XII 1926”, *Seria Statystyczna*, Vol. II, (Warszawa: Prace Ukraińskiego Instytutu Naukowego 1930), (*Statistical tables of the Ukrainian Population of the USSR: According to the 17 December 1926 Census*).

⁶ P. Eberhardt, “Miedzy Między Rosją a...”, 174.

⁷ See: M. Roszczenko, “Kto Mieszka na...”, 38

⁸ P. Eberhardt, “Przemiany Narodowościowe na Ukrainie XX Wieku” (Warszawa: 1994), 150, (*Transformation of Nationality in Ukraine in the 20th Century*).

0.9% Poles, 0.8% Moldavians and Romanians, 0.7% Belarusians, 0.5% Bulgarians, 0.4% Hungarians and 1.0% other nationalities. On the other hand, more recent data from 1989 indicates that on the eve of the restoration of Ukrainian independence, its territory was inhabited by nearly 37.5 million Ukrainians, over 11.3 million Russians and nearly 2.7 million representatives of other nationalities.⁹ Thus we may conclude that after the war, there was a spatial expansion of Russians and the Russian language to Ukrainian ethnic areas. Only the western oblasts, which had belonged to Poland before the war, retained their complete Ukrainian character. The decrease in the percentage of Ukrainian population, from 76.8% in 1959 to 72.7% in 1989, was a result of Ukrainian migration to other USSR republics, their low population growth rate and the mass influx of Russians to industrial areas in eastern Ukraine.

In 1989, in the western oblasts of Ukraine, 93.3% of the population declared Ukrainian nationality, while before the war that number had been 60%. Table 2 presents more detailed data on the national composition of Ukraine in the 20th century.

Table 2.

Changes in the national composition of Ukraine in the 20th century¹⁰

Nationality	1937 (without Crimea)		1959		1989	
	in thousands	in %	in thousands	in %	in thousands	in %
Ukrainians	22212.5	78.2	32158.5	76.8	37419.1	72.7
Russians	3221.9	11.3	7090.8	16.9	11355.6	22.1
Jews	1470.5	5.2	840.3	2.0	486.3	0.9
Belarusians	106.3	0.4	290.9	0.7	440.0	0.9
Moldavians	221.8	0.8	241.6	0.6	324.5	0.6
Bulgarians	74.9	0.3	219.4	0.5	233.8	0.5
Poles	417.6	1.5	363.3	0.9	219.2	0.4
Hungarians	.	.	149.2	0.4	163.1	0.3
Romanians	.	.	100.9	0.2	134.8	0.3
Tatars	24.2	0.1	61.5	0.1	133.7	0.3
Greeks	102.3	0.4	104.4	0.2	98.6	0.2
Germans	401.9	1.4	23.2	0.1	37.8	0.1
Total	28397.0	100.0	41869.0	100.0	51452.0	100.0

⁹ T. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 191, 193.

¹⁰ Andrzej Maryański, "Przemiany Narodowościowe w ZSRR", (Warsaw-Kraków: 1995), 15, (*Transformation of Nationality in USSR*).

This change was caused by the almost complete disappearance of two other large groups inhabiting this territory: Poles and Jews. After World War II, major changes occurred in the ethnic structure of cities on lands which had formerly been mainly populated by Polish-Jewish populations. For example, in Lviv, there were 51% Poles, 32% Jews, 16% Ukrainians and 1% Germans. Currently, there are about 75% Ukrainians, about 18% Russians and about 2-3% Poles. In Stanisławów, which after the war was inhabited by 41% Jews, 37% Poles, 19% Ukrainians and 3% Germans, there are presently more than 80% Ukrainians, about 15% Russians, 1% Poles and 0.5% Jews. Compared to western Ukraine, in the south and east of the country there is a mix of Ukrainian and Russian population – in the Donetsk Basin, Russians represent 44% of the total population and the Russian language is used by two thirds of the population, whereas Ukrainians account for 51.1% of the total population. In 1989, 25.8% of the population of Crimea consisted of Ukrainians and Jews.¹¹

S. Wojciechowski reports¹² that in 1994 and 1995, the inhabitants of Ukraine were: 74.0% Ukrainians, 21.0% Russians, 0.9% Belarusians, as many Jews and Tatars, 0.5% Poles, 0.4% of both Hungarians and Romanians, and 1.0% other nationalities.

The data from the census carried out in Ukraine in 2001, shows a slight increase in the Ukrainian population compared to 1989. What is worth noticing is a decrease in the Russian population (over 3 million), as well as Jewish (about 400,000), Belarusian, Moldavian, Polish and, to a lesser extent, Tatar, Hungarian and German populations. On the other hand, the populations of Crimean Tatars (over 2 million), Armenians, Georgians and Romanians increased during that time.

Compared to the number of people declaring Ukrainian nationality, more than 5 million less declare Ukrainian language as their mother tongue. On the other hand, over 6 million more people declared the use of the Russian language as their mother tongue, than declared Ukrainian nationality. The same tendency can be observed as far as Hungarian language and Hungarian nationality are concerned. For other languages declared as mother tongues, we can observe that the number of people speaking the language is smaller than the number of people declaring the nationality related to it. The trend is particularly strong in the relationships between Polish language and Poles, German language and Germans, Hebrew language and Jews, Greek language and Greeks. Thus, it can be concluded that this trend strengthens the position of the Russian language and possibly Ukrainian as well. As far as people declaring Romanian and Crimean Tatar languages as their mother tongues are concerned, their number is only slightly smaller than the number of people identifying themselves as Romanians and Crimean Tatars.

¹¹ P. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 149, 151-152, 154; Bukowiński, behind: K. Podlaski, *Białorusini. Litwini, Ukraińcy*, (Białystok: 1990). 71, (*Belarusians, Lithuanians, Ukrainians*).

¹² Sebastian Wojciechowski, , *Nacjonalizm w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej*, (Wrocław:1998), 194, (*Nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe*).

Table 3.
Results of the 2001 census in Ukraine¹³

Nationality	1989 in thousands	2001 in thousands	Balance in thousands
Ukrainians	37429.4	37541.7	+ 112.3
Russians	11354.7	8334.1	- 3020.6
Belarusians	439.9	275.8	- 164.1
Moldavians	324.5	258.6	- 66.3
Crimean Tatars	46.8	248.2	+ 201.4
Bulgarians	233.8	204.6	- 29.2
Hungarians	163.1	156.6	- 6.5
Romanians	134.8	151.0	+ 16.2
Poles	219.0	144.1	- 74.9
Jews	486.4	103.6	- 382.8
Armenians	55.5	99.9	+ 44.4
Greeks	98.4	91.5	6.9
Tatars	86.8	73.3	- 13.5
Gypsies	47.9	47.6	- 0.3
Azerbaijanis	36.9	45.2	+ 8.3
Georgians	23.5	34.2	+ 10.7
Germans	37.8	33.3	- 4.5
Gagauzians	31.9	31.9	0
Other	211.1	177.1	- 34.0

Table 4.
Language declared as mother tongue by the population of Ukraine according to the 2001 census¹⁴

Mother tongue	Data for 2001	
	Number	%
Total	48,240,902	100.00
Ukrainian	32,577,468	67.53
Russian	14,273,670	29.59
Belarusian	56,249	0.12
Bulgarian	134,396	0.28

¹³ Урядовий Кур'єр" 244/2002, No. 1..2, behind: Władysław Zwaricz, *Związek Polaków na Ukrainie (1991–2005)*, doctoral thesis, Lublin 2007.

¹⁴ <http://database.ukrcensus.gov.ua/MULT/Dialog/Saveshow.asp>

Mother tongue	Data for 2001	
	Number	%
Armenian	51,847	0.11
Gagauz	23,765	0.05
Crimean Tatar	231,382	0.48
Moldovan	185,032	0.38
German	4,206	0.01
Polish	19,195	0.04
Romani	22,603	0.05
Romanian	142,671	0.30
Slovak	2,768	0.01
Hungarian	161,618	0.34
Karaim	96	0.00
Hebrew	3,307	0.01
Greek	6,029	0.01
Other	143,163	0.30
Unknown	201,437	0.42

2. Ukrainian Diaspora in Various Countries at the End of the 20th Century – a General Overview

At the end of the 20th century, Ukraine was populated by 37.5 million Ukrainians. At the same time about 12 million Ukrainians lived beyond its borders, with around 7 million of them in post-Soviet states. The remaining 5 million lived in other countries.¹⁵ From the Ukrainian point of view, the Ukrainians living in post-Soviet states belong to the so-called “Eastern Diaspora”. According to the census of 1989, 6.8 million Ukrainians lived there, although this number is considered to be underestimated. It is estimated that approximately 300,000 Ukrainian military officers served outside Ukraine. In most cases, they were unable to return to home due to a lack of jobs and housing (see Table 7).¹⁶

The data on the ethnic structure of the territories presently belonging to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and the northern part of East Prussia from the late 19th and early 20th century, did not show any Ukrainians living in the area. The same can be said of the interwar period. After World War II, radical transfers of the population took place in the above-mentioned territories. Germans were replaced by Russians, together with some

¹⁵ M. Roszczenko, “Ukraińcy na Świecie. Diaspora Zachodnia”, *Nad Buhom i Narwoju* (1992), No 3. 27, (Ukrainians in the World. Western Diaspora).

¹⁶ M. Roszczenko, “Ukraińcy na świecie...”, 17, 19.

Belarusians and Ukrainians. The census of 1959 showed that Ukrainians accounted for 1.3% of the total population of the **Estonian SSR** of 1,197,000 thousand. Over the years, this percentage increased. In 1970, Ukrainians formed 2.1% of the total population, increasing to 2.5% in 1979, and 3.1% in 1989.¹⁷

Table 7.

Number of Ukrainians in the former Soviet Union according to the 1989 census¹⁸

Country	Total population (in thousands)	Number of Ukrainians (in thousands)	Percentage of Ukrainians
Russia	147,021	4,362	3.0
Kazakhstan	16,464	896	5.4
Moldova	4,335	600	13.8
Belarus	10,151	291	2.9
Uzbekistan	19,810	153	0.8
Kirghizia	4,257	108	2.5
Latvia	2,666	92	3.4
Georgia	5,400	52	0.9
Estonia	1,565	48	3.1
Lithuania	3,674	44	1.2
Tajikistan	5,092	41	0.8
Turkmenia	3,522	35	1.0
Azerbaijan	7,021	32	0.5
Armenia	3,304	8	0.2

The situation was similar in other Baltic republics. **On the territory of Latvia**, Ukrainians accounted for 1.4% of the total population in 1959, 2.3% in 1970, 2.7% in 1979, and 3.5% in 1989. **On the territory of Lithuania**, they formed, respectively: 0.7%, 0.8%, 1.0% and 1.2% of the total population of the republic. Finally, **in Kaliningrad Oblast**, there was 5.8% Ukrainians in 1959, and this figure has not changed much until 1989, when Ukrainians constituted 7.2% of the total population.¹⁹ Of the Ukrainians who moved to Baltic countries, they usually used and continue to use the Russian language,²⁰ much like Belarusians.

In the late 19th and early 20th century, **the territory of Slovakia** had a population of 2,816,900. Using language as the determining factor, it was calculated that 3.5% of them were Ukrainians (Ruthenians). They lived in the north-eastern part of the country, near

¹⁷ P. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 53-54.

¹⁸ M. Roszczenko M., "Ukraińcy na świecie...", 27

¹⁹ P. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 55-58; Roszczenko M., "Ukraińcy na świecie...", 17.

²⁰ Roszczenko M., "Ukraińcy na świecie...", 19.

the border with Galicia. During the interwar period, on **the territory of the Czech Republic**, Ukrainians formed 0.2% of the total population, while in Slovakia, about 3.3% of the total population. After World War II, the percentage of Ukrainians on the territory of the Czech Republic did not change and continues to constitute 0.1-0.2% of the total population. On the territory of Slovakia (in the north-eastern part), there are approximately 30,400 Ukrainians (0.5%), while 58,600 people declares the use of Ukrainian language. Catholic and Orthodox Greeks together account for 213,100 people.²¹

Ukrainian influences in the south-west of present-day **Belarus** are old and strong, but the ethnic composition of the population has varied throughout the centuries. At the end of the 19th century, the Ukrainian population of Kobryń and Brest counties was 80% rural. Since 1939, the Brest Region belongs to Belarus and an intense Russification of the local population has taken place since then.²² Therefore, it is difficult to determine the number of Ukrainians in Belarus in the late 19th and early 20th century, since the national consciousness of this people was low at that time. 70.8% of the total population was Orthodox Christians, while the use of Ukrainian language was declared by 4.4% out of the total population of 6,493,600.²³ The census of 1937 showed that 1.3% of Ukrainians lived in the above-mentioned territory. After World War II, an increase in the number of Ukrainians was visible in the ethnic structure of the Belarusian SSR: in 1959 they formed 1.6% of the total population of the republic, increasing to 2.1% in 1970, 2.4% in 1979, and 2.9% in 1989 – mostly in the Brest and Gomel oblasts.²⁴ In recent years, there has been a significant influx of Ukrainians to Belarusian regions other than the Brest Region, mostly to cities.²⁵

On the territory of Hungary, a significant number of Ukrainians could be observed only until World War I. At the time, there were 426,600 of them, which accounted for 2.2% of the total population of the country. **On the territory of Romania**, 0.6% of the population was of Ukrainian nationality (71,200 thousand) at the time, while in Bukovina, as much as 17.4% of the population (55,200) declared the use of Ukrainian language. At the same time, the number of Ukrainians **in Moldova** was estimated at 194,600 (13.5%). During the interwar period, the number of Ukrainians living in Romania increased to 3.3% (582,000), while the number of those living in Moldova decreased to 3.7% (70,100). After World War II, their number returned to the pre-World War I level. These changes mainly resulted from border changes.²⁶ According to official statistics, 60,000 Ukrainians currently live in Romania. However, Ukraini-

²¹ P. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 116-118, 136-139.

²² M. Roszczenko, "Ukraińcy na świecie...", 19.

²³ P. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 148-149.

²⁴ P. Eberhardt, "Przemiany Narodowościowe na Białorusi" (Warszawa: 1994), (*Nationality Transformations in Belarus*).

²⁵ G. Kuprianowicz, "Ukraińskie odrodzenia na Polesiu Zachodnim", *Nad Buhom i Narwoju* (1992), No 2, 14-17, (*Ukrainian Revival in West Polesie*).

²⁶ P. Eberhardt, "Między Między Rosją a...", 211-258.

ans living in Romania themselves estimate the number at about 300,000. In 1989, the Union of Ukrainians in Romania was established. There also exists the Democratic Union of Ukrainians in Romania (operating illegally), as well as a youth and women's organizations. Ukrainian language is taught at the University of Bucharest.²⁷

Ukrainians began to settle **in present-day Russia** in the 16th century. Ukrainian colonization was particularly intense after the defeats of Cossack uprisings in the 17th and 18th centuries. At the end of the 18th century, after the destruction of the Zaporizhian Sich, some Cossacks were formed into the Ko and resettled to the North Caucasus (Kuban) to defend it against mountain tribes. This was the beginning of a great wave of Ukrainian colonization on the steppes of the Kuban and Stavropol regions, which continued throughout the 19th century.²⁸ In the 19th century, Ukrainians settled in Russia because the soil and climatic conditions were similar to those in Ukraine. The late 19th century and early 20th century also witnessed mass Ukrainian colonization, this time of Far Eastern territories seized by Russia. Ukrainians also participated in forced migrations during the Stalinist period and labor migration to the Far North.

In Russia, Ukrainians presently live in cohesive groups in Kuban and in the following oblasts: Belgorod, Kursk and Voronezh and Siberia. While the overall population of Kuban is 5 million, only 200,000 people declared Ukrainian language their mother tongue. In fact, about 1.4 million Ukrainian Cossack descendants live there, but they speak a dialect and do not possess a Ukrainian national consciousness. The revival of the Cossack movement in 1990 and 1991 did not affect the situation.²⁹ Surrounded by Russians, Ukrainians quickly assimilated and linguistic assimilation also frequently occurred – people who consider themselves Ukrainians often declare Russian their mother tongue. In 1989, such people accounted for nearly 19% of Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union and, later Russia, while 57% of Ukrainians declared Russian as their native language.³⁰ Presently, Siberia is inhabited by 1.5 million Ukrainians, only 44% of whom declare Ukrainian language their mother tongue, with the remaining majority claiming Russian. The strongest assimilation is observed in the oblasts where Ukrainian colonization is the oldest.

In the period between 1926 and 1989, the Ukrainian population in Russia, in areas of traditional Ukrainian colonization, significantly decreased. This was the result of the rapid pace of denationalization of descendants of displaced persons caused by policy pursued by the authorities in Moscow.³¹

²⁷ Ю. Місіюк "Українці в Румунії. (Ітерв'ю з Олександром Самборем)", *Над Бугом і Нарвою* (1998), No. 6.

²⁸ M. Roszczenko, "Ukraińcy w Rumunii" (1992) 19

²⁹ J. Darski, "Ukraina. Historia, Współczesność, Konflikty Narodowe", (Warszawa:1993), (*Ukraine: History, Contemporaneity, National Conflicts*).

³⁰ A. Maryański, "Przemiany Narodowościowe w...", 64-65.

³¹ M. Roszczenko, 1993a, op. cit., pp. 18; М. Базеюк, 1994, *Українці в Росії* [in:] „Над Бугом і Нарвою” No 1-2; pp. 44-45, (*Ukrainians in Russia*).

Data shows that **in Central and Eastern Europe** in 1994 and 1995, Ukrainians formed 2.9% of the Belarusian population, 0.1% of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3.1% in Estonia, 1.2% in Lithuania, 3.5 % in Latvia, 13.0% in Moldova, 0.8% in Poland and 0.3% in Slovakia.³² Many Ukrainians live abroad **in Western European countries**. For instance, 25,000 live in Germany³³, while an overwhelming majority live in North and South America – especially **in Brazil** (400,000)³⁴, **the United States** (about 2 million)³⁵, and **Canada** (about 530,000).³⁶ According to M. Roszczenko³⁷, there are 1 million Ukrainians residing in Canada. Ukrainians also live in other countries, such as: **Argentina** – 250,000, **France** – 80,000, the **former Yugoslavia** – 60,000, **Australia** – 35,000, **the United Kingdom** – 30,000, **Austria** – 15,000, **Uruguay** – 10-15,000, and **Paraguay** – 10,000.³⁸

In the 2012 edition of the “Encyclopaedia Britannica”, we find information on the percentage of Ukrainians in various populations. In relation to Eastern Europe, it is as follows:

- Ukraine - 77.8%
- Slovakia - Ruthenians and Ukrainians 0.7%
- Russia - 2.03%
- Romania - 0.3%
- Poland - 0.1%
- Moldova - 8.4%
- Latvia - 2.5%
- Lithuania - 0.6%
- Hungary - Ruthenians 2.9% (Greek Catholics - 2.6%)
- Belarus - 1.7%.

In other countries, either there are no Ukrainians or their number is so low that the publication does not identify them as a significant minority group, including them in the “other” category.³⁹

Grzegorz Janusz informs that a Ukrainian minority also existed in:

- Armenia – 8,341 (0.2%) in 1989,⁴⁰

³² S. Wojciechowski, 1998, op. cit., pp. 192-194.

³³ M. Roszczenko, 1992, op. cit., pp. 27; М. Швагуляк, 1992, *Українська політична еміграція в Німеччині у 30-х роках ХХ ст.* [in:] *Українська еміграція. Історія і сучасність*, Львів, (Ukrainian political migration to Germany in the 30's of the twentieth century).

³⁴ Н. Лебчук-Киричук, 1992, *Українці в Бразилії* [in:] *Українська уміграція. Історія і сучасність*, Львів.

³⁵ M. Roszczenko, 1992, op. cit., pp. 27, (*Ukrainians in Brazil*).

³⁶ М. Лупул, 1992, *Українці в Канаді: історичний дорсвід та перспективи* [in:] *Українська уміграція. Історія і сучасність*, Львів, (*Ukrainians in Canada*).

³⁷ M. Roszczenko, 1992, op. cit., pp. 27.

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ *Encyclopaedia Britannica. The book of the year 2012*, Chicago 2012.

⁴⁰ <http://docs.armstat.am/census/pdfs/52.pdf> behind: G. Janusz, *Statystyczny obraz mniejszości narodowych we współczesnej Europie*, [in:] E. Michalik, H. Chałupczak, *Mniejszości narodowe i etniczne w procesach transformacji oraz integracji*, Lublin 2006, (*Statistical picture of national minorities in contemporary Europe*).

- Azerbaijan – 29,000 (0.4%) in 1999,⁴¹
- Georgia – 0.2%, more than 7,000 people in 2002,⁴²
- Estonia – 0.9% of the population used Ukrainian (29.69% – Russian), and 2.12% declared Ukrainian nationality (more than 29,000) in 2000,⁴³
- Serbia (not including Kosovo) was inhabited by 4,635 Ukrainians and 15,626 Ruthenians (out of a total of 7.5 million citizens) in 2002,⁴⁴
- Moldova – 13.8% in 1989.⁴⁵

In Croatia, the Ruthenian community accounted for 0.07% of the total population in 1999, and 0.05% in 2001.⁴⁶

3. Ukrainians in Poland

A. Krysiński informs⁴⁷ that during the interwar period, Ukrainians (Ruthenians) inhabited the following areas in Poland:

- Stanisławów, Tarnopol and Lwów *Voivodeships* (provinces) besides eight *powiats* (counties),
- half of the counties in Kraków Voivodeship: Nowy Sącz, Grybów, Gorlice, Jasło and Krosno,
- Chełm Land and Podlasie (without several municipalities)
- Bielsk county in Białystok Voivodeship,
- Volhynia,
- Polesie.

According to the census of 1921, these territories were inhabited by 3,150,439 Poles, 3,863,849 Ukrainians, 421,619 Belarusians, 15,971 Russians, 38,652 “locals”, and 647,873 Jews. Naturally, the religious and ethnic composition of the Second Polish Republic was also affected by migrations, which Krysiński⁴⁸ also writes about. Fischer⁴⁹ divided Ukrainians into five ethnic groups: Carpathian Ruthenians, Polishchuks, Podlasians, Ruthenians (proper) and Ukrainians (proper).

⁴¹ G. Janusz, op.cit., 17.

⁴² www.statistics.ge/Main/census/tables/tables_en.htm, za: G. Janusz, op.cit., 28.

⁴³ www.stat.ee/index.aw?set_lang_id=2 za: G. Janusz, op.cit., p.25.

⁴⁴ G. Janusz, op.cit., 32.

⁴⁵ www.nationbynation.com/Moldova/Population.htm behind: G. Janusz, op.cit.

⁴⁶ www.dzs.hr/Hrv?Popis%202001/popis2001.html behind: G. Janusz, op.cit.

⁴⁷ A. Krysiński, 1928a, *Liczba i rozmieszczenie Białorusinów w Polsce* [in:] „Sprawy Narodowościowe” nr 3/4, 353; 1928b, *Liczba i rozmieszczenie Ukraińców w Polsce* [in:] „Sprawy Narodowościowe” No 6, pp. 567-592, (*Number and distribution of Belarusians in Poland; Number and distribution of Ukrainians in Poland*).

⁴⁸ Krysiński A., 1931, *Tendencje rozwojowe ludności Polski pod względem narodowościowym i wyznaniowym w dobie powojennej* [in:] „Sprawy Narodowościowe” No 1, pp. 18-60, (*Development trends of the Polish population in terms of ethnicity and religious in the post-war time*).

⁴⁹ Fisher za: D. Matelski (ed.), 1996, *Mniejszości narodowe w Polsce w świetle raportu Ministerstwa Spraw Wewnętrznych z lat 1928-30* [in:] „Sprawy Narodowościowe” No 2, 184.

According to the census of 1931, the 24 counties of eastern Poland contained a population of 3,171,000, including 449,000 Ukrainians (Ruthenians). However, the Ukrainian-Ruthenian population exceeded 25% of the total population in only five counties and 40% in only one. At the same time, they inhabited five counties of Polesie, Bielsk Podlaski county and seven eastern counties of Lublin Voivodeship. Moreover, six counties (Sanok, Krosno, Jasło, Gorlice, Nowy Sącz and Nowy Targ) were inhabited by Lemkos.⁵⁰

World War II and border shifts caused ethnic changes on Polish territory – for example, the repatriation of Poles from the Ukrainian SSR and the resettlement of Ukrainians.⁵¹ The number of Ukrainians who met the criteria for resettlement was estimated at 480-546,000, although in reality the number was at least 700,000.⁵² As part of “Operation Vistula”, all Ukrainian nationality groups, together with Lemkos and mixed families, were resettled.⁵³ According to data from the State Repatriation Office, a total of about 150,000 people were resettled to western lands; 80% of them were settled in the northern region and the remaining 20% in the western region.⁵⁴ This resettlement encompassed the entire population of Ukrainian origin, including Lemkos, Dolinians, Shlakhtov Ruthenians and the remaining Boykos.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ A. Krysiński, 1937, *Ludność ukraińska (ruska) w Polsce w świetle spisu 1931 r.* [in:] „Sprawy Narodowościowe” No 6, 579, (*National minorities in Poland in the light of the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the years 1928-1930*).

⁵¹ P. Eberhardt, 1996, op. cit., pp. 122-123; K. Kersten, 1989, *Polska - państwo narodowe. Dylematy i rzeczywistość* [in:] M. Kula (ed.), *Narody. Jak powstawały i jak wybijały się na niepodległość?*, Warszawa, pp. 472-477; S. Banasiak, 1997, *Wysiedlenie Niemców z Polski z perspektywy półwiecza* [in:] S. Łach (ed.), *Władze komunistyczne wobec Ziemi Odzyskanych po II wojnie światowej*, Słupsk, pp. 161-172, (*Poland - the nation-state. Dilemmas and reality; Expulsion of Germans from Polish from the perspective of half a century*).

⁵² Por. B. Sakson, 1997, *Powojenne migracje zagraniczne ludności polskiej w literaturze przedmiotu* [in:] „Studia Demograficzne” No 3, pp. 56-57; E. Misiło, 1996, *Repatriacja czy deportacja. Przesiedlenia Ukraińców z Polski do USRR 1944-1946*, vol. 1: *Dokumenty 1944-1945*, Warszawa, 29; A. Potocki, 1984, *Organizacja życia religijnego w dzisiejszej Polsce południowo-wschodniej* [in:] „Kultura i Społeczeństwo” No 3, 226, (*Repatriation or deportation. The resettlement of Ukrainians from Polish to the USSR 1944-1946; The organization of religious life in today's south-eastern Poland*).

⁵³ E. Misiło, 1992, *Polska polityka narodowościowa wobec Ukraińców 1944-1947* [in:] *Polska - Polacy - Mniejszości narodowe*, Wrocław - Warszawa - Kraków, pp. 392; G. Motyka, 1998, *Od Wołynia do akcji „Wisła”* [in:] „Więź” No 3, pp. 129-131, (*The organization of religious life in today's south-eastern Poland; From Volhynia to the „Vistula”*).

⁵⁴ A. Kwilecki, 1964, *Liczebność i rozmieszczenie grup mniejszości narodowych na Ziemiach zachodnich* [in:] „Przegląd Zachodni”, Vol. 4, 379, (*Number and distribution of national minorities in the Western Lands*).

⁵⁵ K. Pudło, 1987, *Lemkowie. Proces wrastania w środowisko Dolnego Śląska 1947-1985*, Wrocław, 30, (*Lemkos. The process of growing into the environment of Lower Silesia 1947-1985*).

Table 5.
Population distribution in the Recovered Territories in 1947⁵⁶

Voivodeship	Number settled		Ratio of the number of Ukrainians to the total population of the voivodeship in %
	Families	Persons	
Białystok	252	991	lack of data
Gdańsk	1,116	4,293	4.7
Olsztyn	13,390	54,581	11.5
Poznań	1,692	7,706	3.7
Szczecin	11,483	49,371	8.2
Wrocław	4,755	24,014	5.9
Total	32,688	140,956	lack of data

The first post-war census in Poland took place in 1946. It included a question concerning nationality, however the data collected is considered unreliable. In subsequent censuses there were no questions concerning nationality, native language or religion.

In 1954, the first estimates of the national composition of Poland were made. According to these estimates, Poland was inhabited by 162,000 Ukrainians who made up 0.6% of the total population. The years 1955-1957 were a period of political liberalization, which caused the migration of ethnic Germans and Jews out of Poland, and Poles to the USSR. This resulted in a change in the national composition of Poland – the number of Ukrainian was estimated at 170,000 at that time.⁵⁷

Table 6.
Ukrainians in Poland in 1961⁵⁸

Voivodeship	Number in thousands
Białystok	5.0
Gdańsk	4.5
Koszalin	29.0
Lublin	20.0
Olsztyn	51.0
Opole	1.5
Rzeszów	26.0

⁵⁶ M. Iwanicki, 1994, *Ukraińcy, Białorusini, Litwini i Niemcy w Polsce w latach 1918-1990*, Siedlce, 75, *Ukrainians, Belarusians, Lithuanians and Germans in Poland in the years 1918-1990*.

⁵⁷ J. Byczkowski, 1976, *Mniejszości narodowe w Europie 1945-1974 (wybrane zagadnienia)*, Opole, 164; *Wielka Encyklopedia Powszechna PWN*, 1967, Vol. IX, Warszawa, 71, (*National minorities in Europe 1945-1974*).

⁵⁸ M. Winnicki, 1965, *Osadnictwo ludności ukraińskiej w województwie olsztyńskim*, Olsztyn, 91.

Voivodeship	Number in thousands
Poznań	1.0
Szczecin	11.0
Wrocław	16.0
Zielona Góra	9.0
Total	174.0

According to the latest figures from the Department of Ethnic Minority Culture (*Departament Kultury Mniejszości Narodowych* – DKMN) from 1999, concerning the number of particular ethnic minorities in Poland, the situation was as follows: Germans – 300-500,000, Ukrainians – about 300,000, Belarusians – 200-250,000, Lithuanians – 20-25,000, Slovaks – about 20,000, Romani (Gypsies) – 20-30,000, Jews – 10-15,000, Czechs – about 3,000, Armenians – up to 8,000, Tatars – up to 5,000.⁵⁹

In 2002 and 2011, censuses were carried out in Poland that included questions about nationality and language spoken at home. In 2002, out of 38,230,080 Polish inhabitants, 30,957 people declared Ukrainian nationality. 27,127 of them possessed Polish citizenship, making them representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Poland. They mostly inhabited the following Voivodeships: Warmia-Masuria (over 12,000), West Pomerania, Pomerania and Subcarpathia (about 3-4,000), as well as to a lesser degree, Podlasie, Masovia, Lower Silesia and others.⁶⁰

In the census of 2011, respondents could indicate two national identities; therefore it is difficult to compare this data with the data obtained from previous censuses. In 2011, over 50,000 people declared Ukrainian nationality as their first or second national identity. Poland's total population was 38,511,824 at the time. Ukrainians live mostly in Warmia-Masuria Voivodeship (more than 26% of all Ukrainians in Poland), but can also be found in West Pomerania (10%), Pomerania, Subcarpathia and Silesia (7.3-8.3%) and, to a lesser degree, in Podlasie, Lublin, Lesser Poland, Silesia, Greater Poland and Lubusz (4.4-2.4%). The remaining Voivodeships are populated by less than 2% of the Ukrainian population living in Poland.⁶¹

⁵⁹ Dane DKMN from 17 March 1999, (*The settlement of the Ukrainian population in the province of Olsztyn*).

⁶⁰ *Ludność wg deklarowanej narodowości oraz województw w 2002 roku*, NSP 2002, GUS, (*Population by nationalities and provinces declared in 2002*).

⁶¹ *Narodowy Spis Powszechny Ludności i Mieszkań 2011*, GUS, 89, 270-271, (*National Census of Population and Housing 2011*).

4. Ukrainian Minority in Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia – Present Situation

According to the data from the census carried out in Belarus in 2009, the country was inhabited by 158,723 Ukrainian. Most of them lived in Brest Oblast – over 40,000, Gomel Oblast – about 31,000 and Minsk (city) – over 27,000. The remaining oblasts were inhabited by 13-18,000 people of Ukrainian nationality.⁶² Thus, Ukrainians accounted for 1.7% of the total population of Belarus. This means that in recent years, the number of representatives of this minority decreased compared to the 1980s and 1990s. In fact, their number returned to the pre-1959 level. The censuses of 1970, 1979, 1989 and 1999 found, respectively, 2.1%, 2.4%, 2.9%, 2.4% of the total population of Belarus to be Ukrainian. Therefore, the dissolution of the Soviet Union and emergence of an independent Ukraine has led to the migration of some members of this community from Belarus.⁶³

In 2009, among those who declared themselves Ukrainian, 29.2% declared Ukrainian language their mother tongue, while 7.9% declared Belarusian, and as many as 61.2% Russian. This is a significant change, especially compared to 1999, when 42.8% of Ukrainians declared Ukrainian as their mother tongue, 14.3% Belarusian, and 42.8% Russian. A similar trend can be observed throughout the period between 1979 and 1999.⁶⁴ Therefore, we can speak of a significant increase in the Russification of the Ukrainian community in Belarus.

Furthermore, in the post-Soviet Baltic States, there are 29,000 Ukrainians in Estonia (2.12%), 63,600 in Latvia (2.68%), and 22,500 in Lithuania (0.65%).⁶⁵ 25,200 Ukrainians living in Estonia were born in Ukraine, as well as 51,400 of those living in Latvia and 20,100 living in Lithuania. In Latvia, 1,500 thousand Ukrainians possess Latvian citizenship. There is no data for the other two countries.⁶⁶

The number of representatives of the Ukrainian minority in Latvia between 1935 and 2011 changed as follows:

- 1935 – 1,844 people (0.1%);
- 1959 – 29,440 people (1.4%);
- 1970 – 53,461 people (2.3%);
- 1979 – 66,703 people (2.7%);
- 1989 – 92,101 people (3.5%);
- 2000 – 63,644 people (2.7%);⁶⁷
- 2011 – 45,700 people (2.2%).⁶⁸

⁶² *Перепись Населения 2009. Национальный Состав Населения Республики Беларусь*, том 3, Минск 2011, 7, opulation Census of 2009. (*Ethnic composition of the Republic of Belarus*).

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 7-8.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 318.

⁶⁵ *2000 round of population and housing censuses in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania*, Vilnius 2003, 26.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, 31-33.

⁶⁷ *Latvijas 2000. Gada. Tautas skaitīšanas rezultāti. Statistikas datu krājums. Rīga 2002*, 121, (*Latvian 2000. Censuses. Statistical data*).

⁶⁸ <http://www.csb.gov.lv/en/notikumi/key-provisional-results-population-and-housing-census-2011-33306.html>

In 2000, nearly 32,000 Ukrainians lived just in Riga, while the rest of the community was distributed in a more even way (a few hundred people in each region). However, the districts of Bauska, Jēkabpils, Ogre, Jelgava and the Riga region had slightly larger populations than others.⁶⁹ To sum up, nearly 51,500 people of Latvia's total population were born in Ukraine, while over 35,000 of them declare themselves Ukrainians.⁷⁰

Between 1989 and 2000, the number of Ukrainians in Estonia decreased. In 1989, there were more than 48,000 Ukrainians, which accounted for 3.1% of the total population, while in 2000, there were slightly more than 29,000 Ukrainians, making up 2.1% of the total population. At that time, 2,864 people born in Ukraine had Estonian citizenship, while only 435 were born in Estonia.⁷¹ In 1989, 21,300 Ukrainians living in Estonia considered Ukrainian their native language, almost 600 Estonian, and more than 26,000 Russian, while in 2000, less than 12,000 Ukrainian, almost 500 Estonian and almost 16,500 Russian.⁷² The census of 2011 showed that less than 22,000 Ukrainians now live in Estonia and over 8,000 of them are permanent residents. Most of them live in the following counties: Harju (about 13,800), Ida-Viru (over 3,300), Tartu (about 1000), Pärnu (about 900). Other counties are each inhabited by approximately 125-700 individuals of Ukrainian nationality.⁷³

As far as Lithuania is concerned, we can talk of a significant Ukrainian exodus from this country. In 2001, 22,500 thousand Ukrainians lived there, while in 2011, the number had fallen to just 16,500 (to put this in perspective, the size of this population decreased by 27% in just 10 years). Currently, Ukrainians account for 0.5% of the total population of Lithuania. Most of them live in Vilnius and Klaipėda. Nearly 33% of those people declaring Ukrainian nationality, claim Ukrainian as their first language.⁷⁴

By way of conclusion, it can be stated that there has been a significant decrease in the number of Ukrainians in the above-mentioned countries in recent years.

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⁶⁹ *ibid.*, 123-135.

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 141.

⁷¹ 2000. AASTA. *Rahva ja eluruumide loendus. Kodakondsus, savus, emakeel ja võõrkeelte oskus*, Tallin 2001, 39.

⁷² *ibid.*, pp. 150-151, (*Population and Housing Census. Citizenship, native and foreign languages*).

⁷³ http://www.stat.ee/sdb-update?db_update_id=14122

⁷⁴ *Lietuvos gyventojai 2011 metais*, Vilnius 2012, pp. 23-25, (*Lithuanian population 2011*).

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Abstract: The article presents the ethnic situation in past and present Ukraine. It also presents statistical data concerning the Ukrainian diaspora in Europe. The author chose a number of countries for more thorough analysis, including Poland, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. The analyzed and presented information is based on statistical data from general censuses.

Key words: Ukrainians, diaspora, ethnic structure, Poland, Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia.

Aging Society in Poland and Ukraine: New Challenges for the Educational Sector

NATALIYA CHAHRAK

Precarpathian National Vasyl Stefanyk University, Ukraine

The beginning of the 21st century can be defined as a time of many global changes. Advances in science, technology and socio-economic development have led to significant changes in the characteristics and intensity of demographic processes. This has given rise to complex and contradictory matters of grave consequence, which must firstly be assessed from the position of long-range planning. These days, there is no ignoring demographic factors in long-range social and economic planning, as they can substantially complicate the resolution of many problems a given society will face in the future.

Socio-economic and demographic processes are considered to be part of an interrelated system in which socio-economic process is signified as the determining factor. But then, demographic processes, especially changes in them, substantially affect socio-economic development. Therefore, it is necessary to explore the patterns and consequences of demographic changes which have recently taken place. The influence of demographic factors on socio-economic development is especially appreciable during crucial periods of a society's progress. This especially refers to such a complex phenomenon as population aging and its aftereffects.

1. Population Aging – A Worldwide Social Phenomenon

1.1. Who is an “Old Person”?

While considering this social phenomenon, it is first necessary to give its definition and second, to find out the reasons for its origins, its present and its future perspective. It is also important to find out whether this phenomenon is developing as a permanent or temporary demographic situation.

According to a variety of research and statistical data, a demographic revolution has been occurring worldwide. It is the revolution of a demographic regime of high fertility and relatively low mortality, against a regime of low fertility and low mortality, especially in developed regions. The result of all this is a slow growing, aging population. Many

well-received investigations on demographic changes prove the 21st century to be a turning point in the age structure of the world population and the prognosis shows that the elderly are increasing dramatically, which translates into worldwide population aging.

A general definition for this concept is as follows: *population aging* is the process by which older individuals become a proportionally larger share of the total population,¹ as well as a summary term for shifts in the age distribution (i.e. age structure) of the population toward older ages.² Population aging has three possible causes: migration, longer life expectancy (decrease in death rate) and decrease in birth rate. It is necessary to note that the most commonly accepted measure of population aging is by the evaluation of the percentage of people aged 60+ in the total population structure. The vital senility threshold, according to demographers from the United Nations (U.N.), constitutes 7% of all those aged 65+, in comparison with the total population, or 12% of all those aged 60+, according to Polish demographer, E. Rosset.³

The concept of “*a person of old age*” is quit ambiguous, so it is necessary to give the definition of old age. “Old age consists of ages nearing or surpassing the life expectancy of human beings, and thus the end of the human life cycle.”⁴ Terms for old people include, *old people* (worldwide usage), *seniors* (American usage), *senior citizens* (British and American usage), and the *elderly*. In the social sciences the term *older adults* is more common. The official definition given in the Oxford English Dictionary is as follows: “the later part of life; the period of life after youth and middle age..., usually with reference to deterioration.”⁵

There is not any universal definition of when old age begins, but the U.N. has agreed, and it is generally accepted, that 60+ may be identified as a guide for the working definition of old age.⁶ However, the World Health Organization (WHO) considers 50 years of age as the start of old age. At the same time, the WHO recognizes that when it comes to defining old age, it is very important to take into consideration not only the age (years) a person has reached, but social aspects, as well – loss of previous roles and attainment of new ones; the ability or inability to make active contributions to society.⁷ In the majority of more developed regions, chronological time plays a permanent role. 60 or 65 years of age, roughly equivalent to retirement age, is generally recognized to be the beginning of old age.

¹ Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, accessed December 11, 2013, <http://www.oed.com.librarycatalog.vts.edu/view/>

² Gavrilov L.A., Heuveline P. “Aging of Population,” in *The Encyclopedia of Population*, ed. Paul Demeny and Geoffrey McNicoll (New York: Macmillan Reference USA, 2003) Vol.1, 33.

³ Rosset, Edward. *Ludzie starzy. Studium demograficzne* (Warszawa: PWE, 1967), 43.

⁴ “Definition of an older or elderly person”, World Health Organization, accessed December 02, 2013, <http://www.who.int/healthinfo/survey/ageingdefnolder/en/>

⁵ “old age, n.” Oxford English Dictionary Online. Oxford University Press, accessed December 11, 2013, <http://www.oed.com.librarycatalog.vts.edu/view/Entry/258473?redirectedFrom=old+age&>

⁶ “World Population Ageing: 1950 – 2050”. United Nations, accessed December 12, 2013, <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/>

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1.2. A Four Age Framework

In social and educational gerontology a “Four Age Framework” has been used for the interpreting of life course:

- The First Age – time for growing up, preparation.
- The Second Age – time for establishment, achievement.
- The Third Age – time to alter course, fulfillment.
- The Fourth Age – time for integration, completion.⁸

It is important to remark that in 1991, P. Lasslett introduced the “stage method” into British social life, developing his concept from a French idea:

- First Age of socialization;
- Second Age of work and child raising;
- Third Age of post-work independence.⁹

This three-part format is commonly accepted in most research on social and educational gerontology, and the term “third age” is used for anyone between the ages of 50-75, especially when viewed as a social aspect, as an opportunity for travel, further education etc.

1.3. Demographic Shift Towards Aging Population

According to U.N. demographic studies, life expectancy at birth, especially in Europe, has shown an increase of 20 years in the first half of the century and is now 68 years old. What is more, this increase is expected to rise 10 years by 2050. People live the longest in Scandinavian countries and Australia (over 80), Western European countries, Japan, New Zealand, and Canada (over 78). In Eastern European countries, the average figure is 74; in Poland – 71 and in Ukraine – 69.¹⁰ Social, economic and cultural changes in the 20th century facilitated the rise of living standards and the improvement of medical care, which influenced the significant increase of life expectancy. The increasing old-age population ratio occurs at the demographic level in many countries. The vital senility threshold was first drawn up by France (1870), then by Great Britain (1931), Germany (1937), the USA (1940), and Poland (1967).¹¹

⁸ Sadler, William, A. “Changing life options: uncovering the reaches of the third age.” *The LLI Review*, Fall (2006): 12.

⁹ Midwinter, Eric. “How many people are there in the third age?” *Ageing and Society* 25 (2005): 12.

¹⁰ “Internationalisation, Global Development and World Rankings from a Positive. Comparative Perspective.” Global Sherpa, accessed December 11, 2013, <http://globalsherpa.org/global-development-and-world-rankings/>

¹¹ Зых А. Непрерывное образование в контексте геронтологической теории. Развитие и главные идеи педагогики старения и старости (Zych, Adam. Lifelong Learning in the Context of Gerontological Theory. Development and the Main Ideas of the Pedagogy of Aging and Old Age), accessed July 20, 2013, <http://lifelongeducation.ru/index.php/ru/literatura>

In 1950, the world's population reached 2.5 billion people, and people aged 20 and younger made up 44% of the total population. Approximately 8% were 60+ and only 3% formed people aged 70+.¹² The following table shows that more developed regions (Europe, Northern America, Japan, Australia and New Zealand) possess a significantly higher percentage of the elderly in their populations, than less developed regions (11.7% compared to 6.4%).¹³

Table 1.
Population Distribution by Age Groups, 1950 and 2050

Geographic area	Population, thousand	1950% of total population				
	Total	0-19	20-59	60+	70+	80+
World total	2.523.878	43.9	48.0	8.1	2.9	0.5
More developed regions	812.687	35.7	52.6	11.7	4.8	1.0
Less developed regions	1.711.191	47.8	45.8	6.4	2.1	0.3
Europe	547.318	34.6	53.3	12.1	5.1	1.1

Geographic area	2050 % of total population				
	0-19	20-59	60+	70+	80+
Age					
World total	27.4	51.9	20.7	10.4	3.4
More developed regions	22.6	46.2	31.2	18.6	8.0
Less developed regions	28.0	52.7	19.2	9.2	2.8
Europe	21.6	45.6	32.8	19.2	7.9

Source: "World Population Ageing: 1950–2050". United Nations, <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/>

The forecast for 2050 shows that the percentage of the world's population aged 60+ is expected to reach about 21% (the present level of Europe) and the percentage of people aged 65+ will go up to 16% of the total population. The ratio of older people in developed regions is expected to grow up to 31.2% – almost a third of the population. For Europe, the ratio of the elderly aged 60+ is predicted to reach 32.8%, which means one in three persons will be over 60 years old.¹⁴ This data shows that more developed

¹² Gokdogan, F., Strzelska, E., Ziolkowski, W. *Elderly Care in Selected European Countries* (Lodz: The Academy of Information Technology and Skills, 2012): 24.

¹³ "World Population Ageing: 1950 – 2050". United Nations, accessed December 12, 2013, <http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/worldageing19502050/>


¹⁴ "Internationalisation, Global Development and World Rankings from a Positive. Comparative Perspective," <http://globalsherpa.org/global-development-and-world-rankings/>

nations are rapidly moving toward aging, which means that the elderly will become a significant force of social, economic and cultural development in the near future.

Research on demography and social studies has concluded that on the one hand, increase in longevity is "... one of the most amazing demographic facts in modern history",¹⁵ and people live longer and more active lives than ever before. On the other hand, aging population:

- has influenced a change in the structure of the population; birthrate decrease and the consequence of rising human life expectancy has caused a change in the structure of life course;
- signifies a decrease in the percentage of children and young people, and an increase in the percentage of persons aged 65+;
- affects all aspects of society, including education, social and cultural activities.

According to "The Economist", continued increases in longevity will ensure that the old-age dependency ratio – which measures the number of elderly people as a share of those of working age – will sharply rise over the next three decades in most countries. The chart below shows the biggest absolute increase will be in Japan, where the ratio of 35.1% in 2010 – already the world's highest – will more than double to 73.8% by 2050. At that point, the number of pensioners in China will be equivalent to 38.8% of its labor force, up from 11.6% in 2010. The European Union, which contained 84.6 million elderly people in 2010, will have 148.4 million in 2050. And the ratio for the world as a whole will reach 25.4%, up from 11.7% in 2010.¹⁶



Graph 1.

Old-age Dependency Ratio: Number of People Aged 65+ as % of labor force aged 15-64)

Source: "Old-age dependency ratios". The Economist, <http://www.economist.com>

¹⁵ Sadler, "Changing Life Options: Uncovering the Reaches of the Third Age," 11.

¹⁶ "Old-age dependency ratios". The Economist, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.economist.com>

It is worth emphasizing that all the European countries are among the fifty demographically oldest nations in the world. As many researchers point out, the percentage of elderly aged 65-80 plays a major role in socio-economic policies. It is important to note that the number of people aged 80+ will more than double in 2035 and number 2.574 thousand. Two thirds of the elderly will live in urban areas.¹⁷

2. Demographic Prognosis for Poland and Ukraine: Aging Societies

Analysis of demographic surveys and global literature on the subject has found out that the population of Eastern Europe is predicted to decline over the next 25 years. Low fertility rates and migrant outflows in the region are among the main reasons for this process.

Statistical data, along with information on the age structure of Poland's population, confirms the country's continuing demographic aging. Decline in fertility, decrease in mortality and extension of life span are at the heart of this demographic shift. There are also some socio-cultural factors which have affected the situation – the popularization of proactive lifestyle, improved quality of medical service, higher standards of social care for the elderly and later life education. Poland crossed the threshold of demographic old age in 1986.¹⁸

Table 2.

Changes in the Number of People aged 65+ in Poland 2010-2035 (in thousands)

2010	2015	2020	2025	2030	2035
22.1	776.0	1 024.1	890.5	351.3	162.2

Source: "Prognoza ludności". Główny Urząd Statystyczny, <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/prognoza-ludnosci/>

Table 3.

Number of People aged 65+ falling on 1000 people at the age of 0-14 in Poland

Total		Urban areas		Rural areas	
2020	2035	2020	2035	2020	2035
1 179	1 851	1 345	1 986	957	1 669

Source: "Prognoza ludności". Główny Urząd Statystyczny, <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/prognoza-ludnosci/>

¹⁷ Gokdogan et al., *Elderly Care in Selected European Countries*, 20.

¹⁸ "Prognoza ludności". Główny Urząd Statystyczny, accessed March 10, 2014, <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/prognoza-ludnosci/>

The old-age dependency ratio (people aged 60+ in the total population structure) in Poland was 16.6% in 2000, and according to the demographic projection, this percentage will increase by about 10% in 2025, and reach 35.6% at the halfway mark of the century.¹⁹ The elderly, therefore, are forming a considerable and important fraction of Polish society. Thus, the new challenge consists of helping older people overcome social exclusion, stay independent in later life and turn the final stage of their life course into a time of personal enrichment and “second growth”.

At present, Poland ranks 31st on the list of countries demographically oldest in the world: 17.4% of the total structure of its population is aged 60+.²⁰

Table 4.

Old-age Demographic Dependency Ratio in Poland in the Years 2000 – 2050 (prognosis)

Year	% of the population of 60+	% of the population of 65+	Demographic dependency ratio (persons 65+ per 100 persons aged 15-65)
2000	16.6	12.1	17.6100
2010	18.8	13.0	18.0102
2020	24.8	17.4	26.0148
2030	27.2	21.4	33.3189
2040	31.3	23.3	37.3212
2050	35.6	27.9	50.0281

Source: “Old-age dependency ratios”. The Economist, <http://www.economist.com>

Population prognosis data states that by the year 2035, changes in the intensity of births and deaths will show negative growth rate which will increase each year. In 2035, the positive ratio of deaths over births will reach 180,000; a result of an overall falling birth rate since the 1990s and from extended life expectancy.²¹

Table 5.

Anticipated Life Expectancy in Poland by 2035

Year	Men	Women
2015	72.3	80.2
2020	73.4	80.8
2025	74.6	81.5
2030	75.8	82.2
2035	77.1	82.9

Source: “Prognoza ludności”. Główny Urząd Statystyczny, <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnos/prognoza-ludnosci/>

¹⁹ Clarke, Peter. *Working Together in an Ageing Society* (Lublin: Innovatio Press Wydawnictwo Naukowe Wyższej Szkoły Ekonomii i Innowacji, 2012), 10.

²⁰ “Old-age dependency ratios,” <http://www.economist.com>

²¹ Gokdogan et al., *Elderly Care in Selected European Countries*, 45.

It should be taken into consideration that the average life expectancy in Poland in 2060 will reach 82 years for men and 88 years for women.²² The participation of advanced old age (80+) in the general population structure is a significant indicator of population aging. According to demographic projection, by the year 2035, the number of people aged 80+ will reach 568.8 thousand as compared with 173.6 thousand at present and 78.6 thousand predicted for 2020.²³ The data for old-age population and its projections show two general old-age features: the feminization of old age (the prevailing number of women over the number of men in this age category) and the extension of the advanced old-age group (people aged 80+).

Ukraine is among the leading countries with regard to decreasing population. During 1996-2011, its population size decreased by 5.7 million people.²⁴ Both the reduction of the population and changes in the demographic structure, have led to an aging population and a decrease in the fraction of people who could potentially be economically active in the total population. As the economically active part of the population forms a country's labor market, its change in size influence the rate of economic growth. The age structure of Ukraine's population has shown a regressive type of regeneration: there are 6.5 million people aged 0-14 and 11.3 million retired people.²⁵ At the same time, the percentage of people aged 65+ makes up 15.3% of the total population. According to U.N. classification, if the share of people aged 65+ exceeds 7% of the country's total population, it is regarded as a demographically old nation.²⁶ Thus, the population of Ukraine is estimated to be very old. As per the table below, the age structure of Ukraine is quite similar to that of Poland.

Table 6.
Age Structure of Poland and Ukraine 2013

Country	0-14 (%)	15-64 (%)	65 and over (%)
Poland	14.6	70.9	14.5
Ukraine	13.9	70.6	15.6

Sources: "Poland Age Structure." Indexmundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/poland/age_structure.html
"Ukraine Age Structure." Indexmundi, http://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine/age_structure.html

The determining factors which affect the demographic situation and population aging in Ukraine may be specified as the following:

²² Zych, Lifelong learning in the context of gerontological theory, <http://lifelongeducation.ru/index.php/ru/literatura>

²³ "Prognoza ludności," <http://stat.gov.pl/obszary-tematyczne/ludnosc/prognoza-ludnosci/>

²⁴ "Internationalisation, Global Development and World Rankings from a Positive. Comparative Perspective," <http://globalsherpa.org/global-development-and-world-rankings/>

²⁵ "Ukraine Age Structure." Indexmundi, accessed March 10, 2014, http://www.indexmundi.com/ukraine/age_structure.html

²⁶ Rosset, *Ludzie starzy. Studium demograficzne*, 175.

- a drop in birthrate and the fact that people get married later in life, causing an increase in the number of older people;
- a relatively high death rate, especially among the the middle aged, high abortion and infant mortality rates;
- some social and economic reasons: low level of medical care, low family incomes (especially for the middle class), social vulnerability;
- population migration, the outflow of the economically active part of society, especially youth and the middle aged.

The increase of the old-age dependency ratio influences the labor market and, thus, economic development. The main effects of the reduction of the number of economically active members of the population, as well as population aging, are the following:

1. Reduction in the number of working people versus the unemployed that is dependent on the income of employed citizens. In 2013, the number of employed persons amounted to 20324.2 thousand people which made up 44% of the total population.²⁷ This number is tending to decline, which means that the burden on this category of the population will increase.
2. The rise of the mean age of the population. In 2004, in Ukraine the average age of the population was 39.1, in 2013 this figure increased to 40.1 years, as compared with the mean age of 39.9 in Europe.²⁸
3. The imbalance between supply and demand of labor on various economic activities and professions.

These factors seem to be essential – not only from the point of view demographers, but also economists, gerontologists, educators and social workers.

Thus, the result of demographic changes leads to the conclusion that the growing age group of elderly people needs to be ensured the ability to adapt to rapid economic and social change. For each country, it is important to contribute to overcoming the problems of social isolation for this category of people. Each state needs to rethink its policy approach to human potential, recognizing seniors as a valuable social, and even economic, resource, as this group is going to take a significant place in the future demographic and social structure. According to W. Sadler, if we follow the usual decrement model of aging, the extra time could be spent experiencing decline, degeneration, disability, disease, and dependency, which have usually defined aging up until now. People positively changing their lives after fifty are pushing scientists to redefine the second half of life and aging.²⁹ “People in older age want to feel useful; they also need to be aware that they still are an integral part of the society and that they have their own place in the family and the local environment.”³⁰

²⁷ “Old-age Dependency Ratios”. The Economist, accessed March 14, 2014, <http://www.economist.com>

²⁸ “Old-age Dependency Ratios,” <http://www.economist.com>

²⁹ Sadler, “Changing life options: uncovering the reaches of the third age,” 11–12.

³⁰ Clarke, *Working Together in an Ageing Society*, 23.

3. Learning in Later Life – The Key to Society’s Social, Economic and Cultural Development

It is important to provide the opportunity for the elderly to be active participants of their country’s development process, including in education and the labor market. Encouraging people of the third age to educational activity may be an effective resource for social, economic and intellectual growth of the country, and this idea should become one of the strategic directions of state policy.

The theoretical interpretation of the subject and sense of education for old-age people began in the middle of the 1970s. It was the first stage of educational gerontology which determined its main target: to instruct old-age people how to help themselves during difficult life periods, how to be an active member of the community and still have a strong hold over their lives (McClusky). Other interpretations of education of old/third age people emphasize striving for independence: “third-ager” learning is the process of self-development, self-realization and reception of new experience (Groombridge). It is activity that affords opportunities for the elderly to control their own lives; the emancipation process – in some sense – as old people will be able to adapt and cope with problems themselves, and be impervious to another’s will (Phillipson).³¹ At present, the craving for independence is supposed as the prevailing tendency in education of the elderly.

The Third Age (50-75 years old) has traditionally denoted retirement. Researchers have discovered that the Third Age presents us with new possibilities in life course which are of great importance to both individuals and society, stimulating the development of lifelong learning programs. People in their 50s are changing course to move towards new life peaks. This new trajectory in their life course is often called second growth, a process of renewal that transforms aging in the Third Age – a season in search of purpose, an era for extended self-realization.³²

According to a study of the place of older generations in social stratification, as compared to other age groups (provided by B. Szatur-Jaworska, P. Błędowski and M. Dziegielewska), the following factors were deemed to have an impact: education, the length of work experience, position in the family, profession, old age stereotypes, health condition, current income, resources, retirement benefit system, the condition of public finances, and social redistribution principles. A review has shown that in Poland, pensioners suffer from poverty to a much greater degree than retired persons. Older persons living on welfare benefits are in the worst situation.³³

³¹ Azarina, Marina. “Universities of the Third Age in Russia and in Poland: commons and differences.” *Rocznik Instytutu Polsko-Rosyjskiego* 1 (2012): 148.

³² Freedman, Mark. *Prime Time: How Baby Boomers Will Revolutionize Retirement and Transform America*. (New York: Public Affairs Perseus, 1999).

³³ Szatur-Jaworska Barbara, Błędowski Piotr, Dziegielewska Małgorzata. *Podstawy gerontologii społecznej*. (Warszawa: ASPRA-JR, 2006).

Many prominent researchers believe that how people age is determined not so much by their genes, but by the way they live, which includes an opportunity for second growth, and is closely associated with lifelong learning. According to D. Garvin, people whose lives illustrate growth have been committed learners. They have learned more about themselves, about opportunities and challenges, exploring new areas, and gaining new skills.³⁴ Their learning has not been just mental stimulation accompanied by an accumulation of information. Strategic learning includes gathering information, interpreting it, and then applying learning to new behaviors – the way they work and live.³⁵ It follows that socially adapted persons on pensions are socially active individuals; they act under their own steam, lead their own lives, make full use of their personal and professional experience, as well as intellectual potential. The opportunities for gaining additional competences by people of the third age and developing their motivation for learning activity can be guaranteed by both non-governmental organizations and the private education sector. They can provide education in various disciplines, as well as popularize and promote different forms of intellectual, psychological and physical activity, while suitable to a person's age, overall efficiency and interests. Both international knowledge and special features of national gerontological education should be taken into consideration to create effective educational concepts and models of learning in retirement in the near future. The arrival of an aging society demands further changes. In the future, gains in productivity will critically depend on the retraining of older adults to adapt to the economy. "The challenge to education for an ageing society is an emphasis on lifelong learning among late-life groups. To respond to the new demographic and economic realities, educational institutions will have to develop new roles in recycling human resources in later life."³⁶ Higher education should redefine its role in human capital formation by retraining older people, teaching new life skills to cope with later-life problems, and offer opportunities for personal enrichment through learning of culture and arts. As it is expected by the year 2035, a quarter of the total population will be people aged over 65, so higher education will definitely no longer be a prerogative of the declining group of young people. For this sector, it is strategically important to adapt new educational philosophy and make changes in policy, fundamental structure, financing, and curriculum.

Demographic changes in the contemporary world require a new policy for aging and old people. As A. Zych points out, in Poland, optimistic, happy or active aging has received a great deal of attention and discussion. Modern solutions are focused on the implementation of various forms of assistance and support for older people, but at the same time, older adult education should be tied to self-help opportunities.³⁷

³⁴ Garvin, David A. *Learning in Action*. (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 2000).

³⁵ Sadler, "Changing life options: uncovering the reaches of the third age," 19.

³⁶ Moody, Harry. *Abundance of Life. Human Development Policies for an Ageing Society*. (New York: CUP, 1988), 191.

³⁷ Zych, Adam. Lifelong learning in the context of gerontological theory, <http://lifelongeducation.ru/index.php/ru/literatura>

Analysis of the educational activity of the elderly in Ukraine has proven that development in this area is too slow. A modern legislative platform has not been worked out yet, while the opportunity provided by social partnership has not been utilized.

In both developed and developing countries, elderly people are not deemed of great value to modern society. In other words, people of old age are suffering from inattention, disregard and isolation. This fact reflects some negative stereotypes of elderly people among the young generation. But for the last 15-20 years, some significant changes have taken place in many developed countries, which have principally influenced the system of social welfare of old age people, state social policy, and the changing of deep-seated attitudes to old-agers. Since adapting to present-day conditions of social-economic and technical development is more difficult for older people, we can consider education a successful mechanism for adaptation and development, which can be mutually advantageous and helpful for both individuals and society as a whole. It helps the old age generation fend off social isolation and turn themselves into socially active and creative members of society.

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Abstract. Population aging is a crucial issue amongst the myriad of problems facing long-range social and economic planning worldwide. In historical terms, aging society is recognized to be an unprecedented and continuing phenomenon, which influences all aspects of the progress of society. Poland and Ukraine show similar trends concerning population aging; the elderly are forming a considerable and important group in both countries. Therefore, understanding and providing for aging is an important area of state policy. Later in life education has proven to be a successful means of adaption and development, which helps older people live independent and meaningful lives. The challenge for the educational sector consists of adopting new educational philosophy and redefining its role in human capital development by providing learning opportunities for all generations including, and especially, older people.

Keywords: older adult education, old-age dependency ratio, older people, population ageing.

Ukraine's Economic Performance in Times of Global Financial Instability

NATALIIA DROZD

Taras Shevchenko National University, Kyiv

Introduction

It is quite clear that financial markets today are independent engines of financial development and economic growth in the long-run. Well-functioning financial systems promote economic growth and create a positive, first-order relationship. What is relevant is that national states with developed and effective financial systems demonstrate higher levels of growth over long periods of time. It is quite evident that this effect is not random. In addition, research reveals the mechanisms by which financial markets influence economic growth. The impact primarily affects the diversification of participant savings in a given financial market, not by affecting the total savings level, as it was previously generally thought. Thus, when financial agents identify and direct their financial funds into those projects with the best outcomes and possibilities – not those with the strongest political connections – it improves capital accumulation and promotes economic growth. Here-in lays the main direction for improving the financial system in Ukraine. Today, it is important to ensure effective identification and prevention of crises in Ukraine, especially those concerning public finances under conditions of increasing environmental instability.

Financial observers see a general increase in risk generated by the international sovereign finance sector. They consider the appearance of dangerous potential for sovereign debt to be a trigger to reformat international financial architecture. Nevertheless, various scientific studies on international debt burden in the sovereign sector did not provide solid answers to resolve debt issues. This is why research relevance lies in determining conceptual parameters for assuring stability and growth for global and national financial systems, together with issues of state regulation for the above processes.

Due to the fact that international debt interrelation is one of the main factors of financial instability, Ukraine must prepare early response actions to answer key threats from the international environment. The aim of this article is to study the trends, structural parameters of financial systems, and particular effects of sovereign debt accumulation, all of which are currently urgent objectives.

1. Ukraine in the Global Financial Crisis

When we focus so much on stability issues following a recent crisis, we often underestimate the strong interconnection between the functioning financial system and economic development. Although the international scientific community understands the importance of stability and strong policies in the financial sector, these are not the only measures to avoid a crisis.

Some national states are more or less successful in constructing financial systems that reduce unnecessary costs. The ones that are less successful create possibilities to affect economic growth and development. Basically, financial development arises under conditions when financial instruments, markets, and intermediaries reach a compromise, but it is not necessary to entirely eliminate the effects of imperfect information, limitations in laws and regulations, and transaction costs.

In connection with this, we should consider relevant analysis of such systems in CIS countries, especially since Ukraine is a member of this community. Domestic demand in CIS countries received certain impulses through the continuous growth of income, good labor market dynamics and lowering inflation levels. Nevertheless, slowing investment resulted from constant uncertainty and volatility regarding economic prospects and unreliable external financing conditions. The under-performance of export-oriented industrial areas in Ukraine went hand in hand with issues in the agricultural sector. The Russian economy provided a significant decrease in revenue for smaller, low-income countries by sending back workers from these countries. Private consumption in the Russian Federation was supported by the growth of retail lending. At the same time, the high level of non-performing loans constrained new lending in the banking system of Kazakhstan, and restricted the expansion of domestic demand. The oil sector stabilized after a large decrease in output in Azerbaijan, but there, other sectors of the economy became the main sources of economic progress. Kyrgyzstan faced a serious economic slowdown, resulting from issues in the goldmining sector, including a dramatic fall in output brought about by protests and strikes (Table 1).

Table 1.
Economic indicators in some CIS countries in 2012-2014¹

Country	Real GDP growth, %			Unemployment, %			Inflation, %
	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	2012
Net fuel exporters	4.0	3.8	4.4	5.3	7.1	5.8	-
Azerbaijan	1.2	2.5	3.8	2.3	2.6	4.1	2.3
Kazakhstan	5.5	5.0	5.5	5.1	6.5	5.0	4.9

¹ “World Economic Situation and Prospects”, http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/wesp2013.pdf and “Gradual Upturn in Global Growth during 2013”, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2013/update/01/index.htm>

Country	Real GDP growth, %			Unemployment, %			Inflation, %
	2012	2013	2014	2012	2013	2014	2012
Russian Federation	3.7	3.6	4.2	5.1	7.0	5.7	3.8
Turkmenistan	9.0	8.0	7.0	10.3	12.1	10.0	n/a
Uzbekistan	7.0	6.9	6.1	14.0	13.0	11.0	n/a
Net fuel importers	2.8	3.3	4.3	17.2	12.0	7.9	-
Armenia	3.8	4.0	4.0	4.2	4.3	4.3	1.0
Belarus	3.9	3.1	5.0	68.1	28.0	15.5	82.4
Kyrgyzstan	0.2	3.5	4.0	3.1	5.0	5.0	-0.3
Republic of Moldova	0.6	2.0	3.0	4.4	4.4	5.0	4.1
Tajikistan	7.0	5.7	5.0	12.4	8.0	9.0	n/a
Ukraine	2.0	3.2	4.0	2.3	8.0	6.0	0.4

Despite positive trends in domestic demand, some countries faced increasing credit growth and slight inflationary trends, which gave way to the possibilities of monetary easing in the beginning of 2012. But, as inflationary pressures renewed, the process of monetary easing was ended. In Ukraine there was no strong action taken towards monetary easing, even under low inflation, due to concerns regarding the stability of the national currency. The National Bank of Ukraine, as the main authority in the monetary area, started supporting the currency by halting domestic and import demand, as well as enforcing limits on the credit supply after maintaining robust requirements on reserves for commercial banks. Regarding the further weakening of CIS economies, the Ukrainian financial system may need further monetary easing under a more complicated inflationary outlook.

Slight economic growth stimulated revenue, but constantly difficult fiscal positions were present in countries not exporting energy. In contrast, the fiscal spaces in fuel-exporting countries – mostly the Russian Federation – continued to have positive influences, required to sustain their incomes under a difficult global economic situation. Despite a large adjustment in 2011, Ukraine lost some benefits from fiscal consolidation because of fast growing budget expenditures, coupled with parliamentary elections. All this has caused a negative impact on economic revenue. The state-owned, “Naftogaz Company” received large financial injections due to delays in raising gas tariffs. On the other hand, among other CIS countries, Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation rebuilt their oil funds particularly quickly after the financial crisis. Other non-exporting energy countries continued to feel the influence of fiscal tensions into 2013. For example, slowing GDP growth continued in the Kyrgyz Republic, caused by the gold sector issues, while fiscal deficit increased, because of growing pressures to increase agricultural subsidies.

Lower global demand had a negative impact on export growth throughout the CIS region. High oil prices and lower current-account surpluses had the strongest contribution to the aggregate surplus balance in most countries, including the Russian Federa-

tion; the largest in the region. Sharply declining growth, the high cost of energy imports and falling steel prices left Ukraine with a large deficit.

Ukraine's weak fiscal and international reserve positions reduce the possibilities for government policy to fight the impact of further deterioration in the external environment. Medium-term tasks include lowering the risks associated with issues in the banking sector and the high level of non-performing loans. One of the positive incentives was approving program legislation and bills during 2010-2012.² However, legislative decisions need to be justified in order to secure the public finance sector from complex and systemic risks on the international financial arena, as well as to improve and combine scientific and practical activities.

2. Political and Economic Risks in the Development of Ukraine

Recently, World Bank experts pointed out severe macroeconomic imbalances, significant structural imbalances, and the lack of transparency in public sector management in a special note.³ Their analytical assessment of Ukraine's GDP showed zero growth in recent years, because of weak economic activity in global markets, the accumulation of large macroeconomic imbalances, and a lack of effective structural changes in the public sector, all of which adversely affected economic growth in Ukraine.

What follows is a brief description of the main issues that have caused difficulties in applying state financial incentives through the budget system, particularly in terms of public revenues.

Firstly, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine provided analysis of planning and the timeliness of budget revenues from net profits of state enterprises and dividends on shares of commercial companies with public property in their capital. They discovered that during 2011-2013, Ukraine did not develop a coherent, effective system of calculation and timely receiving procedure for net profits from state enterprises and dividends to the state budget. During this period, the number of profitable state-owned enterprises decreased by 285 companies (18.5 %). Also, only UAH 6.4 billion (net income) was paid to the state budget of Ukraine by these companies. In addition, commercial companies with state shares sent dividends worth UAH 4.8 billion to the state budget. We can conclude that these revenues tended to fall (1.3% of annual budget revenues), which then led to a failure in planned revenues and net profits from state enterprises and private company dividends (special fund budget) in 2013 fell by UAH 1.3 billion.⁴

² See: "On Approval of Regulations to Manage Risks Related to Debt" and "On Approval of Controlling Risks Related to Public (local) Debt Management", as well as the decree: "On Approval of Debt Management in 2013".

³ "Roadmap for Urgent Macroeconomic and Structural Reforms", *World Bank – Ukraine*, www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/ukraine/ua-focus-april-2014-uk.pdf

⁴ "The Accounting Chamber has Analyzed Tax Revenues from State Property", *Report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine*, <http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/control/main/uk/publish/article/16743733>

The situation is further complicated by the State Property Fund, while the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, unbelievably, has no information on the real number of public sector enterprises. According to the monitoring of state property effectiveness, the ministry analyzed the activity of approximately 85% of the total number of entities that are accounted for in the Single Register of public property. Moreover, the State Property Fund does not keep records of public joint stock companies and the state-owned holding company of the Ministry of Energy and Mines. Therefore, such a financial situation in the public sector indicates poor public finance management in the field of public property. The above had a significant impact on budget shortfall based on net profits of state enterprises and dividends from public companies.

Secondly, the Board of Accounting Chamber's analysis of the validity of deferment on cash obligations and tax debt repayment (and its impact on the state budget revenues performance), found that Ukraine has no effective system of tax debt administration. The system should prevent new debt, increase the volume of monetary obligation postponements on tax payments and significantly decrease annual write-offs of bad tax debt. The Board established that the activities of the Ministry of Revenues and Duties of Ukraine and its territorial bodies on tax debt reduction, and controlling returns of deferred sums of money obligations on tax payments in 2012-2013, were not systematic or effective; as evidenced by increasing new tax debt. Thus, when tax debt of UAH 5 billion was written off in 2012, the newly established debt in the consolidated budget amounted to UAH 15.4 billion. When UAH 1.5 billion of tax debt was written off in the first quarter of 2013, the newly established debt in consolidated and state budgets amounted to UAH 4.9 billion and UAH 4.1 billion, respectively. According to the Accounting Chamber, each hryvnia of tax debt paid in cash to the budget in 2012, resulted in 1.21 hryvnia of new tax debt, rising to 3.12 hryvnia in the first quarter of 2013.⁵

3. The Issue of State Regulation

The Accounting Chamber noted that, despite the fact that the Tax Code was adopted, Ukraine is still in the process of reforming its tax legislation, making it difficult to predict prospects for business development and public revenues. Thus, over UAH 30.5 billion of tax debt and deferred monetary obligations have been written off after the enactment of the Tax Code, including over UAH 17 billion tax debt and deferred liabilities, written off under special laws on fuel, energy, the defense industry and the shipbuilding sector.

⁵ "Measures to Reduce Payable Tax Shall be More Effective", *Report of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine*, <http://www.ac-rada.gov.ua/control/main/uk/publish/article/16743718>

According to the *Economic Review* and macroeconomic forecasts, the World Bank indicates a decline in the economy of Ukraine in 2014 (3% GDP reduction),⁶ although it also warns that if the political situation becomes more complicated and necessary macroeconomic measures are not taken rapidly, an economic collapse – along with a fall in investment activity – may further reduce Ukraine’s GDP. At the same time, they noted that in the case of fiscal austerity measures and obtaining adequate financing of USD 1 billion to develop and institute reforms in the financial sector, Ukraine can expect intensified investment activity and a growth in GDP as early as 2015 – mainly in the private sector, by improving business activity and increased foreign investment.

However, according to the State Statistics Service, nominal GDP for the first three quarters of 2013 amounted to UAH 1.046 trillion, and given the rise in consumer prices in December 2013 to December 2012 (0.5%), the nominal GDP for 2013 has to reach approximately UAH 1.475 trillion.⁷ Nevertheless, on examination of the draft law on the State Budget for 2014, the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine concluded that in the previously approved budget for 2013, they planned nominal GDP at UAH 1.576 trillion – a real GDP growth of 3.4 % and an increase in consumer prices by 4.8 %. Also, the Accounting Chamber emphasized that planned state budget revenues for 2014 were 15.7 % higher than their real amount in 2013, while real income (calculated using the GDP deflator) would grow by 6.3%, with growth projected at only 3%.⁸ Thus, they primarily argued the invalidity of state budget figures, despite a possible failure in economic growth forecast for 2014.

4. Sovereign Debt as a Factor of Instability

Finance works effectively and is a background contribution to economic growth and the reduction of poverty. But repeating financial crises and poorly functioning financial systems result in slow growth and increasing poverty, all the while destabilizing global and national economies. Generally, a financial crisis affects all the participants of the financial system. Public indebtedness increases after costly bailouts of bankrupt financial institutions undertaken by the government. These actions result in a lowering of the ability of the state to support key social objectives, including financing education, healthcare and infrastructure improvements. Finally, badly functioning financial systems can also prolong economic crises – well demonstrated by recent events.

⁶ “Economic Review”, *World Bank – Ukraine*, www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/eca/ukraine/ua-macro-april-2014-uk.pdf

⁷ “Basic Indicators of Social and Economic Development of Ukraine 2013” (quarterly data), *State Statistics Service of Ukraine*, <http://www.ukrstat.gov.ua/>

⁸ Resolution of the Board of Accounting Chamber of Ukraine, “Conclusions on the Analysis and Expertise of the Draft Law of Ukraine: On the State Budget of Ukraine for 2014”, www.ac-rada.gov.ua/doccatalog/document/16743258/Bul_Expert_DBU_2014.pdf

Researchers all over the world⁹ discuss issues to ensure the safety of the public debt sector. Multilateral financial flows influence a myriad of factors, including: debt issues in the public sector and other areas, the complexity of information on existing sovereign debt, potential risks to the accumulation of sovereign debt, identifying criteria to ensure safety for debt accumulation in each country and providing governments with the ability to repay debt. The above issues can result in enhancing global financial instability.

Sovereign debt accumulation is continuous, and has reached historical levels in developed countries. This particular trend has caused the international scientific community to systematically rethink challenges to financial stability and security.¹⁰ Despite a certain level of cautious optimism concerning post-crisis global recovery shown by experts, voices pointing out long-term issues in unloading existing financial imbalances persist.¹¹ That is why currently scientific dialogue in this area is generally concerned with a wide range of issues related to features of public debt accumulation,¹² its management and the decline in speed of global economic growth.

Consideration of debt imbalances is particularly important. The amount of government borrowing is 20.3 % higher than the forecast value of public debt, defined in 2014 by a mid-term strategy for public debt management for 2013-2015, and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.¹³ An increasing budget deficit has been accompanied by increases in the number of current Ukrainian account deficits in 2014, which has led to a reduction in domestic consumption and capital investment. Thus, Ukraine's economy needs to take urgent action utilizing macro-financial measures intended to stabilize and stimulate growth.

Generally speaking, the current situation of debt burden in the sovereign sector has demonstrated a positive trend that increased in the post-crisis period. Studies assume that for developed economies in 2013, the average accumulation rate of debt to GDP will be 18.4% compared to 2009. It must be underlined that the process of reducing budget deficits goes hand in hand with an increase in debt burden. That is why the total deficit for all countries in 2012 reached 4.2% of GDP and is expected to reach 3.5% of GDP in 2013 (7.4% of world GDP in 2009). This trend correlates with the widely

⁹ Edison H.J., Levine R., Ricci L., Sløk T., *Journal of International Money and Finance* (2002), No. 21 (6), 749-776; Obstfeld M., Taylor A.M., "Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth", *Cambridge University Press* (2004), 354; Stiglitz J., *Oxford Review of Economic Policy* (2004), 20 (1), 57-71.

¹⁰ Prasad E., Rogoff K., Wei S.-J., Kose M.A., *IMF Occasional Paper No. 220* (2003), 86; Levine R., "Handbook of Economic Growth", Eds., Aghion, P. and S. Durlauf, (North-Holland Elsevier, Amsterdam 2005), 865-934.

¹¹ Ranciere R., Tornell A., Westermann F., "Crises and Growth: A Re-Evaluation", *NBER Working Paper No. 10073* (2003); Tornell A., Westermann F., Martinez L., "The Positive Link between Financial Liberalization, Growth and Crises", *NBER Working Paper No. 10293* (2004); Batkovskiy V., Luybkina O., *Proceedings of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv. Economics* (2012), No. 138, 13-18.

¹² Bassanini F., Revigli E., *OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends* (2011), Issue 1, 31.

¹³ "On Approval of the Medium-Term Debt Management Strategy for 2013-2015", *Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine* (29 April 2013), No. 320. <http://zakon4.rada.gov.ua/laws/show/320-2013-%D0%BF>

chosen direction of fiscal consolidation, which was actively supported by governments at the national level. It has been observed that countries with increased national debt have achieved the fastest level of fiscal consolidation. Notably, budget deficit is expected to reach 4.7% of Greece’s GDP in 2013 (15.6% in 2009), 6.4% GDP in Ireland (13.9% in 2009), 5.7 % GDP in Portugal (10.2% in 2009), and 5.7% GDP in Spain (11.2% in 2009).¹⁴

Fiscal consolidation resulted in unexpected positive achievements along the lines of fiscal discipline and optimization of operating costs. Despite this, no improvements addressing systemic issues were made according to increases in debt burden. For example, economic growth was insufficient to cover debt needs and mechanisms were lacking – mainly financial – to reduce real debt (restructuring mechanisms only caused debt postponement and, as usual, worsened general borrowing terms). The IMF, UN and World Bank predictions for the medium-term indicate very few opportunities for economic growth to solve debt issues in the sovereign sector. The dominating issue here is the high possibility of a synchronized global recession. According to the UN basic outlook, the world gross domestic product was expected to grow up to 2.2% in 2012, 2.4% in 2013 and 3.2% in 2014.¹⁵ Many countries will not be able to restore their potential abilities and regain jobs lost during the crisis.




Fig. 2
GDP growth per year in 2006-2014, % ¹⁶

¹⁴ IMF, “Taking Stock”, *Fiscal Monitor* (2012), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2012/02/pdf/fm1202.pdf>

¹⁵ “World Economic Situation and Prospects (2013), http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/wesp2013.pdf

¹⁶ IMF, “Taking Stock”, *Fiscal Monitor* (2012), <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fm/2012/02/pdf/fm1202.pdf>

It is important to note the synchronizing rate of decline in economic dynamics for countries with various levels of income (Fig. 2). A key task here is to reduce the vulnerability of global GDP growth in developed countries. The majority of them, mainly in Europe, are connected to a lowering trend of economic dynamics, which is due to rising unemployment, as well as continuously reducing credit in households and the corporate sector, while increasing sovereign risk and instability in the banking system.

Concluding Remarks

In order to restore economic growth, it is important to work out measures for the early prediction and elimination of financial imbalances. There must also be more focus on and analysis of the most likely areas and mechanisms for transferring crises from the global system – including debt crises – into the euro area. The national financial system needs to have effective non-debt sources to repay sovereign debt and to use available financing mechanisms in an economy faced by significant weakening in international markets. Optimizing existing sources of external financing and finding new ways to enter international capital markets must include the development of innovative financial mechanisms.

Today it is well known, that the international financial system has faced a variety of negative impacts and potential risks, accumulated through the situation in the public finance sector and a slowdown in economic growth. The global economy's fragility and unstable performance continues to have a massive impact on the economic prospects of Ukraine. National economic indicators remain exposed to worsening conditions in the world, particularly in the eurozone – an important economic partner. Any further worsening in the external environment will have a negative influence on export demand, prices of goods and services, and bring difficult challenges in evaluating finance. Only the implementation of fiscal consolidation plans, along with imposing more control on capital influx shall result in increased resilience, as expected.

These are all reasons why it is relevant to conceptually rethink measures to support financial stability in Ukraine, accumulate prospects for economic growth, manage sovereign debt, as well as work out mechanisms to prevent transferring financial crises in the national economy.

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Abstract: The paper demonstrates the non-random effect of the interconnection between development and effectiveness of national financial systems and levels of growth over long periods of time. A general increase in risk generated by the sovereign finance sector is observed through the appearance of dangerous potential for the sovereign debt sector to become a trigger to reformat financial architecture. Conceptual parameters for assuring stability and growth for a national financial system, together with issues of state regulation for the above processes, are determined. Enhancing policies produced by government to support the operation of a financial system, developing a better system, and deepening discussion, along with covering the areas of efficient allocation of capital, economic growth, and promoting economic discipline are argued to be of main significance to the economy of Ukraine. Also underlined are: the importance to define financial development, review links between financial sector development, economic growth, and the reduction of poverty under new global conditions. Some national states are reviewed in order to compare their conditions and efforts in designing financial systems that create possibilities to affect economic growth and development. The paper provides a broad look at the crucial needs of the state budget of Ukraine during political, economic and social crises.

Keywords: global financial instability, sovereign debt, effective resources allocation, financial system, fiscal consolidation.

II
**GEORGIA'S REFORMS
AND EURO-ATLANTIC ASPIRATIONS**

Georgia's Road to NATO: Everything but Membership?

MARION KIPIANI

Norwegian Helsinki Committee, Tbilisi

Introduction

The ongoing crisis in Ukraine continues to jolt the architectural plans of Euro-Atlantic security developed over the past 25 years. Predictions of a “new Cold War,” and anxiety over Russia’s ambitions in its neighborhood, have led to calls for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to step up efforts to ensure security on the European continent and protect its newer members in close geographic proximity to the Russian Federation. After more than two decades, during which NATO was transforming into a military alliance focused on out-of-area missions, the collective defense at the heart of the 1949 Washington Treaty has suddenly appeared to regain its relevance.

Since the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the escalation of military conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region a year ago, NATO has demonstrated its commitment to the security of its Eastern European member states through reassurance measures that have included increased air and maritime patrols, as well as the rotation of ground forces. There are however countries partnering with NATO – but not covered by its collective defense protective umbrella – which fall into a gray zone of influence between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic allies. These countries, including Moldova, Georgia and Ukraine itself, are particularly concerned by Russia’s strategic objective of keeping a sphere of influence and preventing their alignment with Western political and security structures.

Georgia has been the most adamant and persistent country of the former Soviet Union to have sought membership in NATO. It has taken on wide ranging reforms of its defense sector and military, and has significantly contributed to the Alliance’s largest military mission to date, the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF). Since 2008, the question of whether to grant Georgia a clear timetable and roadmap for accession to NATO has been on the organization’s agenda, and has led to a split between those Allies that favor extending security guarantees to additional members in Eastern Europe, and those that advocate a cautious approach to Russia’s geographical sphere of interest.

This paper looks at Georgia’s road toward closer integration with NATO from the early stages of the country’s independence to the Rose Revolution, August 2008 War, and

beyond. It is aimed to analyze the inter-links between Georgia's attempts to gain NATO membership and its foreign and security policy *vis-à-vis* the Russian Federation. In the final section and conclusion of this paper, we examine the outcomes of the NATO summit in Wales in September 2014 from a Georgian perspective and the options open to the Georgian government in ensuring security and further reform of the defense sector.

The Early Years: from Independence to the Rose Revolution

When the Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) collapsed two years later, the landscape of European security – characterized for half a century by the two opposing military alliances of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact – began to shift. NATO had been formed in 1949, as relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union turned antagonistic over the detonation of a Soviet atomic bomb in August of that year and the incorporation of territories the USSR had occupied at the end of World War II into the Soviet Bloc. Ever since then, NATO's core mission has been collective defense, as declared by Article V of the Washington Treaty: "An armed attack against one or more of them [*the Allies, author's note*] in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all."¹ With the USSR's collapse and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, NATO's Cold War enemy had all but vanished. In its stead, the Alliance was faced with instability and ethno-political conflicts along the Eastern and Southeastern edges of Europe, as well as with the request of former Soviet Bloc states in Central Europe to be incorporated under its protective umbrella.²

At its Rome Summit in 1991, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which would in 1997 be transformed into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The NACC was a political forum, holding annual meetings at the ministerial level with representation of all the former Warsaw Pact members.³ At this time, the Eastern expansion of the Alliance, which would eventually lead to NATO membership for all former Soviet Bloc countries in Central-Eastern Europe, plus Slovenia, Croatia, and the Baltic states, was far from a foregone conclusion – especially among U.S. decision-makers, whose opinions carried predominant weight in the Alliance. Proponents of enlargement in the Clinton Administration argued that includ-

¹ North Atlantic Treaty Organization "The North Atlantic Treaty," last modified December 9, 2008, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm

² cf. C. Tim Carlsson, "Unraveling the Georgian Knot: The United States, Russia, and the New 'Great Game' in the Caucasus" (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2009) 37; and Henry J. Kyle, *The Relevancy of NATO Membership in Russia's Near Abroad*, 2nd edition (Damascus, Md: Penny Hill Press Inc., 2012), Kindle Edition

³ cf. James M. Goldgeier, *Not Whether But When. The U.S. Decision to Enlarge NATO* (Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 1999), 17f

ing the Central European countries in NATO would help extend the benefits of peace, freedom, and security to all of Europe, thereby erasing the Cold War's dividing lines, and create an institutional framework to resolve disputes between nations. Considering the violence Europe was facing at the time in the Western Balkans, this constituted an important argument for NATO expansion.⁴ Enlargement opponents, on the other side, argued that expanding NATO into Eastern Europe would antagonize Russia and endanger progress on a key security issue, namely U.S.-Russian cooperation on nuclear disarmament. The U.S. military was primarily concerned by the capabilities of potential new NATO members and argued that it was vital to first institute patterns of cooperation that would lead to resilient military-to-military relationships, enabling these countries to one day integrate into the Alliance.⁵

The result of the bureaucratic and presidential decision-making process in Washington was a two-track enlargement policy, unveiled by President Clinton in 1994. One track consisted of the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as a mechanism focused on supporting defense reforms in partner countries with the aim of building their capabilities and interoperability with NATO forces. The PfP was open to all of the former Soviet Bloc and Soviet successor states and allowed these countries to participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations with NATO members, such as those in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Through the second track, NATO set up a bilateral mechanism of engagement with Russia under the NATO-Russia Founding Act that was eventually signed in 1997.

Georgia joined the NACC in 1992 and the Partnership for Peace in 1994, three years after it had gained independence from the Soviet Union in a process accompanied by internal strife that culminated in armed confrontation between opposing political forces in the center of its capital city Tbilisi, at the turn of 1991-92. In addition, secessionist wars raged on the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Both of these regions had enjoyed autonomous status within the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic, and sought independence from Georgia after the collapse of the USSR. Since early 1992, Eduard Shevardnadze, the former Foreign Minister of the USSR, who had significantly contributed to the peaceful reunification of Germany, was President of Georgia. He entertained excellent personal relations with important Western decision-makers, such as James Baker III, U.S. Secretary of State in the George H.W. Bush Administration, and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, former German Foreign Minister. By integrating Georgia into Western structures of cooperation and assistance, he sought support for the recognition of the country's territorial integrity, as well as material help to rebuild its shattered economy.

In the early 1990s, Georgia's armed forces were in a deplorable state. When the Soviet Union collapsed, its 15 successor states had proportionally inherited parts of the assets of the Soviet Army that had been stationed on their territories. Due to the cha-

⁴ cf. Carlsson, *Unraveling the Georgian Knot*, 37

⁵ cf. Goldgeier, *Not Whether but When*, 26f

otic nature of the disbandment of the Red Army and the volatile situation in Georgia, many of these assets were misappropriated and trafficked to various sides in the conflicts rattling the country. The armed forces were disorganized and largely consisted of paramilitary formations more loyal to political entrepreneurs or warlords, than to any unified national command; in addition, there had been relatively few Georgian personnel serving in officer positions in the Soviet Army who could pass on their expertise to structure the young state's security and defense institutions.⁶ Joining the PFP provided Georgia international support in defense reform, especially once an Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program with NATO was elaborated and Georgia had joined the PFP Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1999.⁷

Major progress in military transformation came through bilateral security assistance provided by the United States in the form of the Georgia Train and Equip Program (GTEP), an 18-months effort funded at more than USD 60 million. In the words of Lt. Col. Robert E. Hamilton, who served as the chief of the U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation in Georgia from 2006 until 2008, by the time GTEP started in 2002, the Georgian armed forces “were a collection of loosely organized, poorly disciplined units with famously corrupt leadership and few modern combat skills.”⁸ The program trained and equipped four Georgian battalions in light infantry airmobile, mechanized and mountain tactics, as well as medical and logistical methods. It was linked to the George W. Bush Administration's counter-terrorism efforts and ostensibly aimed at enabling Georgia to counteract Chechen formations operating in the Pankisi Gorge, an area straddling the Georgian border with Russia's Chechen Republic. Russia had repeatedly accused Georgia of harboring Chechen terrorists and thus reluctantly acquiesced to the U.S. security assistance program.⁹

While in the 1990s and early 2000s, Georgia had sought Western orientation, since 1993 it had also been a member of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) – the regional association of the USSR's successor states – as well as on CIS's Council of Defense Ministers. The attempt to balance its foreign and security policy reflected the Georgian government's thinking that a solution to the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia – which by 1994 Georgia had eventually lost control over – would not be possible without Russia's positive influence. This approach would change dramatically in the wake of the events of November 2003.¹⁰

⁶ cf. Nakia J. Summers, “Georgia's Quest for NATO Membership: Challenges and Prospects” (Master's thesis, Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2010), 22

⁷ cf. “NATO-Georgia Partnership Mechanism,” Ministry of Defense of Georgia, accessed May 25, 2015, <https://mod.gov.ge/p/NATO-Georgia-partnership>

⁸ Robert E. Hamilton, “Georgian Military Reform—An Alternative View,” CSIS Commentary, February 3, 2009

⁹ cf. Carlsson, “Unraveling the Georgian Knot,” 39; Summers, “Georgia's Quest,” 22

¹⁰ cf. Jakub Kufčák, “Policy recommendation for the Georgian NATO membership,” Prague Security Studies Institute 2013, http://www.academia.edu/5630413/NATO_and_Georgia_in_2014_is_MAP_an_Option_Again

The “New Georgia”: Single-Vector Foreign Policy

In that month, mass protests rocked Georgia's capital city of Tbilisi. Crowds demonstrated against the perceived falsification of the parliamentary elections of November 2, 2003, and against the corrupt and ineffective government of President Eduard Shevardnadze. They were led by a triumvirate of three young political leaders headed by Mikheil Saakashvili, a former Minister of Justice, who had resigned from his position in protest against government corruption. On November 23, the bloodless Rose Revolution deposed President Shevardnadze. Saakashvili was elected the new head of state in a landslide victory in early January 2004, and his political party, the United National Movement, won almost 70 percent of votes in the March election that year.

The new president entered office with the firmly set goal of anchoring Georgia's foreign and security policy more firmly in a Western political and security structures alliance. He also promised that during his term in office, the country's territorial integrity would be reestablished through the “reintegration” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As we have seen above, the previous government had followed a pro-Western course, but at the same time links with Russia and multilateral institutions in the post-Soviet space had been kept intact. Not so Mr. Saakashvili. As an avowedly pro-American president, he had a vision of profoundly transforming Georgian society and “fast-forwarding” the country to a new mode of social relations, governance, and cultural values. The approach chosen for these aims was to reject all post-Soviet labels *in toto* and align Georgia with the United States, NATO, and the European Union politically, economically, militarily and culturally.

The Rose Revolution also coincided with the increased focus of the George W. Bush Administration on the promotion of democracy after 2001. The Georgian political leadership soon started to portray Georgia as a poster-child for the transformation of a former Soviet state with weak governance and a largely informal, poorly developed economy, to a beacon of democratization and market economic reforms in its region. In addition, Saakashvili positioned his country as a key ally of the United States in the “war against terror.” GTEP was wound up by April 2004, but was replaced the following year by the Georgia Sustainment and Stability Operations Program. Georgia SSOP was designed to solidify and build on the achievements of GTEP by implementing modern standards in the Georgian armed forces in order to enable them to operate jointly with Western (primarily U.S.) forces during Operation Iraqi Freedom. By 2007-2008, about 2,000 Georgian soldiers had served in Iraq, which made Georgia the third-largest troop contributing nation after the U.S. and the United Kingdom.¹¹

The more solid Georgian relations became with the United States, the more they deteriorated with Russia. Presidents Saakashvili and Putin quickly developed a personal

¹¹ cf. Carlsson, “Unraveling the Georgian Knot,” 39; Jim Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests,” Congressional Research Service Report, 2 April 2014, 5

dislike for each other. This animosity was exacerbated by what Saakashvili called Russian meddling in Georgia's break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, while Putin countered that Georgia was turning itself into a fifth column of Western (read: American) power projection in Russia's immediate vicinity. President Saakashvili made no secret of his desire to integrate Georgia into NATO. His country had been the first, in October 2004, to agree an Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP) with the Alliance, followed two years later by the establishment of an Intensified Dialog. In the same year, President Saakashvili took Georgia out of the CIS Council of Defense Ministers, arguing that the country could not simultaneously be part of two military structures.¹²

In April 2007, the U.S. Congress approved the NATO Freedom Consolidation Act, urging NATO to grant Georgia a Membership Action Plan (MAP). The MAP process had been instituted to help NATO candidate countries, during the second round of post-Cold War enlargement (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), achieve the military and political standards required to join the Alliance. If Georgia were granted a MAP during the 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest – so the government reasoned – its eventual accession to membership was all but guaranteed. In order to underline Georgia's commitment, President Saakashvili organized a referendum in January 2008 on NATO integration, held simultaneously with pre-term presidential elections triggered by the violent suppression of large-scale public protest in Tbilisi a few months prior. 77 percent of voters endorsed NATO membership for Georgia in this referendum.¹³

Georgian aspirations for NATO membership, which were supported by the Bush Administration and most of the new Central-Eastern European NATO member states, turned into a major bone of contention at the Bucharest Summit. Russia, which loomed large in the discussions, viewed NATO's expansion into its sphere of influence as an expression of hostile intent. This hostility was perceived to be confirmed by events such as the recognition of Kosovo's independence earlier in the year, and U.S. plans for missile defense development, which Moscow considered to be directed against its own strategic missile arsenal. Those NATO Allies who opposed granting Georgia a MAP – primarily Germany, France, and Italy – argued that further Eastern expansion (also to possibly include Ukraine) would endanger peace and stability in Europe. In addition, many of the countries NATO had taken in as members during its two rounds of post-Cold War enlargement had only small and somewhat antiquated militaries, whose inclusion had not strengthened the Alliance's capabilities. There was concern about stretching NATO even further to embrace additional members that clearly saw the Alliance as a way to counteract Russia's strategic designs and meddle in their internal affairs. In Georgia's case, particular apprehension remained about potential Georgian attempts to regain

¹² cf. "NATO-Georgia Partnership Mechanisms"; also Róbert Ondrejcsák, "Perspectives of NATO-Georgia Relations," accessed May 25, 2015. <http://cenaa.org/analysis/perspectives-of-nato-georgia-relations/>; Summers, "Georgia's Quest," 29

¹³ cf. Carlsson, "Unraveling the Georgian Knot," 40; Ondrejcsák, "Perspectives of NATO-Georgia relations"

control over its break-away regions by force, possibly drawing Russia into a conflict and – in case of Georgian NATO membership – triggering the invocation of Article V of the Washington Treaty and thus dragging the Alliance into a military confrontation with Moscow.¹⁴

Eventually, Georgia did not receive a MAP in Bucharest in April 2008. In August, an increase in tensions and armed incidents resulted in a full-scale military assault by Tbilisi on the break-away region of South Ossetia and retaliation by Russia that went beyond that region. While Russian ground troops pushed the Georgian military out of South Ossetia and advanced further into Georgian territory, its air force bombed military infrastructure and the navy ferried Russian troops via the Black Sea to break-away Abkhazia, who from there moved into western Georgia. The war was swift and decisive, ending after five days with a French-brokered ceasefire. By that time, the Georgian military had lost a third of its equipment, three out of five brigades were destroyed, the country's two main military bases in Gori and Senaki had been devastated, and its navy and coast guard virtually annihilated. Within two weeks of the end of armed hostilities, Russia had recognized the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, thus paving the way for the establishment of Russian military infrastructure in both regions and the deployment of Russian border guards at their boundary lines with Georgia.¹⁵

Russia has advanced different motivations and objectives for its intervention in Georgia, including the protection of its peacekeepers and citizens in South Ossetia, as well as self-defense. Eventually, however, the five-day war in August 2008 demonstrated that Russia was prepared to and capable of using its “hard power” option to counter NATO and U.S. presence in its immediate neighborhood, while the West, including the U.S., were ultimately unwilling to provide tangible military support, let alone risk a direct confrontation with Moscow over Georgia.¹⁶

The armed conflict also put a lid on Georgia's ambitions to integrate into NATO. Even though the Alliance set up a NATO-Georgia Council (NGC) in September 2008 to oversee NATO assistance to Georgia and to supervise progress toward eventual membership, the Allies that had previously been most vocal in supporting Georgia, now had to toe the line set by Germany and France on the question. In addition, the incoming U.S. President, Barack Obama, made clear that during his tenure, the “reset” with Russia – i.e. renewed dialogue and pragmatic cooperation focused on crucial theaters of instability such as Afghanistan-Pakistan, Iran, and Israel-Palestine – would take precedence over U.S.-Georgia relations. This point was driven home during the NATO summit in Strasbourg-Kehl on April 3-4, 2009, where Alliance heads of state reaffirmed Georgia's aspirations to join NATO, but stated implicitly in their declaration that such a step would have to be preceded by a peacefully negotiated solution to the disagreements

¹⁴ cf. Kufčák, “Policy recommendation;” Ondrejcsák, “Perspectives of NATO-Georgia Relations;” Kyle, *The Relevancy of NATO Membership*

¹⁵ cf. Pierre Razoux, “What future for Georgia?” NATO Research Paper No. 47, June 2009, 2f

¹⁶ cf. Carlsson, “Unraveling the Georgian Knot,” 32, 57ff; Kyle, *The Relevancy of NATO Membership*

with Russia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. In reaction, Tbilisi developed a strategy of “non-first-use” of military force, which was formally pledged by President Saakashvili in an address to the European Parliament in November 2010.¹⁷

Despite these setbacks, the Georgian government maintained and arguably even strengthened its single-minded foreign policy focus on approximation to Western institutions. Following the August 2008 War, the Georgian Parliament voted unanimously to withdraw Georgia from the CIS and declared Abkhazia and South Ossetia “Russian-occupied territories.”¹⁸ Cooperation with NATO, on the other side, was further intensified, even though subsequent Alliance summits did not grant Georgia the hoped for MAP. Georgia’s National Security Strategy of 2011 described NATO as the basis for Euro-Atlantic security and declared increased interoperability of Georgian with Allied forces a corner stone of defense reform.¹⁹

Since 2008, the country has benefited from various NATO assistance facilities, such as the Defense Enhancement Program, the Professional Development Program and the Building Integrity Initiative. These facilities are focused on education and training to professionalize security and defense structures, as well as to enhance sector transparency and accountability, *inter alia* by building up the National Defense Academy and encouraging best-practice sharing through peer-review mechanisms. In 2010, the Mountain Training School in Sachkhere, central Georgia, received the status of NATO/ PfP Mountain Training and Education Center, enabling it to conduct mountain training courses for the military personnel of NATO member and partner nations. Georgia also participates in diverse new NATO initiatives that aim at increased interoperability and burden sharing, such as Connected Forces and Smart Defense.²⁰

The country’s most visible and perhaps strategically calculated element of cooperation with NATO has been its engagement in the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. Since 2004, small contingents of troops had served under German command and with a Lithuanian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team. But in fall 2009, with a NATO MAP seemingly a long way away, the Georgian Government sent a company-sized unit to be stationed in Kabul under French command. Starting from April the following year, an infantry battalion each would serve six-monthly rotations alongside U.S. Marines in the volatile southern Afghan province of Helmand until summer 2014, when security responsibility in the area was handed over to Afghan national security forces. In October 2012, Georgia’s ISAF contingent was doubled to 1,560 troops serving in-theater at any time, thus making the country the

¹⁷ cf. Paul Belkin, Derek E. Mix and Stevel Woehrel, “NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine and Security Concerns in Central and Eastern Europe,” Congressional Research Service Report, 31 July 2014, 2f; also Carlsson, “Unraveling the Georgian Knot,” 11,29; Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,” 14; Ondrejcsák, “Perspectives of NATO-Georgia Relations;” Razoux, “What future for Georgia?” 2f

¹⁸ cf. Carlsson, “Unraveling the Georgian Knot,” 14

¹⁹ cf. Ondrejcsák, “Perspectives of NATO-Georgia Relations”

²⁰ cf. “NATO-Georgia Partnership Mechanisms”

largest troop-contributing non-NATO member besides Australia, with roughly the same number of personnel deployed. What was more, Georgia placed no national “caveats” (restrictions of use) on its soldiers, which meant Georgian forces were stationed in areas considered amongst the most perilous in Afghanistan. 29 Georgian soldiers had been killed in action by the time ISAF was wound up at the end of 2014.²¹

Participation in ISAF provided Georgia not only with an opportunity to demonstrate that it could be a “security provider” (as opposed to a “security consumer”) in a NATO framework, but also with a rationale to continue and extend another, albeit interlinked, strategic plank in its security policy: close cooperation and partnership with the United States. Since 2009, the preparation of Georgian troop contingents for the ISAF mission was supported by U.S. Marine Forces Europe through the Georgia Deployment Program.²² It thereby fell within the scope of the U.S.-Georgia Charter on Strategic Partnership signed in 2009, whose provisions on security and defense are focused on cooperation for the promotion of peace and global stability that at the same time increase Georgian capabilities and thus strengthen Georgia’s candidacy for NATO membership.²³

Despite the undeniable capability gains of its soldiers, one of the lessons Georgia learned during the 2008 war was that participation in military missions focusing on counter-insurgency as part of an international coalition, did not necessarily translate into defense structures and armed forces able to deal with the type of conflict they were most likely to face at home. Bilateral defense consultations with the U.S. following the war had revealed, in the words of then-Assistant Secretary for Defense Alexander Vershbow, “many previously unrecognized or neglected deficiencies in the various required capacities of the Georgian Armed Forces and Ministry of Defense [...] In practically all areas, defense institutions, strategies, doctrine, and professional military education were found to be seriously lacking.”²⁴ Therefore, Georgia was now seeking more comprehensive assistance in military transformation. This included support for education and professionalization initiatives (such as the strengthening of the National Defense Academy mentioned above), strategy and doctrine development, defense institution building, and joint training of the two countries’ navy and coastguard units. The U.S. has been particularly instrumental in helping Georgia rebuild its coastguard, completely destroyed by Russia in 2008, by supplying patrol boats, constructing repair facilities, and providing new communications and observation equipment, as well as a maritime information center.²⁵

A particularly and continuing point of contention was (and remains) the inability of Georgia to procure defensive weapons (primarily anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems), which the government argues it needs to deter a recurrence of a Russian attack and

²¹ cf. Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,” 6, 44.

²² cf. *ibid.*

²³ cf. Carlsson, “Unraveling the Georgian Knot,” 37f; Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,” 7

²⁴ quoted in Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,” 46

²⁵ cf. *ibid.*, 47f; also Ondrejcsák, “Perspectives of NATO-Georgia Relations”

invasion of the country. Analysts have described this situation as a *de facto* Western arms embargo against Georgia,²⁶ and U.S. political and military leaders have repeatedly testified in Congress that no lethal military assistance or high-end defensive weaponry have been provided to the country post-2008.²⁷ On December 31, 2011, U.S. President Obama signed into law the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2012, Section 1242, which called on the Defense Secretary to submit a plan to Congress for the normalization of U.S. defense cooperation with Georgia, including the sale of defensive weapons systems. The attached signing statement, however, stipulated that if the provisions of the section conflicted with the U.S. President's constitutional authority to conduct foreign relations (for instance, the Administration's "reset" policy with Russia), they would be considered non-binding. Despite reports about an "enhanced defense cooperation" program that was agreed between Presidents Obama and Saakashvili in January 2012, there is no evidence that Georgia has been successful in procuring the weaponry it is seeking to date.²⁸

In the wake of the 2008 conflict, the U.S. have cooperated closely with Georgia in the realm of defense and military reforms, and have tried to advance the country's chances for NATO integration through the NATO-Georgia Council and the provisions of yet a new tool (instead of the MAP) called the Annual Action Program (AAP). Under this confusing formula, Georgia would be able to work towards Alliance membership without formally undertaking the MAP, but would still be tasked with meeting the requirements of the MAP, and was advised to exercise "strategic patience" by its Western partners.²⁹

However, by fall 2013, NATO membership seemed no closer for Georgia than five years earlier – despite the considerable efforts and the ultimate sacrifice of its servicemen in Afghanistan. With the end of the ISAF mission looming, the new Georgian government that had come into power the previous year was searching for ways to continue demonstrating its relevance to the Alliance; it declared its continued support to the ISAF follow-up mission "Resolute Support", as well as to the retrograde of personnel and materiel from Afghanistan through Georgian territory, and also announced Georgia would be joining NATO's new Response Force (NRF). And yet, the regional security situation seemed to predict that NATO had settled into an uneasy *modus vivendi* with Russia, oscillating between cooperation on international crisis hotspots and competition in Moscow's "Near Abroad". Most of the Allies appeared content with the prospect that Georgia would "one day" become a member – provided that the specifics of that date remained hazy.

²⁶ cf. Taras Kuzio, "What Signal Does Washington's Arms Embargo against Georgia Tell us About US Policy towards Ukraine?" The Jamestown Foundation Blog on Russia and Eurasia 12 July 2010, accessed June 1, 2015, http://jamestownfoundation.blogspot.de/2010/07/what-signal-does-washingtons-arms_6060.html

²⁷ cf. testimonies detailed in Nichol, "Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia," 46ff

²⁸ cf. *ibid*

²⁹ cf. Carlson, "Unraveling the Georgian Knot," 35

“More Georgia in NATO, more NATO in Georgia.” Past Crimea and the Wales Summit

NATO leaders were planning their September 2014 summit in Wales to focus on taking stock of the achievements, challenges, and lessons learnt from ISAF Afghanistan, as well as on planning for the follow-up “Resolute Support” mission, slated to start by January 2015. With most stakeholders agreeing that ISAF would be assessed as having had, at most, mixed results, and the Alliance clearly lacking the appetite for taking on similar engagements in the foreseeable future, it seemed like NATO would once again be pressed to define a new *raison d'être* for its continued existence.

The turmoil engulfing another country at NATO's eastern flank, Ukraine, was at the time more of a conundrum for the European Union. In November 2013, Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich had refused to sign an Association Agreement with the EU, instead opting for closer ties with Russia. This led to public protests, escalating to civic unrest in Kyiv and a months-long occupation by demonstrators of the capital city's central square and thoroughfare. The situation reached an apex in February 2014, when police used lethal force against protestors who responded with violence against law enforcement personnel. The Yanukovich government fell on February 22, sparking a political crisis on the Crimean peninsula; part of Ukraine since 1954, but inhabited by a large ethnic Russian population and hosting the home base of the Russian Black Sea fleet at Sevastopol. Unidentified paramilitary forces, later openly supported by Russian troops stationed on the Crimean Peninsula, gradually took control of key public buildings. The regional government was changed, declared independence from Ukraine, and then held a referendum on whether Crimea should become part of the Russian Federation. According to the data released by the new Crimean authorities, almost 97 percent of votes were in favor of joining Russia. The Kremlin announced its annexation of Crimea on March 18, 2014.

At around the same time, unrest arose in Donbas, the south-eastern region of Ukraine bordering Russia. Pro-Russian separatists took control in late March and early April of the oblast centers of Lugansk and Donetsk. Both regions proclaimed their independence from Ukraine in April, which led to the escalation of armed conflict between Ukrainian security forces and pro-Russian militias. While Moscow did not recognize the independence of either Lugansk or Donetsk, there is strong evidence that Russia supplied the separatists with weapons and other equipment, and apparently also with military personnel, including members of their Special Forces

The emerging developments in Ukraine had caught NATO off-guard. Collective defense on the European continent had not been a concern since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Defense spending by European NATO allies had continued plummeting ever since, while the Obama Administration's “pivot to Asia”, hinted at an increasingly relaxed U.S. commitment to European security.³⁰ But once the extent of Russian involvement in the

³⁰ cf. Belkin, Mix, and Woehrel, “NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine,” 1f

military conflict in the Donbas became more obvious, NATO members from Eastern Europe, particularly Poland and the Baltic States, pressed the Alliance leadership to take steps that would deter Russia from any possible military incursions into NATO territory. In response, the White House announced in June the European Reassurance Initiative, providing close to USD 1 billion in order to bolster U.S. military presence in Eastern Europe.

At the NATO summit in Wales in September, the Alliance adopted a Readiness Action Plan, including measures to enhance the number of fighter jets for Baltic air policing, deploy two maritime groups to patrol the Baltic and Mediterranean Seas and increase the frequency of military exercises in Eastern Europe. The Plan also foresees the establishment of a Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) as a “spearhead” of the NATO Response Force (NRF), consisting of about 4,000 troops, ready to deploy and react to emerging crises within a few days.³¹

Once again, as in the case of Georgia in 2008, NATO made clear that it would not intervene directly in Ukraine to counter Russia. The Alliance suspended cooperation with Russia under the framework of the NATO-Russia Council and has since dispatched military trainers to Ukraine. Nevertheless, leaders of NATO member states have publicly spoken out against delivering lethal military aid to Ukraine, as such steps would risk escalating the conflict. Ukraine’s request to NATO to be granted a road map towards NATO membership was also rebuffed at the Wales Summit.³²

The Georgian government initially perceived the evolving situation in eastern Ukraine as a game-changer in its efforts toward NATO accession. Already in February 2014, a bipartisan group of 40 members of the U.S. House of Representatives had sent a letter to Secretary of State John Kerry, urging the Administration to support granting a Membership Action Plan (MAP) to Georgia in Wales.³³ Any hopes this might have stirred in Tbilisi were dashed early on, however, when U.S. President Obama declared on March 26 in Brussels that neither Ukraine nor Georgia “are currently on a path to NATO membership”.³⁴ Nevertheless, Georgian diplomacy in the run-up to the Wales Summit portrayed the military conflict in Ukraine as a logical continuation of Russia’s intervention in Georgia in 2008. Visiting Georgian political leaders urged Alliance member states to rein in Russian interference in its neighbors’ domestic affairs and

³¹ cf. *ibid.* 3, 14; also Jakub Kufčák, “NATO after the Wales Summit: Readying the Alliance for the Future,” Association for International Affairs, Policy Paper 3/2014, October 2014, 4; “NATO’s Readiness Action Plan. Factsheet,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, December 2014, http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_12/20141202_141202-factsheet-rap-en.pdf; “FACT SHEET: European Reassurance Initiative and Other U.S. Efforts in Support of NATO Allies and Partners. 3 June 2014,” The White House, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/06/03/fact-sheet-european-reassurance-initiative-and-other-us-efforts-support->

³² cf. Belkin, Mix, and Woehrel, “NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine,” 2f

³³ cf. *ibid.* 16; also Nichol, “Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia,” 52

³⁴ quoted in Will Cathcart, “Obama tells Georgia to Forget About NATO After Encouraging It to Join,” *The Daily Beast*, 27 March 2014

to protect Georgia's geopolitical choice of further approximation to the Euro-Atlantic community.

Eventually, Georgia again was not granted a MAP in Newport. However, the European Reassurance Initiative announced by the U.S. Administration also foresaw USD 35 million of funding for Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, part of which was used to tie up a "substantive package" of support for Georgia's NATO approximation. This package includes an increased Georgian presence in NATO exercises, as well as occasional NATO exercises in Georgia, and the set-up of a NATO military training center in the country.³⁵ In addition, Georgia (together with Moldova and Jordan) was offered a Defense and Related Security Capacity Building Initiative, aimed at reinforcing NATO's "commitment to partner nations" and to help the Alliance "project stability without deploying large combat forces."³⁶ The Capacity Building Initiative will essentially provide expertise and training to the Ministry of Defense and the Joint Staff of the Georgian armed forces. Acknowledging Georgia's contribution to the ISAF mission, Georgia was also included in a group of five countries (together with Australia, Finland, Jordan, and Sweden) seeking enhanced opportunities for cooperation with the Alliance. In the words of James Appathurai, the NATO Secretary General's Special Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia, there would be "a lot more Georgia in NATO and lot of NATO in Georgia."³⁷

While Georgian political leaders stressed the importance of the "substantive package" for the country's progress toward eventual NATO membership, the failure to obtain a roadmap and timetable was a political blow to the government. Probably for this reason, top U.S. political and military leaders made visits to Georgia during and after the Wales Summit: then-Marine Corps Commandant James Amos was in Tbilisi on September 4-5; then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel arrived on September 6, followed on September 20 by Secretary of the U.S. Army John McHugh and NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe and finally, U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove in October. Still in September, the U.S. Senate accorded Georgia major non-NATO-ally status, which will give the country improved access to U.S. military assistance, including for the transfer of U.S. excess defense materiel.³⁸ These developments raised expectations

³⁵ cf. Belkin, Mix, and Woehrel, "NATO: Response to the Crisis in Ukraine," 5; Luke Coffey, "NATO Summit 2014: An Opportunity to Support Georgia," The Heritage Foundation Issue Brief No.4260, August 13, 2014; Joshua Kucera, "U.S. Proposes Boost In Military Aid For Georgia," Eurasianet.org, July 27, 2014, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69216>; Kufčák, "NATO after the Wales Summit," 9; "NATO Chief Lays Out Package to 'Bring Georgia Closer' to Alliance," Civil Georgia, September 1, 2014, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27631>

³⁶ NATO Wales Summit Declaration, referenced in "Georgia in NATO Wales Summit Declaration," Civil Georgia, September 5, 2014, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27643>

³⁷ "NATO Envoy, Georgian Officials Discuss Implementation of 'Substantial Package'," Civil Georgia, December 4, 2014, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27880>

³⁸ cf. "U.S. Senate Committee Backs Major Non-NATO Ally Status for Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine," Civil Georgia, September 19, 2014, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27672>

that Tbilisi might be able to procure the defense weaponry it had been seeking unsuccessfully so far.

In the nine months since the conclusion of the Wales Summit, Georgia has announced its willingness to participate in the VJTF of the NATO Response Force and has sent rotations consisting of approximately 750 soldiers to participate in the “Resolute Support” mission in Afghanistan. The troops take on force protection and rapid reaction tasks in Kabul, as well as at Camp Marmal in Mazar-i-Sharif (northern Afghanistan) and at Bagram Airfield in Parwan province.³⁹ The government has also undertaken steps to implement the “substantive package” of assistance promised by NATO during the Wales Summit, particularly with regard to the establishment of a NATO Training and Evaluation Center in Georgia. A proposal has been submitted to the Alliance on a possible location for the center (at Vaziani military base in the vicinity of Tbilisi) and is currently pending a response from NATO decision makers.⁴⁰ The center will be hosting training and certification for allied and partner military units, in particular for units committed to the NATO Response Force, as well as exercises in support of NATO’s Connected Forces initiative. It is not clear, however, whether its focus will be on command-post exercises or whether there will also be capacities for field exercises with the participation of multinational troops. Russia has termed the training center a “provocation” and has warned against the installation of NATO military facilities in Georgia. In response, NATO officials have stressed repeatedly that the center will be solely dedicated to training purposes and not entail the positioning of NATO installations in Georgia.⁴¹

In parallel, defense and military cooperation between Georgia and the U.S. has remained close and has been stepped up recently when joint military drills (“Noble Partner 2015”) were held at Vaziani base to increase the interoperability of Georgian troops with the NATO Response Force. While U.S.-Georgian military exercises had been a regular feature over the past years, the scope of the drills and the fact that the U.S. military had shipped heavy military equipment – including infantry fighting vehicles –

³⁹ cf. “Военные Грузии приступили к контролю базы коалиции в Афганистане,” *Caucasian Knot*, November 11, 2014, <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/252140/>; “Georgian Troops Head to Mazar-i-Sharif,” *Civil Georgia*, December 16, 2014, <http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27911>; “MPs Endorse Georgia’s Contribution to NATO’s New Afghan Mission,” *Civil Georgia*, December 24, 2015, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27937>; “Рота пехотинцев Вооруженных сил Грузии прибыла в Афганистан,” *Caucasian Knot*, March 13, 2015, <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/258793/>; “Батальон грузинских военнослужащих вернулся на родину из Афганистана,” *Caucasian Knot*, April 15, 2015, <http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/260610/>

⁴⁰ cf. “MoD: Georgia to Push for MAP at NATO 2016 Summit,” *Civil Georgia*, June 2, 2015, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28318>

⁴¹ cf. “NATO Deputy Secretary General on Planned Training Center in Georgia,” *Civil Georgia*, January 30, 2015, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28318>; “Russian Diplomat: NATO’s Planned Training Center in Georgia ‘Provocative,’” *Civil Georgia*, February 6, 2015, <http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=28028>; “Russian response to joint Georgia-NATO training centre likely to focus on border restrictions, escalation unlikely,” *IHS Jane’s Intelligence Weekly*, 9 February 2015, <http://www.janes.com/article/48841/russian-response-to-joint-georgia-nato-training-centre-likely-to-focus-on-border-restrictions-escalation-unlikely>

from Eastern Europe to Georgia for that specific purpose was a novelty and interpreted by analysts in light of the ongoing crisis in Ukraine.⁴²

On the other side, Georgia has not made much visible progress yet in procuring its long sought-after defensive weapons system despite its new status as a major non-NATO ally of the United States. During the visit of U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to Georgia in September 2014, he announced that the Administration was moving forward Tbilisi's request to purchase UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters.⁴³ It is not clear at this point, how far the negotiations on the helicopters have progressed and how the Georgian Ministry of Defense will be able to finance their procurement and maintenance; in any case the helicopters constitute a reinforcement of the logistical, but not necessarily the defensive, capabilities of the Georgian armed forces. Even though there appeared news reports in late 2014 and early 2015, concerning the possible delivery of French anti-aircraft systems to Georgia, France has categorically denied that any agreement on this question has been achieved. For the time being, it appears that the NATO "substantive package" for Georgia remains primarily focused on defense sector professionalization and increased military interoperability.

Everything but Membership?

During the Wales Summit, Georgia received a commitment from NATO for more cooperation on the democratization, transparency and accountability of defense institutions, the improved capability of Georgian military forces to work within the framework of the NRF, and an enhanced status that provides for more Georgian involvement in NATO planning processes. The Georgian government has responded by moving forward these initiatives, like the Joint Training and Evaluation Center, that would help the country utilize the "substantive package" of support in the best possible way.

At the same time, it has been clearly indicated that NATO will not enlarge in the area of the former Soviet Union in the foreseeable future. The crisis in Ukraine has emphasized for most NATO Allies that taking on new members on the territory of the former Soviet Union might bring them into direct conflict with Russia. While NATO would still have an overwhelming military advantage over the Russian Federation, there is currently no consensus in the Alliance on providing Article V security guarantees to countries that would be difficult and costly to defend. Even more so as NATO can reap

⁴² cf. Giorgi Menabde, "What Does the Arrival of American Military Equipment in Georgia Mean?" Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 95, May 21, 2015, [http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=43938&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=54&cHash=4fc7222e752cf56779e2421ec5329a2f#.VWMkKIKi3Ls](http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43938&tx_ttnews[backPid]=54&cHash=4fc7222e752cf56779e2421ec5329a2f#.VWMkKIKi3Ls); "США направили тяжелую военную технику для учений в Грузии," Caucasian Knot, May 4, 2015, <http://georgia.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/261736/>

⁴³ cf. Joshua Kucera, "Hagel In Georgia To Discuss Helicopters, ISIS," Eurasianet.org, September 8, 2014, <http://www.eurasianet.org/node/69896>

most of the benefits of partnership – such as increased cooperation and interoperability – even without offering full membership. Georgia is a visible example of a partner that significantly contributes to NATO missions without receiving a near-term membership perspective in return.

For Georgia, this situation creates a strategic dilemma. As a small country with a historical narrative of invasion and aggression by larger neighboring powers, successive Georgian governments have seen NATO's Article V as the ultimate protection against its most menacing neighbor: the Russian Federation. A majority of the Georgian population clearly follows the government in this rationale. However, through its continuous – and highly publicized – efforts to gain a Membership Action Plan (and, to a smaller extent, to procure defensive weaponry), Georgia has exacerbated a security dilemma in the South Caucasus region and has given its break-away regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia even more opportunities to hijack the rhetoric on threat perception. Arguably, the MAP has been “fetishized”⁴⁴ by all sides in the debate: for NATO members it is a “carrot” to incentivize Georgia's military and geopolitical cooperation and arguably even its domestic democratic behavior. For Russia, granting Georgia a MAP would be the continuation of what it perceives as Western hostility and provocation in its “Near Abroad.” For Georgia, MAP has turned into a badge of merit and achievement, which every government since 2003 has banked an increasing amount of political capital on.

By staking its success on attaining the MAP, the government has maneuvered itself into a losing position that becomes more evident with every Alliance summit which turns Georgia down on the question of a clear path to membership. The country remains committed to supporting NATO peace-keeping and out-of-area missions, but to the minds of the Georgian public, it has little to show for the blood and treasure expended. Portraying the ultimate goal of its commitment to NATO membership and Article V protection against a possible Russian intervention, turns the road toward Alliance integration into an all-or-nothing proposition. It is hard for the Georgian government to frame the “substantive package” and items like a defense capacity building mission or the establishment of a training center, as a success in the public eye, even though they have real potential to contribute to military transformation. Consequently, the population's support for Georgia's pro-Western course is slowly but surely ebbing – between November 2013 and April 2015, backing for NATO membership dropped from 81 percent to 65 percent.⁴⁵

While the new Georgian Defense Minister has already declared that Georgia would again seek a MAP at the Warsaw Summit in 2016,⁴⁶ it is very unlikely that such efforts

⁴⁴ Kufčák, “Policy recommendation”

⁴⁵ cf. Vasilii Rukhadze, “European Union Snubs Georgia on Visa Free Travel Rules, as Pro-Russian Sentiments Grow in the Country,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor, Volume: 12, Issue: 100, May 29, 2015, [http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=43971&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=54&cHash=50a0db08757da78bccd4b87c8ca10a79#.VWmPWIKi3Ls](http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43971&tx_ttnews[backPid]=54&cHash=50a0db08757da78bccd4b87c8ca10a79#.VWmPWIKi3Ls)

⁴⁶ cf. “MoD: Georgia to Push for MAP at NATO 2016 Summit,” Civil Georgia, June 2, 2015, <http://civil>.

will succeed; either in 2016 or over the medium term. While NATO keeps reiterating that Georgia will “one day” gain membership in the Alliance, it is evidently not considering further enlargement anytime soon, despite or (perhaps more likely) because of Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine. Even if there would be political support for enlargement, analysts have cautioned that NATO might find it hard to militarily defend Georgia, due to its geographic isolation from Alliance territory and its proximity to Russia. This concern has only grown with the increase of Russian military capabilities in the South Caucasus, through its refurbished bases in break-away Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as the build-up of the 102nd Russian military base in Gyumri, Armenia.⁴⁷

NATO’s ambiguous stance toward Georgia need not be seen as deliberate prevarication to keep Georgia out of the Alliance, but rather as a reflection of geopolitical realities and changes. Alliances and organizations choose their members based on a sober analysis of the costs and benefits of their decisions in light of the present circumstances. It may be worthwhile for Georgian decision-makers (and Georgian society) to emulate this process: instead of regarding NATO and the Western institutions as their protectors, accept them as no more than partners. It will be crucial to establish priorities and strategies that are formulated on the basis of realistic analysis and assumptions, so that they produce the maximum benefit for the country’s engagement with these partners. It will also necessitate an official rhetoric that does not inflate public expectations or further exacerbate tensions with Russia. It may be a bitter pill to swallow, but geography is a reality that no country is able to escape.

List of Abbreviations

AAP	Annual Action Program
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
EAPC	Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council
GTEP	Georgia Train and Equip Program
IPAP	Individual Partnership Program
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
MAP	Membership Action Plan
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NRF	NATO Response Force
NGC	NATO-Georgia Council

ge/eng/article.php?id=28318

⁴⁷ cf. Cathcart, “Obama tells Georgia to Forget About NATO After Encouraging it to Join”; Armen Grigoryan, “Russia Increases Military Capacity in the South Caucasus,” Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 61, [http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews\[pointer\]=2&tx_ttnews\[tt_news\]=43732&tx_ttnews\[backPid\]=54&cHash=cb885492041bb202bc5144ecc8b8d3c6#.VUnfFKi3Ls](http://www.jamestown.org/regions/thecaucasus/single/?tx_ttnews[pointer]=2&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=43732&tx_ttnews[backPid]=54&cHash=cb885492041bb202bc5144ecc8b8d3c6#.VUnfFKi3Ls)

PARP	Planning and Review Process
PfP	Partnership for Peace
SSOP	Sustainability and Stability Operations Program
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VJTF	Very High Readiness Joint Task Force

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Abstract: Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia's governments have been adamant in the Euro-Atlantic orientation of their country and the aspiration to accede to full membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. This foreign policy course has largely been supported by the Georgian people, even though NATO did not provide military support to Georgia during its August 2008 war with Russia. After a decade of comprehensive defense and military reform, and significant contributions Georgia has been making to NATO's combat and security assistance missions in Afghanistan, the current Georgian administration is pressing for a clear path and road map to Alliance membership. Taking into account the volatile security situation in the wider Black Sea region, following Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in the ongoing conflict in Eastern Ukraine, NATO has signed off at the 2014 Wales Summit on a "substantive package" of support to Georgia. The present paper examines the trajectory of Georgia's NATO approximation and analyzes the country's options on security policy and further defense modernization in light of the summit outcomes.

Keywords: Security Studies, Georgia, Foreign and Security Policy, Geopolitics, South Caucasus, NATO-Russian relations, NATO Enlargement, U.S. Foreign Policy

Triumphs and Failures of Saakashvili's Administration in Georgia (2003-2012)

MARCIN RUTOWICZ

University of Wrocław

Introduction

In January 2004, after the Rose Revolution, President Edward Shevardnadze was replaced by one of the opposition leaders, Mikheil Saakashvili, who after two terms in office vacated his position in 2013. On 1 October 2012 probably the most important parliamentary elections in the recent history of Georgia took place. The former ruling party, United National Movement (UNM), failed to gain a majority in the Georgian parliament. The question remains, why did this occur? In this article, the author will attempt to provide a short review of Saakashvili and his political camp's activities, which will help to answer the question why UNM lost power.

It should be noted that until 2003 Georgia practically did not exist on the economic map of the world. Georgia used to be a largely agrarian economy. Only recently, because of its location on the Black Sea coast, high mountains and friendly climate, Georgia has developed a vibrant tourist industry. It has also developed a large wine production sector, as well as producing mineral water, various machinery and metals (exports include manganese and copper). After winning its independence, Georgia suffered massive economic decline, with high inflation and a large budget deficit – a situation similar to many post-Soviet countries. Georgia received financial aid from the USA, but also in advisory issues on institution-building programs. During Eduard Shevardnadze, eight years in office (until 2003) some progress was made, such as deregulation of prices, reduction of the number of officials in government administration and acceleration of the privatization process. But there were issues that the government was unable to deal with, such as organized crime, instability, corruption and unemployment.

High levels of corruption, organized crime on a large-scale, significant state intervention, the weakness of state institutions and a lack of confidence in them – these are just some of the problems that Georgia faced. Therefore, in 2003, Georgian society said, “Enough!” to the corrupted elites, and the new leader – Saakashvili – decided to institute a real revolution, along the lines of a total anti-Soviet ideology. It is significant that these reforms were supported by society. Georgians were willing to transform their state and society, not only in economic and political terms, but also in terms of cultural

change and the adoption of the new ways of thinking. The people of Georgia decided that the example they wanted to follow was that of the West.

From the beginning, one of Saakashvili's biggest mistakes was a lack of an information campaign, as well as a failure to engage with society. There were no consultations. Reforms were implemented, but no one knew what these reforms would bring to their lives. People did not understand why these reforms were necessary. Saakashvili could have better managed this situation and demonstrated more willingness to engage with society. Nevertheless, while it should be noted that there were many problems – especially in social matters – which minimized economic successes, Georgia's road to transformation and development may be, to some extent, used as an example for other countries in the region and perhaps even elsewhere in the world.

Business Paradise?

In the World Bank's "Doing Business 2014" rating, Georgia came in 8th place (by comparison Poland was ranked 62nd and Russia 120th). It should be recalled that in the same ranking published in 2005, Tbilisi was well back in 174th place.¹ Already in 2006, the same organization recognized Georgia as the most reformed country in the world. From the very beginning of Saakashvili's reign, significant improvements in economic issues were observed, which are still ongoing.

The United National Movement treated the development of entrepreneurship as a priority, recognizing it as the main impetus for the country's development. After the initial success of deregulation (in which necessary licenses and permissions are limited to a minimum), the new parliament abandoned nearly 800 previously required legal documents. They also simplified the acquisition of permits for the construction of new facilities. For example, when starting a new business, there is now no need to document the minimum initial capital, while registration takes 20 minutes and can be done via the Internet.

In order to improve economic activity and encourage the growth of new businesses, income tax was reduced from 20% to 15%. The number of taxes was reduced from 21 in 2003 to 5. Currently, there are excise taxes on cigarettes, alcohol and fossil fuels. PIT (Personal Income Tax), CIT (Corporate Income Tax), VAT (Value Added Tax) and property taxes have all been significantly reduced.² It is extremely important to note that tax cuts resulted in an increase of revenues to the state budget. This, in turn, increased public expenditures, which included rebuilding infrastructure.

¹ World Bank, "Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises", <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2014>, accessed 14 November 2014.

² Tomasz Cukiernik, "Georgia- A Country without Social Taxes," *Tygodnik Najwyższy Czas* (2010), No. 44-45.

The new ruling elite, educated in the West, was attempting to implement strictly neo-liberal rules, minimizing the involvement of the State in its citizens everyday lives and allowing them greater freedom to act on their own initiative.

Safety First?

Another important aspect, which can be considered a success, is the fight against corruption, which was Saakashvili's flagship goal during the election. In the "Transparency International" ranking of world corruption levels in 2013, Georgia came in 55th position (Poland was 38th, Russia 127th). In 2003, Georgia was ranked a lowly 124th.³ Since 2003, many holders of high public office heard allegations of corruption, including deputy ministers and judges. Anti-corruption agencies were created from scratch and among its officials there are mostly young people. There are no officials with Soviet KGB pasts. The new government also disbanded the Highway Patrol – the most corrupted branch of the police. The salaries of government officials and members of the police have been increased several times. Thus, accepting bribes is no longer profitable or worth the risk. In May 2011, people were asked the question, "Did you have to pay a bribe for the decision/provision of state services during the past 12 months?" 97% of respondents answered in the negative.⁴

At the same time, government administration has been reduced by almost half. However, the system failed to eliminate corruption at the highest levels, and the phenomenon of nepotism is still pervasive. Dealing with corruption amongst the ruling elite is difficult, because of their close ties with business representatives. This situation is negatively affected by the lack of transparency in control of financial ventures by both politicians and entrepreneurs. Many companies – which according to speculation belong to members of the government – are registered in tax havens and it is nearly impossible to find clear ownership structures.

Ironically, and perhaps symbolically, government buildings (the new parliament building in Kutaisi) and police stations are being built almost entirely from glass – a material associated with transparency. Many representatives of the academic community viewed this symbolic imagery with skepticism and even suggested looking into the basements of these transparent police stations. The detention standards in Georgia were far below that of the rest of Europe. The prisons were overcrowded. Georgia had one of the highest rates of prisoners per 100,000 citizens in the world. Evidence of torture in Gldani prison were shown on recordings leaked to the public in 2012, just before the parliamentary election. The UNM government's inability to address the abuse of human

³ World Bank, "Corruption Perceptions Index 2013" , accessed 12 January 2014, <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>

⁴ Marek Matusiak, "Georgian Election: Between Strong State and Democracy", Punkt Widzenia (OSW, 2012), No. 29.

rights in the prison system became one of the most serious political problems. This is closely associated with the judiciary, which was under pressure from the ruling party and had become an instrument in its struggle with the opposition. The fight against corruption strengthened provisions related to economic crimes. Many entrepreneurs supporting opposition parties and criticizing the government were charged with allegations of irregularities in property accounts or tax fraud. In many cases this ended in convictions or prison terms. Evidence of abuses of power by the UNM government included the closure of radio stations that did not agree to run the party's advertising spots.

State security and territorial integrity were the most important postulates of UNM and Saakashvili's election campaigns. High expenditures on the police and military, financed largely with the help of third-parties (for example the USA), not only resulted in upgrading the army, but achieving a higher level of security. This can be seen as one of the successes of Saakashvili's administration. However, many people criticize the former president for the fact that huge funds were allocated to strengthen the defensive capabilities of the state, and yet the army was unable to react sufficiently during conflict with Russia in August 2008.

The conflict with Russia in 2008 and the loss of one third of the country's territory also had an impact on the outcome of the elections, as the Georgians have never forgotten the risky actions of President Saakashvili. His attack on the South Ossetian town of Tskhinvali gave Russia a pretext to send troops and enter the territory of Georgia. The flagship goal of Saakashvili to restore a single, united and integrated Georgia was not achieved. Despite the fact that he was able to restore control over Adjara region, Georgians will always remember him for losing the territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The sovereignty of Abkhazia and South Ossetia was recognized by Russia in 2008, in the aftermath of the conflict. The conflict with Russia also had a negative impact on relations between Georgia and NATO. Earlier, in Bucharest, in April 2008, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization had issued a declaration stating Georgia's imminent accession into the North Atlantic alliance, but after the conflict with Russia, this does not look likely to happen in the near future.

Economic Policies

From 2004, until the conflict with Russia in 2008, GDP growth was approximately 8%. Foreign investment increased each year, reaching USD 2 billion. By comparison, it was approximately USD 300 million in 2003. As a result of the dispute over South Ossetia and the invasion of Russian troops, the amount of foreign investment dropped to about USD 500 million and GDP fell by 4%. It suddenly seemed that the years of prosperity were over. Fortunately for Georgians, the opposite happened. Due to the rationally implemented earlier reforms, Georgia quickly managed to get back on the path of development, and already in 2010, GDP grew by 6.5%. However, the most important

factor was the international financial assistance, in the amount of USD 4.5 billion, which helped to stabilize the economy. As a result of the embargo on Georgian products in Russia, Georgia was forced to diversify markets for its exports. Currently, its most important trading partners are Turkey and Azerbaijan, which have completely filled the gap left by the loss of Russian market outlets. There has also been less reliance on Russian gas. In 2005, Georgia imported 100% of its gas from Russia, but now, more than 80% is obtained from Azerbaijan.⁵ The conflict with Russia also contributed positively to the production of electricity, becoming a kind of stimulus for even faster economic action. Georgia has gone from a country which relied almost entirely on imported electricity to an exporter of energy, primarily through the use of hydroelectric power plants.

Saakashvili ran a good policy of “controlling” investments. He tried to stimulate regions that were economically passive and direct international money to them. For example, the transfer of parliament to Kutaisi, the second-largest city, was not only a symbol of the decentralization of power, but above all, it was intended as a sign to foreign investors that they should take notice of this very attractive region. Much work was devoted to the creation of special economic zones, which continue to improve and already possess an attractive investment climate. Another example is the construction of the Anaklia seaside resort, close to the border with Abkhazia. Saakashvili wanted to financially stimulate the Megrelian region so that people there could also benefit from tourism, whereas before, foreign tourists were almost exclusively travelling to the southern Georgian region of Adjara and its capital Batumi.

The parliament building in Kutaisi, already mentioned above, was meant to be symbol of decentralization. In fact, the idea and plan for decentralization ended with the construction of this building. Lack of real decentralization reform appears to be one of the biggest failures of Saakashvili's presidency. Instead of decentralization, even deeper centralization of power in the hands of just a few people around the president took place.

Education

Education played a particularly important role in the modernization of the country. After the Rose Revolution, the government greatly increased financing for education. As a result of educational reform, the Anglo-Saxon model of education was implemented. The best example is Ilia State University in Tbilisi, currently the best school of higher education in the region. The main objective of the reform was the introduction of the Bologna system in order to bring Georgia on par with Western educational standards. Moreover, a significant change was the implementation of a single, unified central exam for college, which helped to decrease corruption.

⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Poland, “Economic Guidance: Georgia”, <http://www.informatorekonomiczny.msz.gov.pl/pl/azja/gruzja/gruzja>, accessed 2 December 2014.

In 2004, Saakashvili's administration introduced compulsory teaching of the English language, replacing Russian. This act was also a symbolic change in the socio-political discourse, which indicated society's growing Westernization. A program for native speakers from abroad – Teach and Learn in Georgia (TLG) – was also successfully initiated. The main goal of the project is to provide accommodation and a small allowance for native speakers who would like to teach English. The program mainly targets villages and smaller cities, where, unlike in big cities, local English teaching is almost impossible.⁶

Unemployment

A closer look at the employment structure shows that 40% of the workforce is engaged in agriculture, which, in combination with this sector's modest share of the GDP, bares its low efficiency and considerable hidden unemployment. Conversely, the situation in the service sector demonstrates that 42% of the working population is generating more than half of domestic production. Georgian industry employs only 18% of the total workforce, but generates more than one quarter of the GDP. Even in 1989, industry was the largest sector of the economy in Georgia.⁷

According to the National Statistics Office of Georgia in 2014, the unemployment rate in Georgia was estimated at about 13.7% of the professional work force, but this value seems underestimated – no account is made for hidden unemployment and (especially) the fact that that government has created special terminology for people who are living in villages. They are listed as “self-employed in agriculture”, which marks their status as “entrepreneurs” and members of their families are classified as “unpaid family business workers”. They are not included in statistics related to unemployment.

Social Cost of the UNM's Reforms

When asked what they think about former President Saakashvili, Georgian's opinions are divided. Criticism is often heard and admittedly, there are many things to criticize: unemployment rate at 17%, almost completely privatized, expensive health services, high inflation, appallingly low pensions and commodity prices increasing from year to year. It seems that when the ruling elite tried to realize their radical neoliberal economic plan, they completely forgot about state social policies.

The economic development and bold free-market reforms have their high social cost, but on the other hand they brought concrete results. In 2003, per capita GDP was USD

⁶ Georgian Government Website, “Teach and Learn with Georgia”, <http://www.tlg.gov.ge>, accessed 2 December 2014.

⁷ Irina Guruli, “Employment and Unemployment Trends in Georgia”, *Democracy and Freedom Watch*, <http://dfwatch.net/employment-and-unemployment-trends-in-georgia-40249-1452>, accessed 3 December 2014.

870, while in 2011 it was equal to USD 3100. Yet people complain that they are not fully satisfied with the changes, despite the emergence of more and more renovated streets, new cars and the latest mobile phones, not to mention the availability of electricity and running water throughout the country, more products in shops and higher personal safety. Naturally, the standard of living in Georgia is still far below European standards. For example, in Poland, per capita GDP is USD 14,000, but a fairly long period of time was required to reach this level of development. Nonetheless, Georgia's economic transformation appears to be on the right track. During the EU Forum of the Eastern Partnership in March of 2013, Mikheil Saakashvili said: "Our country is developing so fast that the European Union will not be able to refuse our membership in the EU." It was a unilateral declaration, as cooperation or accession to the EU is not only based on the rate of economic development, but primarily the political decision of Brussels and the EU member states, which is based, among other, on criteria like respect for human rights and civil liberties. These are issues that were not previously, truly respected in Georgia.

As the chief architect of the new state, Saakashvili became a kind of symbol. However, gradually, society became less receptive to his opinions as people perceived that a very small group of people held too much power. There was also a lack of information in society concerning reforms. Some people saw the changes, and assumed they must be for the better, but most of them did not fully understand the reforms, their aims or the reason why the government wanted to implement them so quickly. A public information campaign should have been commenced from the very beginning in 2004, but was neglected. The reason may be that there was no place for cooperation with the NGO sector, because many previous NGO workers reinforced the administration. After 2003, there were not as many individuals or groups able to monitor forthcoming reforms and explain them as independent observers.

It suddenly seemed that the President controlled the government, law enforcement and the judiciary. Critics of Saakashvili voiced opinions that Georgia had become a police state. Ordinary citizens had nobody to represent them in their struggle against the ruling elite. There were frequent abuses of power, and in some top-level cases, crimes were not properly investigated, such as the murder of banker Sandro Girgvliani in 2006 by officers of the Interior Ministry.

* * *

The United National Movement party lost the October 2012 parliamentary elections and, as a result, is now a minority in the parliament. Looking at the results of these elections, it can be said that economic growth is not everything. The authorities' respect for civil liberties and human rights is necessary for the proper functioning of the country, which demonstrates that the number one priority of those in charge is taking care of their own electorate. However, democratic change and the peaceful transfer of power to the opposition party was a sign of the maturity of Georgia's political system. Will this change contribute to economic development? Will it improve the social situation? It is still too early to answer.



Abstract: Under Saakashvili's administration, Georgia undertook a number of meaningful reforms, the main aim of which was to modernize the "old" post-Soviet economy. GDP had rapidly increased since the Rose Revolution in 2003 and a huge civilization leap was made in terms of the economy. In "Doing Business" ranking prepared by the World Bank in 2005, Georgia placed 174th, while in 2014, Tbilisi achieved a remarkable 8th place.⁸ Before 2003, Georgia practically did not exist on the economic map. Foreign direct investments have been a driving factor behind the rapid economic growth. Also, close cooperation with the European Union – being a member of the EU Eastern Neighborhood Policy – has helped to stimulate economic growth.

Mikheil Saakashvili's institutional reforms created a young, transparent and educated public sector (without a Communist background), motivated to protect democratic and free market principles. Unfortunately there were also some mistakes, such as a lack of respect for human rights, corruption in the political elite and nepotism.

The following paper contains a description of the economic, social and political situation in Georgia after 2003. This will include changes in the 10 years after the Rose Revolution, the expectations of society in 2003 and 2013 and the biggest achievements and mistakes of Saakashvili's administration.

Keywords: Georgia, Saakashvili, Prosperity, Failures, Transformation

⁸ World Bank, "Doing Business 2014: Understanding Regulations for Small and Medium-Size Enterprises", <http://www.doingbusiness.org/reports/global-reports/doing-business-2014>, accessed 14 November 2014

In Memoriam: Dr. Alexander Rondeli (1942–2015).

KRZYSZTOF ŁUKJANOWICZ

Caucasus Bureau of the Centre for East European Studies, Tbilisi

Alexander Rondeli passed away on June 12th, 2015. He was a Georgian political scientist, policy advisor and founder of the leading think tank, Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies in Tbilisi. Dr. Rondeli was also known as one of the founders of the academic discipline of international relations in Georgia. He chaired Tbilisi State University's international relations department in the 1990s. Later, he served as director of the Foreign Policy Research and Analysis Center at the Georgian Foreign Ministry. He held a Ph.D. in geography from Tbilisi State University (1974). Dr. Rondeli was a Research Fellow at the London School of Economics and Political Science (1976-77), a Mid-career Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson School and Princeton University (1993-94) as well as a Visiting Professor at Emory University (1991), Mount Holyoke College (1995) and Williams College (1992, 1995 and 1997). Dr. Rondeli held the diplomatic rank of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary. During his long career, he wrote a number of books and articles on policy, security and many other important issues. These were published in the United States, Great Britain, Switzerland, Turkey and many other countries, including Poland (Warsaw East European Review – WEER). He took part in numerous conferences and delivered many captivating lectures at more than 25 universities around the world. The Caucasus Bureau of the Centre for East European Studies (UW), located at Tbilisi State University, closely cooperated with the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS). Dr. Rondeli participated in many events organized by the Caucasus Bureau. Over the last few years a dozen Polish students and academics completed internships in Alexander Rondeli's organization, GFSIS. Alexander Rondeli will be remembered by everyone who had an opportunity of meeting him. Great lecturer, teacher, diplomat, devoted patriot, analyst but also friend of many people regardless of their age. He will stay in our hearts. He left a great legacy not only for Georgians but for the whole international community.



Aleksander Rondeli will be fondly remembered by all who ever had the good fortune of making his acquaintance. He was a great lecturer, teacher, analyst and diplomat, but also a devoted patriot and Georgian. He extended his sincere and heartfelt friendship to many individuals, without thought to their age or status. He left behind an ambitious and full legacy, and is a shining example of humanity and academic integrity to each and every one of us.

III

CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE: FROM COMMUNIST UTOPIA TO POST-COMMUNIST REALITIES

Ukrainian Literature in the Moldavian SSR (1944–1953)

MARIUS TĂRIȚĂ

Institute of History, Chisinau

After the reinstatement of Soviet authority in Bessarabia (March–August 1944), one of the areas to which the Party paid special attention to was culture (in fact ideology), including music, theatre and literature. In Chisinau, there appeared special union organizations of composers, painters and writers. These structures also had various contacts with similar structures from other Soviet republics. In the case of the Moldavian Union of Soviet Writers, the main contacts were with the Moscow Union of Soviet Writers. The Soviet Moldavian cultural agenda was filled with classical Russian and Soviet writers. Despite this, among the commemorated cultural personalities, there also appeared Ukrainian writers (usually mentioned in the Moldavian press), including Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko and Lesya Ukrainka; all presented as democratic writers.

In general, the cultural contacts (free or imposed?) of Moldavian Soviet writers and artists with their colleagues from Moscow, Kyiv, Leningrad and other cities in the Soviet Union, have not been the focus of research until now. A few studies have appeared which partially, or more fully, reflect the activities of these writers throughout 1944–1953,¹ but they do not reveal specific relations with writers from other Soviet republics.

This paper focuses on such aspects as the Ukrainian writers celebrated in Chisinau, Ukrainian theatre tours in July 1948 and July 1949, discussions on Ukrainian and Moldavian nationalism in 1951, visits of Ukrainian and Moldavian writers in 1953 and the various books and volumes published in exchange.

The following sources were consulted: two daily Moldavian Communist Party newspapers from that period – “Moldova Socialistă” (“Молдова Социалистэ”) and “Sovetskaya Moldavia” (“Советская Молдавия”) – and two books – “Moldavia” (“Молдавия”), on Moldavian writers in Ukrainian, and “Nuvela Ucraineană” (“Нувела украиняне”), concerning Ukrainian novelists in Romanian. Documents of the Union of Soviet Writ-

¹ In terms of research conducted on the subject in the last ten years, Petru Negură wrote a book on Moldavian Soviet writers between 1924–1953; Ruslan Şevcenco referred to the Party’s decisions which imposed its trends in cultural life; Valeriu Pasat revealed the activity of the Moldavian writers reflected in the Party’s documents in Moscow; Valentina Ursu studied cultural policies in the Moldavian SSR in 1944–1953; Anton Moraru wrote a biography of one of the important writers at that time – Bogdan Istru; Gheorghe Cojocaru dedicated a study to discussions on the correct version of language in the Moldavian SSR (1951–1953).

ers from the Moldavian SSR were also utilized, which can be consulted as part at the Archive of Social-Political Organizations in Chisinau.

It is necessary to mention that a considerable number of writers from the Moldavian SSR were from the left bank of the Dniester, where the Moldavian Autonomous SSR – part of the Ukrainian SSR – existed between 1924 and 1940. This is the reason why such Moldavian Soviet writers, such as I. Kanna, I. Chebanu, L. Barsky, L. Kornyanu, Y. Kutkovetsky and P. Kruchenyuk knew the Ukrainian language.

1. Ukrainian Writers Commemorated in Chisinau

Relations with Ukrainian culture were treated in the official narrative with additional ideological insertions. A relevant perspective appears in the introduction of Petrya Kruchenyuk in the Ukrainian language volume in 1953.

“Moldavian writers took the high ideas of patriotism, love for truth and justice, and hate for all forms of despotism and oppression, from progressive Russian and Ukrainian writers.”² Kruchenyuk then cited the example of the classical writer Mikhaylo Kotsyubynski, who used topics from everyday Moldavian life and Taras Shevchenko’s references to their bitter life in the poem “Kavkaz”.³ The influence of Western 19th century culture was intentionally denied. This idea belonged to the “bourgeois nationalists” and it was said that the “Moldavian realists” were influenced by Pushkin, Gogol, Turgenev, Shevchenko, Belinsky and Dobrolyubov.⁴ Despite this, their influence was not analysed in detail.

Documents of the Moldavian Union of Soviet Writers show that in 1948, there was a plan to commemorate – among 25 other writers – Ivan Franko on 28 of May and Lesya Ukrainka on 1 August.⁵ The press periodically published translations of Ukrainian writers, especially Shevchenko. For example, in 1951 in the review, “Femeia Moldovei” (“Фемея Молдовей”, “The Woman of Moldova”), the poem “The Dream” was edited with a short text dedicated to “the great democratic writer”.

Special attention was paid to Parnas Mirnyi’s opera, “Octombrie” (“Октомбріе”, “October”),⁶ as one of the foundations of the social novel. An article was published by an author from Kyiv – Y. Nazarenko. He mentioned, on the occasion of the 30th anniversary of Mirnyi’s death, that at that moment, his books were being read by 6 million

² *Moldavia* (Kyiv: 1953), 4.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ *Ibid.*, 5.

⁵ Archive of Social-Political Organizations from Republic of Moldova (ASPO), Fund 2955-P, Inventory 1, Folder 42, 4-5.

⁶ Nazarenko, “Marele Realist Ucrainean (Catre Aniversarea 30 din anul mortii lui Parnas Mirnyi)”, *Octombrie 1* (1950), 87-89. (“The Great Ukrainian Realist – commemorating the 30th anniversary of the death of Parnas Mirnyi”)

Ukrainian pupils. “The novels, ‘The Ruined strength’ and ‘Loose Woman’, were edited and translated into Russian in Moscow. A series of articles was published concerning his opera in Latvian, Moldavian, Hungarian, Romanian, Bulgarian and other languages.”⁷ Nazarenko referred to the social aspects contained within Mirnyi’s works and insisted that he continued the democratic traditions of progressive Russian and Ukrainian writers. That was why he was denigrated by “Ukrainian nationalistic critics”.

Finally, a volume of prose by Soviet Ukrainian writers was edited and published in Chisinau in 1953. Possibly, they were preferred to the classical Ukrainian writers because of their contemporaneity. It may be that this prose was meant to serve an example to young writers from the Moldavian SSR; which aspects of reality to pay more attention to and which literary tools to use.

2. Ukrainian Theatre Tours in Chisinau

Among the first Ukrainian theatres which visited Chisinau were the Ivan Franko Ukrainian Drama Theatre in July 1948 (“Zaporozhets za Dunayem,” “Natalka-Poltavka,”⁸ “Guilty without Guiltiness”) and the Chernivtsy Ukrainian Drama Theatre in July 1949 (“The Death of the Squadron”). The shows were lauded in the Moldavian Communist Party’s newspaper edited in Chisinau.

The play, “The Death of the Squadron,” based on the work of the playwright, A. Korneychuk, had an all-Soviet importance. It reflected an incident during the Russian civil war. Only a portion of theatre repertoire in the Soviet Union consisted of local plays. That is the reason why the audience from Chisinau saw a play dedicated to the Bolshevik struggle put on by the Chernivty Theatre. M. Sukharev, a critic from Chisinau, recognized the efforts of the actors from Chernivtsy and the merit of the producer, B. Borin in “Sovetskaya Moldavia”.¹⁰ The audience saw several “truthful and bright characters” on the stage. The role of Hayday was played very well by Y. Velichko, who spoke expressively, sharply, intelligently and passionately. Thus, he demonstrated a “man with Bolshevik characteristics”. The only criticism was reserved for the jokes of the sailors which appeared in, but were not related to, the play.

⁷ Ibid., 89.

⁸ P. Sergeev, “Zaporozhets za Dunayem” i “Natalka-Poltavka”, *Sovetskaya Moldavia*, June 7, 1949.

⁹ P. Sergeev, “Cruchinina – Uzhviy (Fere vine vinovatsy, puse in schene de Teatrul ucrainean dramatic in numele lui Iv. Franco din Stanislav)”, *Moldova Socialistă*, July 11, 1948, No. 136. (“Guilty without Guiltiness, played on the stage by Ivan Franko Ukrainian Drama Theatre from Stanislavov”)

¹⁰ M. Sukharev, “Gibely Eskadry” (“The Death of the Squadron”), *Sovetskaya Moldavia*, 12 June 1949, 116.

3. Volodymyr Sosyura's Case

A complicated moment for Moldavian writers came about in 1951, when the press in Moscow criticized the Ukrainian poet Volodymyr Sosyura. The Union of Moldavian Writers was forced – as was the custom – to also condemn him. Despite this, the Moldavian writers did not hurry in their condemnation. A meeting was organized only after the Party's "Moldova Socialistă" wrote on 22 August 1951, that the, "Union of Writers from Moldavia spends too much time preparing the reunion of writers to discuss the article from "Pravda" concerning the deformity of ideas in Ukrainian literature".

The writers met on 23-25 August 1951. A speech dedicated to the fight against bourgeois nationalism in literature was read by the head of the Moldavian Union of Soviet Writers. In his discourse, Barsky said that the article from "Pravda" called to fight against unprincipled literature and "national limitations". Reading this article we see that it is not only about Sosyura, but Prokofyev.¹¹ Such mistakes were discovered in various other republics.¹²

Among those who paid particular attention to Sosyura's case was Rabinovich. He evoked the results of the article in "Pravda". "Soon after the article was released, Sosyura addressed a letter to the readers, and to public opinion in our country, in which he completely recognized his mistakes and explained also the root and essence of the weak elements in his opera, which contains nationalistic values. In Korneychuk's discourse we see the example of self-criticism towards his own opera – it is the case of important writers of our age, whose works contain elements of disruption. I think we should demonstrate the same responsibility towards our own literature and its critics."¹³ He criticized the poet Vetrov for not showing the Soviet reality in Kazakhstan during the Second World War and for underlining his heartache for "far Moldova with its grapes".¹⁴

Vlad Galits cited "Pravda" in criticizing Sosyura's poem "Love Ukraine", which was assessed as "nationalistic" and which deformed the meaning of "Soviet patriotism". He did not write of "flourishing Soviet Ukraine", but "Ukraine in general, Ukraine out of time". This was why many enemies of Soviet Ukraine demonstrated their support of this poem. As an analogy he gave the example of L. Corneanu's poem, "Towards Dniester", in which the author wrote of his longing for the Dniester, "The question which appears – what is Soviet in this poem?"¹⁵ He continued that, "the reporter Lupan is right when he points out the large ideological disruptions in the operas of E. Bukov, I. Kanna, I. Cheban and others. All these examples demonstrate that our writers have not fought sufficiently for the implementation of Party directives on ideological problems. But I have to say that the Party does not subscribe to the opinion of Comrade Lupan

¹¹ A. Prokofyev, Sosyura's poem "Lyubi Ukrainu", translated from Ukrainian to Russian.

¹² ASPO, F. 2955-P, Inv. 1, F. 95, 68.

¹³ Ibid., 81.

¹⁴ Ibid., 84.

¹⁵ Ibid.

pertaining to the question of critical articles, which appeared on the pages of the republican newspaper.”¹⁶

The main sin which was evoked in several discourses was the “out of time and out of place atmosphere”, which did “not urge good things”. As we see in all the cited cases, the critics of “Love Ukraine” exploited the situation of Moldavian writers, mainly to support their own opinions in internal conflicts. At the end of the reunion, Lupan stated that the poet Barzhansky, had debated with the Party’s press apparatus, and that it was necessary to change this attitude.

During the discussion relating to the final resolution, it was proposed to make changes in the sentence concerning, “the fight against all manifestations of bourgeois nationalism in literature, including national limitations”. The argument was that there was no such manifestation in literature in general, but to specify “in Moldavian literature”.¹⁷ Finally Corneanu was accused of writing nationalistic works. Many other authors were mentioned as still holding to “deformed ideas with bourgeois-nationalistic characteristics” in their works.

4. Contacts in 1953

4.1. Moldavian Writers in Kyiv in January 1953

Contacts between Moldavian and Ukrainian writers culminated in 1953. Due to an invitation by the Ukrainian Union of Soviet Writers, a large delegation of Moldavian writers was hosted in Kyiv on 23–29 January 1953.¹⁸ On 23 January, a meeting of intellectuals and youth from Kyiv was opened by Olesy Gonchar. P. Kruchenyuk read a paper dedicated to, “the new and happy life”, to operas written by Moldavian writers,¹⁹ and appreciating the positive influence of Russian and Ukrainian literature on new Moldavian literature. “The works of Ukrainian authors are very popular among Moldavian readers. During the years of Soviet rule [after 1944 – A/N] the operas of Taras Shevchenko, Ivan Franko, Marko Vovchek, Lesya Ukrainka and the books of Soviet Ukrainian writers, such as Pavlo Tychina, Aleksandr Gonchar and others, were translated into Moldavian. Moldavian theatres played “On the Steppes of Ukraine”, “Makar Dubrava” and “Kalinova Roshcha” by Aleksander Korneychuk.”²⁰ The Moldavian writers read translations they had made of the works of Maksim Rylskiy, Volodymyr Sosyura, Mykola Sheremet, Bohdan Chaliy, Kostya Drok and others.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 123.

¹⁸ The poets E. Bukov, P. Kruchenyuk, B. Istru, L. Kornyanu, V. Kochetkov, P. Darienko, V. Russu, F. Ponomary and the novelists Y. Kutkovetsky and L. Barsky.

¹⁹ Four writers were especially singled out – Kanna, Bukov, Darienko and Ponomary.

²⁰ “Yn Ospetsie la Scriitorii Ucrainei Sovietiche”, Octombrie 1 (1953): 95. (“As Guests of Soviet Ukraine’s Writers”)

The poetry part of the meeting was followed by a concert of Moldavian artists who were at that moment in Kyiv, including Tamara Chebanu, who sang Moldavian and Ukrainian songs.²¹ At the end of the evening, Maksim Rylskiy said that, “the Moldavian songs have awakened deep emotions in our hearts. They are fine, rich and varied in their colours”.

On 24 January, the Moldavian writers had a meeting at the Ukrainian Writers Union. B. Istru analysed in detail the increase and shortcomings of Moldavian Soviet literature. Speeches by Ukrainian writers, Y. Zbanatsky, M. Rylskiy and P. Voronyko followed. Lyubov Zabashta read his poem, “The Meeting with Moldavian Writers”. Lastly, “Moldova Socialistă” published a photo of this meeting, but no mention was made of what was said by the Ukrainian writers, or what recommendations they made.²²

During their stay, the Moldavian writers also visited the House of Pioneers,²³ the “Bolshevik” and “Red Excavator” factories, various museums, the Kyiv Opera and the Ivan Franko Drama Theatre. In his report, Y. Kutkovetsky recalls that, “we were met everywhere with love and sincere joy”.²⁴ He underlined that the “Bolshevik” factory contained a large library with 35,000 books: “The library has become a real hotbed of socialist culture at the factory”. This was also mentioned as an example which workers in Chisinau should follow. At the end of his report, Kutkovetsky wrote that they were glad that the Moldavian and Ukrainian writers would soon meet in Chisinau.

It remains unknown if beyond this official discourse, the writers spoke on other topics and how they reported to the Union of Soviet Writers in Moscow. Not much time had passed following the case of Sosyura and we would do well to consider that the writers were in general dissatisfied with the pressure the Party put on them. In Ukraine, the Moldavian writers’ visit was mentioned in several Ukrainian newspapers.²⁵

Two weeks later, in “Moldova Socialistă” a large report concerning “the unforgettable meeting” and two translated poems were all published; “Our Power” by Rylskiy (translated by Bukov) and “The Great Friendship” by Voronyko (translated by Russu). A short text entitled “The Novelty” by Zbanatsky (translated by Kruchenyuk) and a short ode by Darienko – “Hello Ukraine!” – were published as well. The poet expressed his enthusiastic feelings on meeting with the Ukrainian writers:

²¹ Y. Kutkovetsky, “O Yntylnire de Neuitat”, *Modova Socialistă* (February 11, 1953), 35. (“An Unforgettable Meeting”)

²² The photo published on February 11, 1953, features: Mikola Tereshchenko, Yakob Kutkovetsky, Fyodor Ponomary, Kostya Drok, Bogdan Chalyi, Petrya Darienko, Vladimir Russu, Bogdan Istru, Yuriy Zbanatsky, Emilyan Bukov, Maksim Rylskiy, Petrya Kruchenyuk, Viktor Kochetkov, Leonid Kornyanu and Gritsko Boyko. It is strange that the Russian language version of this newspaper, “Sovetskaya Moldavia”, did not publish any material on the visit to Kyiv.

²³ Bukov, Kruchenyuk and Russu, and later Chaly, met with pupils and read texts about the “happy childhood of the children from Soviet Moldavia”.

²⁴ Y. Kutkovetsky, “O Yntylnire de Neuitat”

²⁵ “Gazetele din RSS Ucraineana despre yntylnirea dintre scriitorii moldoveni shi scriitorii ucraineni”, *Moldova Socialistă*, (February 11, 1953), 35. (“Newspapers from the Ukrainian SSR on the Meeting of Moldavian Writers with Ukrainian Writers”)

“It was daybreak when you met us with flowers,
 And closely embraced us...
 It seemed, that the proud Dnieper,
 Embraced our Dniester,
 And their agitated surges,
 Sang a hymn to brotherhood.”²⁶

4.2. Literary translations

Among the first Moldavian writers published in Kyiv, was the poet E. Bukov and his poem, “Zhovteny” (“October”). In the opinion of the author, the project was initiated by the Ukrainians. A collection of works by Moldavian writers, appropriately titled, “Moldavia”, was soon published in Kyiv, coordinated by the secretary of the Moldavian Union of Soviet Writers, Petrya Kruchenyuk.

The next step was the publication of the volume, “Nuvela Ucraineană” in Chisinau. Texts were selected by Anatoliy Khorunzhiy and translated from Ukrainian by the Moldavian novelist, Yakob Kurtkovetsky. The collection contained the prose of Oles Honchar, Wanda Wasilewska, Jaroslav Halan, Andriy Holovko, Ostap Vyshnia and others.²⁷ The volume did have some problems, as it did not contain an introduction or present the Ukrainian writers it encompassed.²⁸ An anonymous reviewer from “Moldova Socialistă” wrote that, “The friendship between the Moldavian and Ukrainian peoples is centuries old. However, the brotherhood of these two peoples was never as durable as now, during Soviet rule.”²⁹ This friendship was further encouraged by a visit of Moldavian writers to Kyiv in January, as well as by the edition of works by Moldavian writers in Kyiv and lastly by the volume, “Nuvela Ucraineană”. The author especially mentioned the text “Pilipko” by Golovko, “The Land of Children” by Panch and “Anka” by Khorunzhiy.

4.3. Ukrainian Writers in Chisinau – October 1953

In response to the visit of the Moldavian writers to Kyiv in January 1953, a delegation of Ukrainian writers came to the Moldavian SSR in October 1953 and visited

²⁶ “Bune Zyua Ukraine!”, *Moldova Socialistă*, February 11, 1953, 35. (“Good day Ukraine!”)

²⁷ See: “Noutetsy Literare. Nuvela Ucraineană”, *Moldova Socialistă* (September 19, 1953), 222. (“Literary news. Ukrainian prose”)

²⁸ The authors appeared in the following order: Andriy Holovko, Yuri Yanovski, Ostap Vyshnia, Petro Panch, Aleksandr Kopylenko, Ivan Le, Wanda Wasilewska, Semen Sklyarenko, Vasyl Minko, Petro Kozlanyuk, Jaroslav Halan, Yuri Dold-Mihaylik, Vasyl Kucher, Oles Honchar, Vasyl Kozachenko, Mikhaïlo Stelmah, Anton Khizhnyak, Yuriy Zbanatsky, Mikhaylo Chabanivsky, Anatoliy Khorunzhiy and Mikhaylo Tomchaniy.

²⁹ “Noutetsy Literare. Nuvela Ucraineană”

Chisinau, Soroka, Beltsy, Dubessar and Tiraspol. Among them were: Stepan Oliynik, Lyubov Zabashta, Petro Panch, Oleg Babishkin, Andriy Malishko, Mykola Nagnybeda and Volodymyr Pyanov. It is interesting how “Moldova Socialistă” described the scope of their visit to the province: “...to see the gains of socialism in administration and culture built by the free Moldavian people, to meet with workmen from towns and villages”.³⁰

During the writers’ visit to Chisinau they attended a concert of the “Dumka” choir. The history of the choir was presented in “Moldova Socialistă”. This “genuine people’s choir” was conducted by A.N. Soroka and performed “traditional Ukrainian and Moldavian folk songs, classical creations, Russian and Ukrainian classical music, as well as music from abroad.”³¹

In Tiraspol, the Ukrainian writers, Olynyk, Nagnybeda and Babishkin, followed by Kruchenyuk, Ponomary and Baltan, met with students of the Pedagogical Institute. The audience was attracted by the satirical poems of Olynyk. The meeting was described in the press as “warm and friendly”. It is possible that in reality this “enthusiasm” was slightly embellished in order to showcase the so-called “internationalism” of the citizens of Soviet Moldavia.

On 8 October, the Ukrainian writers met with Stakhanovists,³² students, writers and functionaries, as well as some Party delegates at the Moldavian Theatre. The meeting was opened by Kruchenyuk, also a member of the Central Committee at the time. In a speech laced with official ideology, he said that the visit of the Ukrainian writers, “helped to strengthen the fraternal relations of the Moldavian and Ukrainian peoples, between the peoples of our socialist Motherland”.³³ After that Malyshko thanked the Moldavians for their hospitality and recalled a number of meetings with kolkhozniks. The writers then read fragments of their poems or novels. Among them were Nagnybeda, Panch, Olynyk and Belous. Zabashta read a poem written in Chisinau – “Good bye, Moldova!” The Moldavian writers Lupan, Istru, Russu and Zadneprov read texts translated from Ukrainian.³⁴

The next day, before their departure, the Ukrainian writers Kanna, Lupan, Bukov, Istru, Kruchenyuk, Kutkovetsky and Ponomary had a meeting with the Secretary of the Chief of the Council of Ministers of the Moldavian SSR. After the Ukrainian writers left, a large report and several articles related to their visit appeared in “Moldova Socialistă”. The title page read: “Let the Friendship of the Soviet Peoples Flourish for All Eternity!” The first text belonged to Malyshko, entitled, “Unforgettable Impressions.”³⁵

³⁰ “Aflarea Scriitorilor Sovietichi Ucraineni yn Moldova”, *Moldova Socialistă*, (October 6, 1953), 236. (“The Stay of Ukrainian Soviet Writers in Moldova”)

³¹ “Conchertele Capelei “Dumka” la Chisinau”, *Moldova Socialistă* (October 6, 1953), 236. (“The Concerts of the “Dumka” Choir in Chisinau”)

³² These were the “heroes” of socialist factories - they produced more than their planned quota and became the system’s examples for others.

³³ “Remyi cu bine Moldove!”, *Moldova Socialistă* (October 10, 1953), 240. (“Goodbye, Moldova!”)

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ A. Malyshko, “Yntylniri de Neuitat”, *Moldova Socialistă* (October 10, 1953), 240. (“Unforgettable Impressions”)

in which he highly appreciated the socialist transformation taking place in Moldova. His poem “Katyusha” also appeared, translated by Lupan. Another Ukrainian, Nazarenko, wrote a short history of Ukrainian-Moldavian relations.³⁶ He also mentioned that a number of Moldavian scientists wrote their Ph.D. dissertations in Kyiv.

In addition, poems by Voronyko, Nagnybeda and Oleynik, translated by Russu, Kornyanu and Kruchenyuk, were published in the newspaper.

* * *

In conclusion, Ukrainian literature served as a model for Moldavian literature, because it was more developed and because it had experienced the Soviet reality for longer. That is why at the end of the 1940s, and especially at the beginning of the 1950s (culminating in 1953), the Ukrainian writers tried to support their colleagues from the Moldavian SSR. This was also due to the fact that in general, the Moldavian writers still knew Ukrainian language better than Russian. In internal conflicts, the image of Sosyura’s Ukraine was used by critics to justify their opinions of some Moldavian writers and their poems, especially those that expressed feelings of yearning for Moldavia during the war years or being far away from the motherland. This image, taken from Sosyura – a model for critics – was quantified as “out of time, out of place”.

The contacts of 1953 were very intensive and comprised the publication of Moldavian writers in Kyiv and Ukrainian writers in Chisinau. Soon after, contacts between Moldavian and Ukrainian writers decreased. It is possible that this development of Ukrainian-Moldavian cultural contacts was not in the interests of the central Soviet Union, as it excluded Moscow. Also, despite so-called “internationalization”, Moscow possibly feared that the Ukrainians and Moldavians could discover too much of their own, individual national identities, if contacts continued to deepen.

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³⁶ Y. Nazarenko, “Legeturile Strynse Yntre Doue Noroade Fretseshty”, *Moldova Socialistă* (October 10, 1953), 240. (“The Close Relationship Between Two Brother-Peoples”)



Abstract: The study is based on Moldavian SSR press materials from 1945-1953 and on Writers' Fund (no. 2955-P) documents in the Archive of Social-Political Organizations in the Republic of Moldova. The Moldavian-Ukrainian Soviet cultural exchange began with drama theater tours in July 1948. A critical moment took place in 1951, when the Communist Party's structures demanded discussions on Ukrainian nationalism in literature (Volodymyr Sosyura's case). This culminated in a period of increased cultural contact between Soviet writers from Moldavia and Ukraine (January-October 1953). Moldavian and Ukrainian writers translated each other's works and met in both Kyiv and Chisinau.

Keywords: *writers, Ukrainian, Moldavian, bourgeois, nationalism*

Civilian-based Defense System: New Approach – the Polish, Lithuanian and Ukrainian Experience

In Memoriam Grażina Miniotaitė (1948-2013)

MARIUSZ MASZKIEWICZ

Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University in Warsaw

Introduction

For a quarter of a century, the triumph of the “Solidarity” movement, breakdown of communism and collapse of the Soviet Empire, followed by the emergence of new states, led us believe that non-violent methods could be effective in the face of authoritarian systems. Presently, dramatic events and brutal conflicts in Syria and the Middle East or most recently in Ukraine, lead us to question whether the rejection of violence makes sense if it leads to the deaths of thousands of human beings and does not always end successfully with the overthrow of the regime. The issue which arises does not surround the catalogue of non-violent methods, perfectly collected and described by Prof. Gene Sharp, but the set of beautiful and idealistic watchwords, for use within societies which possess or fully understand fixed democratic principles, respect for individual rights, which do have established rules of how civic society works and where these elements are obvious for both sides in the political conflict. The first thing that comes to mind is that non-violent methods refer to such states and societies where both sides of the conflict respect recorded catalogues of principles and norms – both judicial and ethical. Non-violent methods can be effectively applied in such political systems where the justice mechanism efficiently reinforces the part which stands for truth, as well as moral, judicial and material rights, with a defensive set of proofs and legal instruments.

Let's set together two extreme cases of civil disobedience – the peaceful protests in Syria (before war broke out) and “Occupy Wall Street” in New York City. Irrespective of the results, authorities in the USA and Syria applied extremely different methods of combating their opponents. During demonstrations in New York, protesters could choose from many legal rights; they stood in the square, made noise and create a nuisance of themselves to others. In Syria, the authoritarian regime shot participants of funeral ceremonies. This forced a reaction and the next funerals proceeded into a phase of rebellion, with real exchanges of gunfire. In just a few months, peaceful demonstration had transformed into a popular uprising.

In Ukraine, in fall and winter of 2013-2014, authorities organized and financed massive counter-demonstrations consisting of regular hooligans (so-called *titushki*) to combat peaceful protests, provoke riots and armed clashes. The police did not react when groups of *titushki* beat up people in Maidan, kidnapped activists and even killed some of them. Moreover, official media used disinformation, as well as false propaganda, to weaken and break down opposition. A catalogue of methods on how to fight against the so-called “colored revolution” has been effectively and creatively developed by many regimes in CIS countries since 2004 (Belarus, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and others).

The “January Events” or “Singing Revolution” in Lithuania in 1991, presents a unique lesson. The Soviet regime in Moscow tried to stifle Lithuanian ambitions of independence through the use of tanks and Special Forces. Peaceful, massed, non-violent civil disobedience, combined with the strong reaction of the world’s media brought victory with a relatively small amount of bloodshed and victims.

Bearing in mind the experience of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, as well as many other examples of ineffective non-violent methods, this paper will attempt to outline a limited perspective in answer the following questions: How much did the “tradition” of civil disobedience strengthen the police and security apparatus of the above mentioned countries? How and could these mechanisms and methods be applied in a different situation – such as during external aggression or deterring a potential invader? How much could the concept of *civilian-based defense* impact security systems in Poland and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe?

The term or notion: *Civilian-based defense* (CBD) is strictly connected with the historical context of protest movements called *civilian disobedience* and which, in turn, are connected to *non-violent* methods in political campaigns. *Civilian disobedience* especially became popular in the second part of the 20th century, following Mahatma Gandhi’s activities in India. Professor Gene Sharp introduced this notion to political science in the 1970s. *Civilian-based defense* is defined by Sharp as follows:

“The term indicates defense by civilians (as distinct from military personnel) using civilian means of struggle (as distinct from military and paramilitary means). This is a policy intended to deter and defeat foreign military invasions, occupations, and internal usurpations. The latter includes both executive usurpations and the more usual coups d’états, that is, seizures of the physical and political control of the state machinery, often by an elite political, military, or paramilitary group from within or without the established government. Such coups may be conducted purely internally or may receive foreign instigation and aid. Deterrence and defense against external aggression and internal usurpation are to be accomplished by reliance on social, economic, political, and psychological weapons. (By „weapons” we mean those tools or means, not necessarily material that may be used in fighting whether in military or nonviolent conflicts.) In civilian-based defense these nonviolent weapons are used to wage widespread noncooperation and to offer massive public defiance. The aim is both to deny the attackers their objectives and to make impossible the consolidation of their rule, whether in

the form of foreign administration, a puppet regime, or a government of usurpers. This non-cooperation and defiance is also combined with other forms of action intended to subvert the loyalty of the attackers' troops and functionaries, to promote their unreliability in carrying out orders and repression, and even to induce them to mutiny.”¹

Sharp also describes in his book how society and its institutions become a part of non-conventional and non-military war. What is *civilian disobedience*? Following the reasoning of Sharp's work, we could define it as collective behavior and activity consisting of the ability to effectively interact (with tools and methods) to oppose political-military threats (occupation, informational aggression, cyber-war, economic conquest, defection and espionage). *Civilian disobedience* interacts with *civilian-based defense*. In this context, let us review the notions of *civilian defense* and *civil defense*, as interference to *civilian-based defense*. It seems that we have to do with two different, but close-meaning terms, separated by their respective conceptual areas.

1. *Civil defense* or *civil protection* is limited to state structures and non-military formations of the population whose task is to support military and administrative actions in case of military conflict or invasion, as well as in case of natural or humanitarian disasters.
2. *Civilian-based defense* is a concept that goes beyond the realm of *civil defense* and determines the ability of society to carry out subjective, trained and complex reactions not only to threats of a military character, but also psychological and informational aggression (that could undermine the foundations of the state and lead to political, economic and military inroads).

Preparation of the civil population within the framework of *civil defense* provides technical and logistical training (medical first aid, assistance in military defensive actions, ancillary works, etc.). On the other hand, *Civilian-based defense* training contains such activities of civil resistance as massive actions of civil disobedience. This is related in detail in Gene Sharp's papers and books.

Civilian-Based Defense by Gene Sharp

For almost two hundred years, *non-violent* methods of political campaigning were the subject of much research by intellectuals of such renown as: Henry David Thoreau, Lev Tolstoy, William James, Bertrand Russel and many others. War theoreticians also perceived many civilian aspects of defense systems, among them: Stephen King Hall,²

¹ G. Sharp, "Civilian-Based Defense: A Post-Military Weapons System", (Princeton University Press, 1990), 6.

² Hall advocated a British policy of unilateral nuclear disarmament and national defense, involving some reliance on conventional military force. This was to be supplemented by a defense system of "non-violence against violence", often called "defense by civil resistance" or "social defense". Steven King Hall, "Defence in the Nuclear Age", *Royal United Services Institution Journal* (1961), Volume 106, Issue 622, 15.

Antoni Drago, Theodor Ebert, Johan Galtung, Brian Martina, Johan Niezinga, Adam Roberts and many others.³

Sharp made a far-reaching systematization and proposed recognizing *civilian-based defense* as a one of the most important and effective methods of struggle (with an external invader or a dictatorship inside the state) by developing catalogues of non-violent methods adopted throughout historical processes by many different societies in many different cultures. In his book, “From Dictatorship to Democracy”,⁴ he enumerates and describes 198 methods of non-violent action. Most of these methods are related to political protests and activities within a given country, especially campaigns against dictatorships. But when one looks at each form of activity described by Sharp, they could likewise relate to an external aggressor or invader. For example:

- communications with a wider audience (slogans, caricatures, symbols, banners, posters, displayed communications, leaflets, pamphlets, books, newspapers, journals, records, radio, television, skywriting, “earthwriting”, etc.);
- symbolic public acts (displays of flags and symbolic colors, wearing of symbols, prayer and worship, delivering symbolic objects, protest disrobing; destruction of own property, symbolic lights, displays of portraits, paint as protest, new signs and names, symbolic sounds, symbolic reclamations, rude gestures);
- psychological intervention (self-exposure to the elements, the fast of moral pressure, hunger strike, satyagraphic fast, reverse trial, nonviolent harassment);
- boycotts (economical, cultural, aimed at specific individuals);
- public assemblies and processions (until the occupying administration takes restrictive measures);
- noncooperation (“Italian” strike, boycott of administration and political institutions);
- international governmental action (changes in diplomatic and other representation; delays and cancellation of diplomatic events; withholding diplomatic recognition; severance of diplomatic relations; withdrawal from international organizations; refusal of membership in international bodies; expulsion from international organizations);⁵

Furthermore Sharp draws our attention to the extent of social mobilization that is demonstrated in many different mass actions, (e.g. of a patriotic character) and its great importance for deterring potential invaders. Planning his aggression, an invader would have taken into account the costs of subordination or slavery, and the irrespective destruction of its military and economic resources. This aspect of the state security system

³ See: Erica Chenoweth, Maria Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011). And also: Maciej Bartkowski (ed.) *Rediscovering Nonviolent History. Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles and Nation-Making*, (Lynne Rienner, 2013).

⁴ Gene Sharp, “From Dictatorship to Democracy”, (The Albert Einstein Institution: 2003); Polish edition: “Od dyktatury do demokracji. Drogi do wolności”, (Warszawa 2013).

⁵ See: G. Sharp, “From Dictatorship...”, 79-86.

has been commonly known for ages, although it is often underestimated or unrecognized. One common feature characterizes contemporary security systems in many states – overestimation of military means and so-called “hard segments of security” (armament and equipment). Practice of non-violent methods depends on the cultural, political, economic and geographical context. A mixture of methods, including non-violent coercion and resistance, should be permanently trained and exercised to prepare society to easily identify its own specific methods of communication (cultural and context codes or language), to build effective and unique non-violent defensive strategies.

Sharp notes that the difference between violent and non-violent action is sometimes difficult to distinguish. For instance the devastation of enemy property, vehicles, means and tools of communication, roads, installations, fittings etc., could hardly be attached to peaceful activity. The same goes for physical and psychologically obstruction, for example inducing anxiety in members of the enemy’s family or their environment. The harming of the invader’s surroundings, material interests and sense of safety are also taken into account. These types of actions induce strong, overwhelming reactions, well-known in Poland during the German occupation in World War II (mass arrests, roundups, executions, deportations, collective responsibility, obstruction of everyday life, discrimination against churches and religious practices, etc.). This historical experience could be used to develop *civil defense strategy*. Its effectiveness would depend on creativity and innovation, as well as improvisation and the modification of each method of non-violent resistance. Sharp’s catalogue of methods could, in this way, be creatively broadened, supplemented and modified.

The key factors and conditions that decide the effectiveness of those methods which Sharp pointed out remain unchanged. Most importantly:

1. *The number of nonviolent resisters and their proportion in the general population;*
2. *The degree of the opponent’s dependence on nonviolent resisters as sources of power;*
3. *The skill of the nonviolent resisters in applying defensive techniques, including the choice of strategy, tactics, and methods, as well as their ability to implement them;*
4. *The length of time that noncooperation and defiance can be maintained;*
5. *The degree of sympathy and support for the nonviolent resisters by third parties;*
6. *The means of control available to and used by the opponent to induce consent and force a resumption of cooperation, and the reaction of nonviolent resisters to those means;*
7. *The degree to which the opponent’s subjects, administrators and agents support or refuse to support them, and the action that they may undertake to withhold that support and assist the nonviolent resisters;*
8. *The opponents’ estimate of the probable future course of the nonviolent struggle.*⁶

⁶ Sharp, “Civilian...”, 65.

The Polish Perspective

The history of organized civil protection formations began at the end of World War I. Chemical weapons used by the Germans and the deaths of civilians caused by the bombardments or bombings of London, Paris and St. Petersburg, caused military and political strategists to realize that military attacks could not only target military objectives, but also the civilian population, situated well behind the front lines. The time when warfare was strictly waged between armies had passed forever. World War I brought forward the idea of so-called “antiaircraft civil defense” organizations. This pioneering concept gained social acceptance in France, Britain and Germany.

In Poland, the Civilian Committee for Anti-Gas Defense (*Obywatelski Komitet Obrony Przeciwigazowej*) was established in 1921. It was the first organization linking the military and civilians. Its main goal was the preparation and training of civilians so that they might protect themselves from the effects of warfare. At the end of 1924, the Committee was transformed into the Anti-Gas Defense Organization (*Towarzystwo Obrony Przeciwigazowej*), which in 1928, was united with the National Airborne Defense League (*Liga Obrony Powietrznej Państwa*) to form the Airborne and Anti-Gas Defense League (*Liga Obrony Przeciwpowietrznej I Przeciwigazowej*). In 1934, this organization was recognized by the government as a non-profit Public Service Association. Essentially, this organization supported and promoted the air force, as well as focused on organizing, equipping and training personnel, organizing networks of observation and reporting posts, constructing air-raid shelters, carrying out rescue and first aid training and supplying the population with personal protective equipment (gas masks), not to mention educating the public on the role of the air force. This civilian-created institution later transformed into a serious public institution and was absorbed by the state. After 1945, when the communist regime dismantled the League, the new authorities started to organize new forms of civil defense. At the turn of the 1940s and 50s, with the expectation that World War III might take place, the authorities began to connect the civilian population with the army and its goals (ideologically as well). Civilian defense organizations were used to keep the population in permanent readiness to support the People’s Army of Poland in a defensive war against the West (West Germany, USA and NATO). In 1959, the authorities of the People’s Republic of Poland developed the concept of National Territorial Defense. Civil defense thus became a component of the state defense system. It was also significant as an element of the government’s ideological work in relation to the population. Communism provided this “Soviet project” with the total commitment of all society. The Ministry of Defense and Communist Party established the National Defense Committee (*Komitet Obrony Kraju* or KOK) for the coordination of all National Territorial Defense activities.⁷

⁷ As Jerzy Suwart notes in his book, “Zarys Obrony Cywilnej w Polsce w latach 1920-1996”, (Akademia Obrony Narodowej: Warsaw 2003), the concept of establishing KOK was brought up during the com-

KOK's functions quickly turned from defense-oriented to ideological. KOK was then empowered by legislation with the authority and competence to virtually lead and control the whole state. Besides its broad responsibilities, in case of wartime, KOK became a sort of quasi-government. Martial law announced on the night of 13 December 1981 was logical and consistent with the Communist system since the end of the 1940s. The civilian factor was of less importance. The Peoples' Army of Poland played a significant role in strengthening the ideological foundations of the administration, political system, economy and people's everyday lives. So-called "social support" was very important for the management and control of the army and the party. Therefore, within the framework of the National Territorial Defense system, the Civil Defense (*Obrona Cywilna*) played a significant role. Under communism, the army was not intended to serve the nation, but the opposite – each inhabitant was obliged to serve the army and ruling (communist) party. As we know from the histories of other communist regimes, many dictatorships practiced "War Communism", originally introduced by Lenin and practiced for many decades not only in the Soviet Union. As we can observe, *civil defense* in Poland possesses an extensive history and background.

In 1993, many new legal regulations concerning *civil defense* were introduced, but in fact they duplicated the form and structure of the earlier Civil Defense system. The only significant change was the transfer of Civil Defense to the Ministry of the Interior. It was also made more "civilian" by introducing the system to rescue and emergency services. In 1998, the Minister of the Interior and Administration established the Emergency Response Team, which coordinates all activities (using formations of Civil Defense) to protect the population and organize necessary aid in case of natural and human disasters. At the same time Civil Defense Headquarters was transformed into the Office of Emergency Management and Civil Protection. Its role is to:

- protect civilian population, companies, public utilities, cultural goods and heritage;
- rescue and give assistance to victims during times of war;
- cooperate with different institutions in case of natural disasters and participate in disaster-site cleanup;

In Poland, *civil defense* is not subjectively defined. This means that it is not a grass-roots formation. There is nothing in the legal system defining what kind of organization Civil Defense is, but only a description of how it works and what type of tasks belong to it. The new definition, made necessary after entering the European Union, is barely a subject of discussion among a narrow field of experts and there is still little awareness in the wider public, in media or among NGOs. The key problem is that all EU member states (except Poland) use a different term – Civil Protection, which more precisely

mon session of the Defense Ministry and Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party (KC PZPR) on 13 December 1959. This symbolically tied these two structures together and handed over overwhelming control of the State to the People's Army. See: <http://www.ock.gov.pl/ock/historia-oc-w-polsce/193,Fragmenty-publikacji.html>

describes all the above functions.⁸ There is an interesting difference in definitions, better expressed and explained in Austria, Germany and Switzerland – where *Zivilschutz* (protection) is a much narrower notion than *Zivile Verteidigung* (defense).

The Polish National Security Office (within the Administration of the President) issued the so-called “White Book of Security” in 2013. There we can notice a significantly broader field of interpretation for *civil defense*:

The security potential of society is affected by national identity and cultural heritage. It is also a derivative of social security, demographic potential and intellectual, scientific and technological ability. A significant role is played by the development of education and research in the field of security, the healthcare system, as well as media, national identity and heritage. Each nation develops and cultivates its values concerning its own history, which distinguishes it from others and is the foundation for the conviction of its distinct uniqueness. It also develops a sense of belonging to a community, having a common consciousness and historical experience. The unique role played by tradition in the formation of Polish national identity is associated with the struggle for independence, celebration of the renown of the Polish Army, as well as the nurturing of national memory; especially insurgent war cemeteries.⁹

The authors of this document mention the important role played by education in areas of security, but nowhere do they mentioned any aspects which are strictly connected with cataloguing social activities, leading to the effective ability to cooperate on terminology, tools and methods which are associated with resistance or disobedience to the threat of a political-military invasion (occupation, symbolic or real colonization, media, cultural or informational attack, cyber-attack, economic conquest, espionage, betrayal and organized crime activity, etc.).

The East European Perspective

The Lithuanian experience (1990-1991) of *civilian-based defense* is very instructive, especially in the recent case of Ukraine. It shows how important *civilian security* could be in segments of public and political life. In these two countries we have witnessed social and public consensus on *security systems* based and embedded in *civilian*, non-military concepts and practice.

⁸ The problem of definition was touched on by authors A. Kurant and R. Kalinowski, “Moduł Obrony Cywilnej RP”, *Perspektywiczny Model Systemu Obronnego RP, Kierunki* (Warsaw: AON, 1992), as well as M. Drost and G. Zmarzliński, “Obrona Niemilitarna RP”, (Warsaw: AON, 1999) and also by A. Kurant, “Obrona Cywilna RP” (Warsaw: AON, 1993).

⁹ Ministry of the Interior and Administration of Poland, “Biała Księga”, 73-74.

In Ukraine, civil society receives quick courses and training on how to defend their own state, not only by military means. During so-called “hybrid-war”¹⁰ the more serious threat is to independence and democracy, through tools and instruments that undermine the foundations and basic functions of the state (psychological aspects of security, a judiciary system rotted by corruption and a lack of respect for the law, free speech and human rights). The threat only arrives when society is defeated and the door is open for external media aggression and, or including, psychological warfare.

Therefore the Ukrainian experience strengthens calls to introduce new type of defense training and education into the system, consisting of sets of information concerning the threats of contemporary warfare within the media, psychology, etc. Such education would have to be geared towards various social and national groups – possessing different sensitivities to patriotism, regards for values (language, culture, local communities, merit of family life etc.), which seal society and connect it in a strong relationship with its national heritage. Very often in the discussions of many political groups and parties, European integration is presented as a threat to traditional values and national interests, however, it is worth mentioning that this process has been accepted by the majority of Polish society. The same approach to the EU is visible within other East European societies. Globalization and “Europeanization” are both presented by opponents as examples of the decay of civilization. Ukrainians regularly hear such arguments from the supporters of communism and the USSR. Sentimental pining for the “good ole days” of the Cold War, when the world was divided into two parts – West and East – is supported by arguments concerning the invasion of “gay culture” (Gayropa) and decadence. This tradition of Russian (and not only) philosophy, where the Eastern world is more valuable and wholesome for many Ukrainians, Belarusians and Moldovans, becomes a great challenge. This is a serious battlefield for hearts and minds. This outdated ideological conflict is being used in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the intellectual elites in Kyiv must realize how important this forgotten landscape of values and notions needed to build national identity really is. Paradoxically, Putin’s aggression has strengthened

¹⁰ Eugene Messner, “Vsemirnaya Myatezhevoyna” (*Kuchkovo Pole*, 2013). Messner was an anti-communist Russian émigré who ended his days in Argentina. In the 1970s he predicted in his articles and books that contemporary warfare would not be fought between two classical armies. Messner argued that the confrontation theory of Clausewitz was the past. There would be no “deals” done by classic diplomacy, which is the function of strengthening of the state and national interest. Messner describes contemporary war as a permanent war-rebellion (in Russian: *myatezh*) that could be used outside states and would not be subject to international law (this brings us to Al-Qaida, ISIL, and rebels in Donbas/East Ukraine). Such quasi-military formations could be secretly used by some states or mafias to engage in their interests. A common feature of such *myatezh*-wars is the process of destroying the opponents system of values, economic system etc. After such destruction, a state or community is unable to wage war. It is helpless because it is deprived of the symbolic elements of public life (historical and religious values, heritage, etc.). It is virtually invisible if the process of undermining, canceling or destroying national identity is a long term process of many years. Part of this process is the breeding of useful idiots in your own country –says Messner – because the plan is the early, anticipated neutralization of negative reactions to the aggression in the international community and international organizations. This is what we witnessed before Ukraine’s war for independence from Russia.

Ukraine's national identity and patriotism, which provide a strong ability to defend the country and improve the national security system, whether militarily, economically, culturally or otherwise.

The Lithuanian Approach

In the context of Prof. Sharp's work, the Lithuanian example remains the most important and significant for Eastern Europe. His methods on how to fight with a regime for independence were "clinically" adopted by Lithuanian society in the years 1990-1991. In pro-Soviet publications and books (for example see the output of Sergey Kara-Murza, published in the last decade in Russia in millions of copies), Sharp has been named the leading ideologist of "colored revolutions". The Russian media "unmasked" Sharp as a CIA emissary, whose role was to prepare societies in post-Soviet areas to carry out coups d'états and introduce the American model of democracy. This sounds unlikely since as a young man, Sharp refused to serve in the army during the Korean War and spent several months in prison. Despite this, Sharp's books and articles were widely translated and distributed in Lithuania after its proclamation of Independence in 1990 and methods of non-violent resistance were adopted during the dramatic events of January 1991.

One of the key figures involved was the then-Chief of Security for the Lithuanian Prime Minister and later Director of the Security Department (*Krašto apsaugos departamentu generalinis direktorius*), Audrius Butkevičius. In cooperation with academics (among them Prof. Gražina Miniotaitė), Butkevičius created the Department for Civilian Defense within the framework of the Ministry of Defense. Many Lithuanian politicians were well aware that in case of armed invasion by Soviet forces, the Lithuanian military would not be able to defend the country for any extended period. Therefore they decided to train their citizens in actions of civil resistance that would help the country survive invasion and occupation. Lithuania's entrance into NATO does not seem a sufficient guarantee of national security. This issue was raised after Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. This kind of hybrid warfare proves the fragility of peace and the independence of newly established states on the area of the former USSR.

Professor Gražina Miniotaitė devoted much research to the problem of *civilian-based defense* system practices during her long and fruitful academic career.¹¹ In 1995,

¹¹ Gražina Miniotaitė (1945-2013) was professor at the Philosophy and Sociology Institute of Vilnius University and member of the Lithuanian Academy of Sciences. She was the president of the Lithuanian Center for Nonviolent Action. She collaborated for many years with Prof. Gene Sharp. She authored many articles on the relations between ethics and politics, including, "Kantian Ideas in Recent Moral Philosophy" (1988), see also published many works in Western periodicals and collections such as, "Nonviolence as a New Model of Conflict Resolution: Case of Lithuania", "Lithuania: From Nonviolent Liberation Towards Nonviolent Defense?", "Search for Identity in Modern Foreign Policy of Lithuania: between the Northern and Eastern Dimensions?" and "The Security Policy of Lithuania and the 'Integration Dilemma'".

during a conference entitled, “Non-violence and Tolerance in Changing Eastern and Central Europe”¹² in Vilnius, she presented a very interesting paper concerning the presence of *civilian based defense* within the defense and security system of Lithuania. Miniotaitė presented the Lithuanian experience of defense by non-violent resistance that was adopted by politicians and society during their struggle for independence from the Soviet Union. She defined this sort of war for fundamental human and national rights as civilian ability to resist without violence.

The catalogue of methods was very obvious and easy to recognize – mass demonstrations, media activity, boycotts of Soviet institutions, etc. Of course it was also obvious that the military arm of the state’s security system could not be replaced by these methods of civilian resistance. Here, only some elements of civilian defense within the state security system that are comprised of non-military or non-violent aspects (education, training, media, psychological adjustment, etc.) will be mentioned, such as those already adopted in the security strategy of Sweden or Switzerland. In some European states there is already a consistent policy of supporting *civilian-based defense* by subsidizing non-governmental organizations (Austria, Denmark, Holland).

Gražina Miniotaitė stated that at the beginning of the 90s, after Lithuania proclaimed and gained independence, there appeared postulates to introduce skills and the experience acquired during those two years to the state security system. She proposed that different activities, not to mention the courageous and organized attitude of the citizens of Lithuania, could be utilized to train effective resistance in case of occupation, or to boost all available means of defense. She also drew attention to the great importance of the knowledge and academic output of Prof. Gene Sharp. Among the methods of Prof. Sharp, the Minister of Defense, Audrius Butkevičius, highly rated “moral and psychological” weapons. He has since revealed that leaders of the SKAT self-defense movement (*Savanoriškoji krašto apsaugos tarnyba*) were trained in using non-violent methods.

Lithuanian society was well informed by the media and leaflets on how to behave and utilize passive resistance methods. Information included how to organize mass gatherings in front of Soviet soldiers, how to exert psychological pressure on the invaders, etc. Many of Sharp’s methods were based on the historical experiences of Finland, India, Norway and Poland. Instructional articles were published in a few newspapers and magazines during that period.¹³ Furthermore, the Defense Department published many thousands of copies of a special booklet where Sharp’s methods and ideas were presented.¹⁴ The leader of the “Sajudis” movement, Prof. Vytautas Landsbergis, also presented the principles of *non-violent civilian resistance* in public speeches and many published texts.¹⁵

¹² See: Gražina Miniotaitė, “Elements of Civilian-based Defense in the Security System of Lithuania”, *Non-violence and Tolerance in Changing Eastern and Central Europe* (Vilnius: 1996), 136-147; and “Lithuania’s Foreign Policy in Search for Identity: From Modernity towards Post-Modernity?” (Vilnius 2006).

¹³ From Sharp’s paper: “The Role of Power in Nonviolent Struggle”, translated into Lithuanian.

¹⁴ Sharp, “Jegos Vaidmuo Nesmurtineje Kovoje”, (Vilnius: Savanorio Bibliotekele), No. 3.

¹⁵ Vytautas Landsbergis, “Laisves byla”, (Vilnius: 1992), 284.

In August 1991, when Lithuania gained independence after Yanayev's unsuccessful putsch, many political scientists from the West (especially from Scandinavian countries), perceived Lithuania's experience as a "small state defense system", characterized by a catalogue of public activities aimed to preserve national substance and to reduce the escalation of military hostilities of a much larger aggressor as much as possible.¹⁶ This catalogue includes passive resistance, disobedience and common refusal to come into closer relations with the invader. Such moral and psychological resistance must be focused to deprive the occupying army and administration of legitimacy and international recognition. At the same time, any kind of armed activity of military groups of rebels is recognized as favorable to the enemy. But this is a tough and long-term task, which requires many-years of training and education (containing patriotic, moral, social and national values). Each state, culture and civilization has a unique cultural code that must not be of an obvious ethnic or religious character. For such states as Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, multicultural and open society is the basic value that makes them attractive for neighboring Russia. This advantage allowed them to enter NATO and the EU, and become more secure than many other former Soviet republics.

An interesting aspect of this process of "Europeanization" is that the above-mentioned Department of Civilian Defense, established in 1992, was canceled in 2004. For over a decade it dealt with training and preparing thousands of clerks, politicians, self-government officials, NGO activists and others for non-violent activity. In addition, in the 1990s, the academic environment in Lithuania conducted in research projects concerning civilian resistance with the use of non-violent methods and political instruments.¹⁷

Miniotaitė stated in her works that civilian-based defense could be compared to seatbelts in a vehicle in case of military aggression. Nonetheless it is not meant to replace real military defense systems. A *Civilian-based defense* system should only supplement state security strategy and therefore deserves serious academic and expert analysis. A catalogue of non-violent methods used by society could be a serious strategic investment policy within a state's security system.

Unfortunately after Lithuania became a NATO member in 2004, such CBD practices and theories were discontinued. They ceased to play an important role and seem to have been placed on the back burner. Lithuania instituted the EU system of Civil Protection, while its Ministry of Defense established the Department of Civil Protection. This differs widely from the formerly practiced principles of *civilian-based defense*.¹⁸

¹⁶ Compare with: Vital, David, "The Survival of Small States. Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflicts", (London: University Press, 1971) also: Knudsen Olav F., "Baltic States Foreign Policy", *Nordic Journal of International Studies*, Vol. 28, No. 1, 48;

¹⁷ See: Miniotaitė G., "Elements of Civilian-based Defense in the Security System of Lithuania", *Non-violence and Tolerance in Changing Eastern and Central Europe* (Vilnius: 1996), 145-146;

¹⁸ See: http://www.kam.lt/en/structure_and_contacts/kontaktai_eng/339.html and Christer Pursiainen, Sigrid Hedin and Timo Hellenberg, "Civil Protection System in the Baltic Sea Region. Towards Integration in Civil Protection Training (Helsinki: 2005).

Ukraine – From Peaceful Demonstrations to Russian Aggression

Ukraine's ordeal of the last year has a lot of common features with the phenomenon of civil resistance in Lithuania, except that after the *Maidan* victory, external forces decided to halt the process of peaceful transformation. The war against an internal dictatorship changed into a war with Russia. Sociological surveys conducted at *Maidan* in December 2013, by a group of researchers and students from the University of Warsaw,¹⁹ show that participants of the "Revolution of Dignity" primarily expected to improve civil rights, freedom of speech and the fight against corruption. Most of the protest activity that took place can be compared with Sharp's catalogue of non-violent struggle. A dramatic change of script occurred on the tragic Thursday of 20 February 2014, when almost 100 protesters were killed by snipers.

The UW surveys demonstrated that the *Maidan* demonstrators were highly educated people (78%), meaning that high civic identity was obviously out of the question; this was not a social protest for better life conditions, salary, etc. Interviewers asked questions of the value systems of the participants of *Maidan*. Prof. Andrey Vardmatsky pointed out a number of crucial and significant elements: First, this revolution was not about social demands, but concern for civil liberties. Second, protesters identified themselves as "European" and as followers of "European values", meaning the demonstrations were against "anti-European" authority.

After months of winter protests and measures by police, some radical demonstrators (self-defense groups called *Sotnia*) equipped themselves with weapons, including firearms. The Secret Service and police knew this as the demonstrators did not hide the fact – it was meant to discourage questionable police tactics. Information of the presence of weapons at *Maidan* was obviously known by the "Berkut" special police forces. Such escalation became difficult to control or stop in the dramatic days of 17-20 February. Both police officers and demonstrators were afraid for their lives and this enhanced mutual aggression and fear. After three cold months, the peaceful and non-violent demonstration had suddenly become aggressive and transformed into regular armed insurrection. However, most *Maidan* participants were convinced that their "almost non-violent" activities (barricades, fortifications, burning tires, destroying police vehicles, throwing stones and Molotov cocktails) were effective. There also exists the question whether the scenario of events might have not been much more dramatic for the protesters if there were no weapons in the hands of *Maidan* self-defense groups. On 19 February, the authorities decided to introduce heavy equipment; journalists called this operation, "Meat Grinder". The next day snipers killed dozens of the most active protesters.

There is one additional detail that allows us to compare the situation in Kyiv with events in January 1991 in Vilnius. Both were presented very similarly in Russian TV and media. Official propaganda in the USSR and in Putin's Russia tried to prove that

¹⁹ Andrei Vardamatsky, "Socjologia Majdana", *Belarus Bulletin* (Warsaw: Realnost, March 2014), No. 12, 2-12.

leaders of the protest movements had hired snipers to blame the authorities. One more interesting fact is that Dmytro Jarosh, one of the heads of “Right Sector”, the most radical self-defense group, was secretly received by President Yanukovych. It remains unknown for what reason this meeting took place, however, Jarosh was forced to confirm the meeting, since journalists found his name in the logbook of visitors to the Presidential residence. This information became sensational and allowed the interpretation that *Maidan* radicals had somehow collaborated with Moscow, or at least with the Ukrainian secret police.

A significant portion of citizens in southern and eastern parts of Ukraine were under the influence of the Russian media and many of them were convinced that *Maidan* was in fact a political coup d'états conducted by fascists and followers of UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army from the 1940s) and its leader Stephan Bandera, or at least organized by “Right Sector” (Dmytro Jarosh). This disinformation and hysteria was of some use to separatists in the eastern Donbas region of Ukraine.

Soon after Russia's aggression in Crimea in March 2014, it became apparent that the rebellion in Donbas was in fact Putin's pet project to stop Ukrainian aspirations to establish closer relations with the EU (Association Agreement). In July 2014, the Donbas rebellion turned into a full-blown Ukrainian-Russian war. Moscow used the traditional distrust of the government in Kyiv by the pro-Russian population living in the eastern part of the country. But in the fall of 2014, most Ukrainian citizens, even those from Donbas, realized that they were dealing with a real and brutal war against the territory and independence of the Ukraine state. After a few months, the number of rebel followers in Donbas significantly decreased.

In March, Ukrainian troops singing the national anthem left their bases in Crimea. In July-August the armed forces of Ukraine bravely started fighting to preserve the territory of their homeland. Most Ukrainian soldiers are volunteers. They are supported by civil society; various *ad-hoc* organizations that supply the defenders with food, water and equipment. It has become very popular to participate in military training. In just a few months, the idea of *Maidan* has radically changed and broadened its influence all over Ukraine; it is no longer viewed as a non-violent action. Regular people often sat down to discuss the events in 2004 (Orange Revolution) and the first months of 2014. Now, debates focus on supplying the army, methods of defending cities (Mariupol), strengthening the security system, fighting with corruption and politically changing the “Revolution of Dignity” into the basis for governing a civilized country.

Comparison between the current situation in Ukraine and Lithuania in 1991 seems to be justified. However the Lithuanians did not possess sufficient means to protect their independence with military force. Armed resistance is rather hard to imagine at that time as the Soviet Army and Special Forces were completely dominant. Ukraine is a much larger country with an army (even if rather weak), a large population and with a high morale advantage over the invaders, which includes a strong dose of patriotism and a real readiness to fight. This makes the situation a much greater inconvenience for Russia.

Nonetheless applying non-violent methods seems reasonable and in many situations could be effective for Ukraine's war with a much larger and more powerful neighbor. The key methods to keep in mind, based on Sharp's ideas, include:

1. Demonstrations and patriotic actions (organizing marches, pickets, artistic events, installations, social media actions, etc.);
2. Public events in support of the army (holding concerts for soldiers, collecting charity and money), as well as political actions to press authorities and parliament to eliminate corruption (concerning army suppliers and contractors) and against sending young, untrained soldiers to the frontline;
3. Solidarity actions overseas (utilizing Ukrainian diasporas and allied ethnic groups in USA, Canada and West Europe);
4. Diplomatic activity (boycotting Russia's cultural, economic and political activity overseas, sanctions, building an international coalition to hold back invasion, etc.);
5. Symbolic Internet actions and protests (creating films, songs, artistic performances, memes, etc.);
6. Media activity (stopping the emission of fake programs as a reaction to Russian propaganda).

All these activities will not put a stop to military aggression, mass killings and brutality. Nonetheless, non-violent *civilian-based defense* is designed to draw the attention of the international legal system, which might effectively put a stop to real warfare. This is the picture that comes out of the Ukrainian-Russian War. No one dared to write recommendations what to do when the war broke out, but now it is necessary to lay down tasks for the future; especially when we have to do with the distinction between *civil defense*, *civil protection* and *civil resistance*.

In the past, the functioning of *civil defense* in Ukraine and other post-Soviet countries was very similar to what was already described of the Polish experience.²⁰ Reading documents of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, we learn that *civil defense* is understood as support of the army by the Civic Council (within the Ministry, itself). There are about 75 representatives of different organizations (Cossacks, trade unions, social groups, etc.). Once a year the Ministry of Defense prepares a "White Book", outlining public tasks for civil society connected with basic army activity (as well as other issues).²¹

The existing components and structures of the so-called *Civil Defense Service* from the days of the USSR were transformed at the beginning of the 1990s and incorporated

²⁰ Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, "White Book on the Armed Forces of Ukraine 2014", (*БІЛА КНИГА 2014 ЗБРОЙНИ СИЛИ УКРАЇНИ*), http://www.mil.gov.ua/content/files/whitebook/WB_2013.pdf, accessed on 14 July 2014.

²¹ A number of interesting articles were published in 2013 that claimed a change in the system of cooperation between the armed forces and civic society in Ukraine. See: I. Ablazov, "Роль новостних засобів при досягненні воєнно-політичних цілей держави", <http://defpol.org.ua/site/index.php/uk/arhiv/2009-09-10-11-54-49/247-2009-09-12-10-00-57> as well, as webpages of analytical research institutions such as: <http://defpol.org.ua/site/index.php/uk/partners> and <http://defpol.org.ua/site/index.php/uk/arhiv/obonogyad/16765-2014-04-03-07-17-41>, accessed on 19 July 2014.

into a system under the Ministry of Emergency of Ukraine. Relations between civilians and the military, and the task of protecting civilians, went to the Ministry of Defense.

Nonetheless, today a new situation can be observed in Ukraine that significantly alters the previous point of view. In 2014, civilians played an entirely different role – regular people started to organize grassroots activities in support of the armed forces and supplying them with much needed food, equipment and medical assistance, delivered straight to the front line. The role of public control has grown significantly in comparison with the past. Common security, independence and territorial integrity have become a priority, while the understanding of common, mutual defense is widespread, despite hitherto regulations and practices. Thus, it is accurate to claim that a new or refreshed form of *civilian based defense* is currently present in Ukraine; much more spontaneous and commonly reinforced. It is visible even in the grassroots, patriotic-based actions which are focused to demonstrate ties with the homeland and efforts made to change, adjust or reform the corrupt and ineffective system of the past. In Ukraine there is a new, albeit incomplete, process of building a *civilian based defense* system. It is difficult to predict what this new system might achieve, as times of war are especially dynamic.

The experiences and neglect of both military and civilian defense in the last 20 years proved to have dramatic consequences for Ukraine. From their current perspective, Ukrainians admit that if the necessary work had been completed (if the media had been more “civic-minded”, if national values were actively encouraged by the authorities, if politicians had worked more for national solidarity) the dramatic partition (or secession) and external aggression would never have taken place.

Ukraine’s example very distinctly proves that the weaker a state’s institutions, the more opportunities for corruption, the greater the influence of oligarchs, the more external actors in economic processes and decisions, and the more powerless and infirm the country’s ability to defend itself is. All the problems described above have had an indirect influence on the development of a *civilian-based defense system* in Ukraine.

Conclusion

The following paper demonstrates the differences between *civilian-based defense* and *civil defense* (known as *civil protection* in the EU). The first is a subjective and motivated process of building a security system with the major participation of civic society within a democratic state, bringing a non-military component to the security system – especially through the use of all forms of cultural and axiological behaviors – which can form the ability to protect the country from widely understood external threats.

Civil Defense, on the other hand, is an institutional system aimed at the cooperation of civilians and professionals in times of emergency to secure human life, material wealth and goods in case of war or natural disaster.

Gene Sharp spread the idea of non-violent resistance in popular literature and developed the theory of *civilian-based defense*. Among the catalogue of abilities and skills described by Sharp in his works, the decided majority are non-violent.

Lithuanian history shows that a consistently developed defense system, without the use of military means, can be effective and bring results. The methods adopted in Vilnius in January 1991 – well described in the works of Gražina Miniotaitė – cannot be literally or mechanically transferred to other cultural areas or societies, far from the “European” model of civilization. Sharp’s methods would also not be ineffective if used in a system where the conflicting parties did not confess to the same system of values (justice, regard for human rights, etc.). The essential element is the possibility to use international factors to deter, or contain, the invader/dictator (international organizations, media influence, sanctions, boycotts, etc.).

The case of Ukraine illustrates that *civilian resistance* against authoritarian or totalitarian regimes can evolve into international conflict. This specific situation characterizes post-colonial states and shows the difficult relations with former “patrons” that attempt to maintain their influence and control. The occupation of Crimea and the hybrid war induced by Russia allowed Ukraine to start the process of redefining their subjective identity. In this process, *civilian-based defense* plays a key role. The Ukrainian experience of practical solidarity in wartime – with its specific limitations – proves that Sharp’s methods are effective. Finally, relying on the examples of Poland, Lithuania and Ukraine, it may be concluded that an effective state security system should – if not all its components – at the very least take into account the key elements of *civilian-based defense*.



Abstract: The effectiveness of non-violent methods in the past led us to believe in their inevitable success. However, in the contemporary world – with the modern reality and examples such as terrorism, war in Syria or the Ukrainian-Russian conflict – there is doubt. Does non-violent struggle make sense? The revolution on Kyiv’s Maidan has once more opened the debate concerning the effectiveness of non-violent methods. Already in the 1990s, the Lithuanian philosopher, Gražina Miniotaitė, began formulating the concept of *civilian-based defense*. She illustrated effective methods of defense against aggression, based on the Lithuanian experience during the struggle for independence. These types of actions were not meant to replace the state’s military, but rather to supplement and support them. The above deserves academic analysis, whereby, in future, it might be implemented in the national defense system through the fusion of modern technological and civil resistance..

Key words: Civilian-based defense, non-violence, civil defense, civil protection, resistance, disobedience, color revolution.

Where are We on the European Map? Comparing Public Service Motivation in Central and Eastern Europe with Neighboring Countries

PALINA PRYSMAKOVA

Florida Atlantic University, Boca Raton, FL

Introduction

Despite some similarities within regions, the composition of the public sector differs across the world. This also applies to the working culture of this sector. While recognizing the desire to help others and to improve one's personal financial situation as essential work motives, all around, the public sector, employees emphasize the importance of these purposes with varying degrees of strength in different areas.

Shaped to a large extent by the communist past, the public sector of Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries continues to stand out amongst other countries on the continent. Much has been said about the historical determinants that have shaped the motivation of people from the region. While acknowledging the significance of the former regime, this article aims to analyze the current state of the public sector workforce in CEE and to examine its present distinctions from the private sector.

The main research question of this article is what type of motivation drives public sector employees and whether this motivation is different from the private business sector. Thus, the article compares intrinsic and extrinsic work motives of both sectors within the region and contrasts them to other European countries. Being a part of a larger comparative research project, this particular piece is devoted to CEE countries from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.

The article is based on results from a large comparative research project on public service motivation in 25 European countries.¹ The findings of the project suggest that employees in the public and private sector across different European countries have different attitudes towards helping others and enriching themselves. The research also provides some evidence that public-employee reward preferences in CEE not only sig-

¹ Palina Prysmakova, unpublished manuscript (2013). The main project was conducted at the Department of Public Administration at Florida International University and examined work attitudes of European employees in the public and private sectors.

nificantly differ from those in the private sector, but also that the group of CEE countries reveals similar results. The aim of the article is to look closer at the work motives of respondents from nine countries from Central and Eastern Europe.

The data for the project was taken from the fourth and fifth round of European Social Survey 2008-2012, available through the Norwegian Social Science Data Services website.² The total European sample after data cleaning is around 38,000 respondents, where almost one third – 12,240 respondents – are from nine CEE countries.

The article focuses on the latter group by examining its descriptive and inferential statistics. Firstly, it discusses the theory of motivation in the public sector, which forms the research, and presents some results from previous studies. This is followed by a brief methods section. Next, the article reveals some interesting results when comparing the composition of the two sectors in separate CEE countries and contrasts them to the European average. The subsequent section investigates the work attitudes of the public and private sectors in separate CEE countries and shows how employees from these countries fit into the general European results. The article concludes that the composition and attitudes of public sector employees from the CEE region resemble other European countries in many regards. At the same time, strong female domination, comparatively small significance attached to helping others and increased importance to becoming rich, distinguishes the public sector of these countries from the rest of Europe.

Theoretical Background

The following research is based on the theory of public service motivation (PSM), which assumes that a person's choice to work in the public sector is determined, to a large extent, by a personal desire to help others. The definition of PSM varies among authors, depending on the focus of a study; whether a researcher looks at different correlations to PSM, its origins or variations. Every study, however, is imbued with the idea to do good for others and shape the well-being of society^{3,4} with motives that are primarily, or uniquely, grounded in public institutions^{5,6}.

² There are 25 countries that have participated in both the fourth and fifth round of the ESS: Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Russian Federation, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine and the United Kingdom.

³ James L. Perry and Annie Hondeghem, "Building Theory and Empirical Evidence about Public Service Motivation," *International Public Management Journal* 11(1)(2008): 3-12.

⁴ Kim and Vandenberg, "A strategy for building public service motivation", 701-709.

⁵ David J. Houston, "Public-Service Motivation: A Multivariate Test," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 10(4) (2000): 713-27.

⁶ James L. Perry, "Antecedents of Public Service Motivation," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 7(2) (1997):181-197.

The working definition of PSM in this study is the following: “More broadly, public-service motivation can be characterized as a reliance on intrinsic rewards over extrinsic rewards.”⁷ Thus, intrinsic pro-social motives are contrasted to extrinsic incentives, which are provided by the employing organization. The basic form of extrinsic rewards in market economies is monetary incentives that lead to an employee’s improved financial prosperity.

As the public sector comes in to correct for market failure,⁸ preference for rewards that satisfy pure self-interest should not dominate among its employees. Several studies have confirmed that employees indeed rank social/personal rewards higher than monetary rewards, whereas the opposite is true for private sector employees^{9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17}. Other studies have found public employees to possess more altruistic attitudes than private sector workers,¹⁸ and that they possess a higher sense of civic duty.¹⁹ At the same time, there is a number of studies that show equal values to earnings and psychological rewards across public and private sector employees^{20, 21, 22, 23}. The results of previous

⁷ Philip E. Crewson, “Public-Service Motivation: Building Empirical Evidence of Incidence and Effect,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 7(4) (1997): 499–518.

⁸ Kenneth J. Arrow. 1969. The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market versus Non-market Allocations. In *Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPP System*, Washington, D.C., Joint Economic Committee of Congress.

⁹ John D. Jr. Dilulio, “Principled agents: The cultural bases of behavior in a federal government bureaucracy,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 4 (1994): 277–318.

¹⁰ Sangmook Kim, “Individual-Level Factors and Organizational Performance in Government Organizations,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 15(2) (2005): 245–61.

¹¹ David J. Houston, “Walking the walk” of public service motivation: Public employees and charitable gifts of time, blood, and money,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory* 16 (2006): 67–86.

¹² Houston, “A Multivariate Test,” 713–27.

¹³ Carole L. Jurkiewicz, T.K.Jr. Massey and R.G. Brown, “Motivation in public and private organizations: A comparative study,” *Public Productivity & Management Review* 21(3) (1998): 230-250.

¹⁴ Franklin Kilpatrick, Milton C. Cummings and M. Kent Jennings, *The Image of the Federal Service* (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1982).

¹⁵ Jay A. Schuster, “Management Compensation Policy and the Public Interest,” *Public Personnel Management* 3 (1974): 510-23.

¹⁶ Dennis Wittmer, “Serving the People or Serving for Pay: Reward Preferences Among Government, Hybrid Sector, and Business Managers,” *Public Productivity and Management Review* 14(4) (1994): 369–83.

¹⁷ Crewson, “Building Empirical Evidence of Incidence and Effect,” 499–518.

¹⁸ Hal G. Rainey, *Understanding and Managing Public Organizations*, 2d edition (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1997).

¹⁹ Margaret Conway, *Political Participation in the United States* (Washington, DC: congressional Quarterly Press, 2000).

²⁰ Sean Lyons, Linda Duxbury and Christopher Higgins, “A comparison of the values and commitment of private-sector, public-sector, and para-public-sector employees,” *Public Administration Review* 66 (2006): 605–618.

²¹ Ebrahim A. Maidani, “Comparative Study of Herzberg’s Two-Factor Theory of Job Satisfaction Among Public and Private Sectors,” *Public Personnel Management* 20 (1991): 441–48.

²² Norman J. Baldwin, “Are We Really Lazy?” *Review of Public Personnel Administration* 4(2) (1987): 80–89.

²³ Gerald T. Gabris and Gloria Simo, “Public Sector Motivation as an Independent Variable Affecting Career Decisions,” *Public Personnel Management* 24 (1995): 33-51.

research lead to ambiguous conclusions, which are usually explained by the weak design of the given study, small sample size and the cultural peculiarities of a country/region.

By examining a large representative sample, this study aims to define the importance of extrinsic and intrinsic motives for public employees in CEE countries. The core research questions are whether personal wealth matters for them and whether it is important for them to help others. In order to guard against cultural peculiarities, public employees are compared to private employees of a given country. Two major hypotheses are tested in this study: (H1) public sector employees are less likely than others to act out of mere monetary interest (or more simply put, for money) and (H2) public service employees are more likely than others to perform their job responsibilities due to their willingness to lend a helping hand to others.

Methods

Since the study focuses on individual reward preferences, the unit of analysis is the individual. The dependent variables are extrinsic and intrinsic rewards, which are operationalized by using items from the European Social Survey as proxies. They are:

- It is very important for me to help people around me. I want to care for their well-being;
- It is important for me to be rich. I want to have a lot of money and expensive things.

By its very nature, “Importance of being rich/helping others” is a continuous latent variable that has certain threshold points and whose value determines what the observed ordinal variable equals. In the ESS, the two observed ordinal variables have six response categories indicating to what extent an individual identifies themselves with the person described: (1) Very much like me (2) Like me (3) Somewhat like me (4) A little like me (5) Not like me (6) Not like me at all.

A key independent variable is whether a person works in the public or private sector. The ordinal logistic regression model is used to check for causality between dependent and independent variables, controlling gender, age, number of people in a household, living with partner/spouse, and the size of the organization. The following sections present the results of descriptive and inferential analyses of the data.

Public vs. Private Sector in CEE Countries

The table below presents descriptive statistics for an average employee in the public and private sectors in CEE countries, as well as similar statistics results for European averages across 25 countries. A public employee is most often a woman in her mid-forties, who has fourteen and a half years of education, is not single and lives with two other members of her family. A typical private employee tends to be a less educated male,

usually five years younger than a public employee. While the majority of private employees are not single either, the results of the survey suggest that there are more single employees in the private sector, as compared to the public sector.

Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for CEE Countries by Sector
■: the lowest results, ■: the highest results

	Age		Education in Years		Male		Lives w/ partner		Size of Household	
	public	private	public	private	public	private	public	private	public	private
Bulgaria	48.5	43.0	13.5	12.3	0.26	0.51	0.69	0.68	2.9	3.0
Czech Republic	44.3	41.2	14.0	12.8	0.33	0.64	0.67	0.63	2.8	2.7
Estonia	46.3	42.7	15.0	13.2	0.26	0.52	0.67	0.69	2.8	2.9
Hungary	43.4	39.7	15.1	13.0	0.30	0.58	0.69	0.64	3.3	3.1
Poland	42.2	37.1	15.4	13.4	0.36	0.61	0.68	0.67	3.2	3.5
Russia	43.3	39.0	14.0	13.3	0.25	0.53	0.60	0.58	2.7	2.7
Slovakia	46.1	42.2	14.8	13.2	0.25	0.53	0.70	0.65	3.0	3.2
Slovenia	42.3	38.2	14.6	12.8	0.29	0.59	0.74	0.63	3.6	3.6
Ukraine	43.5	38.7	14.0	12.9	0.26	0.51	0.68	0.61	3.1	3.1
CEE average	44.4	40.2	14.5	13.0	0.28	0.56	0.68	0.64	3.0	3.1
European average	44.2	40.5	15.0	13.0	0.34	0.57	0.70	0.65	3.0	3.0

Age

In general, in CEE countries, public sector employees are older than private sector employees. This corresponds with the European average. The Czech Republic has the smallest age difference between public and private employees, which is a little less than three years between mean ages for both sectors.

The oldest public employees are found to be in Bulgaria (on average: 49 years old), while the youngest public employees are in Poland and Slovenia (on average: 42 years old). A possible explanation could be that women constitute the majority of the public sector. In Poland and Slovenia, they retire earlier, as compared to other CEE countries in the study. Bulgarian women retire later than others in CEE countries.²⁴ In the case of Poland, it can also be explained to a certain extent by lustration: after the fall of the Communist Bloc, Poland adopted several laws, which limited the participation of former

²⁴ OECD, The Average Effective Age of Retirement versus the Official Age in 2012 in OECD Countries (2012). Retrieved from http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/Summary_2012_values.xls

communists in succeeding governments or even in civil service positions. This has eliminated many older employees from the public sector.

As for the private sector, the youngest employees are also found in Poland. This might be due to the fact that the Poles retire earlier. The oldest private employees average 42.5 years old in Estonia, which makes them even older than average public sector employees in Poland.

Education

The time spent on education among employees of both sectors in the researched CEE countries echoes with the average European results. On average, public sector employees are more educated than private sector employees. Yet, the most educated private employees are found in Poland. At the same time, on average, they still possess less formal education than the less educated public employees in Bulgaria.

Referring to Poland, on average, both private and public sector employees have more formal education than any other CEE country contained in the study. This might be caused by the fact that the Poles start their compulsory education relatively earlier than in other CEE countries – namely at the age of 5 – and, on average, continue to be enrolled in tertiary education longer than in other countries in the region.²⁵ Thus, the fact remains that employees in Poland spend more time in school than anywhere else in the studied CEE countries.

It is a general trend that enrollment rates in higher education include more women than men.²⁶ Taking into consideration that the public sector in CEE is heavily dominated by women (see the following subsection), public sector employees are, on average, also expected to be more educated.

Gender

The public sector in Central and Eastern Europe remains heavily populated by women. The mean number of men employed in the region is significantly lower than the average for the public sector in Europe. It is only in the Czech Republic and Poland where the average percentage of men employed in the public sector is close to the European average. Yet, they constitute only 30% and 36% of the employees respectively. Most of all, women dominate in the public sectors of Bulgaria, Estonia, Slovakia and Russia, where they constitute 75% of the total number of those employed.

²⁵ Education at Glance 2013: OECD Indicators. Indicator C1 Who participates in education? (OECD Publishing): 269.

²⁶ Ibid: 265.

Gender wise, the private sector is more balanced. The tendency is that this sector consists of equal numbers of women and men. Yet, in the Czech Republic and Poland, the male population prevails in the private sector with 60-65% male employees in this sector, on average.

Partners and Household Size

In this study, family constitution is represented by two variables, namely, whether a respondent lives with a partner and how many people this individual shares their household with. The means for the CEE countries resemble the means for an average European country: in both sectors, the majority lives with a partner or spouse, with 68% and 64% for public and private organizations, respectively. At the same time, there are slightly more singles among private sector employees, than among public employees, which is close to the European average difference of 5%.

The public sector in Slovakia and Slovenia has the largest percentage of respondents, who live with a partner/spouse, with 70% and 74% of individuals, correspondingly. The largest percentage of individuals who live by themselves is found in Russia and this is true for both sectors. This might be explained by the fact that Russia has the highest divorce rate in the world.²⁷ In the Russian private sector, about half of the employees do not share their homes with their partner.

The statistics shows that, on average, for both sectors, employees in the study share their households with two people, which is equally true for the CEE region, as it is for the European average. Slovenia has the most extended families: most employees live with their partners or spouses and two other members of the household. The smallest households are found in the Czech Republic and Russia. This can be explained by the high level of urbanization in these two countries, where the majority of people live in apartment complexes in big cities. In Russia, taking into consideration that 40-45% of employees do not live with their partners, the two additional members of the household could either be the employee's parents or children.

The largest households are found in Slovenia, Hungary and Poland, which can also be explained by the high percentage of people living in rural areas. Contrary to the Czech Republic and Russia - Slovenia, Hungary and Poland are known to be rural, which allows for the fact that the majority of individuals living in private housing accommodate more people under one roof. In Slovenia, for instance, 51% of the population resides in rural areas, as compared to 27% for Russia.²⁸

²⁷ United Nations, Demographic Yearbook (2012): 610-67.

²⁸ Ibid: 134-42.

Establishment Size

Resembling an overall European trend, the size of an employer's establishment is larger in the case of public organizations than in private ones. This is true for all the CEE countries with the exception of Slovenia. There, despite being smaller in size compared to other CEE countries, private organizations tend to have a larger number of workers than public organizations. This interesting fact requires further investigation.

Helping Others and Becoming Rich


The statistics above reveal some interesting peculiarities of demographic characteristics of average employees in the public and private sectors in CEE countries. At the same time, the main interest of this study remains their attitude towards work motives -- their desire to help others and their itch for monetary gain. Firstly, this section compares the attitudes of CEE public and private employees to other European countries by analyzing countries' means. Secondly, a regression analysis is conducted to contrast average results for each country in order to control the demographic peculiarities discussed above.

Descriptive Statistics

Histogram 1 depicts the average responses to the importance of being rich for public and private sector employees in 25 European countries. It allows us to observe where CEE respondents are in their attitudes as compared to other Europeans. In the majority of the CEE countries, on average, public sector employees consider being rich as important. Namely they are Eastern European countries Russia and Ukraine, and Central European countries of the former Eastern Bloc: Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Bulgaria.

The average answer for the importance of being rich appears to always be higher for public, rather than private employees. It designates that, on average, public sector employees across Europe emphasize material wealth as less important than private employees do. These findings support the initial hypothesis of the study; that public sector employees are less likely to be led by extrinsic motives than their private counterparts. The sectoral difference in means, however, varies from country to country. Some CEE countries, namely Ukraine, Poland, and Estonia, reveal the largest differences between sectors, compared to the rest of the Europe.


Another dependent variable of the study, which reflects the difference between the public and private sectors, is helping others. Overall, public sector employees across Europe consider helping others as a very important characteristic that properly describes them. The mean responses vary between the following: (1) Very much like me (2) Like me (3) Somewhat like me.



Histogram 1.

Public vs. Private Employees: Country Means for Importance of being Rich

At the same time, employees from European countries still differ, depending on how much they stress the importance of taking care of others. Only one CEE country – Slovenia – finds itself among other European countries, where public employees emphasize helping others as very much important. The evident trend is that the respondents in the majority of CEE countries tend to emphasize helping others as less important than in other European countries. With the exception of Bulgaria, they are located at the right end of the histogram, where respondents put less emphasis on helping. While still considered important, Ukrainians and Czechs do not place as much emphasis on helping, as compared to other countries.



Histogram 2.

Public vs. Private Employees: Importance of Helping Others

When answering the question to do with the importance of helping others, private sector employees tend to be in the “less likely” category for almost all the considered countries. Slovakia, Poland, Russia, Ukraine and the Czech Republic reveal the most drastic differences between the two sectors in Europe: employees in the private sector on average tend to emphasize the importance of helping others much less than their counterparts in the public sector.²⁹ The least caring individuals working for the private sector are found in Eastern Europe Russia and Ukraine, as well as in the former Eastern Bloc Czech Republic and Estonia.

Inferential Statistics

A better comparison of employee attitudes across the sectors requires multivariate analysis, since it allows for controlling a number of factors that might determine the differences between the means across countries and sectors. As mentioned in the previous sections, the model controls for age, gender, education, living with a partner and the total number of household members.

The results for the CEE countries obtained from the regression are expressed in the ordered log-odds estimates.³⁰ Overall, the signs of the coefficients indicate that public employees are more likely to place a higher value on the intrinsic reward of helping others and a lower value on the extrinsic reward of being rich than their private counterparts. Since the log-odds coefficients are relatively difficult to interpret, Figure 1 presents a visualization of statistically significant results for the importance of helping others. The more intensive color represents stronger differences in the importance to help others between employees in the public and private sector. Thus, for instance, public sector employees from Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia are among those European countries that put the strongest emphasis on helping others, when compared to their counterparts in business. Estonia found itself among the European countries with the mildest differences between the two sectors in the attitudes towards the importance of helping others. Responses from the two sectors in this country are quite similar, meaning that this country showed the least statistically significant sectoral variation when keeping other factors constant.

Public service motivation (PSM) emerged as a characteristic that distinguishes public sector employees from private sector employees in their desire to perform actions that benefit society. The strongest PSM in Europe is found in several CEE countries: the public sector employees in Central Europe - Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic – have the largest gap in their attitude towards helping others, compared to private employees. Such a large gap was found only in some Nordic countries.³¹

²⁹ The only exception of other European countries is Denmark, where the sectoral difference is also very high.

³⁰ The detailed analyses of the results of the CEE countries obtained for the independent and control variables as well as tables representing these results are available upon request.

³¹ Prysmakova, 2013.




Figure 1.

Helping Others: Statistically Significant Differences between Public and Private Sectors

Poland and Slovakia not only have the largest gaps between the public and private sectors, but also group together in their mean values for the importance of helping others, which are close to the median of the average European response. The attitudes differ between sectors, not only in their magnitude when controlling for other factors, but also whether the responses are in a low or high importance category. For example, simultaneous analyses of Histogram 2 and Figure 1 allow for the conclusion that the Polish and Slovakian private sectors, compared to their respective public sectors, resemble each other in questions of the importance of helping others. In these countries, public sector employees usually view “it is important to help others” as (1) Very much like me and (2) Like me. Whereas, private sector employees emphasize the importance of helping less; answering the same question as (2) Like me and (3) Somewhat like me. These sectoral differences are statistically significant.

Czech public employees, on average, place the least stress on helping others when compared to any other European country. Moreover, the results for this country show the largest statistically significant gap between the sectors, suggesting that the private sector employees are even more indifferent to helping others. These results describe Czech private employees as the least caring individuals across all the countries and sectors that showed significant results during the regression analyses.

The results of public-private comparison for being rich support the initial hypothesis that public sector employees put less stress on the importance of being rich, than individuals employed in the private sector. The results for Estonia reveal a large gap in responses between the two sectors, which also exists in Scandinavian countries, and

some Western European countries, such as France or Switzerland. The Czech Republic has one of the smallest differences between people in different sectors in stressing material well-being across the whole of Europe. The chance that a public employee will report being rich as less important is higher than the chance of a private employee. These results are considerably smaller, for instance, in Ukraine.

Analysis suggests that the largest statistically significant difference between public and private employee responses across Europe is found in Ukraine. Public sector employees in Ukraine show that differences with the private sector regarding material wealth are the largest for any individuals working in the public and private sectors across Europe. Ukrainians working for public organizations value extrinsic rewards much less than individuals employed in private companies. The gap between sectors is explained by the fact that private sector employees value material wealth more than public sector employees. Analysis of the means suggests that Ukrainians in the private sector are in the group of countries that value wealth the most in Europe. However, wealth is still important for public sector employees in Ukraine, with the mean for this country located near the first quartile of responses for all European countries in the study. The means for Ukraine suggest that Ukrainian public sector employees feel that being rich is still very important, when compared to the mean responses for the public sector in other countries.

Bulgaria and Slovenia also grouped together, according to the differences between the public and private sector. The views on the importance of being rich for public and private employees in these countries differ considerably less than, for instance, in Scandinavia. Even smaller differences between sectors are found in Central European countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic.



Figure 2.

Being Rich: Statistically Significant Differences between Public and Private Sectors

Figure 2 presents a visualization of differences among the sectors showing statistically significant results for the importance of being rich and possessing expensive material objects. The more intensive color represents stronger differences in the importance of being rich for employees in the public and private sector. Thus, for instance, Ukraine is one of the countries in Europe where public sector employees put the least emphasis on the importance of being rich, as compared to their counterparts in business. The smallest statistically significant difference between the public and private sector in the importance of being rich is found in Central European Poland and Czech Republic, with similar results found in Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal. This shows that in some countries in CEE responses among individuals employed in the different sectors can be fairly similar, despite differences in age, gender and level of education.

Conclusion

The results of the study allow us to conclude that sectoral differences in extrinsic and intrinsic motivation exist in Eastern and Central Europe, similarly to other European countries. Both descriptive and inferential statistics supported the hypotheses that within a single country, public sector employees put greater emphasis on the importance of helping others and less strong emphasis on the importance of being rich, than individuals employed in the private sector.

At the same time, the countries from the former Soviet Bloc exhibit some special features. In the majority of these countries, the employees tend to be more concerned with material wealth and less concerned with helping others, when compared to the means of other respective European countries. The gaps between sectors in the importance of helping others are often larger across the CEE countries, when compared to the rest of Europe, whereas the sectoral differences in importance of material wealth are not so univocal. Eastern European Russia and Ukraine have shown larger sectoral gaps, while differences between the public and private sectors regarding the importance of being rich are often marked from moderate to low, when compared to other European countries and controlling for additional factors.

The findings for control variables suggest that in the CEE countries, the public sector consists of more women than men and more educated employees, than the private sector. Undoubtedly, a high level of formal education is an advantage, although the translation of that education into applicable practice is arguably more important.

Some interesting findings concerning the relativity of public service motivation emerge when the responses for both sectors and all the countries are compared simultaneously. The analysis of the means shows similar results for employees in Russia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic. Individuals employed in the public sector in these countries are, on average, less concerned with being rich when compared to private employees in the same countries, but they are still more concerned about money and material wealth

than private sector employees in the majority of other European countries. With regard to questions of material enrichment, public sector employees differ greatly from their private counterparts in Estonia and Ukraine. Estonians in the public sector consider personal wealth as significantly less important. So do Ukrainians, however, employees in this country, in both sectors, firmly believe that money matters.

One of the unexpected findings is that Poland stands out from the rest of the CEE countries in the study in many demographic dimensions, which make the public sector of this country quite exceptional. The Polish public sector has the largest number of male employees. Employees of this sector have spent more years on education than anywhere else in the CEE region, but on average, still remain one of the youngest.

The study reveals many single individuals among public sector employees in Russia. The public sector employees in this country also tend to be highly concerned with individual wealth and less with caring for others, than in any other CEE country. These findings combined, suggest the high importance of family socialization and mutual learning of caregiving. Divorce rate should be included as a control variable for further studies of PSM, since through sharing a household with others a person seems to learn how to care for others. The evidence from Russia in this study supports the ideas that, in fact, the country has the highest divorce rate and the declared importance to help others is among the weakest in the region. The divorce rate is also very high among Ukrainians and Czechs. Thus their emphasis on the importance to help people around them is also correspondingly weak. Positive examples of family socialization are Slovakia and Slovenia, where employees tend to live together with their partners/spouses and with their extended family. In Slovenia, public sector employees emphasize helping others more strongly than anywhere else in CEE.

The level of urbanization is another variable that should be included in the models examining the relations between sectors and helping others. In the present study, this variable is very closely correlated to the size of the household. Dense European cities tend to be less able to accommodate extended families in one place, than countryside towns and villages. Thus, living on one's own or sharing a small household is typical for cities. This situation makes citizens stronger individualists. Indeed, the urbanized populations in Russia and the Czech Republic emphasize helping others less than respondents in other, more rural, CEE countries.

With the exception of Slovenia, and to a certain extent Bulgaria, CEE public sector employees consider helping others as less important when compared to other European countries. In the desire to take care of others, the public sector is very much different from the private sector in Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic. While in Poland and Slovakia they are willing to help more than employees from the private sector, Czechs from both sectors weakly emphasize helping others as important, with a significantly lower importance for the private sector.

The main limitation of the study is that European Social Survey items are used as proxies for PSM and, thus, the construct validity is highly debatable. However, this

detracts little from the main argument that intrinsic rewards are, indeed, more important for public employees in CEE countries than for private employees. Individuals employed in public administration and defense, compulsory social security, education and, health and social work score significantly higher on the question asking about the importance of helping others, than individuals employed in other more business-type industries. The employees in these public sector industries find wealth less important than their private counterparts, and score significantly lower on the question concerning the importance of being rich.

In summation, the findings suggest that citizens in CEE countries can trust their public sector employees to serve the best public interest, even at the cost of their own individual wealth. In these countries, individuals employed in public organizations are the best match for this sector. Even in places where public service motivation appears to be weaker, the public sector employees still remain the most caring and least voracious individuals in the country.

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Abstract: Public Service Motivation theory suggests motivational differences between employees in private and public organizations. The article tests these differences for Central and Eastern Europe and compares them to findings from other European countries. Data collected from 12,240 respondents is put through a regression model to check for causality between the two employment sectors, the importance of helping others and personal enrichment. The results support the general theory, but also reveal some peculiarities of the public sector in Central and Eastern Europe: strong female domination, the comparatively small importance of helping others and the increased significance of achieving financial success.

Key Words: extrinsic motives, intrinsic motives, public sector, private sector, altruism

